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World Peace Foundation

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS
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VOLUME I
1917-1918

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 MT. VERNON STREET, BOSTON

World Peace Foundation

Boston, Massachusetts

*FOUNDED IN 1910 BY EDWIN GINN



The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.—*By-laws of the Corporation.*

It is to this patient and thorough work of education, through the school, the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the World Peace Foundation addresses itself.—Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force cannot at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first, some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an *International Guard or Police Force.*—Edwin Ginn.

*Incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, July 12, 1910, as the International School of Peace. Name changed to World Peace Foundation, December 22, 1910.

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¹A separate armistice with Hungary was signed November 13, 1918.

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No. 8, DECEMBER, 1918

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By PAYSON JACKSON TREAT,
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COURT SUSTAINS BEQUEST

Decision of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to Mr. Ginn's Legacy to World Peace Foundation

BY SAMUEL J. ELDER

It would be worse than useless to attempt by way of analysis or exposition to add to the words of Chief Justice Rugg of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in rendering the opinion of the Court concerning the purposes of the World Peace Foundation. It is a cause of profound satisfaction that a great Court in a Christian Commonwealth has so clearly shown how fully our Constitution and the policy of our laws, instead of hampering, promote and safeguard the highest moral aims.

The case was that of Parkhurst *et al.*, Executors, *v.* Treasurer and Receiver General. A tax was imposed and paid upon the legacy given by Mr. Ginn for the benefit of the Foundation, based upon the contention that it was not in law a charity and was therefore not exempt from taxation.

The language of the Chief Justice in determining "that the excise has been illegally exacted" and was to be repaid is in part as follows:

"Mr. Ginn by his will devoted a large annual payment for the benefit of the World Peace Foundation, a corporation organized under the laws of this commonwealth. Its corporate purpose is declared in these words: 'The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war and of preparation for war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and generally by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.'

"The declaration of corporate purpose expresses one of the highest moral aspirations of the race. It adopts almost the very words of the angel song on the night of the Nativity. It reveals nothing on a

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close and technical analysis at all at variance with the lofty idealism of its general sentiments. In a large sense its object is to bring all mankind under fraternal, educational and humanitarian influences. The final establishment of universal peace among all the nations of the earth manifestly is an object of public charity. The comprehensive definition in *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen 539, at 554, is this: 'A charity, in the legal sense may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.' It was said, also, in *Molly Varum Chapter, D.A.R., v. Lowell*, 204 Mass. 487, at 493: 'Charitable institutions organized to administer trusts in aid of the general welfare, which are the outgrowth of the conditions of modern society,' may be found to be valid charities. The avowed objects of this corporation come within these accepted definitions.

"All the incorporators have devoted time, labor and service of great value to work of the corporation without material compensation or other reward than the hope of benefit to mankind. There is no pecuniary profit even remotely available to any of the members of the corporation. *Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Boston*, 142 Mass. 24. There is an express decision in *Tappan v. Dublois*, 45 Maine 122, to the effect that a bequest to promote peace is a charity. The World Peace Foundation in its statement of corporate purposes sets forth a strictly legal charity.

"But it is contended that the nature of the work being conducted by the World Peace Foundation and its main actual activities stamp it as an organization striving for objects 'opposed to the existing laws' and designed 'to bring about changes in the laws or political institutions of the country,' and that this can not be held to be a charitable purpose within the rule formulated in the great case of *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen 539, at 555. The principle on which reliance is placed is settled. A bequest aimed at a change in the existing laws and constitutions can not be sustained as a charity. The 'laws do not recognize the purpose of overthrowing or changing them, in whole or in part, as a charitable use.' 14 Allen, at 571. These

COURT SUSTAINS BEQUEST

words were used in applying that principle to a trust fund to be expended in aid of the passage of laws securing to women the right to vote and other political and business rights, and it was held that such a purpose was not charitable but rather political.

"The description of the work done by the corporation up to the beginning of the great war shows that it was all charitable in the accurate legal sense, and that it does not come within the inhibition of the principle just stated. It consisted chiefly in the publication of literature and the employment of speakers and writers of ability, widely respected for their character and attainments, to attempt to propagate an opinion among the peoples of the earth in favor of the settlement of international disputes through some form of international tribunal and to cultivate a belief in the waste of warlike preparation, and in the practical wisdom of reductions in the armaments of nations, and in the education of children as well as of adults in the knowledge of peace and the superior advantages of peaceful solutions of international difficulties. It is not necessary to narrate in further detail the kind of work carried on by this corporation. The instrumentalities adopted in brief tended in the direction of educating the world in the true principles of international order as a cure for the waste of preparation for war and the horrors of waging war. The methods followed to attain this end were legitimate and were in harmony with the ideal which was the goal.

"It can not justly be said that the purpose was political, or the means other than educational. Efforts were not directed immediately to the change of existing laws, constitutions or governments. The general diffusion of intelligence upon the subjects taught well might result ultimately in a modification of governmental policies. A different kind of government would be demanded by a highly educated than by a densely ignorant body politic. A nation made up of individuals, each of whom believes and practices love of God and love of man, would be likely to pursue a diplomacy dissimilar to that of a nation whose subjects, as individuals, were actuated by selfishness, pride and greed. The constitution of the commonwealth declares that a constant adherence to the principles of piety and justice are essential to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government and admonishes all legislatures and magistrates 'to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence.' A conscientious following of these precepts by all people would result in the most enlightened government and wise and

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just laws perhaps differing in substantial part from those now prevailing, yet gifts to promote these ends would not come under the prohibition of the rule against gifts to change existing laws.

“The aim of this corporation as manifested by the means it employed was to nourish a public sentiment and to develop a moral influence among all the people in favor of peace and against war. Ethical and religious sentiments, as well as social and economic motives, were or might properly be appealed to in order to attain this end.”

A second case, *Parkhurst et al., Executors, v. M. Francesca G. Ginn et al.*, was decided at the same time. This was a petition by the Executors of Mr. Ginn for instructions upon various questions concerning the administration of the estate; and the decision, while of importance, is not of general interest.

BOOKS ON A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(This list is supplementary to one published in No. 1 of A League of Nations, 51-53.)

- Bassett, John Spencer.** *The Lost Fruits of Waterloo.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. xx, 289 p. 19½ cm.
- Brailsford, Henry Noel.** "Foundations of Internationalism," *The English Review*, August, 1918, XXVII, 87-101.
Has subtitle "The League of Nations Prize Essay."
- Burns, Cecil Delisle.** *The World of States.* London, Headley Bros., 1917. [vii], 145 p. 19 cm.
- I diritti dei popoli.** Rivista trimestrale per l'organizzazione giuridica della società internazionale. Direttore, Guiseppe Cimbali.
Roma, Tipografia del senato, 1917- . Quarterly. 25½ cm.
Vol. 1, No. 1, is dated May, 1917.
- Draft Convention** for League of Nations by group of American jurists and publicists. Description and comment by Theodore Marburg. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. vi, 46 p. 17 cm.
- Dunlop, Hendrik.** *The Supreme Will, or the danger of a premature peace.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1916. [ii], 191 p. 20 cm.
- Frangulis, Antoine F.** "Une ligue des nations comme garantie d'une paix durable est-elle possible?" *Revue générale de droit international public*, XXIV, 437-451.
- Institutions judiciaires et de conciliation.** Rapport présenté par M. le Dr. B. C. J. Loder, . . . président de la commission internationale d'études No. v. La Haye, [Organisation centrale pour une paix durable], octobre 1917. 182 p. table. 22½ cm.
- Jacobs, A. J.** *Neutrality versus Justice.* An essay on international relations. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1917. 128 p. 18 cm.
- Lammasch, Heinrich.** *Das Völkerrecht nach dem Kriege.* Kristiania, H. Aschehoug & Co., 1917. [viii], 218 p. 26½ cm.
- League of Nations Society.** *Monthly Report for Members.* London, League of Nations Society, 1918- . Monthly. 21½ cm.
No. 1 is dated January, 1918.
- Marburg, Theodore.** *League of Nations.* A chapter in the history of the movement. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917. [vii], 139 p. 17½ cm.
- Marburg, Theodore.** *League of Nations.* Its principles examined. Volume II. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. [iii], 137 p. 17½ cm.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad. Internationale Sanktionen. Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1917. 47 p. 23½ cm. (Zentralorganization für einen dauernden Frieden . . . Internationaler Studien-Kongress. Bern, 1916.)

Otlet, Paul. Constitution mondiale de la société des nations. Le nouveau droit des gens. Paris, G. Crès & cie., 1917. 253 p. 19 cm.

A Reference Book for Speakers, . . . Part I, The Things against which we are Fighting; Part II, The World for which we are Fighting; Part III, Keeping the World Safe. New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1918. 64 p. 17½ cm.

Sacerdoti, Adolfo. Progetto americano di una Lega internazionale per il rafforzamento della pace. Firenze, Tipografia Domenicana, 1918. 12 p. 21½ cm.

Taylor, Charles Fremont. A Conclusive Peace, presenting the historically logical, and a feasible, plan of action for the coming peace conference, which will co-ordinate and harmonize Europe, and the world. Philadelphia, The John C. Winston Company, 1916. 173 p. 17½ cm.

War and Peace—The International Review. London, The Nation.

“War and Peace, which is published monthly, aims at contributing to the creation of a public opinion equipped for the major problem of the settlement and the succeeding peace. The proposal for a League of Nations will be discussed in all bearings each month by the most authoritative writers on the subject in Britain and America.”

Wells, Herbert George. In the Fourth Year. Anticipations of a world peace. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918. xi, 154 p. 20 cm.

Win the War for Permanent Peace. Addresses made at the national convention of the League to Enforce Peace, in the city of Philadelphia, May 16th and 17th, 1918. Convention platform and governors' declaration. New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1918. 253 p. 23 cm.

The World Court. A magazine of international progress supporting a union of democratic nations. New York, The World's Court League, 1915—Monthly. 24½ cm.

Vol. 1, No. 1, is dated August, 1915. This magazine began publication as the organ of the International Peace Forum and succeeded *The Peace Forum* (1912-1915).

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR

AMERICAN REPLY TO THE POPE'S PEACE PROPOSAL.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, August 27, 1917.

TO HIS HOLINESS, BENEDICTUS XV., POPE:

In acknowledgment of the communication of your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of his Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the *status quo ante bellum* and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament and a concert of nations, based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan states, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully

carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier, either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength, and a renewal of its policy would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or

powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world—the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world—to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty, both of those that are weak, and those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves, as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force; territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations, and the possibility of a covenanted peace.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State of the United States of America.

TAFT COMMENDS THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE POPE.¹

I strongly commend President Wilson's attitude toward the Pope's peace proposals, as shown in the extracts you have wired me. The present union of the democratic peoples of the world, in a titanic struggle to defeat German militarism, is Providential and affords an opportunity for the greatest step forward in Christian civilization taken in centuries.

This opportunity and the enormous sacrifices the Allies have made and are making to cut the cancer of militarism out of the body politic of the world must not be wasted by a patched-up compromise peace with the Hohenzollern Prussian military caste still in control of Germany's military and foreign policy. Such a peace would be a mere truce to be ended when the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg and Ludendorff think it wise. All the world must continue armaments after such a peace in mere self-defense, and the world's blood and treasure, spent as never before, will have achieved nothing.

Our goal is permanent peace, and that is impossible until by force of arms we have established international morality and the sacred character of every nation's obligations as a basis for international law.

By defeating their present rulers we shall show the Germans the futility of the false philosophy with which they have been poisoned by fifty years' teaching, and reveal to them the hideous futility of the sacrifices they have made to the Frankenstein of military autocracy. The survival of that monster will be fatal to the safety of democracy. It must be destroyed, because without real and lasting peace the peoples who embrace democracy cannot secure its great benefits.

The victory in the present war of the unprepared democracies of the world over a military power, developed to its highest efficiency by half a century's discipline and application of the most scientific principles, will make the German people see. When the scales thus fall from their eyes, and not till then, will the nations of the world be able to use their power jointly to secure world peace. Hence let there be no peace without victory of righteousness over wrong.

WILLIAM H. TAFT.

¹ By telegraph to the *New York Times* from Pointe au Pic, Quebec, August 29, 1917.

AMERICA'S WAR AND AMERICA'S
OPPORTUNITY.BY A. LAWRENCE LOWELL.¹

Every great catastrophe turns our thoughts to the realities that underlie human life. We are moved to ask ourselves what is superficial and what is eternally true. What our efforts and our principles signify. Whether we are like butterflies, getting what pleasure we can from sunlight and flowers, living a life of instinct, and dying when the least danger overtakes us; or, whether our lives should mean the building up of moral principles that shall make life nobler, better and happier, not chiefly for ourselves, but for those who shall come after us. As we look back over the long stretches of history we feel sure that the men who taught higher morals, enlarged the bounds of human sympathy, and did heroic deeds, have permanently enriched and ennobled human life. Where do such thoughts lead us in entering the present war?

We are witnessing the greatest catastrophe that has befallen Europe, certainly since the wandering hordes overran the Roman Empire and destroyed its civilization. After the fall of Rome social order had to be rebuilt from the foundations, ultimately on a higher plane, no doubt, but by a long and very painful process. For centuries we have been working slowly upward, with many obstacles from ignorance, from prejudice, from shortsightedness, from selfishness, individual and co-operative; but still with a striving toward a better justice, more mercy for the unfortunate and oppressed, keener sympathy with suffering, and a fuller respect for the right of every man, woman and child to be treated, not as a mere tool in the social workshop or a pawn in the great game of national ambition, but as an end in himself, whose happiness, whose material—and above all whose moral—welfare should be the aim of civilization. We are very far, as yet, from having achieved such a result, but this is the direction in which the best men have been striving to move. The question now is whether we shall continue to work for that principle or substitute for it the doctrine that the fruits of the earth belong to the strongest people, who may take them by any means within their power, however ruthless these may be.

¹ Address at the meeting of the National Safety Council, September 12, 1917.

The striving to make life more humane has not been confined to times of peace. In the case of war also an effort has for generations been made to mitigate, through the rules of international law, the injury and suffering inflicted; by protecting the rights of neutrals; by confining the operations to the armed forces of the antagonists, leaving noncombatants unmolested, forbidding looting and sparing property not directly needed for military purposes. Mercy has even been extended to soldiers,—by the provision of the Hague treaty, for example, which was signed by Germany,—forbidding the use of poisonous gases in war. In the present conflict the German armies have violated all these rules, not under stress of calamity, but deliberately. Those who believe that Providence or a moral power rules in the affairs of men may well point to the fact that if Germany had not, in violation of a solemn treaty, invaded Belgium, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to bring the English people to the point of taking part in the war, however eagerly any British statesman might have desired it; that if it had not been for atrocities in Belgium, and the dropping of bombs from the air on defenseless towns in England, recruiting there would have been far less rapid, and the British Empire would not have put forth so gigantic an effort; that had it not been for the sinking of merchant ships on the high seas and the drowning of their crews, the United States would not now be in arms against Germany.

The Allies believe that the German military autocracy planned this war with malice aforethought, to enlarge the territory, enhance the power and expand the commercial prosperity of their nation. The German people have been taught by their rulers that the war results from an attempt by England to drive Germany, which strove for peace, out of a place in the sun; although those rulers supposed that England was in no condition to fight, and were obviously disappointed when she took part with France. But no one imagines that the United States planned the war, or had any share in bringing it on. Wholly unprepared for hostilities abroad, and contrary to our long-established principle of keeping clear of conflicts in Europe, we have been drawn in by violation of the rights of our citizens, and by the spectacle of barbarous treatment of neutrals and noncombatants. No one suspects that we have any national ambitions to gratify, any lust of conquest to be fed; but we shall fight none the less vigorously from righteous indignation and for an ideal of civilization that we will not suffer the enemy to destroy.

No vast upheaval that lays bare the foundations of human society can pass away and leave things as they were before. Geological convulsions may destroy the soil formed by ages of silent growth and thickly falling leaves, replacing it by a barren waste; or they may heave upward veins of coal and ore or precious stones that, unsuspected, lay deep below the surface. This war cannot leave the world as it was before. The result must be either a worse world or a better one. If Germany should win, the principles of her government must triumph, the ruthless rule of force, exploiting the earth for the benefit of the strong, suppressing other peoples, and beating down small, weak or peaceful nations. If the result should be a drawn battle, a stale-mate, with Germany in her present state of mind, the whole world will probably become a series of armed camps, preparing for another fray, and compelled by the very conditions by which they are faced to adopt the methods of warfare Germany has introduced,—that is, the nation in arms using every resource at its command and striving to destroy by every means the resources of the people to which it is opposed. Can any one contemplate without horror a planet whose inhabitants devote their efforts to devising scientific processes for making it unfit for human habitation? Yet such is the result that we must at least contemplate if the present war should decide nothing, leaving the belligerents with their former ambitions and principles, with fiercer hatreds and a better knowledge of what the next war will signify.

If, on the other hand, the side on which we are fighting wins, it may mean a better world, re-organized on a basis of justice and peace; and much of the result may depend upon us, both in the field and at the council table.

Let us be perfectly clear in our own minds. We proclaim that we are fighting for democracy, but President Wilson has put it more accurately when he said that we are at war to make the world safe for democracy. We are not fighting to impose any form of government upon an unwilling people. That would be contrary to our principle of political liberty. If any people prefer to be ruled by a monarch it is their affair, *provided* they mind their own business, leave other nations alone and live peaceably with their neighbors. A military autocracy, that goes forth conquering and to conquer, the world must subdue, or it will have no peace; moreover, the oppression of one race by another must, so far as possible, be removed.

We are at war to prevent any nation from imposing an autocratic

military system on the world, or on any people; and when the Allies have succeeded in so doing, they, and any other peoples that sincerely desire a better and more peaceful world, must solemnly resolve that no such catastrophe shall occur again. For this purpose they must not split apart into discordant fragments or hostile groups, but must combine to police the world, and bring in a reign of international justice among men.

We often boast that we are both an idealistic and a practical people, and in the re-organization that will follow this war we have the only chance we shall probably ever have to show these qualities on a world-wide scale. We are now a world power engaged in a world war, and we cannot, by shrinking into ourselves when it is over, evade our duty or shut our eyes to our own future security. In league with the other free nations of the earth we must set up an international court of justice, and a sheriff armed with such force as may be needed to summon offenders before the tribunal. By so doing we can fulfil a great destiny for our nation and bring peace and good-will among men.

MILESTONES OF HALF A CENTURY

What Presidents and Congress have done to bring about a League of Nations

While the friends of peace and the advocates of international organization were trying to persuade the American people that it would be the duty of the country, after the war, to enter a League of Nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world, the President and Congress of the United States suddenly cut the discussion short by announcing that it was the duty of the nation to enter such a league during the war, and fight to realize these ideals. In the words of the Secretary of War—"Our Combined armies from now on will represent a League of Nations to enforce peace with justice."

The inexorable logic of events had moved faster even than the logic of the propagandists. They got more than they asked for sooner than they expected it. Not a few critics looked upon this enthusiasm for a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world as an abrupt change of national policy. It seems worth while, therefore, to follow the successive steps by which, during half a century, the President and Congress of the United States have steadily advanced toward the position they now hold.

GRANT AND THE *ALABAMA* SETTLEMENT, 1871.

The arbitration of the *Alabama* claims, resulting in an award of damages of \$15,500,000 to the United States and removing acute causes of unfriendliness between two great nations, one of which had just won a great war, created a tremendous impression throughout the world.

President Grant accurately reflected the thought of the time when he wrote in his third annual message of December 4, 1871:

The year has been an eventful one in witnessing two great nations, speaking one language and having one lineage, settling by peaceful arbitration disputes of long standing and liable at any time to bring those nations into bloody and costly conflict. An example has thus been set which, if successful in its final issue, may be followed by other civilized nations, and finally be the means of returning to productive industry millions of men now maintained to settle the disputes of nations by the bayonet and the broadside.¹

THE SUMNER RESOLUTIONS, 1872-1874.

The general enthusiasm for the newly demonstrated method of pacific settlement found expression in many popular memorials to Congress. These found a champion in Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. In May, 1872, he sought Congressional approval for the establishment of an international tribunal before which "any question or agreement which might be the occasion of war or of misunderstanding between nations could be considered"; a tribunal whose true character should be such "that its authority and completeness as a substitute for war may not be impaired, but strengthened and upheld, to the end that civilization may be advanced and war be limited in its sphere." The senator apparently contemplated a tribunal invested with sanctions. For two years this resolution was pending before Congress.

The Sumner resolution was introduced in the Senate May 31, 1872, and so aptly reflected the prevailing feeling among those then concerned with improving international relations that it is quoted in full:

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING ARBITRATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR IN DETERMINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONS.

Whereas, by international law and existing custom war is recognized as a form of trial for the determination of differences between nations; and

Whereas, for generations good men have protested against the irrational character of this arbitrament, where force instead of justice prevails, and have anxiously sought for a substitute in the nature of a judicial tribunal, all of which was expressed by Franklin in his exclamation: "when will mankind be convinced that all wars are follies, very expensive and very mischievous, and agree to settle their differences by arbitration?" and

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 4097.

Whereas, war once prevailed in the determination of differences between individuals, between cities, between counties, and between provinces, being recognized in all these cases as the arbiter of justice, but at last yielded to a judicial tribunal, and now, in the progress of civilization, the time has come for the extension of this humane principle to nations, so that their differences may be taken from the arbitrament of war, and, in conformity with these examples, submitted to a judicial tribunal; and

Whereas, arbitration has been formally recognized as a substitute for war in the determination of differences between nations, being especially recommended by the Congress of Paris, where were assembled the representatives of England, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and Turkey, and afterward adopted by the United States in formal treaty with Great Britain for the determination of differences arising from depredations of British cruisers, and also from opposing claims with regard to the San Juan boundary; and

Whereas, it becomes important to consider and settle the true character of this beneficent tribunal, thus commended and adopted, so that its authority and completeness as a substitute for war may not be impaired, but strengthened and upheld, to the end that civilization may be advanced and war be limited in its sphere: Therefore,

1. *Resolved*, That in the determination of international differences arbitration should become a substitute for war in reality as in name, and, therefore, co-extensive with war in jurisdiction, so that any question or grievance which might be the occasion of war or of misunderstanding between nations should be considered by this tribunal.

2. *Resolved*, That any withdrawal from a treaty recognizing arbitration, or any refusal to abide the judgment of the accepted tribunal, or any interposition of technicalities to limit the proceedings, is to this extent a disparagement of the tribunal as a substitute for war, and therefore hostile to civilization.

3. *Resolved*, That the United States having at heart the cause of peace everywhere, and hoping to help its permanent establishment between nations, hereby recommend the adoption of arbitration as a just and practical method for the determination of international differences, to be maintained sincerely and in good faith, so that war may cease to be regarded as a proper form of trial between nations.¹

The resolution was acted upon in 1874, when Sumner was no longer alive. On June 9, 1874, Senator Hamlin of Maine presented a report and resolution from the Committee on Foreign Relations, the resolution being considered and agreed to without debate on June 23. This report reads:²

¹ *Cong. Globe*, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Part V, 4106-7. The resolution was also introduced on December 1, 1873, without the second resolve, *Cong. Record*, Vol. 2, Part I, 3.

² *Sen. Rept.* No. 426, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Docs., Vol. 1587.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom were referred various petitions praying Congress to provide for the settlement of international difficulties by arbitration, and without a resort to war; and also a "resolution concerning international law for the determination of differences between nations," have given the same careful consideration and beg leave to submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That the United States, having at heart the cause of peace everywhere, and hoping to help its permanent establishment between nations, hereby recommend the adoption of arbitration as a just and practical method for the determination of international differences, to be maintained sincerely and in good faith, so that war may cease to be regarded as a proper form of trial between nations.

In the House of Representatives a similar consideration of the question had been going on. John B. Storm of Pennsylvania had introduced a resolution as early as January 22, 1872.¹ The House delayed action until after the Senate report was made. Then it acted with a rush. On June 17, 1874, Stewart L. Woodford of New York moved to suspend the rules and pass a concurrent resolution, and this was done, the following text being accepted without debate:

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and requested to negotiate with all civilized powers who may be willing to enter into such negotiation for the establishment of an international system whereby matters in dispute between different governments agreeing thereto may be adjusted by arbitration, and if possible without recourse to war.²

An hour later Godlove S. Orth of Indiana reported another resolution by unanimous consent from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and this was also adopted without debate. This declaration of principle reads:

Whereas, war is at all times destructive of the material interests of a people, demoralizing in its tendencies, and at variance with an enlightened public sentiment; and

Whereas, differences between nations should in the interests of humanity and fraternity be adjusted if possible by international arbitration: Therefore,

Resolved, That the people of the United States, being devoted to the policy of peace with all mankind, enjoining its blessings and hop-

¹ *Cong. Globe*, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Part I, 497.

² *Cong. Record*, Vol. 2, Part VI, 5114.

ing for its permanence and its universal adoption, hereby through their representatives in Congress recommend such arbitration as a rational substitute for war, and they further recommend to the treaty-making power of the Government to provide if practicable that hereafter in treaties made between the United States and foreign powers war shall not be declared by either of the contracting parties against the other until efforts shall have been made to adjust all alleged cause of difference by impartial arbitration.¹

No action seems to have resulted from either resolution. That the interest in arbitration aroused by the *Alabama* settlement was not confined to the United States is shown by the fact that similar resolutions were being adopted by European parliaments.²

¹ *Cong. Record*, Vol. 2, Part VI, 5124.

² On July 8, 1873, the British House of Commons adopted the following resolution, moved by Henry Richard, M.P. for Merthyr Tydvil:

"That an humble address be presented to her Majesty, praying that she will be graciously pleased to instruct her principal secretary of state for foreign affairs to enter into communication with foreign powers with a view to further improvement in international law and the establishment of a general and permanent system of international arbitration."

The resolution elicited the following reply on July 17:

"I have received your address praying that I will be graciously pleased to instruct my principal secretary of state for foreign affairs to enter into communication with foreign powers, with a view to further improvement in international law, and the establishment of a general and permanent system of international arbitration."

"I am sensible of the force of the philanthropic motives which have dictated your address."

"I have at all times sought to extend, both by advice and by example, as occasion might offer, the practice of closing controversies between nations by submission to the impartial judgment of friends, and to encourage the adoption of international rules intended for the equal benefit of all."

"I shall continue to pursue a similar course, with due regard to time and opportunity, when it shall seem likely to be attended with advantage."—(*Hansard's Parl. Deb.*, 3rd series, 217, 52-90, 500-501.)

On November 24, 1873, the Italian Chamber of Deputies unanimously adopted the following motion, introduced by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, recently minister of justice, the whole house rising in token of approval:

"The Chamber expresses the wish that His Majesty's Government will endeavor, in their relations with foreign powers, to render arbitration an acceptable and frequent mode of solving, according to the dictates of equity, such international questions as may admit of that mode of arrangement; that it propose, as occasion offers, to introduce into treaties a clause to the effect that any difference of opinion respecting the interpretation and execution of those treaties is to be referred to arbitrators; and that it persevere in its excellent initiative of many years' standing for the conclusion of conventions between Italy and other civilized nations of a nature to render uniform and obligatory, in the interest of the respective peoples, the essential rules of private international law."—(*Revue de droit international*, VI, 172-176.)

On March 21, 1874, the second chamber of the Swedish Diet, at Stockholm, adopted a resolution (71 ayes, 64 noes), moved by Jonas Jonassen:

"That an humble address be presented to the King, praying that his Majesty will, in the form and under the circumstances which he may think fit, use his best endeavors to procure the establishment of a court of arbitration, either permanent or composed for each special occasion, to settle disputes that may arise between nations."—(*Revue de droit international*, VII, 79.)

On November 27, 1874, the second chamber of the States General of the Netherlands adopted the following motion (35 ayes, 20 noes), introduced by M. Van Eck and M. Bredius:

"The Chamber expresses its desire that the government should negotiate with foreign powers, for the purpose of making arbitration the accepted means for the just settlement of all international differences between civilized nations respecting matters suitable for arbitration; and that until this object has been accomplished, this government will endeavor in all agreements to be entered upon with other states, to stipulate that all differences, capable of such solution, shall be submitted to arbitration."—(*Revue de droit international*, VII, 79-80; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1875, 987-988.)

On January 20, 1875, the Chamber of Deputies of Belgium adopted (81 ayes, 2 noes) the following resolution, introduced by M. Couvreur and M. Thonissen:

"This Chamber records its desire to witness an extension of the practice of arbitration among

HAYES INDORSES GRANT'S POLICY, 1877.

President Hayes in his inaugural address on March 5, 1877, which was a declaration of administration policy, gave the following assurance to his fellow citizens:

The policy inaugurated by my honored predecessor, President Grant, of submitting to arbitration grave questions in dispute between ourselves and foreign powers points to a new, and incomparably the best, instrumentality for the preservation of peace, and will, as I believe, become a beneficent example of the course to be pursued in similar emergencies by other nations.

If, unhappily, questions of difference should at any time during the period of my administration arise between the United States and any foreign government, it will certainly be my disposition and my hope to aid in their settlement in the same peaceful and honorable way, thus securing to our country the great blessings of peace and mutual good offices with all the nations of the world.¹

ARTHUR URGES CONGRESS TO ACT.

As early as 1881 the Department of State took up the problem of closer relations with Pan America. The result was a tentative invitation to a conference where all the American states might discuss their mutual problems and devise methods for insuring the maintenance of peaceful relations. The time was not entirely propitious for such a meeting, and it was found advisable to drop the matter for a while. In discussing the subject in his second annual message to Congress of December 4, 1882, President Arthur urged his own desire in these words:

I am unwilling to dismiss this subject without assuring you of my support of any measures the wisdom of Congress may devise for the promotion of peace on this continent and throughout the world, and I trust the time is nigh when, with the universal assent of civilized

civilized nations in all cases to which it may be applicable. It invites the government to aid, as opportunity may offer, in establishing rules of the procedure to be followed in the appointment and duties of international arbitrators. And it hopes that the government whenever it may deem it practicable to do so, when negotiating treaties, will endeavor to obtain the insertion of a clause providing that any differences which may arise, in respect of their execution, may be submitted to the decision of arbitrators.²

The same resolution was adopted on February 17, 1875, with absolute unanimity by the Senate of Belgium. On this occasion, the minister for foreign affairs, Count D'Aspremont-Lynden, stated that he did not hesitate for a single moment to declare that it was perfectly opportune for the Belgian Government to support such resolutions.—(*Revue de droit international*, VII, 80-87.)

¹Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 4397-4398.

peoples, all international differences shall be determined without resort to arms by the benignant processes of arbitration.¹

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND, 1883.

On April 1, 1883, Col. Emile Frey, Swiss minister to the United States and previously an officer in the American army during the Civil War, addressed a confidential inquiry to Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, regarding the possibility of concluding a general treaty of arbitration between the two countries. Mr. Frelinghuysen accepted the suggestion, and on July 24, 1883, a project of treaty was adopted by the Swiss Federal Council. This draft was the subject of negotiations, which, however, were not concluded. The substantive parts of this treaty, indicating the state of opinion only 34 years ago, are as follows:

1. The contracting parties agree to submit to an arbitral tribunal all difficulties which may arise between them during the existence of the present treaty, whatever may be the cause, the nature or the object of such difficulties.

5. The contracting parties bind themselves to observe and loyally to carry out the arbitral sentence.

CLEVELAND REPLIES TO BRITISH MEMORIAL, 1887.

The next American move in the direction of a permanent peace policy was inspired from England. William Randal Cremer, who a little later organized the Interparliamentary Union, had been much impressed by the publication of Andrew Carnegie's "Triumphant Democracy," in 1886. On June 16, 1887, Cremer arranged a meeting to consider the best means for obtaining a treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States. At that gathering, Mr. Carnegie asserted that "for years there had not been a political platform formulated by any party in the United States which did not contain the clause 'we are in favor of submitting to arbitration all questions of international dispute.'" With that encouragement, Cremer drew up a memorial from members of the British House of Commons to the President and Congress of the United States. This memorial, signed by 232 members of Parliament, was presented to President Cleveland by a Parliamentary deputation, which was given the

¹Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 4718.

privilege of the floor in both houses of Congress a few days later. The memorial reads:

The undersigned members of the British Parliament learn with the utmost satisfaction that various proposals have been introduced into Congress, urging the Government of the United States to take the necessary steps for concluding with the Government of Great Britain a treaty which shall stipulate that any differences or dispute arising between the two Governments, which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency, shall be referred to arbitration. Should such a proposal happily emanate from the Congress of the United States, our best influence shall be used to insure its acceptance by the Government of Great Britain. The conclusion of such a treaty would be a splendid example to those nations who are wasting their resources in war-provoking institutions, and might induce other governments to join the peaceful compact.

The President in his reply regretted that he had not given the subject practical attention, and continued:

I am reminded that in the administration of government, difficulty often arises in the attempt to carefully apply ideas which in themselves challenge unqualified approval. Thus it may be that the friends of international arbitration will not be able at once to secure the adoption, in its whole extent, of their humane and beneficent scheme. But surely great progress should be made by a sincere and hearty effort. I promise you a faithful and careful consideration of the matter; and I believe I may speak for the American people in giving the assurance that they wish to see the killing of men for the accomplishment of national ambition abolished, and that they will gladly hail the advent of peaceful methods in the settlement of national disputes, so far as this is consistent with the defense and protection of our country's territory, and with the maintenance of our national honor, when it affords a shelter and repose for national integrity, and personifies the safety and protection of our citizens.¹

RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS, 1890, AND RESPONSE OF BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1893.

The British memorialists also had an interview with Senator John S. Sherman, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, who introduced the following concurrent resolution that was passed by the Senate on June 14, 1888,² and finally by both the Senate and House in 1890:

¹ Howard Evans, *Sir Randal Cremer, His Life and Work*, 126-128.

² *Cong. Record*, Vol. 19, 5239.

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President be, and is hereby, requested to invite, from time to time as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any Government with which the United States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two Governments which can not be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means.¹

The British House of Commons replied to this American initiative in a resolution adopted on June 16, 1893. This British action was the result of considerable effort and popular interest as indicated by "petitions representing nearly 1,300,000 of our contrymen, heartily indorsing the proposal for a treaty of arbitration." The effort to get parliamentary action lasted intermittently for nearly a year and a half and resulted in this definite response to the American suggestion:

Resolved, That this House has learnt with satisfaction that both Houses of the United States Congress have, by resolution, requested the President to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States have or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration and peaceably adjusted by such means; and that this House, cordially sympathizing with the purpose in view, expresses the hope that her Majesty's Government will lend their ready co-operation to the Government of the United States, upon the basis of the foregoing resolutions.²

President Cleveland commended this British action to Congress in his message of that year,³ as requested by Great Britain,⁴ and, as a result, negotiations between the United States and Great Britain were begun for a permanent treaty of arbitration, resulting in a

¹ This particular resolution was introduced by Senator Sherman on December 9, 1889. It was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 15, 1890, and was considered and agreed to by the Senate February 14, 1890, and by the House of Representatives April 3, 1890. The text is reprinted from Misc. Doc. No. 113, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (*Cong. Docs.*, Vol. 2768).

² *Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, XIII, 1240-1273. The resolution was adopted on June 16 and not on July 16 as stated in Sir Julian Pauncefote's note covering it to the Department of State. The typographical error has been generally repeated in subsequent references to the British action. The British discussions of that period will be found in *Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, I, 88, 1813; III, 1664-1676, February 9, March 3 and April 29, 1892.

³ *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 5874.

⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1893, 346, 352.

document signed on January 11, 1897.¹ This treaty failed to pass the Senate.

PAN AMERICA FOLLOWS EXAMPLE OF UNITED STATES, 1890.

In his address to the British memorialists in 1887, President Cleveland had said that he was "sorry to be obliged to confess that the practical side of this question has received but little of my attention." The Government was destined within two years to give that attention to practical methods of solving international disputes which the President had stated was not yet accorded to the problem. James G. Blaine while secretary of state in 1881 had invited the governments of the American nations to participate in a congress to be held in Washington "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." Before this project was realized, Mr. Blaine was out of office, but he again became secretary of state in 1889 and immediately proceeded to carry out his former project. The International American Conference which assembled in that year was the first of the efforts to make Pan America a solid unit for peaceful development. The conference drew up a complete plan for the arbitration of disputes, consisting of an arbitration treaty, a recommendation to European powers expressing the wish that controversies between American republics and European states might be settled by this method, and, in the third place, a resolution that, for the first time in diplomatic history, attacked the right of conquest. This resolution is an interesting precedent, and reads as follows:

Whereas, there is, in America, no territory which can be deemed *res nullius*; and

Whereas, in view of this, a war of conquest of one American nation against another would constitute a clearly unjustifiable act of violence and spoliation; and

Whereas, the possibility of aggressions upon national territory would inevitably involve a recourse to the ruinous system of war armaments in time of peace; and

Whereas, the Conference feels that it would fall short of the most exalted conception of its mission were it to abstain from embodying

¹Negotiations for the treaty began in 1896. On July 8, 1895, the French Chamber of Deputies passed this resolution:

"The Chamber invites the Government to negotiate, as soon as possible, a permanent treaty of arbitration between the French Republic and the Republic of the United States of America."—(*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1895, 427; cf. *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 6060.)

its pacific and fraternal sentiments in declarations tending to promote national stability and guarantee just international relations among the nations of the continent; Be it therefore

Resolved by the International American Conference, That it earnestly recommends to the Governments therein represented the adoption of the following declarations:

First. That the principle of conquest shall not, during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized as admissible under American public law.

Second. That all cessions of territory made during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration shall be void if made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed force.

Third. Any nation from which such cessions shall be exacted may demand that the validity of the cessions so made shall be submitted to arbitration.

Fourth. Any renunciation of the right to arbitration, made under the conditions named in the second section, shall be null and void.¹

No action resulted from this recommendation so far as a multipartite treaty was concerned. But the recommendations had their effect in the conduct of foreign relations, and their influence on the Brazilian constitution of February 24, 1891, appears in this article:

Art. 34. The National Congress shall have exclusive power:

II. To authorize the Government to declare war, when arbitration has failed or cannot take place, and to make peace.

HARRISON'S HOPEFUL ATTITUDE.

President Harrison in his message of December 3, 1889, had said concerning the Pan American conference:

It is a matter of high significance and no less of congratulation that the first year of the second century of our constitutional existence finds as honored guests within our borders the representatives of all the independent states of North and South America met together in earnest conference touching the best methods of perpetuating and expanding the relations of mutual interest and friendliness existing among them. . . . But while the commercial results which it is hoped will follow this conference are worthy of pursuit and of the great interests they have excited, it is believed that the crowning benefit will be found in the better securities which may be devised for the

¹ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 224, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 6.

maintenance of peace among all American nations and the settlement of all contentions by methods that a Christian civilization can approve.¹

The plan of arbitration adopted by the conference justified the President's expectation, for it has ever since been considered a model. It drew from President Harrison, in his letter of transmittal to the Senate, the remark that ratification of the treaties proposed would "constitute one of the happiest and most hopeful incidents in the history of the Western hemisphere." The provisions which elicited this commendation are:

Art. I. The republics of North, Central and South America hereby adopt arbitration as a principle of American international law for the settlement of the differences, disputes or controversies that may arise between two or more of them.

Art. II. Arbitration shall be obligatory in all controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, territories, indemnities, the right of navigation, and the validity, construction and enforcement of treaties.

Art. III. Arbitration shall be equally obligatory in all cases other than those mentioned in the foregoing article, whatever may be their origin, nature or object, with the single exception mentioned in the next following article.

Art. IV. The sole questions excepted from the provisions of the preceding articles are those which, in the judgment of any one of the nations involved in the controversy, may imperil its independence. In which case, for such nation, arbitration shall be optional; but it shall be obligatory upon the adversary power.

Art. V. All controversies or differences, whether pending or hereafter arising, shall be submitted to arbitration, even though they may have originated in occurrences antedating the present treaty.²

CLEVELAND'S ADVANCE IN HIS SECOND ADMINISTRATION.

In view of President Cleveland's frank confession to the British memorialists in 1887 during his first administration, that he had given little attention to the practical side of arbitration, it is peculiarly interesting to observe that his experience in negotiating the treaty of arbitration of January 11, 1897, with Great Britain had converted him into an ardent champion of the principle. In his letter transmitting the text of that treaty to the Senate, he wrote:

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 5467-5468.

² Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 224, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3.

The provisions of the treaty are the result of long and patient deliberation and represent concessions made by each party for the sake of agreement upon the general scheme.

Though the result reached may not meet the views of the advocates of immediate, unlimited and irrevocable arbitration of all international controversies, it is nevertheless confidently believed that the treaty can not fail to be everywhere recognized as making a long step in the right direction and as embodying a practical working plan by which disputes between the two countries will reach a peaceful adjustment as matter of course and in ordinary routine.

In the initiation of such an important movement it must be expected that some of its features will assume a tentative character looking to a further advance, and yet it is apparent that the treaty which has been formulated not only makes war between the parties to it a remote possibility, but precludes those fears and rumors of war which of themselves too often assume the proportions of national disaster.

It is eminently fitting as well as fortunate that the attempt to accomplish results so beneficent should be initiated by kindred peoples, speaking the same tongue and joined together by all the ties of common traditions and common aspirations. The experiment of substituting civilized methods for brute force as the means of settling international questions of right will thus be tried under the happiest auspices. Its success ought not to be doubtful, and the fact that its ultimate ensuing benefits are not likely to be limited to the two countries immediately concerned should cause it to be promoted all the more eagerly. The examples set and the lessons furnished by the successful operation of this treaty are sure to be felt and taken to heart sooner or later by other nations, and will thus mark the beginning of a new epoch in civilization.

Profoundly impressed as I am, therefore, by the promise of transcendent good which this treaty affords, I do not hesitate to accompany its transmission with an expression of my earnest hope that it may commend itself to the favorable consideration of the Senate.¹

VIEWS OF PRESIDENT McKINLEY, 1897.

Eleven years before he became President, William McKinley had introduced into the House of Representatives a bill authorizing the President to invite delegates of the other American Republics to a conference to "revise, formulate and recommend a precise and definite plan of arbitration for all differences" among them. In his inaugural address on, March 4, 1897, President McKinley reverted to the

¹Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 6178-6179.

subject again in connection with the treaty with Great Britain which his administration was expected to make effective. In view of the fact that the fate of this treaty illustrates the sinister part which the United States Senate has played in defeating at least three of the most hopeful attempts at international organization, the President's remarks on this occasion are particularly noteworthy:

Arbitration is the true method of settlement of international as well as local or individual differences. It was recognized as the best means of adjustment of differences between employers and employees by the Forty-ninth Congress in 1886, and its application was extended to our diplomatic relations by the unanimous concurrence of the Senate and House of the Fifty-first Congress in 1890. The latter resolution was accepted as the basis of negotiations with us by the British House of Commons in 1893, and upon our invitation a treaty of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain was signed at Washington and transmitted to the Senate for ratification in January last.

Since this treaty is clearly the result of our own initiative, since it has been recognized as the leading feature of our foreign policy throughout our entire national history—the adjustment of difficulties by judicial methods rather than force of arms—and since it presents to the world the glorious example of reason and peace, not passion and war, controlling the relations between two of the greatest nations of the world, an example certain to be followed by others, I respectfully urge the early action of the Senate thereon, not merely as a matter of policy, but as a duty to mankind. The importance and moral influence of the ratification of such a treaty can hardly be overestimated in the cause of advancing civilization. It may well engage the best thought of the statesmen and people of every country, and I cannot but consider it fortunate that it was reserved to the United States to have the leadership in so grand a work.¹

The treaty which the President discussed so hopefully did not receive the approval of the Senate, and therefore could not be ratified by the executive. This was a disappointment to President McKinley, for in his first annual message, dated December 6, 1897, he said:

International arbitration cannot be omitted from the list of subjects claiming our consideration. Events have only served to strengthen the general views on this question expressed in my inaugural address. The best sentiment of the civilized world is moving toward the settlement of differences between nations

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 6242.

without resorting to the horrors of war. Treaties embodying these humane principles on broad lines, without in any way imperiling our interests or our honor, shall have my constant encouragement.¹

THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899.

In 1898, the Emperor of Russia invited the powers to what became known as the First Peace Conference at The Hague. In 1896, David Jayne Hill, assistant secretary of state, had delivered an address entitled "International Justice; with a Plan for its Permanent Organization" before the American Social Science Association. In that paper, which was republished in pamphlet form, the American diplomat reviewed the historic efforts to organize an international judicial system, criticised them, and offered certain suggestions of his own. Sir Julian Pauncefote, British ambassador to the United States, had also been much impressed with the possibilities of arbitration as a result of the negotiations for a treaty with the United States just before the publication of the Czar's manifesto. What followed is best told in Mr. Hill's own words:

"One day (November, 1898) the door of my office opened, and the genial face of John Hay appeared. He walked into my room saying, 'I have brought you a visitor'; and Lord Pauncefote, following, as the door was swung open, entered the room. Mr. Hay said, 'Lord Pauncefote has brought to the department a little pamphlet about international justice. He has come to talk with regard to the answer to be given to the Czar's rescript calling the Conference at The Hague. I think you have thought a little about that subject, and I believe you have written something upon it. Won't you sit down with Lord Pauncefote and discuss it?' And so that venerable diplomat and jurist sat down with me and for half an hour we discussed this subject. 'It is quite impossible,' he said very calmly, 'that anything should be done at that conference in the direction of disarmament or of arresting armament; but isn't it possible that there should be a movement in the direction of a court of arbitration?'"²

Mr. Hill wrote the instructions of the Department of State to the delegates to the Peace Conference, and he annexed thereto his plan

¹*Ibid.*, 6267.

²*Fourth National Conference, American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes*, pp. 383-384.

for an international tribunal. At the conference, work began in the third Commission on the basis of projects presented by Russia, and written by the great publicist Feodor Martens. This project aimed only to create machinery for the use of such international commissions as might be established independently by the powers. After this project was read, Sir Julian Pauncefote as the first British delegate arose and spoke "in the sort of plain, dogged way of a man who does not purpose to lose what he came for." "It seems to me," he said, "that new codes and regulations for arbitration, whatever their merit, do not much advance the great cause which brings us together. If we desire to take a step in advance, I am of the opinion that it is absolutely necessary to organize a permanent international tribunal which may be convened on a moment's notice at the request of the contesting nations." Sir Julian began drafting a project as soon as he had finished speaking, and telegraphed it for approval to the British minister for foreign affairs. This British plan and the American project, together with a plan presented by Russia, became the foundation of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. Here for the first time definite methods of pacific settlement of international disputes became a recognized part of international procedure.

ROOSEVELT.—AMERICA SUBMITS THE FIRST CASE, 1901.

Theodore Roosevelt succeeded to the Presidency of the United States on September 14, 1901, six months after the Hague Court of Arbitration had been declared open for business. One of the first foreign visitors whom he entertained at the White House was a French senator, who was one of the most active members of the Interparliamentary Union, which has so influentially affected the attitude of parliaments in favor of the pacific settlement of international disputes. It was feared that Continental chancelleries would permit the established Court to die of inanition. This idea was presented to President Roosevelt. The American Executive, suspecting that the American Department of State, like all other chancelleries, had plenty of unsolved problems capable of arbitral solution, inquired of the secretary of state whether he did not have a pending dispute that was suitable to start the work of the new international institution. Secretary Hay did have such a problem, one of long standing, due to the fact that the southwestern part of the

United States had once been under the Mexican flag, and that the Mexican clerical authorities had possessed much property in that territory. As a consequence, the Pious Funds case between the United States and Mexico was submitted at The Hague and duly decided.¹

SUPPORT FOR PAN AMERICAN PROGRESS 1901.

President Roosevelt gave instructions on October 8, 1901, to the delegates to the Second Pan American Conference that they should support arbitration during its sessions in Mexico City. He used these words:

The Government of the United States is favorable to the pacific settlement of international disputes and will be gratified to see provision for such settlement promoted and applied wherever practicable. In the discussion of this subject and in the formation of any convention that may be proposed relating to it, the commission will be guided by the following general principles: (1) All arbitration should be voluntary; (2) the choice of judges should be left to mutual agreement; (3) the locality in which a tribunal of arbitration is to act, in case one should be instituted, should not be definitely prescribed in a general convention.²

Organization for peace played a considerable part in that conference. Among its results were the adhesion of 19 American republics to the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; a convention for the arbitration of pecuniary claims; and a draft plan for compulsory arbitration.

¹ Mr. Roosevelt tells the story in his *Chapters of a Possible Autobiography*:

"It was under my administration that the Hague Court was prevented from becoming an empty farce. It had been established by joint international agreement, but no power had been willing to resort to it. Those establishing it had grown to realize that it was in danger of becoming a mere paper court, so that it would never really come into being at all. M. d'Estournelles de Constant had been especially alive to this danger. By correspondence and in personal interviews he impressed upon me the need not only of making advances by actually applying arbitration—not merely promising by treaty to apply it—to questions that were up for settlement, but of using the Hague Tribunal for this purpose. I cordially sympathized with these views. On the recommendation of John Hay, I succeeded in getting an agreement with Mexico to lay a matter in dispute between the two republics before the Hague Court. This was the first case ever brought before the Hague Court. It was followed by numerous others; and it definitely established that Court as the great international peace tribunal."

² Sen. Doc. No. 330, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 34.

SERIES OF ARBITRATION TREATIES NEGOTIATED, 1904.

Shortly after the First Hague Conference, Sir Thomas Barclay, then a commoner practicing law in Paris, began a campaign for the betterment of relations between Great Britain and France. On March 27, 1901, he proposed in an address before the French Arbitration Society that the two neighboring countries should have an arbitration treaty. Barclay organized and conducted an active propaganda for this proposition, which was crowned with success by a treaty signed on October 14, 1903. When the treaty was concluded Barclay was in the United States, whither he had come to interest the American authorities in it.¹ The visit was effective. He saw several prominent men, including Secretary of State Hay, and as a result a Second American Conference on International Arbitration was held in Washington on January 12, 1904. It was largely due to the public interest thus created that Secretary Hay issued on October 20, 1904, an invitation to the governments signatory to the Hague convention to enter into arbitration treaties with the United States. In this circular the secretary instructed American diplomats:

The President, in his last message to the Congress of the United States, on December 7, 1903, stated:

"There seems good ground for the belief that there has been a real growth among the civilized nations of a sentiment which will permit a gradual substitution of other methods than the method of war in the settlement of disputes. It is not pretended that as yet we are near a position in which it will be possible wholly to prevent war, or that a just regard for national interest and honor will in all cases permit of the settlement of international disputes by arbitration; but by a mixture of prudence and firmness with wisdom we think it is possible to do away with much of the provocation and excuse for war, and at least in many cases to substitute some other and more rational method for the settlement of disputes. The Hague Court offers so good an example of what can be done in the direction of such settlement that it should be encouraged in every way."

Moved by these views, the President has charged me to instruct you to ascertain whether the Government to which you are accredited, which he has reason to believe is equally desirous of advancing the principle of international arbitration, is willing to conclude with the Government of the United States an arbitration treaty of like tenor

¹Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years. Anglo-French Reminiscences* (1876-1906), pp. 194-241.

to the arrangement concluded between France and Great Britain, on October 14, 1903.

I enclose herewith a copy of both the English and French texts of that arrangement. Should the response to your inquiry be favorable, you will request the government to authorize its minister at Washington to sign the treaty with such plenipotentiary on the part of the United States as the President may be pleased to empower for the purpose.¹

As a result of this invitation a series of treaties was negotiated. They failed because of the chronic attitude of the Senate in regard to its participation in the special agreement of submission. Secretary Root modified the treaties to meet the scruples of the Senate and secured the assent of the other governments to the change. As altered, 25 of these treaties were negotiated in 1908 and 1909, becoming effective with this provision respecting the scope of arbitration:

Differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two contracting parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of the 29th of July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence or the honor of the two contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third parties.²

INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE—ROOSEVELT, 1904.

The settlement of the Pious Funds case was not only a triumph for the Hague Court, but it also had the effect of causing the President to study the problem of peace. He developed his ideas with typical vigor in his message to Congress, dated December 6, 1904, in which for the first time in recent years the head of a state frankly faced the question of co-ordinating international justice with international force. In this message, the President said:

It is our duty to remember that a nation has no more right to do injustice to another nation, strong or weak, than an individual has

¹*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1904, 8-9.

²*Treaties, Conventions*, etc., 1776-1909, 59. The treaties are effective, after renewal, with the following: Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. The Imperial German government declined to sign the treaty.

to do injustice to another individual; that the same moral law applies in one case as in the other. But we must also remember that it is as much the duty of the nation to guard its own rights and its own interests as it is the duty of the individual so to do. Within the nation the individual has now delegated this right to the state, that is, to the representative of all the individuals, and it is a maxim of the law that for every wrong there is a remedy. But in international law we have not advanced by any means as far as we have advanced in municipal law. There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law. When one nation wrongs another or wrongs many others, there is no tribunal before which the wrongdoer can be brought. Either it is necessary supinely to acquiesce in the wrong, and thus put a premium upon brutality and aggression, or else it is necessary for the aggrieved nation valiantly to stand up for its rights. Until some method is devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, for those with most sense of international obligations and with keenest and most generous appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, to disarm. If the great civilized nations of the present day should completely disarm, the result would mean an immediate recrudescence of barbarism in one form or another. Under any circumstances a sufficient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international police; and until international cohesion and the sense of international duties and rights are far more advanced than at present, a nation desirous both of securing respect for itself and of doing good to others must have a force adequate for the work which it feels is allotted to it as its part of the general world duty. Therefore it follows that a self-respecting, just and far-seeing nation should on the one hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development of the various movements which tend to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations in their actions toward one another, and indeed toward their own peoples, more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding wrongdoing itself, to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the head of the exercise of the international police. A great free people owes it to itself and to all mankind not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil.¹

¹ Fourth Annual Message, December 6, 1904, Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 7052-7053.

PRESIDENT A NOBEL PEACE LAUREATE, 1906.

This portion of the President's message created much discussion at the time, and was generally condemned by the leaders of the peace movement of that period, who tended to center their efforts upon securing a reduction of armaments.

The following summer the President became the leading figure in the movement for international peace by virtue of the important part which he played in bringing about the Treaty of Portsmouth, which closed the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The Committee of the Norwegian Storting which controls the Nobel peace prize awarded that prize to the President of the United States the following year.

When Mr. Roosevelt stepped down from the presidency on March 4, 1909, and shortly sailed for Africa on a hunting trip, he had acquired a unique distinction which gave his sayings and doings peculiar interest both in the Old World and in the New. On his return from Africa, he made many addresses in Europe, one of which was his address at Kristiania, Norway, as Nobel peace prize laureate. In that speech, he offered a definite scheme for a league of peace, which attracted much attention and sank deep into the minds of European publicists. Mr. Roosevelt at Kristiania said:

Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others. The supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace work of The Hague arises from the lack of any executive power, of any police power to enforce the decrees of the court. In any community of any size the authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force; on the existence of a police, or on the knowledge that the able-bodied men of the country are both ready and willing to see that the decrees of judicial and legislative bodies are put into effect. In new and wild communities where there is violence, an honest man must protect himself; and until other means of securing his safety are devised, it is both foolish and wicked to persuade him to surrender his arms while the men who are dangerous to the community retain theirs. He should not renounce the right to protect himself by his own efforts until the community is so organized that it can effectively relieve the individual of the duty of putting down violence. So it is with nations. Each nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the

establishment of some form of international police power, competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations. As things are now, such power to command peace throughout the world could best be assured by some combination between those great nations which sincerely desire peace and have no thought themselves of committing aggressions. The combination might at first be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind.¹

THE NEXT STEP—A COURT OF PERMANENT JUDGES, 1907.

The Hague court began operation in 1901, and since that time has had on its docket 17 cases, of which 15 have been decided. Its operation previous to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 demonstrated that while it was sound in principle and timely in appearance, it was inadequate because it was not what it purported to be, a "permanent court of arbitration." For the court established at The Hague was merely a panel of judges from which arbitrators might conveniently be chosen by litigant nations. The next logical step in advance was taken by the United States. Secretary of State Root saw the cogency of the arguments for a court consisting of permanent judges, and in his instructions to the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference he discussed the problem involved and gave this positive direction:

It should be your effort to bring about in the Second Conference a development of The Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility.²

The American delegates loyally carried out the desire of their Government. Before the conference was over, they had enlisted the co-operation of Great Britain and Germany for their plan, which was complete, except for a method of successfully apportioning 15 judges among 44 states. But the American delegates succeeded in having the principle indorsed in the Final Act of the conference, to which

¹ *African and European Addresses*, 81-83. The address was entitled "International Peace" and was delivered at Kristiania, May 5, 1910.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, 1135. The instructions are dated May 31, 1907.

was appended the entire project, minus details respecting the composition of the court. Though the conventions signed by the conference required ratification by the powers to become binding, the Final Act did not; so that, while the project failed of immediate realization, the wish expressed in the Final Act committed 44 states of the civilized world to the advisability of such a court in these words:

The conference calls the attention of the signatory powers to the advisability of adopting the annexed draft convention for the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice, and of bringing it into force as soon as an agreement has been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the court.¹

The American Government continued to work for a Court of Arbitral Justice, being thus assured that the plan must come before a third Hague conference, and it is more than probable that, if the European war had not broken out in 1914, such a court would now be in existence.

TAFT.—A STEP TOWARD WORLD ORGANIZATION, 1910.

With the idea of a league of peace backed by regulated force already prominently launched by a former President of the United States, there was formed in New York at almost the time when Mr. Roosevelt was speaking at Kristiania an organization called the World Federation League. This organization proved to be short-lived; but it was instrumental in having Congress consider and pass a joint resolution providing for a commission to study the preservation of peace and the establishment of a combined force for its maintenance. This resolution, which was approved by President Taft on June 25, 1910, is of peculiar significance because it is believed to be the first attempt on the part of any legislature to initiate an organization of the nations of the world, with or without the element of force. The joint resolution as passed reads:

[No. 43.] JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION
IN RELATION TO UNIVERSAL PEACE.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States to

¹ Scott, *Texts of the Peace Conference at The Hague 1899 and 1907*, 138-139.

consider the expediency of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement, and of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of government for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war: Provided, That the total expense authorized by this Joint Resolution shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars and that the said commission shall be required to make final report within two years from the date of the passage of this resolution.

Approved, June 25, 1910.¹

The idea was in advance of its time, even though it correctly expressed the aspirations of the American Congress and the American people. When the Government inquired of other states as to their attitude on the matter and the Department of State examined the world situation with a view to realizing the purpose intended, it was found that action was not possible. There is only one official statement respecting the matter in American public records, but that is clear and accurately reflects the situation at the time. President Taft in his annual message of December 6, 1910, wrote:

I have not as yet made appointments to this commission because I have invited and am awaiting the expression of foreign governments as to their willingness to co-operate with us in the appointment of similar commissions or representatives who would meet with our commissioners and by joint action seek to make their work effective.²

Foreign governments evidently discouraged the American initiative.

RADICAL EXTENSION OF ARBITRATION PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT.

Two weeks lacking a day after the publication of this message, President Taft proved how thoroughly he had the cause of pacific settlement at heart by consenting to address the annual meeting of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes at its annual banquet. Not only did he lend to the ideal for which the society stood the prestige of his position, but he thrilled his hearers, and the world next day through the newspapers, by suggesting, responsibly, for the first time on behalf of a great power, that the arbitral settlement of every issue between states, whether

¹ *Statutes at Large*, 36, Part I, 885.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1910, ix.

or not involving honor or vital interest, might be attempted. In his address, he made an assertion which was immediately taken up as indicating a new American policy. His words were:

If now we can negotiate and put through a positive agreement with some great nation to abide the adjudication of an international arbitral court in every issue which can not be settled by negotiation, no matter what it involves, whether honor, territory, or money, we shall have made a long step forward by demonstrating that it is possible for two nations at least to establish as between them the same system of due process of law that exists between individuals under a government.

It seems to be the view of many that it is inconsistent for those of us who advocate any kind of preparation for war or any maintenance of armed force or fortification to raise our voices for peaceful means of settling international controversies. But I think this view is quite unjust and is not practical. We only recognize existing conditions and know that we have not reached a point where war is impossible or out of the question, and do not believe that the point has been reached in which all nations are so constituted that they may not at times violate their national obligations.¹

President Taft showed without delay that he was in earnest. The administration announced the intention of negotiating treaties involving the solution of every issue by peaceful methods with two of the great powers. American relations with France had proceeded without a ripple of distrust or serious difference for a century, and there was a mutual admiration between the two republics that made France a natural party to such an agreement. America's relations with the other great English-speaking state, Great Britain, had varied; but the year in which the President spoke had seen the settlement of the last continued and serious difference between the two countries, when the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration had rendered its decision in the North Atlantic Fisheries controversy. Cordial relations, similarity in institutions, a common language, and like ideals all pointed to Great Britain as another participant in the projected step forward. Great Britain and France were approached and were found to be responsive.

The problem remained to find a formula capable at the same time of realizing what the President had in mind, and of safeguarding the

¹ *Proceedings of International Conference* under the auspices of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Washington, D.C., December 15-17, 1910, 353.

rights of the contracting states. In addressing the Third National Peace Congress at its opening session in Baltimore on May 3, 1911, he hinted at the difficulties confronting the administration:

Your chairman has been good enough to refer to something that I had said with reference to a hope for general arbitration, and the expression of opinion that an arbitration treaty of the widest scope between two great nations would be a very important step in securing the peace of the world. I do not claim any patent on that statement, and I have no doubt that it is shared by all who understand the situation at all. I have no doubt that an important step—if such an arbitration treaty can be concluded—will have been taken, but it will not bring an end of war at once. It is a step, and we must not defeat our purposes by enlarging the expectation of the world as to what is to happen and then disappointing them. In other words, we must look forward with reasonable judgment, and look to such an arbitration treaty as one step, to be followed by other steps as rapidly as possible; but we must realize that we are dealing with a world that is fallible and full of weakness—with some wickedness in it—and that reforms that are worth having are brought about little by little and not by one blow. I do not mean to say by this I am not greatly interested in bringing about the arbitration treaty or treaties that are mentioned, but I do think that we are likely to make more progress if we look forward with reasonable foresight and realize the difficulties that are to be overcome, than if we think we have opened the gate to eternal peace with one key and within one year.¹

The actual work of negotiation was intrusted to Chandler P. Anderson, counselor of the Department of State. His work was much facilitated by the sympathy for the project evinced by Ambassadors James Bryce of Great Britain and Jules Jusserand of France. Treaties were signed on August 3, 1911, embodying an idea which had first been developed by William Jennings Bryan at the London Conference of the Interparliamentary Union on July 24, 1906. The formula adopted distinguished for the first time in a formal manner between justiciable disputes, to be settled by legal methods, and nonjusticiable disputes, to be resolved by a process of extra-legal and extra-diplomatic investigation. For six months following the publication of these treaties, they were one of the principal subjects of public comment. With tenacious insistence upon its alleged prerogatives, the Senate failed to advise and consent to the ratification

¹ *Proceedings of Third National Peace Conference*, Baltimore, May 3, 1911, 14-15.

of these treaties, taking the attitude it had previously assumed in the case of the Anglo-American treaty of 1897 and the 1904 series of treaties. After some amendments, based on provincial prejudices which legal experts from that time forward have pronounced to be invalid, the Senate gave the requisite consent.¹ The President did not proceed to the ratification of the treaties, because the extraneous amendments destroyed their full usefulness as world-models. As negotiated the treaties provided:

ART. I. All differences hereafter arising between the High Contracting Parties, which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, relating to international matters in which the High Contracting Parties are concerned by virtue of a claim of right made by one against the other under treaty or otherwise, and which are justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the Convention of October 18, 1907, or to some other arbitral tribunal, as shall be decided in each case by special agreement. . . .

ART. II. The High Contracting Parties further agree to institute as occasion arises, and as hereinafter provided, a Joint High Commission of Inquiry to which, upon the request of either Party, shall be referred for impartial and conscientious investigation any controversy between the Parties within the scope of Art. I, before such controversy has been submitted to arbitration, and also any other controversy hereafter arising between them even if they are not agreed that it falls within the scope of Art. I; provided, however, that such reference may be postponed until the expiration of one year after the date of the formal request therefor, in order to afford an opportunity for diplomatic discussion and adjustment of the questions in controversy, if either Party desires such postponement. . . .

ART. III. . . . It is further agreed, however, that in cases in which

¹President Taft strongly opposed the Senate's attitude at the time, and as an ex-President has many times rebutted its arguments. In his book, *The United States and Peace*, published in 1914, he wrote (pages 112, 115-116):

"As in the consideration of the Hay treaties, so here it was argued that the President and the Senate would unlawfully delegate their treaty-making power if they agreed that a tribunal should finally adjudge that a specific difference, subsequently arising, was in the class of differences covered by the treaty. It is very difficult to argue this question because the answer to it is so plain and obvious. . . .

"Nevertheless, the Senate struck out the provisions for a decision by the Joint High Commission. I considered this proposition the most important feature of the treaty, and I did so because I felt that we had reached a time in the making of promissory treaties of arbitration when they should mean something. The Senate halted just at the point where a possible and real obligation might be created. I do not wish to minimize the importance of general expressions of good-will and general declarations of willingness to settle everything without war, but the long list of treaties that mean but little can now hardly be made longer, for they include substantially all the countries of the world. The next step is to include something that really binds somebody in a treaty for future arbitration."

the Parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under Art. I of this Treaty, that question shall be submitted to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the Commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Art. I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.¹

The incident in American national history, however, is not to be counted a failure. It broadened interest in the cause of world organization, and it convinced many in and out of public life that sound advances toward a practical plan for insuring peace were possible. Moreover, it had the effect of bringing the once remote problems of international peace into the sphere of practical politics.

THE LARGER GOAL, A LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1911.

President Taft, however, was looking beyond the treaties he attempted to establish as a world model. He made this clear in his public speeches. One of the notable occasions on which he expressed his views was the Citizens' Peace Banquet at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on December 30, 1911. At that time, he definitely foreshadowed the idea of a league of nations, and particularly emphasized the fact that his own treaties and even a full-fledged international arbitral court were to be considered only as steps toward a larger goal. In the course of his remarks, he said:

We have gone on in this present day and generation until we are all in a sense "armed camps"—not so much in this country, because we have two oceans between us and possible danger, but in Europe the burden of armament I need not overstate, because I could not overstate it; and yet any movement for a voluntary disarmament up to this has been a failure, an absolute failure. And why? Because each nation feels that if an international controversy arises, war may follow, and if war does follow, each nation feels it its patriotic duty to be ready to prevent its defeat, its disintegration, and so for safety each nation maintains this armament. Now how are we going to get rid of it? We are never going to get rid of it until we substitute some method of settling international controversies that every nation may rely upon as a certain method of settling them. When you get an arbitral court, supported by the authority and the prestige of all the powerful nations of the earth, under treaties binding

¹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1776-1909, Supplement, 1913, 380-382.

every one, then you have a means of settling controversies that every nation may look to with certainty, and until we do get that we shall not get that something which may be substituted for war as a means of settling controversies between nations. Why am I in favor of these treaties? It is because these treaties I regard as the first steps toward the establishment of such an arbitral court.¹

The idea continued to be dominant in the President's mind during the remainder of his administration. At a luncheon given by the International Peace Forum to him at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on January 4, 1913, he again stated his belief in a way which completely foreshadowed the program of the League to Enforce Peace, of which he has been president since its organization on June 17, 1915. The following statement by the President was more than a declaration of personal views, it was an assertion of state policy:

My own idea was that if we could make those treaties, they would form a basis for a treaty with every other nation by the United States, and then between other nations than the United States, and finally, by interlocking and intertwining all the treaties, we might easily then come to the settlement of all international questions by a court of arbitration, a permanent, well-established court of arbitration, whose powers are to be enforced by the agreement of all nations, and into which any nation may come as a complainant and bring any other nation as a defendant, and compel that defendant nation to answer to the complaint under the rules of law established for international purposes, and under the rules of law which would necessarily, with such a court, grow into a code that would embrace all the higher moral rules of Christian civilization.²

WILSON.—NEW SERIES OF TREATIES INITIATED, 1913.

President Wilson succeeded President Taft on March 4, 1913. The effort of his administration to make progress was destined to be successful. The previous administration had failed in an effort to combine the principles of arbitration and the commission of inquiry in a single system of pacific settlement. The new administration decided to leave the 25 existent treaties of arbitration then in force undisturbed, and to negotiate independent treaties establishing permanent commissions of investigation for all questions not properly falling under the arbitration treaties. These "treaties for

¹ *Peace*, March, 1912, 7.

² *The Peace Forum*, February, 1913, 12.

the advancement of peace," as they are officially called, are at present in force with 20 countries, while 10 more have been signed and five others accept the principle. Their effect has been to add to the practical machinery of pacific settlement a method for resolving all nonjusticiable disputes. The treaties already in force contain the following essential provisions:

ART. I. The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding Article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report.

ART. II. The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from each country, by the Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments. . . .

ART. III. In case the high contracting parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the International Commission for investigation and report. The International Commission may, however, act upon its own initiative, and in such case it shall notify both Governments and request their co-operation in the investigation.

The report of the International Commission shall be completed within one year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend the time by mutual agreement. . . .

The high contracting parties reserve the right to act independently on the subject-matter of the dispute after the report of the Commission shall have been submitted.

PRESIDENT ADVOCATES A COMMON FORCE.

International practice was in this phase of development when the European war broke out. Immediately, clear-sighted citizens sought to devise some workable plan of securing a just and lasting peace after the war itself had ended. A judicial court was the most obvious part of such a plan. The principle of a commission of investigation to conciliate differing parties was equally well recognized owing to the publicity given to the American peace plan. Diplomatic conferences

to codify international practice into international law were familiar, thanks to the Hague Conferences, and were unchallenged in principle. Beyond that, the way was not so clear; but it was the feeling of many competent observers that the time was ripe for a form of international organization in which these accepted principles were re-enforced by an international sanction. This conviction was successfully championed by President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard University when the League to Enforce Peace was organized in Philadelphia.¹ Thus the idea of an international police force indorsed by Congress in 1910, and the ideas advanced by President Taft in 1913,—that the powers of a court should be enforced by the agreement of all nations, and that there should be authority to compel a defendant nation “to answer to the complaint under the rules of law established for international purposes,”—became a commanding subject of public discussion in the United States. American interest in the proposition was powerfully reflected abroad. It received the careful attention of the Wilson administration, and the President openly aligned himself with the advocates of “some common” force behind international institutions by consenting to address the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace in Washington on May 27, 1916. On that occasion he spoke for the country, as follows:

I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation. . . .

I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice and a common peace.²

¹ Mr. Lowell was chairman and reporter of the committee on resolutions. The discussion and votes are in *League to Enforce Peace*, 9-10, 58-62.

² *Enforced Peace*, 162-163.

CONGRESS DECLARES A POLICY, 1916.

While the President was speaking, there was pending in Congress a proposal destined to commit the United States to a policy entirely consistent with his words. As a result of a widespread public interest, the following provisions were included in the naval service appropriation act, approved by the President on August 29, 1916:

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NAVAL SERVICE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE THIRTIETH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTEEN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Increase of the Navy.

.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided. It looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase of armament throughout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative standing in military strength.

In view of the premises, the President is authorized and requested to invite, at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe, all the great Governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal, to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred to adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question of disarmament and submit their recommendation to their respective Governments for approval. The President is hereby authorized to appoint nine citizens of the United States, who, in his judgment, shall be qualified for the mission by eminence in the law and by devotion to the cause of peace, to be representatives of the United States in such a conference. The President shall fix the compensation of said representatives, and such secretaries and other employees as may be needed. Two hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated and set aside and placed at the disposal of the President to carry into effect the provisions of this paragraph.

If at any time before the construction authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for there shall have been established, with the co-operation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals competent to secure peaceful determinations of

all international disputes, and which shall render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals may be suspended, when so ordered by the President of the United States.¹

This portion of the act, like many other sections of limited legislation in our system of government, declares a permanent policy of the United States. It revives the idea of 1910 for a commission, but its incorporation in the naval appropriation act makes it clear that the policy of the United States as stated therein involves the use of force where necessary to realize the aspirations expressed in the declaration.

THE SEQUEL.

The subsequent steps came in rapid succession, and are an important and familiar part of the contemporary history both of this country and of Europe.

In a letter to the belligerent nations on December 18, 1916, the President gave his official indorsement to the project of a league of nations "to insure peace and justice throughout the world."

In an address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, he went still further and outlined the kind of a league which the United States would be willing to enter. And in his address to Congress on April 2, 1917, the President urged that Congress "formally accept the status of belligerent which has been thrust upon it," and declared that "a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations."

The declaration of war by joint resolution of the two houses of Congress became effective April 6, 1917.

In a note cabled to Russia on May 26, 1917, in view of the approaching visit of the American delegation to Russia, the President presented to the new democracy of the Old World the ideals which he had so forcibly been championing in the New World:

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of

¹ B. R. Tillman, Jr., *Navy Yearbook*, 483-484 (Sen. Doc. 555, 64th Cong., 2d Sess.).

force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford, then, to be generous, but we cannot afford, then or now, to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

Among the notable state papers from the pen of the President since that time is the reply to the peace proposal of the Pope, which bears the date of August 27, 1917, and is printed in full in the preceding pages.

SELECTED LIST OF BOOKS ON THE PRESENT WAR

Edited by GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, *Professor of History and International Relations, Clark University.*

(Reprinted from the *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 8, No. 1, July, 1917.)

The following list of books has been prepared by the Clark University Seminar on International Relations, as a result of its recent study of the literature of the war, from over 3700 volumes arranged and catalogued in a separate department. Some 3000 to 4000 more, from Germany and Austria, are now waiting shipment from Holland. It is to be regretted, however, that with all the wealth of war literature, few if any really satisfactory books have as yet appeared on the war activities of certain of the belligerent countries; this is true both of Russia and of Turkey. It has been the particular aim of the Seminar to make a selection which would not only well represent the typical viewpoints of both the Entente and the Central Powers, but also the various schools of war thought in Great Britain and in France. The United States has so recently become a belligerent that it has seemed advisable to include no works dealing particularly with its part in the conflict.

The Historical Background.

Bernhardi, Friedrich von, general. *Germany and the Next War.* New York, Longmans, Green, 1914. 288 p.

One arrives at an understanding of the military bureaucratic mind of Germany by reading these pages.

Bourdon, Georges, *L'Enigme allemande.* Une enquête chez les Allemands. Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1913. (Translation.) *The German Enigma: Being an Inquiry among Germans as to What They Think, What They Want, What They Can Do.* London, J. M. Dent & Co., 1914. 357 p.

The author, one of the ablest publicists of France, went to Germany in 1912 on behalf of the *Figaro* to find out the attitude of Germany toward France and to estimate the possibility of war.

Bülow, Bernhard Heinrich Martin Karl, fürst von. Imperial Germany: with a Foreword by J. W. Headlam. New and revised edition. New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1917. xiv, 335 p.

To obtain Germany's explanation of her foreign policy during the last forty years, there is probably no better book than Imperial Germany by the former Chancellor of the German Empire. The first edition appeared before the war, but the work has recently been rewritten and much additional material, bearing upon the diplomacy of the present struggle, has been added.

Cramb, J. A. Germany and England. London, Murray, 1914. 137 p.

Constituted a trumpet call to the people of Great Britain to arm for the inevitable conflict. The point of view is similar to that of Bernhardt.

Gibbons, Herbert Adams. The New Map of Europe (1911-1914): The Story of the Recent Diplomatic Crises and Wars and of Europe's Present Catastrophe. New York, Century Co., 1914. 412 p.

An excellent history of the recent international complications which finally brought about the present war. Valuable information regarding the racial, economic and social factors which must be taken into consideration in making the new map of Europe.

Guyot, Yves. Les Causes et les Conséquences de la Guerre. Paris, Alcan, 1916. 422 p. (English edition.) The Causes and Consequences of the War. London, Hutchinson, 1916. 360 p.

Guyot may possibly reflect the wishes of France. A very interesting and stimulating work, but more valuable for its historical than prophetic parts.

Lichtenberger, Henri. L'Allemagne Moderne: Son Évolution. Paris, E. Flammarion, 1907. (English edition.) Germany and its Evolution in Modern Times. New York, Holt, 1913. 440 p.

Gives us, through the eyes of a Frenchman, a dispassionate presentation of the evolution of the whole German people in their economic, social, political, religious, philosophical and artistic life during the nineteenth century. The work is written in the spirit of a scientific historian.

Morel, Edmund Dene. Morocco in Diplomacy. London, Smith, Elder, 1912. 539 p.

In this work, written two years before the war, the British and French foreign offices are flayed in a merciless manner for the part they played in the Moroccan dispute. The best part of it is the documentary appendix.

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740-1914. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1916. 505 p.

An explanation of the cause of the present war ably presented by a Rhodes scholar, well qualified by extensive study and travels.

Seymour, Charles. The Diplomatic Background of the War. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916. 311 p.

The war of 1914 was caused by the attempt of William II to reassert his prestige in European world affairs.

The Outbreak of the War.

Ferrero, Guglielmo. Who Wanted the European War? Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915. 39 p.

An excellent though brief survey of the diplomatic exchanges preceding the outbreak of hostilities, giving the Allied interpretation by one of Italy's foremost historians.

Headlam, James Wycliffe. The History of Twelve Days (July 24 to August 4, 1914). London, Unwin, 1915. 412 p.

The published correspondence of each belligerent country is explained thoroughly in its proper setting. An invaluable treatise on the outbreak of the world conflict.

Scott, James Brown, editor. *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1916. 2 vols.

Merely a compilation of the diplomatic dispatches of the chief belligerent nations in the critical days of 1914. Very valuable as a work of reference.

Stowell, Ellery Cory. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915. 728 p.

Similar to Headlam's *History of Twelve Days*. The two works may profitably be studied together.

Military History.

Battine, Cécil, captain. *A Military History of the War; From the Declaration of War to the Close of the Campaign of August, 1914*. London, Hodder and Stoughton. 307 p.

As military correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, the author was in Brussels when the Belgian capital capitulated to the Germans, after which he followed the retreat of the Anglo-French forces.

Belloc, Hilaire. *The Elements of the Great War*. New York, Hearst's International Library Co., 1915. Vol. 1, *The First Phase*. 377 p. Vol. 2, *The Second Phase, The Battle of the Marne*. 382 p.

The author is a tactician of experience in the French artillery. His books are the most scholarly of any published in English which treat of the war from a military point of view.

Reinach, Joseph. *La Guerre sur Le Front Occidental. Etude Stratégique 1914-1915*. Paris, Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1916. 320 p.

A clear presentation of the course of events from the beginning of the war up to the Battle of the Yser.

Simonds, Frank H. *The Great War. The First Phase (from the Assassination of the Archduke to the Fall of Antwerp)*. New York, Kennerley, 1914. 250 p.

Many of the chapters of this book first appeared as editorial articles. The twelve maps are unusually clear. The book is popular rather than scientific.

Legal Aspects—National and International.

Baty, Thomas, and Morgan, John Hartman. *War: Its Conduct and Legal Results*. London, Murray, 1915. 578 p.

The authors have discussed in a scholarly manner, yet not too technical for popular comprehension, the legal problems arising from the war.

Dampierre, Jacques, marquis de. *L'Allemagne et le Droit des Gens*. Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1915. (English edition.) *German Imperialism and International Law*. London, Constable, 1917. 277 p.

The evidence is mostly confined to the diaries of German officers which have fallen into the hands of the French. The book is one of the rare productions of war-time chaos that will live for many years to come.

Grosser Generalstab. *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*. Berlin, 1902. Translated with a critical introduction under title of *The German War Book*, by J. H. Morgan. London, Murray, 1915. 152 p.

This is the official volume of the German General Staff giving the usages of war on land. The doctrine of "military necessity" is carried to the extreme, justifying nearly everything.

Phillipson, Coleman. International Law and the Great War. London, Unwin, 1915. 407 p.

Mr. Phillipson, an English law writer of some note, has naturally presented a point of view uniformly favorable to the Allies; but in spite of this the book is of great value to the student of international law.

Descriptive and Narrative.

Askew, Alice and Claude. The Stricken Land, Serbia, as We Saw It. New York, Dodd, 1916. 363 p.

A personal narrative rather than a comprehensive view of the war in Serbia.

Buswell, Leslie. Ambulance No. 10. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916. 155 p.

Letters of one of the drivers to an American friend.

Doty, Madeleine Zabriskie. Short Rations. New York, Century Co., 1917. 274 p.

It is a sad story but it reveals the horrors of war in Germany as no other record of personal experience.

Gibbs, Philip. The Soul of the War. London, Heineman, 1915. 362 p.

Protest against war and its futility and a plea for educating people for peace.

Hall, James Norman. Kitchener's Mob. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916. 201 p.

A series of articles which appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

Hankey, Donald. A Student in Arms. London, Melrose, 1916. 296 p.
New York, Dutton, 1917. 290 p.

Speculative rather than descriptive.

Hedin, Sven. With the German Armies in the West. Authorized translation from the Swedish, by H. G. de Wallerstorff. New York, Lane, 1915. 402 p.

Intimate pen pictures of striking personalities, and of war conditions as seen through the eyes of a pro-German.

Huard, Frances Wilson (Baroness Huard). My Home in the Field of Honor. New York, Doran, 1916. 302 p.

Hunt, Edward Eyre. War Bread: A Personal Narrative of the War and Relief in Belgium. New York, Holt, 1916. 374 p.

Kreisler, Fritz. Four Weeks in the Trenches. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915. 85 p.

LaMotte, Ellen N. The Backwash of War. New York, Putnam, 1916. 186 p.

A series of short stories of scenes and incidents "in a French military field hospital."

Low, Sidney James. Italy in the War. London, Longmans, Green, 1916. 316 p.

Mr. Low made a tour in June and July, 1916, of the important sectors of the Italian battle front, and also visited the principal industrial centers of Italy.

MacGill, Patrick. The Great Push. London, Herbert Jenkins, 1916. 254 p.

A narrative of events just prior to, during and immediately subsequent to the Allied drive at Loos in September, 1915.

Morlae, Edward. A Soldier of the Legion. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916. 128 p.

Palmer, Frederick. *My Year of the Great War.* New York, Dodd, 1915. 464 p.

Palmer was the only official representative of the American press with the British army in France.

—, —. *My Second Year of the War.* New York, Dodd, 1917. 404 p.
The book also shows in a purely military way, what England has accomplished.

Riou, Gaston. *Journal d'un Simple Soldat.* Paris, Hachette, 1916. 249 p. (English edition.) *Diary of a French Private.* London, Unwin, 1916. 315 p.

The diary of a French philosopher, wounded in the Battle of Dienze, who was taken prisoner and passed eleven months in a Bavarian fortress.

Swope, Herbert Bayard. *Inside the German Empire.* New York, Century Co., 1917. 366 p.

The story of conditions in Germany, as the author found them in the latter part of 1916, based on a series of articles written for the *New York World*.

Toland, Edward D. *The Aftermath of Battle.* New York, Macmillan, 1916.

The diary of a young Princeton graduate who served in one of the first war hospitals, and later in the Morgan, Harjes Ambulance unit in France. The things that happened around him are described in all their simple horror without shrinking.

Turczynowicz, Laura de. *When the Prussians came to Poland.* New York, Putnam, 1916. 281 p.

The author, an American woman married to a Polish nobleman, gives an account of her personal experiences, chiefly in Suwalki, Russian Poland, during the first year of the war.

Controversial: Conflicting National Viewpoints.

Bergson, Henri. *The Meaning of the War.* London, Unwin, 1915. 47 p.

To him Germany stands for the things material; the forces arrayed against her, for the things moral.

Beyens, baron. *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre. Les Causes et les Responsabilités.* Paris, Van Oest, 1915. (English edition.) *Germany Before the War.* London, Nelson and Sons, 1916. 366 p.

The author was Belgian minister at the court of Berlin for some three years preceding the outbreak of the war.

Bryce, James, viscount, chairman. *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages.* New York, Macmillan, 1915. 61 p. Appendix, 296 p.

This report is the presentation of some of the evidence, and a summary of the findings.

Clark University. *Problems and Lessons of the War.* New York, Putnam, 1916. 424 p.

The volume contains side by side the opposing views on the fundamental issues of the war as presented by twenty-four writers of reputation.

Deutschland und der Weltkrieg. Breslau, Kern, 1914. 210 p. (Translation). *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War.* By various German writers, translated by William Wallace Whitelock. New York, Kennerley, 1916. 628 p.

A series of essays by professors in various German and Austrian universities and by government officials; scholarly expression of the German point of view.

Eastman, Max. *Understanding Germany.* New York, Kennerley, 1916. 169 p.

Aims to correct the feeling that the Central Powers are entirely wrong and the Allies entirely right.

Francke, Kuno. *The German Spirit.* New York, Holt, 1916. 132 p.

A view of contemporary Germany which is intended to help Americans better understand the sources of German greatness, and why German achievements have so often failed to appeal to America.

Great Britain: Foreign Office. *Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16.* Documents presented to Viscount Grey by Viscount Bryce. Edited by A. J. Toynbee. London, 1916. 684 p.

"All the evidence that could be obtained up to July, 1916, as to the massacres and deportations of the Armenian and other Eastern Christians."

Massart, Jean. *Belgians under the German Eagle.* London, Unwin, 1916. 368 p.

The author writes, as a Belgian, against the German administration of Belgian affairs.

Meyer, Eduard. *England: seine staatliche u. politische entwicklung u. der krieg gegen Deutschland.* Stuttgart u. Berlin, Cotta, 1915, 213 p. (Translation) *England: Its Political Organization and Development and the War against Germany.* Boston, Ritter, 1916. 328 p.

Important as a reliable expression of German opinion and sentiment regarding the war and the outlook for the future.

Oliver, Frederick Scott. *Ordeal by Battle.* London, Macmillan, 1915. 437 p.

Probably the best and most complete presentation of the British case against Germany which has yet appeared.

Powers, Harry Huntington. *Things Men Fight for, with Some Applications to Present Conditions in Europe.* New York, Macmillan, 1916. 382 p.

He holds England and Germany especially responsible for the war. He believes there will be several other great wars after this one,—that a permanent peace will come only after the small countries of the world have been amalgamated into a few world powers.

Reventlow, Ernst zu, graf. *Der Vampir des Festlands—eine Darstellung der englischen Politik nach ihren Triebkräften Mitteln und Wirkungen.* Berlin, Mittler und Sohn, 1915. 185 p. (Brief English translation.) *The Vampire of the Continent.* New York, Jackson Press, 1917. 225 p.

From the hand of one of the most prominent pan-Germanists, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. England is pictured as the "vampire" of civilization.

Visscher, Charles de. *La Belgique et les Juristes Allemands.* Lausanne and Paris, Payot, 1916. 134 p. (English edition.) *Belgium's Case: a Juridical Enquiry.* London and New York, Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. 164 p.

This work of Dr. Visscher, professor of law in the University of Ghent, is to be recommended. This defense of Belgium is scholarly, clear and convincing.

Walling, William English. *The Socialists and the War.* New York, Holt, 1915. 512 p.

A very good compilation of Socialist anti-war principles and opinion.

Wells, Herbert George. *Mr. Britling Sees it Through.* New York, Macmillan, 1916. 443 p.

The Psychology of the War.

The following short list has been recommended by President G. Stanley Hall:

- Bon, Gustave Le.** Enseignements psychologiques de la guerre européenne. Paris, Flammarion, 1915. 364 p.
 ———, ———. (Translation.) The Psychology of the Great War. Tr. by E. Andrews. London, Unwin, 1916. 480 p.
Campbell, A. J. The War and the Soul. London, Chapman and Hall, 1916. 277 p.
Crile, George W. A Mechanistic View of War and Peace. New York, Macmillan, 1916. 104 p.
Conway, Martin. The Crowd in Peace and War. London, Longmans, Green, 1915. 332 p.
Mitchell, Peter Chalmers. Evolution and the War. London, Murray, 1915. 114 p.
Trotter, W. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. London, Unwin, 1916. 213 p.
Machen, Arthur. The Bowmen and other Legends of the War. London, Putnam, 1915. 77 p.

War as a World Problem.

- Angell, Norman.** The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. London, Heinemann, 1911. 332 p.
 Mr. Angell aims to prove that the world is under a "great illusion" in believing the generally accepted theory that "military and political power gives a nation commercial and social advantages."
Ellis, Henry Havelock. Essays in Wartime. London, Constable, 1916. 247 p.
 "War and Eugenics" is the most valuable contribution of the group, stressing the great danger to the race in the war's drain on the more virile types of selected men.
Howe, Frederic Clemson. Why War. New York, Scribner, 1916. 365 p.
 According to the author present-day wars are economic—the result of surplus capital, with the foreign office behind it, seeking privileges in foreign lands.
Key, Ellen K. S. War, Peace and the Future. Translated by Hildegard Norberg. New York, Putnam, 1916. 271 p.
 The author discusses the effect of the war on woman's mind and how far she will be changed by it, and the effect on the rising generation.
Krehbiel, Edward Benjamin. Nationalism, War and Society; A Study of Nationalism and its Concomitant, War, in Their Relation to Civilization; and of the Fundamentals and the Progress of the Opposition to War. New York, Macmillan, 1916. xxxv, 276 p.
 An especially valuable feature of the work is a large and carefully selected bibliography.
Lippmann, Walter. The Stakes of Diplomacy. New York, Holt, 1915. 235 p.
 He arrives at the conclusion that some sort of an internationalization of backward areas is a possible solution of the modern wars for economic and political imperialism.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. Armaments and Arbitration; or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States. New York, Harper, 1912. 259 p.
A plea for the retention of war as a permanent factor in international relations. The chapter entitled, "The Great Illusion" is a direct reply to the argument of Norman Angell.

Rolland, Romain. Au-dessus de la mêlée. Paris, Ollendorff, 1915. 163 p. (English edition.) Above the Battle. Translation by C. K. Ogden, M.A., editor of the Cambridge *Magazine*. London, Unwin; Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1916. 194 p.

His mission, as he conceives it, is to protect France and Germany from the hallucinations, injustices and follies of thought which war lets loose.

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. Why Men Fight. New York, Century Co., 1917. 272 p.

A book for social thinkers, ethical leaders and statesmen, primarily, but one from which the average citizen as well can derive much of profit.

The Peace Settlement and the Future.

Bullard, Arthur. The Diplomacy of the Great War. New York, Macmillan, 1916. 344 p.

The author shows a sympathetic appreciation of the view-points of the various nations.

"Cosmos." The Basis of Durable Peace. New York, Scribner, 1917. 144 p.
A series of articles contributed to the *New York Times*, "from a source," the editors state, "the competence and authority of which would be recognized in both hemispheres."

Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. The European Anarchy. London, Unwin, 1916. 153 p.

If he is correct in his analysis, the remedy for war lies in perfecting an international organization. "The States of Europe and the world will be unable to maintain the peace, even though all of them should wish to maintain it, unless they will construct some kind of machinery for settling their disputes and organizing their common purposes, and will back that machinery by force."

Dominian, Leon. The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. New York, Holt, 1917. 375 p. Maps, charts.

In general, he believes the new map of Europe should follow frontiers of language; these he traces in detail.

Headlam, James Wycliffe. The Issue. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1917. 159 p.

"With a Germany defeated no artificial security will be wanted, for there will be a stronger security in the consciousness of defeat."

Hobson, John Atkinson. Towards International Government. London, Unwin, 1915; New York, Macmillan, 1915. 216 p.

A scholarly, clear-cut analysis of the problems involved in creating a league of nations.

Naumann, Friedrich. Mitteleuropa. Berlin, Reimer, 1915. 299 p. (English edition.) Central Europe, with an introduction by Prof. W. J. Ashley, of the University of Birmingham. Translated by Christabel M. Meredith. London, P. S. King & Son, 1916. 345 p.

Important as a study of German political aspirations.

Toynbee, Arnold J. Nationality and the War. London, Dent, 1915. 511 p.

He presents clearly and fairly the problems of nationality in the warring countries and their relation to the world crisis.

BOOKS ON A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Ashbee, C. R. *The American League 'to Enforce Peace, an English Interpretation.* With an introduction by G. Lowes Dickinson. London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917. 92 p. 19 cm.

Mr. Ashbee, who, with one exception, was the only Englishman present at the League's inauguration, goes into the question of its policy and the force that underlies it (it is no peace campaign). He had occasion, in his year's study of American conditions, to come into personal contact with most of the active workers of the League and the statesmen who have committed themselves to its platform.

Brailsford, Henry Noel. *A League of Nations.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917.

An outline of a settlement of the war to provide for the future security of the world with the following chapter headings: From Force to Conference; America and the League of Nations; On Peace and Change; Problems of Nationality; The Roads of the East; The Future of Alliances; On Sea-Power; Empire, Sea-Power, and Trade; The Economics of Peace; The Constitution of the League.

Bryce, James, viscount, and others. *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars.* London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917. 53 p. 21½ cm.

Draft treaty prepared by a British committee early in 1915 and privately circulated. It is preceded by a preface from the pen of Lord Bryce, and an Introduction.

Buxton, Charles Roden, editor. *Towards a Lasting Settlement.* London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916. 216 p. 19 cm.

A collection of essays by Henry Noel Brailsford, Charles Roden Buxton, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, John Atkinson Hobson, Vernon Lee, A. Maude Royden, H. Sidbotham, Philip Snowden and Irene Cooper Willis.

Collin, Christen Christian. *The War against War and the Enforcement of Peace.* With an introduction by William Archer. London, New York, etc., Macmillan and Co., 1917. xii, 163 p. 19 cm.

An eminent Norwegian professor's point of view. The American reader will be particularly interested in Chapter X, *The Ford Peace Mission in Christiania*.

Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. *The Choice before Us.* London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917. xi, 274 p. 21½ cm.

Part I, pp. 3-159, is entitled "Militarism"; Part II, pp. 161-274, is entitled "Internationalism," and has the following chapter headings: Internationalism; A League of Nations; The Question of a Sanction to the Treaty; International Regulation and Administration; Democratic Control of Foreign Policy; The League and the Settlement.

Enforced Peace. *Proceedings of the First Annual National Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, May 26-27, 1916.* With an introductory chapter and appendices giving the proposals of the league, its officers and committees. New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1916. vi, 204 p. 19½ cm.

Fried, Alfred Hermann. *Die Bestrebungen der Vereinigten Staaten für Ausbau und Festigung einer Zwischenstaatlichen Ordnung (1794-1917).*

Haag, Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, 1917. 52 p. 21½ cm. (At head of title: Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad. *Capita selecta*, No. 2.)

A review of the leadership of the United States.

Goldsmith, Robert. *A League to Enforce Peace.* With a special introduction by President A. Lawrence Lowell. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917. xxx, 331 p. 18½ cm.

An authoritative statement of the proposals put forth by the League; a clear and sympathetic outline of the plans of the League, showing how the intelligence of the world may be so directed and organized as to render future war less likely.

Hobson, John Atkinson. *Towards International Government.* New York, The Macmillan Company; London, George Allen & Unwin, 1915. 216 p. 19 cm.

States and discusses the chief proposals for securing a durable peace on a basis of better international relations after this war has been brought to an end and terms of settlement have been arranged. Schemes for agreed reduction of armaments, for the submission of disputes to arbitration or conciliation, for the establishment of a "league of peace," or a council of nations with legislative and executive powers are brought under consideration.

Keen, Frank Noel. *The World in Alliance. A Plan for Preventing Future Wars.* London, Walter Southwood & Co., Limited, 1915. 60 p. 19 cm.

A London barrister's independent examination of the problem, resulting in conclusions consistent with those of the League to Enforce Peace.

La Fontaine, Henri. *The Great Solution, Magnissima Charta.* Essay on evolutionary and constructive pacifism. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1916. x, 177 p. 24 cm.

The author's aim is to show that institutions capable of substituting a state of right for the state of war originate in institutions already realized or contemplated, and that, by slightly modifying them and arranging them logically, it will be possible to secure for the society of states the agencies requisite for its peaceful and continuous evolution.

Lange, Christian Lous. *The Conditions of a Lasting Peace. A Statement of the work of the Interparliamentary Union.* Kristiania, Interparliamentary Bureau, 1917. 55 p. 24 cm.

The League Bulletin issued weekly by the League to Enforce Peace. New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1917-. 4 p. per number. 23 cm.

"A medium for the news and propaganda of the League." The first printed number is dated June 8, 1917, and is No. 38 of a series which was previously issued only to officers and branches of the organization.

League to Enforce Peace, American Branch. Independence Hall Conference held in the City of Philadelphia, Bunker Hill day (June 17th), 1915, together with the speeches made at a public banquet in the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel on the preceding evening. New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1915. xii, 65 p. 19½ cm.

Otlet, Paul. *La Fin de la Guerre, Traité de paix générale basé sur une charte mondiale déclarant les droits de l'humanité et organisant la confédération des Etats.* Bruxelles, Oscar Lamberty; La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1914. 159 p. 27½ cm.

An ambitious examination of international organization, envisaging an organic combination of states and contemplating joint economic and military sanctions.

—, —. *Les Problèmes internationaux et la Guerre. Tableau de conditions et solutions nouvelles de l'économie, du droit et de la politique.*

Genève, Librairie Kundig; Paris, Librairie Rousseau, 1916. xi, 593 p. 26½ cm. (Publication de l'Union des Associations internationales.)

An attempt to synthesize the scientific conclusions requisite for justifying the author's World Charter as revised.

La Société des Nations. Organe de la Ligue pour une Société des Nations basée sur une Constitution internationale. Rédacteur en chef: Emile Pignot. Paris, Imprimerie Centrale de la Bourse, 1917-. Le journal paraît les premier et troisième samedis de chaque mois.

Woolf, Leonard S., editor. *The Framework of a Lasting Peace.* London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917.

A collection of all the more important schemes for a league of nations.

—, —, —. *International Government.* Two reports, prepared for the Fabian Research Department with an introduction by George Bernard Shaw together with a project by a Fabian Committee for a supernational authority that will prevent war. New York, Brentano's, 1916. xxiii, 412 p. 21 cm.

The scope of this book is wide. It is divided into three parts, as follows: Part I, An International Authority and the Prevention of War; Part II, International Government; Part III, Articles Suggested for Adoption by an International Conference at the Termination of the Present War (by the International Agreements Committee of the Fabian Research Department). The expository chapters cover a wide range, their titles being: The Causes of Wars; International Law; Treaties; Conferences, Congresses, and the Concert of Europe; Arbitration and Judicial Tribunals; An International Authority; International Government, International Agreement, and International Disagreement; International Organs and Organisms; The Internationalization of Administration: (a) Communications; (b) Public Health and Epidemic Diseases; (c) Industry and Commerce; (d) Morals and Crime; Cosmopolitan Law-Making: (a) International Maritime Legislation and the Unification of Maritime Law; (b) International Labor Legislation; (c) Other Examples; International Society and International Standards; The Internationalization of Commerce, Industry and Labor.

THE NATIONALITY MAP OF EUROPE¹

BY LEON DOMINIAN

A nation's development unfolds itself within a definable area. Its history undergoes constant change. But the natural features of the regions in which the changes occur are abiding. And life everywhere and in all its transformations tends to adapt itself to its surroundings. Europe is a soil on which the plant of nationality has blossomed. Some of the continent's nations rose to eminence because they came into being on propitious sites. Often natural conditions were adverse. A study of the map is nothing less than a study of the foundations on which national life was laid.

Two great facts underlie European history during the past hundred years. Everywhere nations are emerging from their struggles with increasing homogeneity of population. Within them the spirit of democracy is growing stronger. A survey of boundary changes in the last century reveals the tendency of peoples of the same race and speech to consolidate into single political units. In western Europe the process has attained a highly advanced stage. Tangled conditions still prevail in the eastern section of the continent. Allowance for these considerations is necessary in a study of nationality in Europe as well as in the settlement of new boundaries.

To consider a nation as the arbitrary creation of diplomacy is to ignore the working of natural laws which preside over the formation of nationality. The consciousness of belonging to the same political unit among individuals, and the feeling of union engendered thereby, are manifestations of a persistent action of social forces which are reducible to scientific expression. Self-preservation comes into play. The perpetuation of ideals is desired. Men of a given group have needs which are not felt in other

¹ This article is based on the writer's book "The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe" published by Henry Holt and Company for the American Geographical Society of New York. Reference to this work is invited for ampler details.

units. Such tendencies foster divergences in human aims and culminate in the formation of nationality. But opposed ideals are not necessarily irreconcilable since the welfare of men is the highest aim in every nation. Armed struggle between nations can generally be traced to the inordinate ambition of powerful rings in any one of them. The law of orderly progress then requires that the others combine for repression. To-day Germany's challenge for supremacy flung in defiance of all that men have held most sacred and accompanied by foul and widespread outrages has convulsed the life of the whole world. More than ever is seen the need of a world organization backed by force to curb the ambition of cliques which happen to have attained control in any nation. This phase of the subject has received attention elsewhere in this series and the reader is referred to the sound presidential utterances recorded in the first number of this publication.

In thinking of nationality three fundamental elements must win their way to dominance in the mind. The people of a nation deserve attention first. Their past is equally important. Last, **Elements of Nationality** the land in which they lived or the environment in which they toiled, must be taken into account. Population, history and geography are, therefore, the components of nationality. I shall attempt in this paper to show that nationality in Europe is a resultant of the three in every instance. If emphasis is laid on geography it is simply because racial and historical development have been strongly influenced by environment.

From the standpoint of population alone a nation is an artificial product manufactured out of racial raw material. The assimilation of diverse races into single nationalities is world-wide and time-old. We can follow the process at present **How a Nation Forms** under our own eyes in the United States. In Europe a similar origin and growth of nations has taken place long ago. That old continent has been invaded by human races since ages altogether lost to history. It is not unlikely that Asia contributed the heaviest flow of immigrants. Africa also added its overflow. We therefore look to the east and the south in attempting to account for the presence of man in Europe. But these early invasions were exceedingly slow movements of humanity. They trickled lazily like the slow waters of a sluggish stream. We can conceive of them best perhaps by recalling the wanderings of gipsy bands familiar to travelers in the Balkans. The nomads of Asia Minor, of

Mesopotamia or Arabia also unconsciously perpetuate human wanderings of archaic times. It was humanity's quest of comfort in space. Rigorous climate or arid regions were forsaken. Sometimes nature's supply of food, whether animal or plant, would be exhausted and family or tribe would keep on moving within the zone of supply. Thousands of miles in as many years would thus be covered by a race.

In time the descendants of early comers began to feel the pressure of new arrivals. For, along with migration, settlement had also taken place. Thus Europe twenty-five thousand years ago was dotted with numerous settlements each of which probably consisted of one or a few families. It was the time of the stone age when men were rude and their culture was primitive. But even then life could not have been unlovely. The beauty of mountain scenery, of lakes and forests or of glorious summer fields was as resplendent as it is now. Love of homestead must have had its place in the emotions of these ancestors of white man. A rudimentary idea of nationality originated then and there. For, divested of the complex elements which enter into the composition of nationality, the idea reduces itself to attachment for the native soil. The peasant, ignorant of history, knows of nationality little else than love of the land in which he was born. The simple pleasures of his life are associated with the locality in which they were experienced.

Races in the stone age were well defined in Europe. The northern plain from Russia to the North Sea was the home of fair-complexioned giants—the tallest men of the continent. Descendants of this ancient race are met to-day among the tall blonds of northern Russia and Finland. In Sweden and the Baltic shores of Germany a very pure type is still to be met. They were born fighters, active and energetic as men reared in a cold climate must necessarily be. From the earliest time this race has been engaged in fleeing the inclement climate of its original land. It has spread southward, fighting its way and conquering a right of sojourn in central and southern Europe. But as in all war-like migrations wandering was generally restricted to the males, the race lost its individuality once beyond its homeland. Its men married with foreign women. All the blondness in Europe as far as Spain, Italy and Greece is due to the coming of these northern men. To them also is due the infusion of northern vigor and energy in southern blood.

In the mountainous center of Europe, all the way from the Balkan

peninsula, in a circular sweep to the mountains of Scotland, there lived a race of mountain men, known generically as the Alpines, who twenty-five thousand years ago must have been fairly pure. To-day wherever a dark-complexioned and stockily built individual is met it is a safe guess to consider him a descendant of the ancient mountain population. A broad chest, round head and dark eyes and hair are convincing signs of this origin. These mountaineers were also travelers. They learned in time that life in the lowlands on the north and south of their racial homeland held greater attraction. They mingled accordingly with northern and Mediterranean races. Like their northern neighbors they contributed native hardiness and splendid physique to the mingling.

These contributions from northern and central Europe were of the utmost benefit to the race of men which peopled the Mediterranean basin. We find here in the stone age peoples characterized by dark complexion and tallness but not as massive-boned as northern men. Indolence, an inevitable result where each season is fair, was a native trait. But although wanting in energy or enterprise they made up by their keen perception of the beautiful and the ability to communicate through art their appreciativeness of all that is fine in life. So throughout ages men of northern Europe have looked to the south for artistic inspiration. They felt that their heritage of toil and climatic gloom could be enlivened by the sunshine of Mediterranean lands.

From such racial intercourses the population of every European nation reached its present composition. The blending has been carried everywhere to such an extensive degree that to conceive of racial purity in any nation is impossible. In Finland perhaps the fair type of the north is found in a condition of striking purity. Southern Italy and southern Greece are peopled almost exclusively by Mediterranean men. Parts of Switzerland, particularly in the mountainous recesses of the eastern cantons, contain inhabitants of Alpine stock. But these are extreme cases. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the happiest results from the standpoint of civilization are derived wherever the blending has been greatest. Racial purity leads to racial degeneracy and tends to weaken the spirit of nationality. In France and England where modern civilization reaches perhaps its highest stages, the blending of races has been particularly intense. In the United States the splendid results of racial mingling are everywhere apparent. It should

**No Racial
Purity**

be borne in mind, however, that these remarks apply only to the mingling which has taken place between races of white men. The presence of Asiatic blood in European races has been most pernicious. Unfortunately this phase of racial mingling cannot be overlooked, for it has left the impress of Asia in all of eastern Europe where nationality is still in a stage of travail.

Europe is soldered to Asia, so much so that for practical purposes of investigation one and the same continent may be considered as extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. And from **Influx from Asia** Central Europe to Central Asia the world's longest plain extends uninterruptedly. A pedestrian traveler starting from Hamburg or Antwerp may proceed east as far as Vladivostok without finding any serious mountain obstacle in his way. The silk merchants who carried their wares from China to Constantinople in the ninth and tenth centuries knew part of this road well. So did Marco Polo a little later. The fact is that Europe is devoid of a natural bulwark that might have stemmed the tides of early Asiatic invasions. But for this vast stretch of plains in Europe and Asia, the history of eastern Europe and hence that of all the continent would have been quite different. The open plain enabled Asiatics to swarm into Europe in their thousands and more. They came as Tatars, Turks or Huns. But Tatars, Turks or Huns are all members of the only race which peoples Central Asia. Between the three the difference is not even as great as that between inhabitants of southern Spain, southern Italy or southern Greece. To-day Turks and Tatars speak identical languages, whereas between Spanish and Italian the linguistic divergence is perceptible to all. The description of the Huns by early chroniclers applies in every respect to the Tatar bands which brought havoc in the Middle Ages to eastern Europe. The portrait of Attila from the pen of ancient historians would fit that of any leader of the Tatar hordes which devastated Poland in the thirteenth century. The peoples of eastern Europe—that is to say of eastern Germany, of Finland, Poland and Russia, and likewise of the Balkan countries—have received heavy admixtures of Tatar blood. The formation and growth of their nationality has been affected—retarded, to be more precise—by this fact. In all these countries pug-noses and small eyes coupled to a cruel cast of countenance are relics to-day of Europe's former defenselessness against Asia.

These blendings of men from varied climes preclude adoption of racial standards in gaging European nationalities. To determine the

No Racial Standard amount of Teutonic blood in the average Frenchman or Englishman leads to as great a confusion as the endeavor to trace the Tatar in the Pole or the Slav in the German. England swarms with dark-complexioned men and many northern Italians or Greeks are blonds. On the map itself the areas peopled exclusively by men of northern or southern races are rarely pure except along the continental fringes. Hence the value of a racial map lies in its revelation of past conditions. In the majority of cases the citizen of any European nation carries within himself a mixture of every race which made its appearance in Europe. Were it not for the varied environment in which Europeans live the physical difference between them would be slight. Clearly a stronger tie than race is needed to hold men together by nationality. We turn hence to history. Here again the map will be found to have exerted profound influence.

A nation is a cultural creation of the past. We may conceive it as the historical masterpiece carved out of time by the thought of its former leaders and the deeds of its former citizens, or as a fund of achievement bequeathed by ancestors and intrusted to the stewardship of every responsible citizen. **Harmony Increasing** From the earliest period of history, nations like individuals have grown from humble beginnings to greatness. But there exists a fundamental difference between this development in ancient times and that of our own day. Formerly a nation increased by the addition of alien territory and population. The modern tendency is to bring together peoples whose aims are harmonious. The world is learning to recognize that the endeavor to assimilate alien elements forcibly is fraught with discord. All this means that peoples and nations are finding themselves. A remarkable fact permeates this self-discovery. As nations and peoples acquire growing consciousness of their individuality, their respect for each other's rights increases. A strong promise of future harmony is thereby indicated.

To the collaboration of time in nationality must be added that of space. All life in the world has a place of its own. The oak or the tundra thrive in their respective belts only. As men, **Influence of Habitat** Frenchmen in France and Germans in Germany differ primarily because they occupy dissimilar regions. Each leads a life which is largely a result of environment. The influence of the land can be detected both in the physical and spiritual temperament of its sons. And Europe as a human habitat is an eminently

privileged continent. Each geographical subdivision of the continent has exerted its particular influence on life within its limits. This will be appreciated first by a comprehensive survey of the continent.

Although the smallest of all continents, Europe stands out on the map as the most important seat of history in the past two thousand years. It occupies only one-thirteenth of the land area of our planet but it is peopled by one-fourth of the world's population. It lies in the very heart of the northern temperate zone where civilization has reached its highest form. No obstacle to communication with the rest of the world exists for Europeans. The continent is splendidly indented and the seas which penetrate it have shielded its inhabitants from the bane of isolation. Travel over these seas was easy and brought European peoples into contact with one another. Along the sea lanes Vikings met adventurous Argonauts or piratical Illyrians. A wholesome interchange of ideas accompanied commercial barter. On land the vast northern plain is an ancient road of commerce and of invasion. Between Paris and Moscow the railroad line extends without tunnels or steep grades. Intercourse with remotest Asia has been maintained uninterruptedly; Africa lies at Europe's very door. That admirable lane of travel known as the Mediterranean has supplied the continent with men, products and ideas from the most favored sections of Asia. And the wide Atlantic, far from being a barrier, has united America to Europe. Economically and historically this absence of natural boundaries has made of Europe the center of the world's human activity.

The debt of the continent to geography can be detected in all its features. By climate it lies open to tempering maritime influences. Temperature and humidity are maintained at seasonal averages. Infrequency of excessive variations has favored European humanity. Nervous tension characteristic of climates in which changes in temperature and pressure are wide and frequent is rarely met among Europeans. For their benefit the currents of the Atlantic bring the warmth of distant southern regions. The prevailing winds in Europe also come from the southwest and contribute a supply of natural heat taken from warm regions. A temperature map of the world shows that for the same latitude Europe has on the average a warmer climate. Without these warm winds and currents the climate in Great Britain or northern Germany would be as cold as that of Labrador. Their share in

Europe's Advantages

Advantages of Climate

European history has been ample. Further, they point to the existence of solid foundations for the individuality and unity of European life.

A union of European peoples does not exist however and the federation of the continent is a problem for coming generations which perhaps will realize better that in spite of its diversified features their continent suggests genuine uniformity. At present it is pertinent to note that each region has a character of its own and that nations are symbols of regional unity. The case of France and French nationality with all that it stands for is exemplary, because by its configuration no less than by its position France has been the meeting-place of peoples in western Europe.

A portion of the country's boundary is sharply set off by mountain and sea. The Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, and the mountains on the east from the Maritime Alps to the Vosges provide France with frontiers which confined French nationality within a definite habitat. On the north and northeast, however, French territory merges without sharp transition into the great lowland of northern Europe. The Teuton has taken advantage of this open stretch to swarm into France century after century since antiquity. Many of the troubled periods in the history of French nationality are manifestations of the ease with which Teutonic penetration of France was made possible. But if France was open on the north it had likewise a stretch of smiling sea coast on the south which was easily accessible to the stranger. Northern peoples met the southerners therefore upon French soil. The Teuton came under the name of Goth, Frank or Burgundian and mingled with Phœnician, Greek and Roman who through Marseilles had reached every nook and corner of the country. In the early stage fusion was incomplete. The results were constant fighting on French soil and the existence of strongly marked class differences. The fact is true in every nation. The progress of fusion however was accompanied by peace within the land until French nationality emerged in modern history with the attribute of unity.

France therefore is essentially Europe's western highway of peoples. Upon its territory is found the western termination of the northern plains of Europe and Asia. The great mountain system of Central Europe likewise has its dying offshoots, on the west, in France. In the population a living reflection of these facts of geography are to be traced. The energy of northern

racés is peculiar to Frenchmen, in whom also is found the softness and artistic sense of southern elements. Intellectually the French mind carries an admirable blend of vigorous and graceful thought. The lucidity of French scientific writing is universally recognized. Its mathematicians and its students of mechanics have presented the most abstruse conceptions of their arid studies in pleasant language. For these natural gifts Frenchmen are primarily indebted to their native land.

But this heritage of geography is tainted with dark aspects. To-day we watch the culminating effects of momentous movements due to the northern gap in the continuity of France's natural boundary. **A Fated Clash** The historical sifting of centuries settled on the political problem of Alsace-Lorraine. In both Germany and France the forces of nationalism have crystallized into political entities only during the nineteenth century. The clash in the border zone was fated. Alsace and Lorraine have the common characteristic of being transition lands. Both provinces have felt the influences of two powerful adjoining nations. In Lorraine the struggle between French and German culture has been most intense because the province is a lowland easily accessible both on the east and the west. The mixed character of its population is therefore far more apparent than in Alsace.

The problem of this borderland requires mention of the Vosges mountains. In ancient times the ranges proved an effective barrier to communication between France and Germany. The height of crests, thickly wooded flanks and the lack of defiles led to their being shunned alike by the ancestors of Frenchmen and Germans. Teutonic invaders have always avoided the slopes, preferring to follow the Belfort gap on the south or to turn its northern edge where the plateau of Lorraine afforded easier routes. The demands of medieval industry contributed principally to the peopling of the mountains. To-day the highland population consists principally of descendants of miners or wood-cutters. On the sides facing France are found districts where French is spoken exclusively, while Alsatian dialects are met on the east. The linguistic boundary is sharply marked by the line of crests extending along the entire length of the uplift. The boundary delimitation of 1871 was laid with slight regard to this natural division and runs since then well within an area peopled by French inhabitants.

In both Alsace and Lorraine an easterly expansion of French

culture as represented by language is observable since the 16th century.

French This linguistic advance may be taken as the symbol
Tongue Gains of the preference felt in the two provinces for French civilization. It is particularly wide in Lorraine because here the country is less mountainous. Upon strictly linguistic grounds Germany cannot claim a considerable area of Lorraine.

The predominance of the French language in Lorraine is a victory of which Frenchmen may well be proud. It was the triumph of culture and refinement over aggression. France fought for supremacy in Lorraine with the tool of high ideals and all the armament of Teutonic warriors proved unavailing to prevent the steady advance of French thought and ideas. So of old had conquered Greece subdued her victors. To-day the stronghold of Metz is the center of a thoroughly French district. For many miles to the east and south, within territory which is still German, French language and ideals hold sway. This moral conquest is also strongly felt in Alsace where, in spite of his Teutonic dialect, the Alsatian is a Frenchman at heart, and this in spite of the formidable barrier of the Vosges.

The opening in the mountain border of France has therefore affected the country adversely. In Belgium too a similar evil is due to the same cause. This small nation's only natural frontier is the sea on the west. Its territory is borderless on the other sides. Belgium therefore became the hedge country in which French and German elements met. It has been the alternate prey of Teuton and Roman. Its population to-day is made up of two elements, the Flemish and the Walloon, each representing the two great peoples of western Europe. Time has welded the two Belgian elements into a nation endowed with consciousness of its individuality. But the curse of its unfortunate position has hovered over the land through the ages to our day.

The country is divided within itself into a hilly and a depressed area. The uplands are peopled by the Walloons and form the area of French language. The lowland is the home of the Flemings who speak a Teutonic dialect but who also know French. For an official and the business language of Belgium is French. This language is also that of polite society and represents the existence of national unity. With all the diversity brought about by race and environment both Flemings and Walloons consider themselves as Belgians above everything else. This union rests on solid economic foundations; for the

Belgian
National Unity

two main divisions complement each other. The lowlands contain the farming and trading centers of the country, while the hills have become the seat of thriving mining and metallurgical industries. The needs of the population are filled by exchanges which take place within the land. This condition is one in which culture has turned environment to advantage with results beneficial to nationality.

The part played in history by Europe's northern plain looms so far in an unfavorable light. It is the home of the Teutonic peoples and the seat of German power. Germany in Europe is the country of the core. The nation occupies on the map a magnificently central position between the Latin and the Slavic world. German writers have dwelt on this enviable location with the utmost elation. "The heart of Europe" is the appellation they often bestow upon their land. That this position has contributed to the strength of Germany in war we know to-day. In view of this, the lateness in the achievement of German national unity is surprising. Here again the evidence of the map is illuminating. German national territory comprises both a mountain zone and a lowland. The transition between these two natural regions is obtained by a series of subzones of decreasing elevation but which are endowed with sufficient physical importance to form distinct areas of peopling.

This fact coupled to the utter lack of frontiers on the northern plain explains why Germany was divided into a large number of petty states down to the memory of living generations. Comparison of German physical and historical maps shows that the political morseling of German territory is particularly intense in the mountainous areas of the south and southwest. And each unit can be traced to its geographical foundation. Thus to mention only a few Bavaria represents the upper basin of the Danube, Wurtemberg the upper valley of the Neckar and Franconia the higher valleys of the Main.

This geographical phase of German history is repeated to a certain extent in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The territory of the Dual Monarchy is even more diversified than that of its Teutonic neighbor and ally. It will be shown below that the varied elements making up the population of the empire represent distinct natural regions. Austria-Hungary is not a nation but only a political state. This artificial unity is due to a single cause, to wit, the existence of the important Danube corridor. Barring the Volga, this river is the

longest in Europe. Its valley has always been the main artery of continental trade. Historically Austria owes its political life and its large territory to this river.

The importance of this natural highway was intensified at the time of the Turkish penetration into Europe. The conquest of Balkan land by Mohammedan armies was to be followed by further westerly invasions for which the Danube provided a convenient route. Austria's mission was to check the Turkish advance. For this purpose Christendom in the affected regions rallied around Austria. The large number of Slavs who owe allegiance to the house of Hapsburg to-day is a relic of former grouping for protection. But with the passing of the Turkish danger the reason for Austrian subjection of alien peoples was removed. Valid reason may therefore be advanced for the liberation of Italians, Slavs or Rumanians from the Austrian yoke.

The southern boundary of the Austrian state abuts against Italian lands from Switzerland to the Carinthian hills. Along this contact line a notable Italian element maintains itself within Austria. This foreign area is Italian proper in western Tyrol and Ladin in its eastern extension. The southerly advance of Germans in the mountains followed the valleys of the Etsch and Eisack, showing thereby that the channels through which mountain waters flowed also facilitated transit of traders from German highlands to the Adriatic. A steady current of freight has been maintained along this route since the beginnings of continental commerce. By the Middle Ages numerous colonies of German merchants had acquired solid footing along the much-traveled road over the Brenner Pass which connected Augsburg and Venice.

By degrees the Germans occupied the valley of the Etsch south of its confluence with the Eisack. The divide between Teutonic and Italian languages has its westernmost reach at Stelvio near Trafoi. The junction of Swiss and Austrian political boundaries at this point corresponds to the contact between the German of the Tyrol and the Romansh idioms of Engadine. Ladin settlements begin north of the Fleims valley and spread beyond the Groden basin to Pontebba and Malborghet where the meeting of three of Europe's important peoples, the Romans, Germans and Slavs, occurs.

The Italian section of the Tyrol constitutes the Trentino of present-day Italian irredentists. As early as 774 Charlemagne's division of the region between the kingdoms of Bavaria and of Italy had implied

recognition of differences which later were to be expressed by nationality. But the importance of maintaining German control over natural lines of access to southern seas determined his successors to award temporal rights in the southeastern Alps to bishops upon whose adherence to Germanic interests reliance could be placed. The bishopric of Trentino thus passed under the Teutonic sphere of influence which is preserved to-day by the political union of the territory of the old see to the Austrian Empire. Definite annexation of the Trentino to the province of Tyrol took place in 1815. Contact with the Teutonic element appears to have failed, however, to eradicate or modify the Italian character of the region's institutions or its life.

The Czechs of Bohemia make up Slavdom's vanguard in Europe. On a racial map the area they occupy conveys a vivid picture of a ram battering the compact mass of Teutons. Few regions are as well defined as this mountain-framed land. It is the most centrally situated block of continental Europe. Here better than in any unredeemed territory perhaps, the poet's song, the historian's tale and the scientist's achievements have contributed to the awakening of national conscience. With school, church and their famous athletic and tourist associations as sole weapons, the Czechs are waging a vigorous campaign to secure political independence. Within their territory Pan Germanism is strictly on the defensive. Pitted against Saxons on the north, Bavarians on the west and Austrians on the south, the Czechs like the Slav-encircled Hungarians appear to derive renewed energy from the very encroachments upon their national ideals.

With the Bohemians must be included their kinsmen and neighbors the Moravians and Slovaks. Community of national aspirations is generally ascribed to these three Slavic groups. A Czecho-Slovak body consisting of about 8,500,000 individuals thus came into being within the Dual Monarchy. The Slovaks are mountain dwellers who have but slightly fraternized with Czechs and Moravians notwithstanding close racial and linguistic affinity. The course of centuries failed to change their customs or the mode of life led in the western Carpathians. The Hungarian plain unfolded itself below their rocky habitation without tempting them to forsake the seclusion of their native valleys. Their language holds its own as far east as the Laborec valley. Junction with Polish is effected in the Tatra.

**Bohemia Slav
Vanguard**

**The Other
Czechs**

South of the Baltic the unbroken expanse now peopled by Germans merges insensibly into the western section of the great Russian plain.

**Poland's Buffer
Position**

This extensive lowland is featureless and provides no natural barriers between the two nations it connects. The Polish area alone intervenes as a buffer product of the basin of the middle Vistula. The region is a silt-covered lowland which emerged to light after the drying out of glacial lakes of recent geological age. It appears to have been inhabited by the same branch of the Slavic race since the beginning of the Christian era. It was the open country in which dearth of food and the consequent inducement to migration did not exist. The development of Poland rests primarily on this physical foundation. Added advantages of good land and water communication with the rest of the continent likewise contributed powerfully to the spread of Polish power, which at one time extended from the Baltic shores to the coast of the Black Sea.

Political uniformity was thus the result of the unifying influence of a region characterized by common physical aspects. From the Carpathians to the Baltic, the valley of the Vistula constitutes both the cradle and the blossoming field of Polish humanity and its institutions. In spite of the remoteness of the period of their occupation of the land, these children of the plains never attempted to scale mountainous slopes. The solid wall of the western Carpathians between Jablunka and Sanok, with its abrupt slopes facing the north, forms the southern boundary of the country.

The struggle for predominance between Poles and Germans along Poland's western boundary is fully nine centuries old. In the 6th century Slavonic tribes had become widely distributed between the Oder and the Elbe in the course of westerly expansions, which corresponded to south and west migrations of Teutonic peoples. The beginning of the present millennium witnessed the inception of a slow and powerful Germanic drive directed toward the east. Repeated German aggressions brought about the earliest union of all Polish tribes into one nation at the beginning of the 11th century. It proved, however, of little avail before the fighting prowess of the knights of the Teutonic Order who, by the first half of the 13th century, had succeeded in adding all Wend territory to Teutonic dominions. This early and northern phase of the "Drang nach Osten" brought the Germans to the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Their advance was

**Polish-German
Rivalry**

rendered possible in part by the presence of Tatar hordes menacing southern Poland. Teutonic progress was also facilitated by the condition of defenselessness which characterizes an open plain. Between the Oder and the Vistula the slightly undulating lowland is continuous and devoid of barriers to communication which the interposition of uplifted or uninhabitable stretches of territory might have provided.

Polish history has been affected both favorably and adversely by this lack of natural bulwarks. The one-time extension of Polish sovereignty to the coasts of the Baltic and Black Seas or to within fifty miles of Berlin and the central plateau of Russia was a result of easy travel in a plain. This advantage was more than offset by the evident facility with which alien races were able to swarm back into the vast featureless expanse forming Polish territory. The very dismemberment of the country is in part the result of the inability of the Poles to resort to the protection of a natural fortress, where a stand against oppressing foes might have been made.

Poland's easterly expansion, with its prolonged and finally disastrous conflict with Russia, began after the battle of Grünwald in 1410. Although the Poles then inflicted a decisive defeat on the German knights, the western provinces they had lost could not be regained. In the eastern field the basin of the Dnieper merged without abrupt transition into that of the Vistula just as the basin of the Oder on the west had formed the western continuation of the Baltic plain. Four centuries of struggle with Russia ensued until the Muscovite Empire absorbed the greatest portion of Poland.

The presence in Europe of Hungarians, a race bearing strong linguistic and physical affinity to Turkish tribesmen, is perhaps best explained by the prolific harvests yielded by the broad valleys of the Danube and Theiss. Huns, Avars and Magyars, one and all Asiatics wandering into Europe successively, were enticed into abandonment of nomadism by the fertility of the boundless Alföld. Western influences took solid root among these descendants of eastern ancestors after their conversion to Christianity and the adoption of the Latin alphabet. So strongly did they become permeated by the spirit of Occidental civilization that the menace of absorption by the Turks—their own kinsmen—was rendered abortive whenever the Sultan's hordes made successful advances toward Vienna. At the same time,

**Poland Without
Defenses**

**Harvests Attract
Hungarians**

fusion with the Germans was prevented by the Oriental origin of the race. The foundation of a separate European nation was thus laid in the Hungarian plains.

A minor group of Hungarians has settled on the eastern edge of the Transylvania mountains. They live surrounded by Rumanians on all sides except on the west, where a lone outpost of Saxons brings Teutonic customs to the east.

The Magyar Outpost

The name of Szekler, meaning frontier guardsmen, applied to this body of Magyars, is indicative of their origin. Their presence on the heights overlooking the Rumanian plain bespeaks the solicitude of Hungarian sovereigns to control a site on which the natural bulwark dominating their plains had been raised. These Magyars represent at present the landed gentry of Transylvania.

This Hungarian colony was in full development at the end of the 13th century. Its soldiers distinguished themselves during the period of war with the Turks. Prestige acquired on the battlefield strengthened the separate and semi-independent existence of the community. The region occupied by these Hungarians is situated along the easternmost border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The towns of Schässburg and Maros Vásárhely lie on its western border. The Rumanian area situated between the land of the Szekler and the main Hungarian district is studded with numerous colonies of Magyars, thereby rendering delimitation of a boundary in the region almost impossible.

The Saxon colony adjoining the Szekler area on the west is also a relic of medieval strategic requirements. In spite of the name by which this German settlement is designated, its original members appear to have been recruited from different sections of western European regions occupied by Teutons.

Colonization had already been started when King Gesa II of Hungary gave it a fresh impulse in the middle of the 12th century by inducing peasants of the middle Rhine and Moselle valleys to forsake servitude in their native villages in return for land ownership in Transylvania.

To promote the efficiency of the soldier colonists as frontier guardsmen an unusual degree of political latitude was accorded them. In time their deputies sat in the Hungarian diet on terms of equality with representatives of the nobility. Prolonged warfare with the Tatar populations attempting to force entrance into the Hungarian plains determined selection of strategical sites as nuclei of original settlements. These facts are responsible for the survival of the

Teutonic groups in the midst of Rumanians and Hungarians. To-day the so-called Saxon area does not constitute a single group, but consists of separate agglomerations clustered in the vicinity of the passes and defiles which their ancestors were called upon to defend. The upper valley of the Oltu and its mountain affluents in the rectangle enclosed between the towns of Hermannstadt, Fogaras, Mediasch and Schässburg contain at present the bulk of this Austrian colony of German ancestry.

The Germans and Hungarians who founded settlements on the Transylvanian plateau were unable to impose their language and ideals on the inhabitants of the mountainous region. Rumanian, representing the easternmost expansion of Latin speech, is in use to-day on the greatest portion of this highland, as well as in the fertile valleys and plains surrounding it between the Dniester and the Danube. A portion of Hungary and the Russian province of Bessarabia is therefore included in this linguistic unit outside of the kingdom of Rumania. Beyond the limits of this continuous area the only important colony of Rumanians is found around Metsovo in Greece, where, in the recesses of the Pindus mountains and surrounded by the Greeks, Albanians and Bulgarians of the plains, almost half a million Rumanians have managed to maintain their Latin character.

From the valley of the Dniester to the basin of the Theiss the steppes of southern Russia spread in unvarying uniformity, save where the tableland of the Transylvanian Alps breaks their continuity. The entire region was the Dacia colonized by the Romans. Unity of life in this home of Rumanian nationality has been unaffected by the sharp physical diversity afforded by the enclosure of mountain and plain within the same linguistic boundary. The thoroughness with which Rumanians have adapted themselves to the peculiarities of their land is evinced by the combination of the twin occupations of herder and husbandman followed by Moldavians and Wallachians. Cattle and flocks are led every summer to the rich grazing lands of the elevated Transylvanian valleys. In winter man and beast seek the pastures of the Danubian steppes and prairies. Rumanians thus maintain mountain and plain residences, which they occupy alternately in the year. These seasonal migrations account for the intimacy between highlanders and lowlanders, besides affording adequate explanation of the peopling of the region by a single nationality.

**Rumanian
Tongue Area**

**Live Both on
Plains and
Mountains**

There was a time, however, when Rumanian nationality became entirely confined to the mountain zone. The invasions which followed the retirement of the Romans had driven Rumanians to the shelter of the Transylvanian ranges. Perched on this natural fortress, they beheld the irruption of Slavs and Tatars in the broad valleys which they had once held in undisputed sway. Only after the flow of southeastern migrations had abated did they venture to reoccupy the plains and resume their agricultural pursuits and seasonal wanderings.

The outstanding fact in these historical vicissitudes is that the mountains saved Rumanian nationality. Had the Romanized Dacians not been able to find refuge in the Transylvanian Alps there is no doubt that they would have succumbed to Slavic or Tatar absorption. As it is, the life of Rumanians is strongly impregnated with eastern influences. Oddly enough, its Christianity was derived from Byzantium instead of from Rome, and were it not for a veritable renaissance of Latinism about 1860 its affinity with the Slavic world would have been far stronger in the present century.

Of the two groups of southern Slavs subjected to Austro-Hungarian rule the Slovenes are numerically inferior. Settled on the calcareous plateau of Carniola, they cluster around Laibach and attain the German area on the north, along the Drave between Marburg and Klagenfurt. Eastward they march with Hungarians and the Serbo-Croat group of southern Slavs. Their southern boundary also coincides with the latter's. Around Gottschee, however, a German zone intervenes between Slovene and Croatian areas. Practically the entire eastern coast of the Gulf of Triest is peopled by Slovenes. The group thereby acquires the advantage of direct access to the sea, a fact of no mean importance among the causes that contribute to its survival to the present day in spite of being surrounded by Germans, Hungarians, Croats and Italians.

The Slovenes may be considered as laggards of the Slavic migrations that followed Avar invasions. They would probably have occupied the fertile plains of Hungary had they not been driven to their elevated home by the pressure of Magyar and Turkish advances. Confinement in the upland prevented fusion with the successive occupants of the eastern plains which unfolded themselves below their mountain habitations. Racial distinctiveness characterized by language no less than by highly developed attachment to tradition resulted from this state of seclusion.

South of the Hungarian and Slovene zones the Austro-Hungarian domain comprises a portion of the area peopled by Serbians. Serbian language predominates from the Adriatic coast to the Drave and Morava rivers, as well as up to the section of the Danube comprised between its points of confluence with these two rivers. Serbian, in fact, extends slightly east of the Morava valley toward the Balkan slopes lying north of the Timok river, where Rumanian prevails as the language of the upland. To the south contact with Albanian is obtained.

This Serbian area includes the independent kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia. Within the territory of the Dual Monarchy it comprises the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Serbian nationality is founded, therefore, on the region of uplift which connects the Alps and the Balkans or which intervenes between the Hungarian plain and the Adriatic.

Union between the inhabitants of this area is somewhat hampered by the division of Serbians into three religious groups. The westernmost Serbs, who are also known as Croats, adhere to the Roman Catholic faith. Followers of this group are rarely met east of the 19th meridian. A Mohammedan body consisting of descendants of Serbs, who had embraced Islam after the Turkish conquest, radiates around Sarajevo as a center. The bulk of Serbians belong, however, to the Greek Orthodox church. Cultural analogies between the Mohammedan and Orthodox groups are numerous. Both use the Russian alphabet, whereas the Croats have adopted the Latin letters in their written language.

The Serbian group made its appearance in the Balkan peninsula at the time of the general westerly advance of Slavs in the 5th and 6th centuries. A northwestern contingent, wandering along the river valleys leading to the eastern Alpine foreland, settled in the regions now known as Croatia and Slavonia. Here the sea and inland watercourses provided natural communications with western Europe. Evolution of this northwestern body of Serbians into the Croatians of our day was facilitated by the infiltration of western ideas. But the great body of Serbians occupying the mountainous area immediately to the south had their foreign intercourse necessarily confined to eastern avenues of communication. They therefore became permeated with an eastern civilization in which Byzantine strains can be easily detected.

To-day the political aspirations of this compact mass of Serbians are

centered around the independent kingdom of Serbia, which is regarded as the nucleus around which a greater Serbia comprising all the Serbian-speaking inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula will grow. This Serbo-Croatian element is estimated at between ten and eleven million individuals.

Southeast of Serbia lies the Bulgarian national area. The Bulgarians are primarily inhabitants of the main Balkan ranges. North and south of the uplift they have overflowed into better favored areas. Thus the forelands leading to the Danube are peopled by Bulgarians. The Maritza valley is also predominantly Bulgarian—a fact recorded in the country's national hymn. For Bulgarian, therefore, the physiographic features which have dictated nationality are a central mountain mass and its adjoining lowlands. This area makes up the southeastern end of the Balkan peninsula and it seems logical at first sight to infer that Bulgaria is entitled to this section of Europe. But another fact of geography intervenes here, for the extreme southeastern end of Europe is the region of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. At its tip stands Constantinople, the goal of nations.

To ascribe nationality to the shores of the straits is impossible from the standpoint of population. The coastland stretching from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea entrance of the Bosphorus is inhabited by a motley population in which the most important elements are represented in almost equal numbers. Greeks mingle with Bulgarians, Turks and Armenians. The Bulgarians are mainly farmers while the Greeks are fishermen and sailors who control the petty coastwise traffic. The Turk still rules as lord of the land and imposes himself by means of strong garrisons. Armenians are found everywhere especially in and around Constantinople. The Jews too are ancient dwellers on these shores and have wedged themselves tightly into the population. Important colonies of European traders have also been present since Byzantine times. Almost every language in the world is heard in the crowded streets of the capital. From the site of Troy to the low hills on which Constantinople is built the classic shores have become the meeting-place of nations.

This mixed agglomeration was inevitable on such a site. From the Dardanelles to the Black Sea a single waterway extends in spite of the different names by which its parts are known. This region was the crossing of the two main roads between Europe and Asia. Land travelers from

Bulgarian National Area

Mixture of Peoples at the Bosphorus

Where Asia and Europe Meet

central Europe to Asiatic markets forded the straits and proceeded by way of Asia Minor to central or southern Asia. The navigators from southern Europe could bring their cargoes to the Black Sea terminals of caravan routes only after having steered their ships through the straits. The meeting of two main lines of traffic explains therefore the mixed character of the population. A human residue has been deposited by centuries of thickly flowing travel in those channels. Neither has the traffic ceased. Between Calais or Hamburg and Bombay the shortest land route passes through Constantinople. Even the air line between northwestern Europe and India is straightened by passing over these important waterways. The value of the region for international traffic is one which affects every commercial nation in Europe.

Geography, therefore, has created the Eastern Question. The presence of the Turks in Europe complicated it. The Turk has camped on this tip of the peninsula since the fourteenth century without ever settling. He failed to endow the region with nationality because, nomad that he was, he had none to confer. He failed to assimilate the conquered populations because the bleak and sandy steppes of his Asiatic homelands never gave birth to national institutions and he was forced to model a semblance of political organization after what he found on conquered soil. But the copying was clumsy, and five centuries of occupation did not improve it. He is the Asiatic alien on European soil and geography alone, not to mention a foul historical record, invalidates his title to European territory. His presence has checked the normal growth of nationality on every inch of the Balkan peninsula. Everywhere in this eastern region national freedom has been a late event because of the Turk. In one case—that of the Albanians—its achievement almost failed.

About Albania the map is explicit. Its surface is extremely rugged, few regions in Europe being less accessible. Hence Albanians have had little intercourse with other peoples. Moreover, they have been isolated from one another. Living in a land of narrow valleys, communication between which was rendered difficult by high rocky bulwarks, tribal life was perpetuated among them. They cannot turn to history for light or guidance. The narrowness of their views is a reflection of the surroundings in which they live. In such a land national unity cannot come from within. The value of national organization is an idea

**Turk out of
Place in Europe**

**Albanians are
still Tribal**

which must be taught to Albanians. Of government the only conception they have is obedience to the chieftains of their clans. To abandon them to themselves is to inaugurate a period of warfare. The problem of Albania is one for joint and disinterested concern on the part of the great powers. Here, if ever, the tottering steps of nationality in infancy need elderly guidance for, in spite of adverse conditions, Albania is not lacking in foundations for national unity.

The Albanian region is well defined. An Albanian language, spoken from the southern frontier of Montenegro to the northern limits of Epirus, exists. Lack of intercourse with the outside world favored the perpetuation of a single type. Tallness accompanied by round headedness and dark complexion is common to the majority. Although many of them are Mohammedans, fanaticism is absent. Inter-marriage of Christians and Mohammedans is not uncommon. The interesting fact deserves to be recorded that Albanians were Christians in Byzantine days. Their conversion to Islam entitled them to privileges in Turkish times which were denied to Christians. But whether Christians or Mohammedans the Albanians carry their religion lightly, a characteristic which may help to overcome the obstacle of religious divergence.

This brief survey of Balkan nationalities cannot be complete without mention of the drawbacks to the formation of a single nationality due to the peninsula's structure. Lack of uniformity is a dominating characteristic of the peninsula.

Geography
a Balkan
Handicap

The heights at which its mountains rise vary greatly. Deep and narrow valleys are the usual occurrence within the ranges. The diversity extends to climate. In the Greek section of the peninsula mild and rainy winters alternate with dry and burning summers. Along the Danubian valley however the winters are long and bitterly cold. Moreover the peninsula through its valleys provides lanes of travel which have been crossed by both European and Asiatic invaders. From Asia especially the inflow has been heavy through the passing of the Danube valley into that of the Pruth. Away from the lanes of travel a life of isolation would be the rule. Communities like those of the Rumanians of the Pindus mountains or the Macedonians thus preserved their identity to this very day.

The first of these remnants owes its existence to its mountain homeland where a language closely akin to the Roman of the early Christian era is still spoken by its members. The Macedonians however living in less isolated areas are bordermen in whom neither

Serbian nor Bulgarian customs definitely asserted themselves. Only by language does their affinity with Bulgaria present a stronger tie. In every other phase of their life the misfortune of position is apparent. Their land is the time-old cockpit of Serbian and Bulgarian struggles.

A border zone of far greater extent is the seat of Europe's easternmost nation, Russia. We deal in this instance with the merging into

**Russia is
Merging
Continents**

one of two continents and the magnitude of the problem explains the difficulties which have attended the formation of the Russian nation. The basic element in Russia is the ancient Russ or Ruthenian state peopled exclusively

by Slavs. Its union with Muscovy produced Russia. But the Muscovite states were Tatar and the absorption of this element by the Slavs of Russia has been a constant source of weakness for the nation. No means of checking this westerly spread of the Tatar was afforded by nature to Russia. Once, in history, over two thousand years ago this same Tatar element was on the point of conquering China, but its progress was arrested by the mountain wall which is China's natural protection on the west. Russia, devoid of a similar barrier, succumbed to the Tatar and is permeated through and through by Tatar blood and Tatar views. Only in the Ukraine has the Slav element retained its purity. In the wide plains of this western province, the real Russian is found. Here the best of Russian thought has found its way in national literature and music. Only when this thoroughly Slavic element will have fully asserted itself on the Asiatic in the east and—we may say it now—on the Teuton in the west, will Russian national life reach full maturity. Before fusion is complete the menace of dismemberment is apt to loom again and again on the Russian political horizon. As a matter of fact the Russian has shown himself in history as a capable assimilator of aliens. But the number of non-Slavs with which he has to deal is overwhelming.

Discordant elements in the Russian nation are further provided by the Letts and Lithuanians of the Baltic provinces. These peoples

**Discordant
Elements
of Russia**

owe their individuality to seclusion in little accessible forested and marshy retreats. The shelter saved them from the Teuton and the Slav. They speak a form of old

Aryan which in modern times has helped them to stand aloof from their powerful neighbors. In Finland also the population has always been lukewarm in its allegiance to Russia. In this province, however, the feeling of nationality is based on a highly valid contention.

On the map Finland stands out as a peninsula. Its population is separated from neighboring peoples by the sea and the frozen deserts of Lapland. Within these natural barriers the land has a characteristic of its own imparted by the numerous lakes which dot its surface. This geographical peculiarity is accompanied by a high state of culture in which love of country is deeply enshrined. On such foundations nationality may be solidly established. But the political incorporation of Esthonians with the Finns is a matter teeming with international complication, although the Esthonians are Finns and speak a Finnish language. To dwell on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland has been, from a political standpoint, their misfortune.

West of these Finns the problems of nationality appear to have been satisfactorily solved by the Scandinavians. The separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905 was the political expression of a physical dualism in the northern peninsula. Norway is a mountainous land with a deeply dissected coast along which the number and beauty of bays are famed the world over. Sweden however is a plateau sloping gently toward the Baltic. Norway enjoys a milder climate because it is subject to oceanic influences from which Sweden is cut off by the very mountains of its sister state. In sum, diversity in the land was eventually felt in nationality.

The case of Denmark is no exception. The peninsular section of this country and its neighboring islands enclose a number of straits. Because of this fact the Danes have become the middlemen of the Baltic region. They control the entrance to this sea and exact a toll on the traffic going in or out. The prosperity of Denmark is based on this accident of their country's position. Community of interests born on this gateway created and maintained nationality. The Kiel canal was built to avoid the crossing of the Danish straits by German ships. Note the interlocking of events due to geography. To provide German territory for the canal the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were annexed by Prussia in 1866. Through this seizure some 150,000 Danes are to-day unwilling subjects of the Kaiser.

Before abandoning the theme set forth in these lines it is fitting to carry this survey along the broadest lines of European geography. The continent is a peninsula. The Mediterranean and the Atlantic with the North and Baltic seas outline this feature definitely. Between this fact of

**Scandinavia
Offers no
Problem**

**Denmark
Controls Straits**

**Highest Type
near Seashore**

geography and the progress of nationality a striking relation is in evidence. The highest form of civilization in Europe and the most perfected types of nationality are found along the seaward fringe of the European continent. The progress of life in the land mass is still clouded by the veil of medieval anachronisms. In Teutonic lands, notwithstanding boasted superiority, the disastrous effects of dynasticism are felt. In France and Britain such relics of past ignorance have been swept away by a more enlightened comprehension of man's welfare. Russia is even worse off than Germany, since it is in the throes of a transition which has plunged its long-suffering inhabitants from one extreme to another.

This remarkable fringe of the European peninsula has even more to its credit. As a seat of civilization it has stood foremost ever since Europe assumed its predominant rôle in world history. The coastland from Greece through its westerly sweep to Scandinavia became the avenue which favored the northerly travel of the high ideals evolved in the Asiatic lands of early civilization. The Greek and Roman world owed the best in their civilization to southwestern Asia. As Greeks and Romans drew from the east, so France and Great Britain draw from Hellenic and Roman thought for a more intimate understanding of the abiding truths which have been the prime movers of high purpose in every land. In this dissemination of light, France plays a leading part. To this very day British thought is influenced by French intellectualism. In Germany, Teutonic civilization has advanced only as it has drawn on the enlightenment radiating from France. France and Great Britain are now the leading nations of the fringe before our view. And away at the northern end Scandinavians have given the world a shining example of national unity coupled with the most progressive democratic ideals.

Now that this travel of culture has reached its northern bounds a due easterly push has originated which bids fair to improve life in central and eastern Europe. Germany's backwardness in civilization is proved by the brutality, often degenerating into savagery, which permeates the German mind. Civilization can be measured by ideals alone. Material progress is a deficient gage. Were other means of ascertaining these truths wanting, the lesson of the map alone would be convincing. Humanity's debt to the coastlands of Europe can never be overestimated.

**France and
Britain Leaders**

**Germany
Backward
in Ideals**

This was an effect of geography the drift of which is in agreement with the particular cases outlined for each nation. Travel by sea was an easier feat than the scaling of the mountain barrier which in central Europe hampers direct communication between northern and southern lands. Southern Europe's great midland sea and its smiling climate invited travel the year around. In such propitious surroundings civilization advanced at least twice as fast as in the colder inland plain where, away from the softening influence of the sea, one half of each year was a period of lethargy in thought or material achievement. The gift of sea and ocean to Europe therefore meant higher civilization.

But the student of nationality sees beyond the physical background. The progress by instalments which everywhere has been a characteristic of nationality has been accompanied by social movements which should be estimated in their proper light. A hundred years ago dynasticism was held as the most stable guarantee of peace. To-day the idea that peoples exist for the benefit of their monarchs has given place to sounder conceptions of democracy. East and west of the Atlantic two sister republics, France and the United States, share the honor of having proven by a practical application of a republican form of government that the welfare of the state is a direct outcome of the welfare of its citizen. To her honor also Great Britain, in spite of a monarchical form of government and because of the high character of Anglo-Saxon ideals, has been singularly free from the evils of dynasticism which in continental Europe have retarded the progress of democracy. Unfortunately the endeavor to free Europe from the danger of dynastic ascendancy has been accompanied by the rise of revolutionary tendencies which, carried to impractical extremes by fanatically inclined idealists, tend to create conditions of anarchy. The case of Russia lies before the world's gaze. A perverted use of appealing catchwords has spread in ignorant quarters. Fanciful notions concerning liberty disseminated by irresponsible visionaries have become effective agencies to suppress law and order as conceived by the saner thought of generations. Clearly a middle course between dynasticism and ultra-radicalism is required in European nations. A clear grasp of the working of these social currents is essential everywhere, more so perhaps in the case of the smaller states which have hitherto led a mutilated national life. Such knowledge coupled to the data of science as supplied by an enlightened interpretation of

the map will help in converting the sorely tried continent into a peacefully administered unit.

A final glance at the peoples dealt with in these pages as well as at their background shows evidence everywhere of a development toward union and harmony. We have seen races effecting lodgment on European soil and mingling with one another to form peoples. These peoples throughout the long procession of centuries have been aspiring even when thwarted by their surroundings. Yet nature rarely thwarts. The spectacle of the assistance rendered by geography in the development of union among men is before us. None who follow this growth can fail to realize its significance. Nationality is but a stage in the unfolding of a grander human union which will absorb the whole world. The end is far—very far—from having been achieved. But the process is under way. The welding of races into a single one in which the best of each will be represented, the effacement of particular interests before the common weal, the conquests of natural barriers which tend to promote parochial individuality, are all goals of humanity. We stand on the threshold of a period in which the betterment of peoples will be facilitated by the accumulated toil of scholars. Results of scientific endeavor are available to-day for the fine adjustment of any political balance. Like the blossom on the tree they are the pledges of fruitfulness. A crying need for their application exists.

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PRESIDENT WILSON'S ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 4, 1917¹

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: Eight months have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you. They have been months crowded with events of immense and grave significance for us. I shall not undertake to detail or even to summarize those events. The practical particulars of the part we have played in them will be laid before you in the reports of the executive departments. I shall discuss only our present outlook upon these vast affairs, our present duties and the immediate means of accomplishing the objects we shall hold always in view. I shall not go back to debate the causes of the war. The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed. But I shall ask you to consider again and with a very grave scrutiny our objectives and the measures by which we mean to attain them; for the purpose of discussion here in this place is action, and our action must move straight toward definite ends.

Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won?

NATION UNITED IN SPIRIT AND INTENTION

From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it. As a Nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent—who does not? I hear the criticism and the clamor of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the Nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken

¹ The subheads inserted in the address are reprinted from *The Official Bulletin*.

spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the Nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten.

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people, and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise,—deeply and indignantly impatient,—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

MENACE OF COMBINED INTRIGUE AND FORCE

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace,—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the basis of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends.

VOICES OF HUMANITY DAILY MORE AUDIBLE

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be

robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities." Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach—in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.

WILL BASE PEACE ON GENEROSITY AND JUSTICE

But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peacemaker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money or of materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved, I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enterprise, we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had built up for

herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of manufacture, science and commerce that were involved for us in her success, and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms, by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated. The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

NO WISH TO RE-ARRANGE AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

We owe it however, to ourselves, to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purposes with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are, in fact, fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or

schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

EXCLUSION FROM PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

WRONGS OF WAR MUST BE RIGHTED

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world, either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war

will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides.

RUSSIAN PEOPLE POISONED BY FALSEHOODS

All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset, the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often.

From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose, to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude toward the settlement that must come when it is over. When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways, I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient.

MUST CLEAR AWAY IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCCESS

What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany, but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is, in fact, the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others.

The financial and military measures which must be adopted will suggest themselves as the war and its undertakings develop, but I will take the liberty of proposing to you certain other acts of legislation which seem to me to be needed for the support of the war and for the release of our whole force and energy.

It will be necessary to extend in certain particulars the legislation of the last session with regard to alien enemies; and also necessary, I believe, to create a very definite and particular control over the entrance and departure of all persons into and from the United States.

Legislation should be enacted defining as a criminal offense every wilful violation of the Presidential proclamation relating to enemy aliens promulgated under Section 4067 of the Revised Statutes and providing appropriate punishments; and women as well as men should be included under the terms of the acts placing restraints upon alien enemies. It is likely that as time goes on many alien enemies will be willing to be fed and housed at the expense of the Government in the detention camps, and it would be the purpose of the legislation I have suggested to confine offenders among them in penitentiaries and other similar institutions where they could be made to work as other criminals do.

FAVORS FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON PRICES

Recent experience has convinced me that the Congress must go further in authorizing the Government to set limits to prices. The law of supply and demand, I am sorry to say, has been replaced by the law of unrestrained selfishness. While we have eliminated profiteering in several branches of industry it still runs impudently rampant in others. The farmers, for example, complain with a great deal of justice that, while the regulation of food prices restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the things they must themselves purchase; and similar inequities obtain on all sides.

It is imperatively necessary that the consideration of the full use of the water power of the country and also the consideration of the systematic and yet economical development of such of the natural resources of the country as are still under control of the Federal Government, should be immediately resumed and affirmatively and constructively dealt with at the earliest possible moment. The pressing need of such legislation is daily becoming more obvious.

The legislation proposed at the last session with regard to regulated combinations among our exporters, in order to provide for our foreign trade a more effective organization and method of co-operation, ought by all means to be completed at this session.

APPROPRIATION BILLS BY SINGLE COMMITTEE

And I beg that the members of the House of Representatives will permit me to express the opinion that it will be impossible to deal in any way but a very wasteful and extravagant fashion with the enormous appropriations of the public moneys which must continue to be made, if the war is to be properly sustained, unless the House will consent to return to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication as much as possible avoided.

Additional legislation may also become necessary before the present Congress again adjourns in order to effect the most efficient co-ordination and operation of the railway and other transportation systems of the country; but to that I shall, if circumstances should demand, call the attention of the Congress upon another occasion.

If I have overlooked anything that ought to be done for the more effective conduct of the war, your own counsels will supply the omission. What

I am perfectly clear about is that in the present session of the Congress our whole attention and energy should be concentrated on the vigorous, rapid and successful prosecution of the great task of winning the war.

ENEMY SOUGHT TO DISRUPT UNION

We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

NO IDEAL OR PRINCIPLE FORGOTTEN

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardor of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honor among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favor, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of His own justice and mercy.

PROCLAMATION OF STATE OF WAR

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas the Congress of the United States, in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them, have resolved, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives bearing date of December 7, 1917, as follows:

Whereas the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.¹

Whereas, by sections 4067, 4068, 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes, provision is made relative to natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of a hostile nation or government, being males of the age of 14 years and upward, who shall be in the United States and not actually naturalized;

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war

¹ *The Official Bulletin* of December 8, 1917, gives the following account of the progress of the resolution through Congress:

The resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the Austro-Hungarian Government and the United States was adopted in both Houses of Congress yesterday afternoon, and sent at once to the President, who gave it his official approval at 5.03 o'clock. In the Senate no objection was offered when Chairman Stone asked unanimous consent to proceed with the consideration of the resolution reported by the committee. Speeches in support of the resolution were made by Senators Stone, Lodge, Hitchcock and Owen, followed by a brief statement by Mr. Vardaman. The vote was 74 to 0. Mr. La Follette was absent when the roll was called, but subsequently made a brief statement in which he said he had gone to his office to prepare an amendment. The Senate consumed only 1 hour and 9 minutes in disposing of the entire subject.

In the House the debate continued for 2 hours and 40 minutes. Brief speeches were made by 21 members. The final vote was 363 to 1. The single negative vote was cast by Mr. London of New York. The debate was opened by Chairman Flood of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and closed by Mr. Cooper of Wisconsin, ranking minority member of the committee. The final vote was concluded at 4.10 o'clock and the Speaker signed the enrolled resolution at 4.20 o'clock. Vice President Marshall received and signed it at 4.32 o'clock and it was sent at once to the President.

exists between the United States and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and I do specially direct all officers, civil or military, of the United States that they exercise vigilance and zeal in the discharge of the duties incident to such a state of war; and I do, moreover, earnestly appeal to all American citizens that they, in loyal devotion to their country, dedicated from its foundation to the principles of liberty and justice, uphold the laws of the land and give undivided and willing support to those measures which may be adopted by the constitutional authorities in prosecuting the war to a successful issue and in obtaining a secure and just peace;

And, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the aforesaid sections of the Revised Statutes, I do hereby further proclaim and direct that the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States toward all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of 14 years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be as follows:

All natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of 14 years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, are enjoined to preserve the peace toward the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations, and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and toward such of said persons as conduct themselves in accordance with law all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States.

And all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary, being males of the age of 14 years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety;

(1) No native, citizen, denizen or subject of Austria-Hungary, being a male of the age of 14 years and upward and not actually naturalized, shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge or justice, under sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes;

(2) No such person shall land in or enter the United States, except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe;

(3) Every such person of whom there may be reasonable cause to believe that he is aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States marshal, or his deputy, or such other officers as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp or other place of detention as may be directed by the President.

This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done in the District of Columbia this eleventh day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and forty-second.

WOODROW WILSON.

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.

WAR AIMS OF BELLIGERENTS.

I. THE RUSSIAN PEACE OFFER.

I. PROGRAM DRAWN UP BY CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN COUNCIL OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES IN THE FORM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS DELEGATE TO THE ALLIED WAR CONFERENCE, PARIS, DATED OCTOBER 20, 1917.¹

I. Evacuation by the Germans of Russia, and autonomy of Poland, Lithuania and the Lettish provinces.

II. Autonomy of Turkish Armenia.

III. Solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question by a plebiscite, the voting being arranged by local civil authorities after the removal of all the troops of both belligerents.

IV. Restoration to Belgium of her ancient frontiers and compensation for her losses from an international fund.

V. Restoration of Serbia and Montenegro with similar compensation, Serbia to have access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herzegovina to be autonomous.

VI. Disputed Balkan districts to receive provisional autonomy, followed by a plebiscite.

VII. Rumania to be restored her old frontiers on condition that she grant Dobrudja autonomy and grant equal rights to Jews.

VIII. Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria to be followed by a plebiscite.

IX. Restitution of all colonies to Germany.

X. Re-establishment of Greece and Persia.

XI. Neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas and also the Suez and Panama Canals. Freedom of navigation for merchant ships. Abolition of the right to torpedo merchant ships in war time.

XII. All belligerents to renounce war contributions or indemnities in any form, but the money spent on the maintenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the war to be returned.

¹ *New York Times*, October 22, 1917.

XIII. Commercial treaties not to be based on the peace treaty; each country may act independently with respect to its commercial policy, but all countries to engage to renounce an economic blockade after the war.

XIV. The conditions of peace should be settled by a peace congress consisting of delegates elected by the people and confirmed by Parliament. Diplomats must engage not to conclude separate treaties, which hereby are declared contrary to the rights of the people, and consequently void.

XV. Gradual disarmament by land and sea, and the establishing of a non-military system.

2. NOTE OF LEON TROTSKY, RUSSIAN NATIONAL COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALLIES FORMALLY OFFERING AN ARMISTICE ON ALL FRONTS AND PROPOSING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, NOVEMBER 22, 1917.¹

PETROGRAD, November 21, 1917.

I herewith have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the All-Russian Congress of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates organized on Oct. 26 a new government in the form of a Council of National Commissioners. The head of this government is Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The direction of the foreign policy has been intrusted to me in the capacity of National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

Drawing attention to the text of the offer of an armistice and a democratic peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities and the self-determination of nations, approved by the All-Russian Congress of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates, I have the honor to beg you to regard the above document as a formal offer of an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations—an offer with which the authoritative government of the Russian republic has addressed itself simultaneously to all the belligerent peoples and their Governments.

Accept my assurance, Mr. Ambassador, of the profound respect of the Soldiers' and the Workmen's Government for the people of France [etc.], which cannot help aiming at peace, as well as all the rest of the nations exhausted and made bloodless by this unexampled slaughter.

L. TROTSKY,
National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

¹ Associated Press dispatch, November 22, 1917. The note was sent in fulfilment of a resolution of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Congress voted on November 10, 1917, a translation of which is printed in *Current History*, Vol. VII, Part I, 422.

a. INCLOSURE.

*General notice to Russian representatives abroad offering armistice to all nations involved in the war, and order to Russian commander-in-chief to offer a cessation of hostilities, November 20, 1917.*¹

By order of the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates the Council of Commissioners of the People has taken power into its hands, together with the obligation to offer to all the nations and their respective Governments an immediate armistice on all fronts, with the purpose of immediately opening *pourparlers* for the conclusion of a democratic peace.

When the power of the Council is firmly established in all the most important places of the country the Council will make, without delay, a formal offer of armistice to all the nations involved in the war—to the Allies and also to the nations at war with us.

A draft message to this effect has been sent to all the people's representatives abroad, and to all the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allied nations in Petrograd.

ORDER TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

To you, Citizen Commander-in-Chief, the Council, in fulfilling the resolution of the Congress of Delegates, gives the order that, after receiving the present message, you shall approach the commanding authorities of the enemy armies with an offer of a cessation of all hostile activities for the purpose of opening peace *pourparlers*.

In charging you with the conduct of these preliminary *pourparlers*, the Council orders you:

1. To keep the Council constantly informed, by direct wire, of all your *pourparlers* with the enemy armies.

2. To sign the preliminary act only after approval by the Council.

(Signed)

VLADIMIR ULIANOV-Lenin [*alias* Cederblum],

President of the Council of Commissioners of the People.

L. TROTSKY [*alias* Braunstein], *Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.*

N. KRILENKO, *Commissioner for War.*

VLADIMIR BONCH-BRUEVICH, *Chairman of the Council.*

N. GORBUNOV, *Secretary.*

b. *Notification by Russian Council of Commissioners of the People to the army and navy deposing commander-in-chief, appointing his successor and instructing regiments to begin pourparlers with the enemy, November 22, 1917.*²

To All Committees of Regiments, Divisions, Corps, Armies; to All the Soldiers of the Revolutionary Army, and to All the Sailors of the Revolutionary Navy:

During the night of November 20 the Council of Commissioners of the People sent a wireless message to the Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin, containing an order that he should immediately and formally offer an armistice to all the nations, Allied and hostile, involved in the war. This message was received at Headquarters on November 21, at 5.05 A.M.

¹ British Admiralty, per Wireless Press, London *Times*, November 22, 1917, page 6. A textual summary of this order is printed in *Current History*, Vol. VII, Part II, 7.

² British Admiralty, per Wireless Press, London *Times*, November 23, 1917, page 6.

Dukhonin was instructed to keep the Council continually informed of the progress of the *pourparlers*, and only to sign the agreement for an armistice after sanction by the Council.

At the same time a similar offer for an armistice was formally submitted to all the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allies in Petrograd.

Having received no answer from Dukhonin up to yesterday evening, the Council authorized Lenin, Stalin and Krilenko to ask Dukhonin by direct wire for the cause of such delay.

The *pourparlers* have been in progress since 4.30 A.M. to-day.

Dukhonin attempted many times to evade giving an explanation of his conduct and a clear answer to the orders of the Government. When a categorical order was sent to Dukhonin instructing him to offer immediately and formally an armistice for the purpose of beginning peace *pourparlers* he refused to obey.

Now, in the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, and by order of the Council, Dukhonin has been informed that he has been deposed from his functions for disobeying the instructions of the Government and for conduct which is bringing unheard-of and terrible sufferings upon all the working masses, upon the whole country, and especially upon the Armies.

At the same time Dukhonin has been ordered to continue his duties till a new Commander-in-Chief, or any other person authorized by him, arrives to take over the command.

Ensign Krilenko has been appointed the new Commander-in-Chief.

Soldiers! the question of peace is in your hands. You must not permit the counter-revolutionary generals to destroy the great work of peace. You must arrest and guard them well, so that lynch-law, which is not worthy of a Revolutionary Army, cannot take place, and so that these generals cannot evade imminent justice. You will observe the strongest revolutionary and military discipline.

Let the regiments which are in the frontal positions elect immediately plenipotentiaries who shall formally begin peace *pourparlers* with the enemy. The Council gives you the right to do this. On the progress of the *pourparlers* you shall inform us by all possible means.

Only the Council has the right to sign the final agreement of armistice.

Soldiers! the question of peace is in your hands. Have watchfulness, tenacity and energy, and the will for peace will win!

In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic.

(Signed) V. ULIANOV-LENIN [*alias* Cederblum],
President of the Council of Commissioners of the People.
 N. KRILENKO, *Commissioner for War and*
Highest Commander-in-Chief.

PETROGRAD, NOV. 22, 1917.

c. Order of N. Krilenko, Russian national commissioner for war directing the army to cease firing and begin fraternization, November 28, 1917.¹

Our envoys have returned, bringing an official reply from the German Commander-in-Chief signifying his assent to the proposal to inaugurate negotiations

¹ London Times, December 3, 1917, page 8.

for an armistice on all fronts. The first meeting of the negotiators is fixed for November 19 [December 2, N. S.].

Any person concealing or opposing the promulgation of this order will, contrary to all existing usage, be brought before a revolutionary court-martial.

I order firing to cease immediately and fraternization to begin on all fronts. Great vigilance is necessary regarding the enemy. No military operations should be undertaken except in reply to those by the enemy. . . .

The Army is starving. It is without clothes and boots. The horses are dying for want of fodder. We have no means of assuring the transport of supplies. In a short time we shall obtain a general peace. Meanwhile all attention and care should be devoted to the Army remaining in the trenches.

3. NOTE SENT BY LEON TROTSKY, RUSSIAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO ALL ALLIED EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS, REQUESTING PARTICIPATION IN ARMISTICE, DECEMBER 6, 1917.¹

The negotiations opened by the delegates of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the one side, and the delegates of Russia on the other side, have been interrupted, on the initiative of our delegation, for a week, with the purpose of providing the opportunity, during this period, of informing the peoples and Governments of the Allied countries on the existence of such negotiations and on their tendency.

On Russia's part it has been arranged to declare that the proposed armistice has for its object the preparation of a peace on a democratic basis as expressed in the manifesto by the All-Russian Soviet Congress.

The armistice can be signed only under the conditions that the troops will not be sent from one front to another, and that the Islands of the Moon Sounds must be cleared by Germans.

Concerning the aims of the war the enemy delegates evaded a definite reply.

Indicating that they had been authorized to negotiate exclusively on the military side of the (proposed?) armistice, and not concerning the question of a general armistice, the delegates of the opposite side declined on the ground that they did not possess powers for deciding a general armistice with the countries whose delegates are not taking part in the conference.

The delegates of the opposite side proposed, in their turn, an armistice on the front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the duration of this armistice to be 28 days.

At the same time the delegates of the opposite side promised to transmit to their respective Governments the proposal made by the Russian delegation to invite all belligerent countries (that is, all Allied countries, except Russia) to take part in the negotiations.

¹ London Times, December 8, 1917, page 9.

Our delegation refused to sign at this stage of the negotiations a formal armistice, and it was decided again to suspend all hostile activities for a week and to interrupt for the same period the negotiations on an armistice.

As a result a period of over one month will exist between the first decree of November 8 [November 21, N. S.] by the Council's authority concerning peace, and the moment of the continuation of the peace negotiations on December 12 [December 25, N. S.]. This period is, even for the present disturbed state of international communications, amply sufficient to afford the Allied Governments the opportunity to define their attitude toward the peace negotiations, that is, their willingness or their refusal to take part in the negotiations for an armistice and peace.

In the case of a refusal they must declare clearly and definitely before all mankind the aims for which the peoples of Europe may have to lose their blood during a fourth year of war.

(Signed) L. TROTSKY,
People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

4. BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PUT FORWARD BY RUSSIAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS IN THE SESSION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, BREST-LITOVSK, DECEMBER 22, 1917.¹

I. No forcible appropriation of any territories taken in the course of the war. The occupying armies to be withdrawn from those territories at the earliest moment.

II. Complete political independence to be given to those nationalities which were deprived of it before the beginning of the war.

III. Nationalities not hitherto in the enjoyment of political independence to be allowed the right to decide by means of a referendum whether they

¹ London Times, December 26, 1917, page 6.

The German version of the principles differs, and, as translated in Washington, reads:

"In the sitting of the 22d of this month the Russian delegation declares it proceeds from the expressed will of the Russian people to reach as soon as possible a conclusion of a general, just and acceptable peace for all.

"Making reference to resolutions of the All-Russian Congress of Workingmen and Soldiers' Deputies and of the All-Russian Farmers' Congress, the Russian delegation declares that it is considered a crime to continue war simply for the purpose of making annexations and that, therefore, it makes known solemnly its determination to put their signatures to conditions for peace which will end this war upon the foundation of principles of just conditions for all peoples in like manner without exception.

"Proceeding from these principles the Russian delegation has proposed to place as foundation for peace negotiations the following six points:

"One—No forcible union of districts which have come into possession during war is allowed. Troops which are occupying these districts will be withdrawn in shortest time.

"Two—Political independence of peoples which have lost their independence in this war will be in fullest extent restored.

"Three—Possibility shall be granted to national groups which before the war were not politically independent to decide the question of submitting themselves to one or other State or to determine their political independence by referendum. This referendum must be carried out in such a way

elect to be united to other nations or to acquire independence. The referendum should be so arranged as to insure complete freedom in the voting.

IV. In the case of territories inhabited by several nationalities, the rights of minorities to be safeguarded by special provisions.

V. None of the belligerent powers to pay any war indemnity. War requisitions should be returned and sufferers by war should be compensated from a special fund levied on all belligerent countries in proportion to their resources.

VI. Colonial questions to be settled in accordance with preceding conditions in the colonies.

In conclusion the Russian delegates proposed that no indirect pressure should be exerted on weaker nations by such economic boycotting as made their subjection oppressive by commercial dependence or blockades.

II. REPLIES TO THE RUSSIAN OFFER

I. STATEMENT OF COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN VON CHUDENITZ, AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE IN REPLY TO THE RUSSIAN PEACE PRINCIPLES, AND CONSTITUTING THE BASIS OF THEIR GENERAL PEACE PROPOSAL, BREST-LITOVSK, DECEMBER 25, 1917.¹

The delegations of the allied [Teutonic] powers, acting upon the clearly expressed will of their Governments and peoples, will conclude as soon as possible a general peace. The delegations, in complete accord with the repeatedly expressed viewpoint of their Governments, think that the basic principles of the Russian delegation can be made the basis of such a peace.

The delegations of the Quadruple Alliance are agreed immediately to conclude a general peace without forcible annexations and indemnities. They share the view of the Russian delegation, which condemns the continuation of the war purely for aims of conquest.

that complete independence is assured in voting for the whole population of the district concerned, including emigrants and refugees.

"Four—In reference to districts of mixed nationality the right of the minority shall be protected by special law which gives to it independence for its national culture and, when this can be carried through, practically an autonomous administration.

"Five—As to what concerns replacement of losses of private persons in consequence of war, they shall be met from an especial fund to which belligerents shall contribute proportionately.

"Six—Colonial questions shall be decided by the observation of fundamental principles expressed under number one to number four.

"In addition to these points, the Russian delegation proposed to the contracting parties to declare every kind of indirect attack on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger as inadmissible; for instance, by economic boycott, by economic predominance of one land over another based on compulsory commercial treaties, by special tariffs which limit freedom of trade of their countries, by sea blockades which have in view not immediate war aims, etc."—(*Official Bulletin*, January 2, 1918; see also *London Times*, December 28, 1917, page 7.)

¹ Associated Press dispatch, December 27, 1917; Reuter translation, *London Times*, December 28, 1917, page 7.

The statesmen of the allied [Teutonic] Governments in programs and statements have emphasized time and again that for the sake of conquest they will not prolong the war a single day. The Governments of the allies unswervingly have followed this view all the time. They solemnly declare their resolve immediately to sign terms of peace which will stop this war on the above terms, equally just to all belligerents without exception.

It is necessary, however, to indicate most clearly that the proposals of the Russian delegation could be realized only in case all the powers participating in the war obligate themselves scrupulously to adhere to the terms, in common with all peoples.

The powers of the Quadruple Alliance now negotiating with Russia cannot, of course, one-sidedly bind themselves to such terms, not having the guarantee that Russia's allies will recognize and carry out these terms honestly without reservation with regard to the Quadruple Alliance. Starting upon these principles, and regarding the six clauses proposed by the Russian delegation as a basis of negotiations, the following must be stated:

Clause 1. Forcible annexation of territories seized during the war does not enter into the intention of the allied powers. About troops now occupying seized territories, it must be stipulated in the peace treaty, if there is no agreement before, regarding the evacuation of these places.

Clause 2. It is not the intention of the allies to deprive of political independence those nations which lost it during the war.¹

Clause 3. The question of subjection to that or the other country of those nationalities who have not political independence cannot, in the opinion of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, be solved internationally. In this case it must be solved by each Government, together with its peoples, in a manner established by the Constitution.

Clause 4. Likewise, in accordance with the declaration of statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential component part of the constitutional rights of peoples to self-determination. The Allied Governments also grant validity to this principle everywhere, in so far as it is practically realizable.

Clause 5. The allied powers have frequently emphasized the possibility that both sides might renounce not only indemnification for war costs, but also indemnification for war damages. In these circumstances, every belligerent power would have only to make indemnification for expenditures for its nationals who have become prisoners of war, as well as for

¹ Compare the Russian proposal, which relates to nationalities deprived of independence before the war not to those losing it during the war. The statement of Count Czernin follows the German version.

damage done in its own territory by illegal acts of force committed against civilian nationals belonging to the enemy. The Russian Government's proposal for the creation of a special fund for this purpose could be taken into consideration only if the other belligerent powers were to join in the peace negotiations within a suitable period.

Clause 6. Of the four allied powers, Germany alone possesses colonies. On the part of the German delegation, in full accord with the Russian proposals regarding that, the following is declared:

The return of colonial territories forcibly seized during the war constitutes an essential part of German demands, which Germany cannot renounce under any circumstances. Likewise, the Russian demand for immediate evacuation of territories occupied by an adversary conforms to German intentions. Having in view the nature of the colonial territories of Germany, the realization of the right of self-determination, besides the above outlined considerations, in the form proposed by the Russian delegation is at present practically impossible.

The circumstance that in the German colonies the natives, notwithstanding the greatest difficulties and the improbability of victory in a struggle against an adversary many times stronger and who had the advantage of unlimited import by sea, remained in the gravest circumstances faithful to their German friends, may serve as proof of their attachment and their resolve by all means to preserve allegiance to Germany, proof which by its significance and weight is far superior to any expression of popular will.

The principles of economic relations proposed by the Russian delegation in connection with the above six clauses are approved wholly by the delegations of the allied powers, who always have denied any economic restrictions and who see in the re-establishment of regulated economic relations, which are in accord with the interests of all people concerned, one of the most important conditions for bringing about friendly relations between the powers now engaged in war.

2. EXTRACT FROM PROCEEDINGS OF BREST-LITOVSK CONFERENCE PROPOSING 10-DAY RECESS TO ENABLE OTHER NATIONS TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, DECEMBER 25, 1917.¹

The leader of the Russian delegation, replying said:

"The delegation notes with satisfaction that the reply of the delegations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey accepted the principle

¹ London *Times*, December 28, 1917, page 8.

of a general democratic peace without annexations. The delegation recognizes the enormous importance of this advance on the road to a general peace. It must, however, observe that the reply contains an important reservation on point 3. The Russian delegation has further noted with satisfaction in the declaration of the four allied powers on point 5 the recognition of the principle of no indemnities. It has made a reservation, however, regarding indemnification for the support of war prisoners."

The Russian delegation further declared that it attached importance to the indemnification from an international fund of private persons who have suffered from acts of war. The delegation also recognized that the evacuation by the enemy of occupied German colonies corresponds to the principles it has laid down, and it proposes that the question whether the principle of the free expression of the people's will is applicable to colonies should be reserved for a special commission.

Finally, the head of the Russian delegation declared that, despite the differences mentioned, the delegation is of opinion that the frank statement contained in the reply of the four allied powers—namely, that no aggressive intentions are entertained, offers a real possibility of an immediate start with the negotiations for a general peace between the belligerent States.

The Russian delegation therefore proposed that negotiations be interrupted for 10 days from December 25 until January 4 so that the peoples whose Governments have not yet joined in the negotiations proceeding here for a general peace may have an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the principles of such a peace as now set forth. After the expiry of this period the negotiations must under all circumstances be continued.

Count Czernin then asked the Russian delegation to present its answer in writing. . . .

3. ATTITUDE OF THE ALLIES. EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY STEPHEN PICHON, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, JANUARY 11, 1918.

Stephen Pichon, French minister for foreign affairs, stated the decision of the Allies in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on January 11, 1918, when he said:

"I telegraphed to our Allies and inquired whether they did not think it opportune to agree to make identical combined statements. The Allies finally decided unanimously that it was preferable to keep to separate

declarations, leaving to each country full latitude as to form, since there was no disagreement in substance.”¹

4. THE WAR AIMS OF THE ALLIES: SPEECH OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, BRITISH PREMIER, BEFORE THE LABOR CONFERENCE ON MAN-POWER OF THE EMPIRE, LONDON, JANUARY 5, 1918.²

Explanatory Note.

Early in the war the British Government found it necessary to exempt men in certain occupations from military service. Eventually a List of Certified Occupations was issued and the exemptions indicated by this list became the subject of negotiations between the Government and the trade unions. The Military Service Act (5 & 6 Geo. 5, ch. 104, January 27, 1916) did not take full cognizance of the importance of occupational exemptions and it was therefore revised, after conference with the labor interests, by the Military Service Act (6 & 7 Geo. 5, ch. 15, May 25, 1916). The necessity of still further revising this act resulted in the so-called Man-Power Conference which began its sessions at Central Hall, Westminster, January 3, 1918, between representatives of the British Government and the representatives of the trade unions which were parties to the arrangements made in connection with recruiting under the schedule of protected occupations.

The British prime minister before the House of Commons, December 20, 1917 explained the relation between the Government and the trade unions in these words:

The tribunals [for determining liability to military service] are necessarily hampered and restricted by the conditions which Parliament imposed upon them, and probably which governments have imposed upon them owing to pledges given from time to time to avert labor troubles. . . . On behalf of the Government [Mr. Henderson] did his very best to smooth over those difficulties. He went on behalf of the Government to negotiate and whatever pledges he gave on behalf of the government for the time being, he did so with the full support and consent of the war cabinet. . . . It was the best thing to do in the interests of the country, and the reason why now we have got to ask that these pledges shall be either altered or cancelled is because the conditions have changed and the demands upon the man-power of the country are greater in consequence of those conditions. . . .

After an agreement had been entered into which gave protection to men engaged in certain trades, this question was asked by one of the trade unionists—this was on April 26, 1916; [Mr. Asquith] was Prime Minister at the time—“What

¹ London Times, January 14, 1918, page 7.

² London Times, January 7, 1918.

guarantee have we got if we come to an agreement that the Government will keep it?" Mr. Henderson's answer was:—"You have got no guarantee at all, and you cannot get any guarantee at all in view of the changing circumstances of a great war like this. What we will do if we are compelled by the necessities of the war—which must always be paramount—again to depart from the schedule is that we will ask you to come and meet us before we do it." . . .

Does anyone doubt that the conditions have materially changed? They have changed through circumstances over which not merely no government has any control, but circumstances over which this country has no control. Therefore it will be necessary for us to take action which will enable us to call men who at the present moment are protected by the conditions of these schedules to take their part in defense of their country in another sphere. But, as [Mr. Henderson] gave an undertaking on behalf of the Government, an undertaking which binds us all, . . . that if there were circumstances which would justify the Government in departing from the schedule, if they were compelled by the necessities of the war to depart from the schedule, they would ask them to come and meet the Government before doing it, it is proposed that before the scheme which the Government have got in their minds and the proposals which they mean to submit to the House—before they come to the House of Commons and state what their plans are, and ask for the necessary legislation to enable them to carry out those plans, we propose to summon the unions which are concerned, to state the whole of the circumstances to them, and place before them the circumstances which have induced the Government to ask the House of Commons for a release from those pledges. My right hon. friend the Minister for National Service (Sir A. Geddes) proposes next week to invite the leaders of the trade unions to meet him in order to place the whole of these conditions before them.¹

In preparation for the meeting announced by the prime minister, the labor interests on December 17, 1917, had issued a memorandum on war aims.

This memorandum was approved by the Executive Committee of the Labor Party and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress for submission to the conference. It followed the main lines of a memorandum drawn up by a sub-committee of the Executive Committee of the Labor Party on the occasion of its conference on the abortive Stockholm project in August, 1917, and was as follows:

Memorandum of the British Labor Movement on war aims submitted to the Prime Minister in negotiations on man-power of the Empire, voted by special conference Central Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917.

1. *The War.*—The British Labor movement declares that whatever may have been the causes of the outbreak of war, it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting peace for the world. The British Labor

¹ London Times, Weekly Edition, December 28, 1917, page 1,083.

movement sees no reason to depart from the declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labor parties of the Allied nations on February 14, 1915.¹

2. *Making the World Safe for Democracy.*—Whatever may have been the causes for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the British Labor movement in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy.

Of all the war aims, none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there shall be henceforth on earth no more war. Whoever triumphs, the people will have lost unless some effective method of preventing war can be found.

As a means to this end, the British Labor movement relies very largely upon the complete democratization of all countries; on the frank abandonment of every form of imperialism; on the suppression of secret diplomacy, and on the placing of foreign policy, just as much as home policy, under the control of popularly elected legislatures; on the absolute responsibility of the foreign minister of each country to its legislature; on such concerted action as may be possible for the universal abolition of compulsory military service in all countries, the common limitation of the costly armaments by which all peoples are burdened, and the entire abolition of profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in war scares and rivalry in preparation for war.

But it demands, in addition, that it should be an essential part of the treaty of peace itself that there should be forthwith established a supernational authority, or League of Nations, which should not only be adhered to by all the present belligerents, but which every other independent sovereign State in the world should be pressed to join; the immediate establishment by such League of Nations not only of an International High Court for the settlement of all disputes between States that are of justiciable nature, but also of appropriate machinery for prompt

¹ The declaration referred to was voted in London, February 14, 1915, and reads:

I. This conference cannot ignore the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society, and of the policy of colonial dependencies and aggressive imperialism, against which international socialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every government has its share of responsibility.

The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the very existence of independent nationalities, and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In these circumstances a victory for German imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium, France and Russia do not pursue the political and economic crushing of Germany; they are not at war with the people of Germany and Austria, but only with the governments of those countries by which they are oppressed. They demand that Belgium shall be liberated and compensated. They desire that the question of Poland shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another State, or in that of complete independence. They wish that throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by force shall receive the right freely to dispose of themselves.

While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved to accomplish this task of liberation, the Socialists are none the less resolved to resist any attempt to transform this defensive war into a war of conquest, which would only prepare fresh conflicts, create new grievances, and subject various peoples more than ever to the double plague of armaments and war.

Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles of the International, the members of the Conference express the hope that the working classes of all the different countries will before long find themselves united again in their struggle against militarism and capitalist imperialism. The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the world.

II. On the conclusion of the war the working classes of all the industrial countries must unite in the International in order to suppress secret diplomacy, put an end to the interests of militarism and those of the armament makers, and establish some international authority to settle points of difference among the nations by compulsory conciliation and arbitration, and to compel all nations to maintain peace. . . .

and effective mediation between States at issue that are not justiciable; the formation of an International Legislature, in which the representatives of every civilized State would have their allotted share; the gradual development, as far as may prove to be possible, of international legislation agreed to by and definitely binding upon the several States, and for a solemn agreement and pledge by all States that every issue between any two or more of them shall be submitted for settlement as aforesaid, and that they will all make common cause against any State which fails to adhere to this agreement.

3. *Territorial Adjustments.*—The British Labor movement has no sympathy with the attempts made, now in this quarter and now in that, to convert this war into a war of conquest, nor should the struggle be prolonged for a single day, once the conditions of a permanent peace can be secured, merely for the sake of extending the boundaries of any State.

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that not only restitution and reparation, but also certain territorial readjustments, are required if a renewal of armaments and war is to be avoided. These readjustments must be such as can be arrived at by common agreement on the general principle of allowing all peoples to settle their own destinies and for the purpose of removing any obvious cause of future international conflict.

(a) *Belgium.*—The British Labor movement emphatically insists that a foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government, under the direction of an International Commission, of the wrong admittedly done to Belgium; payment by that government for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong, and the restoration of Belgium to complete and untrammelled independent sovereignty, leaving to the decision of the Belgian people the determination of their own future policy in all respects.

(b) *Alsace and Lorraine.*—The British Labor movement reaffirms its reprobation of the crime against the peace of the world by which Alsace and Lorraine were forcibly torn from France in 1871—a political blunder the effects of which have contributed in no small degree to the continuance of unrest and the growth of militarism in Europe—and, profoundly sympathizing with the unfortunate inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, who have been subjected to so much repression, asks in accordance with the declarations of the French Socialists that they shall be allowed, under the protection of the supernational authority, or League of Nations, freely to decide what shall be their future political position.

(c) *The Balkans.*—The British Labor movement suggests that the whole problem of the re-organization of the administration of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula might be dealt with by a Special Conference of their representatives, or by an authoritative International Commission, on the basis of (a) the complete freedom of these people to settle their own destinies, irrespective of Austrian, Turkish or other foreign dominion; (b) the independent sovereignties of the several nationalities in those districts in which these are largely predominant; (c) the universal adoption of religious tolerance, the equal citizenship of all races and local autonomy; (d) a Customs Union embracing the whole of the Balkan States, and (e) the entry of all the Balkan National States into a Federation for the concerted arrangement by mutual agreement among themselves of all matters of common concern.

(d) *Italy.*—The British Labor movement declares its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian blood and speech who have been left outside the inconvenient

and indefensible boundaries that have as a result of the diplomatic agreements of the past been assigned to the Kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue. It realizes that arrangements may be necessary for securing the legitimate interests of the people of Italy in the adjacent seas, but it has no sympathy with the far-reaching aims of conquest of Italian imperialism, and believes that all legitimate needs can be safeguarded without precluding a like recognition of the needs of others or an annexation of other people's territories.¹

(e) *Poland, etc.*—With regard to the other cases in dispute, from Luxemburg on the one hand, of which the independence has been temporarily destroyed, to the lands now under foreign domination inhabited by other races—the outstanding example being that of the Poles—the British Labor movement relies, as the only way of achieving a lasting settlement, on the application of the principle of allowing each people to settle its own destiny.

(f) *The Jews and Palestine.*—The British Labor movement demands for the Jews of all countries the same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. But it further expresses the hope that it may be practicable by agreement among all the nations to set free Palestine from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that the country may form a free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and work out their own salvation, free from interference by those of alien race or religion.

(g) *The Problem of the Turkish Empire.*—The whole civilized world condemns the handing back to the universally execrated rule of the Turkish Government any subject people which has once been freed from it. Thus whatever may be proposed with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia they cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his pashas.

The British Labor movement disclaims all sympathy with the imperialist aims of governments and capitalists who would make of these and other territories now dominated by the Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or militarism. If in these territories it is impracticable to leave it to the peoples to settle their own destinies, the British Labor movement insists that, conformably with the policy of "no annexations," they should be placed for administration in the hands of a commission acting under the supernational authority, or League of Nations. It is further suggested that the peace of the world requires that Constantinople should be made a free port, permanently neutralized, and placed (together with both shores of the Dardanelles and possibly some or all of Asia Minor) under the same impartial administration.

(h) *The Colonies of Tropical Africa.*—With regard to the colonies of the several belligerents in tropical Africa from sea to sea—whether including all north of the Zambesi River and south of the Sahara Desert, or only those lying between 15 degrees north and 15 degrees south latitude, which are already the subject of international control—the British Labor movement disclaims all sympathy with the imperialist idea that these should form the booty of any nation, should be exploited for the profit of the capitalist, or should be used for the promotion of

¹ The last sentence was added to the text submitted to the labor conference on August 10, 1917. In the interval the treaty of May 9, 1915, had been published textually at Petrograd. For its text see *The New Europe*, Vol. VI, 24-27, and *Current History*, Vol. VII, Part II, 494-497.

the militarist aims of governments. In view of the fact that it is impracticable here to leave the various peoples concerned to settle their own destinies, it is suggested that the interests of humanity would be best served by the full and frank abandonment by all the belligerents of any dreams of an African empire; the transfer of the present colonies of the European powers in tropical Africa, however the limits of this area may be defined, to the proposed supernational authority, or League of Nations, herein suggested, and their administration under the legislative council of that authority as a single, independent African State, with its own trained staff, on the principles of (1) taking account in each locality of the wishes of the people when these can be ascertained; (2) protection of the natives against exploitation and oppression and the preservation of their tribal interests; (3) all revenues raised to be expended for the welfare and development of the African State itself, and (4) the permanent neutralization of this African State and its abstention from participation in international rivalries or any future wars.

(i) *Other Cases.*—The British Labor movement suggests that any other territories, in which it is proposed that the future safe-guarding of pacific relations makes necessary a transfer of sovereignty, should be made the subject of amicable bargaining, with an equivalent exchange in money or otherwise.

4. *Economic Relations.*—The British Labor movement declares against all the projects now being prepared by imperialists and capitalists not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an economic war after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations, as such an economic war if begun by any country would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defense be driven.

It realizes that all such attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the British workmen see in the alliance between the military imperialists and the fiscal protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace.

On the other hand, if unfortunately a genuine peace cannot be secured, the right of each nation to the defense of its own economic interests and, in face of the world shortage hereinafter mentioned, to the conservation for its own people of a sufficiency of its own supplies of foodstuffs and raw material cannot be denied.

The British Labor movement, accordingly, urges upon the Labor parties of all countries the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the government toward commercial enterprises, along with the necessary control of supplies for its own people, on the principle of the open door, on customs duties being limited strictly to revenue purposes, and on there being no hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But it urges equally the importance not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development by appropriate government action of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, hours of labor, and the prevention of sweating and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression.

5. *The Problems of Peace.*—To make the world safe for democracy involves much more than the prevention of war, either military or economic. It will be

a device of the capitalist interests to pretend that the treaty of peace need concern itself only with the cessation of the struggle of the armed forces and with any necessary territorial readjustments. The British Labor movement insists that, in view of the probable world-wide shortage after the war of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships and even possible famine in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries in proportion not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs, and that within each country the government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market, mainly to the richer classes, in proportion to their means, but systematically, to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community, on the principle of "No cake for any one until all have bread."

Moreover, it cannot but be anticipated that in all countries the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition workers and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of soldiers—in face of the scarcity of industrial capital, the shortage of raw materials and the insecurity of commercial enterprise—will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment, more or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the British Labor movement holds that it is the duty of every government to take immediate action not merely to relieve the unemployed when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment.

It therefore urges upon the Labor parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads and railways, the erection of schools and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings, and the reclamation and afforestation of land) that will be required in the near future not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level year by year and throughout each year the aggregate demand for labor, and thus prevent there being any unemployed. It is now known that in this way it is quite possible for any government to prevent, if it chooses, the very occurrence of any widespread or prolonged involuntary unemployment, which, if it is now in any country allowed to occur, is as much the result of government neglect as is any epidemic disease.

6. *Restoration and Reparation.*—The British Labor movement holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries immediately peace is declared will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings and means of communication in France, Belgium, Tyrol and North Italy, East Prussia, Poland, Galicia, Russia, Rumania, the Balkans, Greece, Armenia, Asia Minor and Central Africa; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings, and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting

up the wage-earners and peasants themselves in homes and employments; and that to insure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so far as the cost is contributed by any international fund, should be made under the direction of an International Commission.

But the British Labor movement will not be satisfied unless a full and free judicial investigation be made into the accusations, so freely made on all sides, that particular governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence and theft against individual victims for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of war. It draws attention in particular to the loss of life and property of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including women and children) resulting from this inhuman and ruthless conduct.

It should be part of the conditions of peace that there should be forthwith set up a court of claims and accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or government to answer the complaint, to pronounce judgment and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong or to their dependents. The several governments must be responsible, financially and otherwise, for the presentation of the cases of their respective nationals to such a court of claims and accusations.

a. TELEGRAM OF ARTHUR HENDERSON, PRESIDENT OF SPECIAL CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH LABOR MOVEMENT, TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU AT STOCKHOLM, DECEMBER 28, 1918.¹

The Conference of the British Labor and Socialist movement carried to-day the War Aims Memorandum as published *Times*, 19th December. Endeavoring to influence Government accordingly. Please communicate terms and decision Chairman, Soviet, Petrograd, conveying the strong desire Trades Union Congress and Labor Party Executive against separate peace. Also inform Branting.

Immediately after the adoption of the memorandum the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the Labor Party met jointly and got into communication with the prime minister with the purpose of laying the memorandum before him. Mr. Lloyd George agreed to see them at once. "A full and frank exchange of views took place not only on the broad question of general policy, but on the detailed proposals of the memorandum," said the *London Times*.² Difficulties expressed by the labor leaders "were satisfactorily met, and the interview removed the last trace of misunderstanding which may have existed between the prime minister and labor. The initiative in securing this understanding with the prime minister had been taken by the labor leaders. It was fortunately timed for all parties, as the Government were enabled to build upon this foundation the imposing edifice which has since been revealed to the world."

¹ *London Times*, December 29, 1917, page 7. A more definite appeal to the Russian Bolshevik authorities was issued on January 15, 1918, on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress and the National Executive of the Labor Party. This is printed in the *London Times* of January 16, 1918, page 4, and summarized in *Current History*, Vol. VII, Part II, 206-7.

² *London Times*, January 7, 1918, page 7.

PRIME MINISTER LLOYD GEORGE'S SPEECH

When the Government invite organized Labor in this country to assist them to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives are entitled to ask that any misgivings and doubts which any of them may have about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied should be definitely cleared, and what is true of organized labor is equally true of all citizens in this country without regard to grade or avocation.

When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and die and vast populations are being subjected to the sufferings and privations of war on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world, they are entitled to know for what cause or causes they are making the sacrifice. It is only the clearest, greatest and justest of causes that can justify the continuance even for one day of this unspeakable agony of the nations. And we ought to be able to state clearly and definitely not only the principles for which we are fighting but also their definite and concrete application to the war map of the world.

We have arrived at the most critical hour in this terrible conflict, and before any Government takes the fateful decision as to the conditions under which it ought either to terminate or continue the struggle, it ought to be satisfied that the conscience of the nation is behind these conditions, for nothing else can sustain the effort which is necessary to achieve a righteous end to this war. I have therefore during the last few days taken special pains to ascertain the view and the attitude of representative men of all sections of thought and opinion in the country. Last week I had the privilege not merely of perusing the declared war aims of the Labor Party, but also of discussing in detail with the Labor leaders the meaning and intention of that declaration. I have also had an opportunity of discussing this same momentous question with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey. Had it not been that the Nationalist leaders are in Ireland engaged in endeavoring to solve the tangled problem of Irish self-government, I should have been happy to exchange views with them, but Mr. Redmond, speaking on their behalf, has, with his usual lucidity and force, in many of his speeches, made clear what his ideas are as to the object and purpose of the war. I have also had the opportunity of consulting certain representatives of the Great Dominions Overseas.

I am glad to be able to say as a result of all these discussions that, although the Government are alone responsible for the actual language I propose using, there is national agreement as to the character and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions, and in what I say to you to-day, and through

you to the world, I can venture to claim that I am speaking not merely the mind of the Government but of the nation and of the Empire as a whole.

WHAT WE ARE NOT FIGHTING FOR

We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are *not* fighting for. We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day. Most reluctantly and, indeed, quite unprepared for the dreadful ordeal, we were forced to join in this war in self-defense, in defense of the violated public law of Europe, and in vindication of the most solemn treaty obligations on which the public system of Europe rested, and on which Germany had ruthlessly trampled in her invasion of Belgium. We had to join in the struggle or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force triumph over public right and international justice. It was only the realization of that dreadful alternative that forced the British people into the war. And from that original attitude they have never swerved. They have never aimed at the break up of the German peoples or the disintegration of their State or country. Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination and to see her devote all her strength to the great beneficent tasks of the world. Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.

Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the Imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the 20th century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that in her the old spirit of military domination had indeed died in this war, and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

COUNT CZERNIN'S PRONOUNCEMENT

It is now more than a year since the President of the United States, then neutral, addressed to the belligerents a suggestion that each side should

state clearly the aims for which they were fighting. We and our Allies responded by the note of January 10, 1917.

To the President's appeal the Central Empires made no reply, and, in spite of many adjurations, both from their opponents and from neutrals, they have maintained a complete silence as to the objects for which they are fighting. Even on so crucial a matter as their intention with regard to Belgium they have uniformly declined to give any trustworthy indication.

On December 25 last, however, Count Czernin, speaking on behalf of Austria-Hungary and her Allies, did make a pronouncement of a kind. It is indeed deplorably vague. We are told that "it is not the intention" of the Central Powers "to appropriate forcibly" any occupied territories or "to rob of its independence" any nation which has lost its "political independence" during the war. It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge.

Does it mean that Belgium, Servia, Montenegro and Rumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as the Germans or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economic, incompatible with the status and dignity of a freed self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention then there will be one kind of independence for a great nation and an inferior kind of independence for a small nation. We must know what is meant, for equality of right among nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her Allies are fighting to establish in this war. Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages and their inhabitants is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called "offer" of the Central Powers is almost entirely a refusal of all concessions. All suggestions about the autonomy of subject nationalities are ruled out of the peace terms altogether. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to Arabs, Armenians or Syrians is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte. A pious wish for the protection of minorities "in so far as it is practically realizable" is the nearest approach to liberty which the Central statesmen venture to make.

GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT.

On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the "German demand" for the restoration of the whole

of Germany's colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or, as our earlier phrase goes, government by consent of the governed, here vanish into thin air.

It is impossible to believe that any edifice of permanent peace could be erected on such a foundation as this. Mere lip service to the formula of no annexations and no indemnities or the right of self-determination is useless. Before any negotiations can ever be begun, the Central Powers must realize the essential facts of the situation.

The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared at whatever sacrifice to honor the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

BELGIUM AND ALSACE-LORRAINE.

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their Allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. This is no demand for war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another, which may or may not be defensible. It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there can be any hope for a stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated, and, so far as possible, repaired. Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is recognized by insistence on payment for injury done in defiance of its canons it can never be a reality. Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy and Rumania. The complete withdrawal of the alien armies and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without

any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and until it is cured healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right.

I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the Revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be discussed. Russia accepted war with all its horrors because, true to her traditional guardianship of the weaker communities of her race, she stepped in to protect Serbia from a plot against her independence. It is this honorable sacrifice which not merely brought Russia into the war, but France as well. France, true to the conditions of her treaty with Russia, stood by her Ally in a quarrel which was not her own. Her chivalrous respect for her treaty led to the wanton invasion of Belgium; and the treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land brought us into the war.

The present rulers of Russia are now engaged, without any reference to the countries whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations with their common enemy. I am indulging in no reproaches; I am merely stating facts with a view to making it clear why Britain cannot be held accountable for decisions taken in her absence, and concerning which she has not been consulted or her aid invoked. No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to delude Russia, she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another—and the name hardly matters—these Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an impotent army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany. We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country mean to stand to the last by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other Allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side by the new democracy of Russia, so will America and so will France and Italy. But if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their Allies we have no means of intervening

to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people.

We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe.

AUSTRIA, ITALY, TURKEY

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the breakup of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that, unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace.

On the same grounds we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe, instead of being merely an instrument to the pernicious military autocracy of Prussia that uses the resources of its allies for the furtherance of its own sinister purposes.

Outside Europe we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople—the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized—Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.

Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our Allies on this and on other subjects. I can only say that as new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our Allies.

THE GERMAN COLONIES

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments. The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members, and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal.

The general principle of national self-determination is therefore as applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories. The German declaration, that the natives of the German colonies have, through their military fidelity in the war, shown their attachment and resolve under all circumstances to remain with Germany, is applicable not to the German colonies generally, but only to one of them, and in that case (German East Africa) the German authorities secured the attachment, not of the native population as a whole, which is and remains profoundly anti-German, but only of a small warlike class from whom their *askaris*, or soldiers, were selected. These they attached to themselves by conferring on them a highly privileged position as against the bulk of the native population, which enabled these *askaris* to assume a lordly and oppressive superiority over the rest of the natives. By this and other means they secured the attachment of a very small and insignificant minority whose interests were directly opposed to those of the rest of the population, and for whom they have no right to speak. The German treatment of their native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves.

REPARATION

Finally, there must be reparation for injuries done in violation of international law. The peace conference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered to, and the outrages they have suffered for, the common cause of freedom.

One omission we notice in the proposal of the Central Powers which seems to us especially regrettable. It is desirable, and indeed essential, that

the settlement after this war shall be one which does not in itself bear the seed of future war. But that is not enough. However wisely and well we may make territorial and other arrangements, there will still be many subjects of international controversy. Some, indeed, are inevitable.

The economic conditions at the end of the war will be in the highest degree difficult. Owing to the diversion of human effort to warlike pursuits, there must follow a world-shortage of raw materials, which will increase the longer the war lasts, and it is inevitable that those countries which have control of the raw materials will desire to help themselves and their friends first.

"JUST AND LASTING PEACE "

Apart from this, whatever settlement is made will be suitable only to the circumstances under which it is made, and, as those circumstances change, changes in the settlement will be called for.

So long as the possibility of dispute between nations continues, that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by passionate ambition and war is the only means of settling a dispute, all nations must live under the burden not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak. The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing evil of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation, these are blots on our civilization of which every thinking individual must be ashamed.

For these and other similar reasons, we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. After all, war is a relic of barbarism, and, just as law has succeeded violence as the means of settling disputes between individuals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied—We are fighting for a just and a lasting peace—and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for three conditions must be fulfilled.

First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war.

On these conditions the British Empire would welcome peace, to secure those conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.

5. THE TERMS FOR WHICH AMERICA FIGHTS: SPEECH OF WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO CONGRESS, JANUARY 8, 1918.¹

Gentlemen of the Congress:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis for a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.

The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles.

The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added.

That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied,—every province, every city, every point of vantage,—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statemen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

¹ *Official Bulletin*, January 8, 1918.

INCIDENT FULL OF SIGNIFICANCE

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 19th of July last,¹ the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

ISSUES OF LIFE AND DEATH INVOLVED

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be

¹ The resolution referred to was introduced in the name of the Center, Radical and Socialist parties; and was adopted, 214 ayes, 116 noes, 17 abstentions. Its text is as follows:

"As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war, the German people stand upon the assurance of the speech from the Throne—'we are driven by no lust of conquest.'

"Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic and financial violations are incompatible with such a peace.

"The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international juridical organizations. So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken, and fight until the rights of Germany and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

"The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the Fatherland; in the heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people."—*New York Times*, July 21, 1917.

responded to and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week, Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail.

The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what it is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

DAYS OF CONQUEST GONE BY.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they

are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly 50 years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

Unless this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could

act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess.

The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

6. ADDRESS OF COUNT GEORG FRIEDRICH VON HERTLING, CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE, BEFORE THE MAIN COMMITTEE OF THE IMPERIAL REICHSTAG IN REPLY TO THE ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON, JANUARY 24, 1918.¹

Gentlemen, When last I had the honor to speak before your Committee—that was on January 3—we were faced by an incident which had occurred at Brest-Litovsk. At that time I expressed the opinion that we should await the settlement of this incident in all equanimity. The facts have corresponded with this expectation. The Russian delegation has again arrived at Brest-Litovsk, and negotiations have been resumed and continued. The negotiations are progressing slowly. They are exceedingly difficult.

I have already referred on a previous occasion to the exact circumstances from which these difficulties arise. Indeed, many times, there were reasons to doubt whether the Russian delegation was in earnest with their peace negotiations, and all sorts of wireless messages, which are going around the world with remarkably strange contents, tended to strengthen this doubt. Nevertheless, I hold firmly to the hope that we shall come to a favorable conclusion in the near future with the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk.

Our negotiations with the Ukrainian representatives are in a more favorable position. Here, too, difficulties have yet to be overcome, but the prospects are favorable. We hope shortly to reach conclusions with Ukraine which will be in the interests of both parties and will be economically advantageous.

One result, gentlemen, might be recorded, as you all know. The Russians last month proposed to issue an invitation to all the belligerents to participate in the negotiations. Russia submitted certain proposals of a very general character. At that time we accepted the proposal to invite

¹ Translation from the Department of State, Division of Foreign Intelligence, supplemented by paragraphs from the news report of Reuter's Telegraph Agency.

the belligerents to take part in the negotiations, on the condition, however, that the invitation should have a definite period for its acceptance.

At ten o'clock on the evening of January 4 the period expired. No answer had come, and as a result we were no longer under obligations and had a free hand for separate peace negotiations with Russia. Neither were we longer bound, of course, by the general peace proposals submitted to us by the Russian delegation.

DECLARATIONS, BUT NO REPLY

Instead of the reply which was expected, but which was not forthcoming, two declarations were made by enemy statesmen—Premier Lloyd George's speech and President Wilson's speech. I willingly admit that Lloyd George altered his tone. He no longer indulges in abuse, and appears desirous of again demonstrating his ability as a negotiator, which I had formerly doubted. I cannot go so far, however, as many opinions which have been expressed in neutral countries, which would read in this speech of Lloyd George a serious desire for peace and even a friendly disposition.

It is true, he declares he does not desire to destroy Germany, and never desired to destroy her. He has even words of respect for our political, economic and cultural position. But other utterances also are not lacking, and the idea continually comes to the surface that he has to pronounce judgment on Germany, charging her with being guilty of all possible crimes. That is an attitude with which we can have nothing to do, and in which we can discover no trace of a serious purpose to attain peace. We are to be the guilty ones, over whom the Entente is now sitting in judgment. That compels me to give a short review of the situation and the events preceding the war at the risk of repeating what long ago was said.

GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

The establishment of the German Empire in the year 1871 made an end of dismemberment. By the union of its tribes the German Empire in Europe acquired a position corresponding to its economic and cultural achievements and the claims founded thereon. Bismarck crowned his work by the alliance with Austria-Hungary. It was purely a defensive alliance, so conceived and willed by the exalted allies from the first.

Not even the slightest thought of its misuse for aggressive aims ever occurred in the course of decades. The defensive alliance between Germany and the Danube monarchy, closely connected by old traditions and allied to us by common interest, was to serve especially for the maintenance of peace.

But Bismarck had even then, as he was often reproached for having, an obsession in regard to coalitions which menaced the allied Central Powers, and the events of the times that followed have shown that it was not a mere terrifying phantom. The danger of enemy coalitions which threatened the allied Central Powers often made an appearance. By King Edward's isolation policy the dream of coalitions became a reality. The German Empire, progressing and growing in strength, stood in the way of British imperialism. In French lust of revenge and Russian aspirations of expansion, this British imperialism found only too ready aid. Thus future plans, dangerous for us, were formed.

The geographical situation of Germany in itself had always brought near to us the danger of war on two fronts, and now it became increasingly visible. Between Russia and France an alliance was concluded whose participants were twice as numerous as the population of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. Republican France lent the Russia of the Czar billions to construct strategical railways in the Kingdom of Poland in order to facilitate an advance against us. The French Republic drew on its last man for three years of service. Thus France, with Russia, built up armaments extending to the limit of the capabilities of both, thereby pursuing aims which our enemies now term imperialistic.

It would have been a neglect of duty had Germany remained a calm spectator of this game and had we not also endeavored to create an armament which would protect us against future enemies. I may perhaps recall that I as a member of the Reichstag very frequently spoke on these matters, and on the occasion of new expenditure on armament, pointed out that the German people, in consenting to these, solely desired to pursue a policy of peace, and that such armaments were only imposed upon us to ward off the danger threatening from a possible enemy. It doesn't appear that any regard was paid to these words abroad.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ALSACE-LORRAINE

And Alsace-Lorraine, of which Lloyd George speaks again. He speaks of the wrong Germany did in 1871 to France. Alsace-Lorraine—you need not be told, but abroad they appear still to be ignorant of things—Alsace-Lorraine comprises, as is known, for the most part purely German regions which by a century-long violence and illegality were severed from the German Empire and, until finally in 1789 the French Revolution swallowed up the last remnant, Alsace and Lorraine then became French provinces.

When in the war of 1870 we demanded back the districts which had been criminally wrested from us, that was not a conquest of foreign territory but

rightly and properly speaking what to-day is called disannexation, and this disannexation was then expressly recognized by the French National Assembly, the constitutional representatives of the French people at that time, March 29, 1871, by a large majority of votes.

And in England too, gentlemen, language quite other than is heard to-day has been heard. I can appeal to a classic witness. It is none other than the famous British historian and author Thomas Carlyle who in a letter to the *Times* wrote: "No people has had such a bad neighbor as Germany has possessed during the last 400 years in France. Germany would have been mad had she not thought of erecting such a frontier wall between herself and such a neighbor when opportunity offered."

Observe that I have not repeated a very hard expression which Carlyle used about France. I know of no law of nature, no resolution of heavenly parliaments, whereby France alone of all earthly beings was not obliged to restore stolen territories if the owners from whom they had been snatched had an opportunity of reconquering them. And respected English press organs expressed themselves in a like sense. I mention for example the *Daily News*.¹

REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON

I now come to President Wilson. Here, too, I recognize that the tone appears to have changed. The unanimous rejection of Mr. Wilson's attempt in reply to the Pope's note to sow discord between the German Government and the German people has had its effect.

This unanimous rejection might of itself lead Mr. Wilson on the right path. A beginning to that end has perhaps been made, for now there is at any rate no longer talk about oppression of the German people by an autocratic German Government and the former attacks on the House of Hohenzollern have not been repeated.

I shall not enlarge upon the distorted representation of German policy which is contained in Mr. Wilson's message, but will deal in detail with the points which Mr. Wilson lays down there, not less than fourteen points, in which he formulates his peace program; and I pray your indulgence in dealing with these as briefly as possible.

¹ As clear a series of proofs could be adduced for the French claim. The chancellor refers to these territories having been detached from the German Empire, but the allusion is to the Holy Roman Empire, which was not a lineal predecessor of the present German Empire. The French National Assembly's vote of March 29, 1871, was passed at a time when France was occupied by German troops and the assembly was consequently not a free agent respecting matters stipulated in the preliminary treaty of peace of February 26, 1871, which was made definitive by the treaty of Frankfurt of May 10, 1871.

The Carlyle letter was published on November 18, 1870, not in December. The newspaper publishing the letter did not approve it.—*Editor's note.*

I.—The first point is the demand that there shall be no more secret international agreements. History shows that it is we above all others who would be able to agree to the publicity of diplomatic documents. I recall that our defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary was known to the whole world from 1888, while the offensive agreement of the enemy States first saw the light of publicity during the war, through the revelations of the secret Russian archives.¹ The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk are being conducted with full publicity. This proves that we are quite ready to accept this proposal and declare publicity of negotiations to be a general political principle.

II.—In his second point Mr. Wilson demands freedom of shipping on the seas in war and peace. This also is demanded by Germany as the first and one of the most important requirements for the future. Therefore, there is here no difference of opinion. The limitation introduced by Mr. Wilson at the end which I need not quote textually, is not intelligible, appears superfluous and would therefore best be left out. (The limiting clause reads: "... except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.") It would therefore be highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongkong, the Falkland Islands and many other places, were removed.

III.—We too are in thorough accord with the removal of economic barriers which interfere with trade in a superfluous manner. We too condemn economic war, which would inevitably bear within it causes of future warlike complications.

IV.—Limitation of armaments. As already declared by us, the idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The financial position of all European States after the war might most effectively promote a satisfactory solution.

It is therefore clear that an understanding might be reached without difficulty on the first four points of Mr. Wilson's program.

¹ The German-Austro-Hungarian alliance treaty of October 7, 1879, was secret until published by Prince Bismarck in the *Berlin Official Gazette*, February 3, 1888, to serve the political purpose of putting "an end to doubts which have been entertained in various quarters of its purely defensive character, and have been turned to account for various ends." That treaty was only one of the series constituting the Triple Alliance, and none of the others has been published with the exception of Arts. I, III, IV and VII of the main treaty of May 22, 1882 (as revised in 1887), which were quoted in the diplomatic exchanges between Austria-Hungary and Italy prior to the latter's declaration of war.

The effort evidently was made to imply that, while Germany's pre-war alliance was defensive, the opposing one—the Triple Entente—was offensive. The implied antithesis is not true. The Triple Entente was at least as defensive as the Triple Alliance. Moreover, more was known of it than of the Triple Alliance. (See Pierre Albin, *La France et l'Allemagne en Europe (1885-1894)*, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1913.) If the implication stated was not intended, the term "offensive agreements" can only refer to arrangements made during the course of the war. In that case the phrase loses all propriety it otherwise might have.—*Editor's note.*

V.—I now come to the fifth point, settlement of all colonial claims and disputes. Practical realization of Mr. Wilson's principles in the realm of reality will encounter some difficulties in any case. I believe that for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the program also will have to be discussed in due time, on the reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions, which we also demand absolutely.

VI.—Evacuation of Russian territory. Now that the Entente has refused, within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance, to join in the negotiations, I must in the name of the latter decline to allow any subsequent interference. We are dealing here with questions which concern only Russia and the four allied powers. I adhere to the hope that, with recognition of self-determination for the peoples on the western frontier of the former Russian empire, good relations will be established, both with these peoples and with the rest of Russia, for whom we wish most earnestly a return of order, peace and conditions guaranteeing the welfare of the country.

VII.—Belgium. My predecessors in office repeatedly declared that at no time did the annexation of Belgium to Germany form a point in the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference.

So long as our opponents have not unreservedly taken the standpoint that the integrity of the allies' territory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgian affair from the entire discussion.

VIII.—The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands. Here, too, forcible annexations form no part of the official German policy. The conditions and methods of procedure of the evacuation, which must take account of Germany's vital interests, are to be agreed upon between Germany and France. I can only again accentuate expressly the fact that there can never be a question of dismemberment of Imperial territory. Under no fine phrases of any kind shall we permit the enemy again to take from us territory of the empire which with ever increasing intimacy has linked itself to Germanism, which has in a highly gratifying manner ever and increasingly developed in an economic respect, and of whose people more than 87 per cent speak the German mother tongue.

IX, X, XI.—The questions dealt with by Mr. Wilson under points 9, 10 and 11 touch both the Italian frontier question and questions of the future

development of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the future of the Balkan States, questions in which for the greater part the interests of our ally, Austria-Hungary, preponderate. Where German interests are concerned, we shall defend them most energetically. But I may leave the answer to Mr. Wilson's proposals on these points in the first place to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister.

Close contact with the allied dual monarchy forms the kernel of our present policy, and must be the guiding line in the future. Loyal comradeship in arms, which has stood the test so brilliantly in war time, must continue to have its effect in peace. We shall thus, on our part, do everything for the attainment of peace by Austria-Hungary which takes into account her just claims.

XII.—The matters touched upon by Mr. Wilson in point 12 concern our loyal, brave ally Turkey. I must in no wise forestall her statesmen in their attitude. The integrity of Turkey and the safeguarding of her capital which is connected closely with the question of the straits, are important and vital interests of the German Empire also. Our ally can always count upon our energetic support in this matter.¹

XIII.—Point 13 deals with Poland. It was not the Entente—which had only empty words for Poland and before the war never interceded for Poland with Russia—but the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy who liberated Poland from the Czaristic régime which was crushing her national characteristics. It may thus be left to Germany and Austria-Hungary and Poland to come to an agreement on the future constitution of this country. As the negotiations and communications of the last year prove, we are on the road to the goal.²

XIV.—The last point, the 14th, deals with a league of nations. Regarding this point, I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future a possibility or a

¹ A Constantinople telegram of February 7, 1918, said that Halil Bey, the new Turkish foreign minister, speaking before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, said: "We adhere to the standpoint that the fate of national groups which were not independent before the war cannot be regulated otherwise than by institutions created in accordance with the constitution of each individual country. The Straits will remain open in future to international traffic as in the past, and on the same conditions."

The Minister eulogized the Turkish constitution, which, he maintained, dealt equally with all, and he resolutely rejected all proposals, from whatever quarter, which would mean any interference in the internal affairs of the country. Halil Bey declared that he was in complete accord with Count Hertling's and Count Czernin's replies to Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson.—(London Times, February 9, 1918, page 5.)

² The German chancellor in this paragraph evidently refers only to a portion of the Poland which President Wilson spoke of as due for a historical resurrection. The last partition of Poland, confirmed by the treaty of Vienna of June 9, 1815, was between Prussia, Austria and Russia. Austria in 1848 assimilated to her share the Republic of Cracow established by the treaty of Vienna. It is difficult to say that within the last hundred years the fate of one-third of the former Poland has been more happy than that of another. Germany in the course of the war has, however, set up a Polish kingdom in what was Russian Poland, and it is to this only that the chancellor refers. Neither the German Empire nor Austria-Hungary has "freed" their Polish territories.—*Editor's note.*

probability of war, and will promote a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the idea of a league of nations, as suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality toward all, then the Imperial Government is gladly ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of such a league of nations.

“LET THEM REVISE THEIR PROGRAMS”

Gentlemen, you have acquainted yourselves with the speech of Premier Lloyd George and the proposals of President Wilson. I must repeat what I said at commencement: We now must ask ourselves whether these speeches and proposals breathe a real and earnest wish for peace. They certainly contain certain principles for a general world peace to which we also assent, and which might form the starting point and aid negotiations.

When, however, concrete questions come into the question, points which for us are of decisive importance, their peace will is less observable. Our enemies do not desire to destroy Germany, but they cast covetous eyes on parts of our allies' lands. They speak with respect of Germany's position but their conception ever afresh finds expression as if we were the guilty who must do penance and promise improvement. Thus speaks the victor to the vanquished, he who interprets all our former expressions of a readiness for peace as merely a sign of weakness.

The leaders of the Entente must first renounce this standpoint and this deception. In order to facilitate this I would like to recall what the position really is. They may take it from me that our military position was not so favorable as it now is. Our highly gifted army leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victory. Throughout the whole army, in the officers and men, lives unbroken the joy of battle.

I will remind you of the words I spoke November 29 in the Reichstag. Our repeatedly expressed willingness for peace and the spirit of reconciliation revealed by our proposals must not be regarded by the Entente as a license permitting the indefinite lengthening of the war. Should our enemies force us to prolong the war, they will have to bear the consequences resulting from it. If the leaders of the enemy powers really are inclined toward peace let them revise their programs once again, or, as Premier Lloyd George said, proceed to reconsideration. If they do that and come forward with fresh proposals, then we will examine them carefully, because our aim is no other than the re-establishment of a lasting general peace. But this lasting general peace is not possible so long as the integrity of the

German Empire, the security of her vital interests and the dignity of our fatherland are not guaranteed. Until that time we must quietly stand by each other and wait. As to the purpose, gentlemen, we are all one.

VICTORY WILL BE OURS

In regard to the methods and the "modalities," there may be differences of opinion. But let us shelve all these differences. Let us not fight about formulæ which always fall short in the mad course of the world events, but, above dividing party controversies, let us keep our eyes on the one mutual aim, the welfare of the fatherland. Let us hold together, the Government and the nation, and victory will be ours. A good peace will and must come. The German nation bears in an admirable manner the sufferings and the burdens of the war, which is now in its fourth year. In connection with these burdens and sufferings I think especially of the sufferings of the small artisans and the lowly-paid officials. But you all, men and women, will hold on and see it through. With your political knowledge you do not allow yourselves to be fooled by catch phrases, you know how to distinguish between the realities of life and the promising dreams. Such a nation cannot go under. God is with us and will be with us also in the future.

7. ADDRESS OF COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN VON CHUDENITZ, AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION, JANUARY 24, 1918.¹

It is my duty to give a faithful picture of the peace negotiations, discuss the various phases of the results reached to date, and to draw from them conclusions which are true, logical and justified. It seems to me above all that those who seem to find the course of the negotiations too slow are not able to have even a slight idea of the difficulties which are naturally met in them everywhere. In what follows I shall describe these difficulties, but would like to point out in advance the cardinal difference between the peace

¹ The translation is the one supplied to the American press by the Department of State on February 6, 1918, compared with a Reuter summary telegraphed from Basel on January 24, a German text published in the *New Yorker Staatszeitung*, February 22, and the Associated Press summary telegraphed from Basel on January 24.

A significance attaches to the circumstance that this speech was delivered before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Delegation. Count Czernin is minister for foreign affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and he refers in his speech to the careful distinction he has observed between the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations. These two bodies are selected from the Austrian Reichsrath and Hungarian Parliament and are charged with the constitutionally common interests of the Monarchy, the ministries of war, finance and foreign affairs. They meet separately, and neither is able to obligate the other. (See A. Lawrence Lowell, *Government and Parties in Continental Europe*, II, 165-170.)

negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and all those which ever took place in history. Never, so far as I know, have peace negotiations taken place in view. It is quite impossible that negotiations which approach the present ones in extent and depth can take their course smoothly and without obstacles from the very beginning. Our task is to build a new world, and rebuild all that which this most trying of wars has destroyed and trampled to the ground. Various phases of all the peace negotiations which we know have developed more or less behind closed doors and their results were told to the world only after the negotiations have been completed. All histories teach, and it is easily understood, that the troublesome road of such peace negotiations always leads up and down, that prospects are more favorable some days, less favorable on others. But when these various phases and these details are each day telegraphed to the world it is quite easily understood that they act like electric shocks in the present condition of nervousness which rules in the world, and that they excite public opinion. We were completely aware of the disadvantage of this procedure. Still we immediately gave way to the desire of the Russian Government for publicity because we wished to show ourselves friendly, and because we have nothing to hide, and also because we might have made a false impression had we insisted on a method of provisional secrecy. But the other fact consequent on this complete publicity of the negotiations is that the great public, that country behind the front, and, above all, the leaders, keep their nerves steady. The game must be finished in cold blood and it will come to a good end if the peoples of the Monarchy support the responsible representatives at the peace conference.

NO COMPENSATIONS, NO INDEMNITIES

In advance let it be said that the basis on which Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-created Russian governments is that of no compensations nor annexations [*ohne Kontributionen und ohne Annexionen*]. That is the program which I stated briefly to those who wanted to speak about peace after my nomination as minister, which I have repeated to the Russian people in power on their first offer of peace, and from which I will not deviate. Those who believe I can be crowded off the road which I purpose to go are bad psychologists. I have never let the public be in doubt as to the road which I go and I have never allowed myself to be crowded from this road a hair's breadth, neither to the right nor to the left. Since then I have become the undisputed darling of the Pan-Germans and those in the Monarchy who imitate the Pan-Germans. At the same time I am calumniated as an inciter to war by those who want peace at any price, of which

innumerable letters are proof. Neither has ever troubled me. On the contrary, these double insults are my only amusement in these serious times. I declare once more that I demand not a square meter nor a penny from Russia, and that if Russia, as seems to be the case, itself adopts that point of view also, peace will be made.

Those who want peace at any price might have doubts as to my non-annexationist purposes toward Russia if I did not tell them with the same inconsiderate openness that I shall never allow myself to make a peace which transcends the form I have just sketched. Should our Russian fellow-peacemakers demand the cession of territory from us, or indemnity, I should continue the war despite a desire for peace which I have as well as you, or would resign if I could not make my view prevail.

DIFFICULTIES AT BREST-LITOVSK

Having said this in advance, and emphasized once more that there is no reason for the pessimistic view that peace will fail, since negotiating committees have agreed on the basis of no annexations nor contributions,—and only new instructions from the various Russian governments or their disappearance could change this basis,—I now proceed to the two greatest difficulties which contain reasons why the negotiations are not progressing as rapidly as we all should like.

The first difficulty is that we are not treating with one Russian peacemaker, but with various newly-created Russian governments, which have not clearly defined among themselves their spheres of competency. The governments in question are that part of Russia which is led by Petrograd, secondly, our own new neighboring state, great *Ukrainia*, thirdly, Finland, and, fourthly, *Caucasus*. With the first two states we treat directly, with the two others now only more or less indirectly, because they have to date sent no negotiator to Brest-Litovsk. These four Russian fellow-peacemakers are met by us four powers and the case of the *Caucasus*, in which we naturally have no difficulties to remove, but which is in conflict with Turkey, shows the extent of the subjects under discussion.

What interests us especially and chiefly is the newly-created great state which will be our neighbor in the future, *Ukrainia*. We have got very far in our negotiations with this delegation. We have agreed on the above-mentioned basis of no annexations nor compensations and have agreed what and how commercial relations with the newly-created republic are to be re-established. But this very example of *Ukrainia* shows one of the ruling difficulties. While the *Ukrainian Republic* holds the point of view

that it has the right to treat with us quite autonomously and independently, the Russian delegation stands on the basis that the boundaries of its country and those of Ukraina have not been definitely fixed, and St. Petersburg consequently has the right to participate in our negotiations with Ukraina, a view with which the gentlemen of the Ukrainian delegation do not care to agree. But this troubled situation of domestic conditions in Russia was the cause of enormous delay. We have overcome these difficulties also and I believe that the negotiations to be taken up in a few days will find the road clear here.

I confess I do not know what the situation is to-day, for yesterday my representative at Brest-Litovsk received two telegrams to the effect that M. Joffe, the president of the Russian delegation, had sent to the delegations of the Quadruple Alliance a circular note declaring that the Government of the Republic of Workmen and Peasants of the Ukraine, which sits at Kharkov, in no case recognizes the secretariat-general of the Kiev Rada as representing the entire Ukrainian people, because the Central Rada represents only the capital classes, and cannot, consequently, speak in the name of the Ukrainian people. The note also states that the Kharkov Rada does not recognize any agreements which might eventually be concluded by the Central Rada without its assent, and announces that the Kharkov Rada is sending two delegates to Brest-Litovsk as delegates of the central committee of all the councils of workmen, soldiers and peasants in the Ukraine.

According to the decision of January 12 of the Central Executive Committee, the note proceeds, these delegates must declare categorically that all attempts on the part of the Central Rada to speak in the name of the Ukrainian people must be considered as overtures due solely to the initiative of the *bourgeois* groups of the Ukrainian people in opposition to the interests and will of the working classes of the Ukraine. They must declare that the decisions taken by the Rada will not be recognized by the Ukrainian people; that the Rada of Workmen and Peasants recognizes the People's Commissioners as the organ of all the Soviets of Russia and as having the right to speak in the name of the entire Russian federation; that the delegation of the Rada of Workmen and Soldiers sent to Brest-Litovsk to denounce the intrigues of individuals at Kiev will act in complete accord with the delegation of all Russia. President Joffe adds in his communication that his delegation is ready to co-operate to the fullest extent with the new Ukrainian delegation.

There is a new difficulty, for we cannot and do not wish to meddle in the internal affairs of Russia, but, if the way is once clear, other difficulties will

not arise. We will agree with the Ukrainian Republic that the old frontiers of Russia and Austria-Hungary will also apply to the Ukraine.

WOULD WELCOME UNION OF POLAND WITH MONARCHY

We want nothing at all of Poland, the boundaries of which have not been definitely settled. Poland's people shall choose their own destiny, free and uninfluenced. I consider the form of popular decision of this question not especially important. The surer it reflects the general will of the people the more I shall be pleased, for I desire only voluntary union on the part of Poland. Only in the desire of Poland in this matter do I see a guarantee of lasting harmony. I hold irrevocably to the point of view that the Polish question must not delay the conclusion of peace by a single day. Should Poland seek close relationship with us after the conclusion of peace, we shall not refuse, but the Polish question shall and will not endanger peace. I should have liked to see the Polish Government take part in the negotiations, for, according to my opinion, Poland is an independent state. The St. Petersburg Government, however, thinks that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak in the name of the country and failed to recognize it as a competent exponent of the country. Therefore, we desisted from our intention in order not to create a possible conflict. The question is certainly important, but more important for us is the removal of all obstacles which delay the conclusion of peace.

DISPUTE OVER SELF-DETERMINATION

The second difficulty which we encounter, and which found the greatest echo in the press is the difference of opinion between our German ally and the St. Petersburg Government in the matter of interpretation of the right of the Russian nations to determine their own destinies, that is, those territories occupied by German troops. Germany holds the point of view that it does not intend to make forcible territorial acquisitions from Russia, but to express it in two words the difference of opinion is a double one.

First, Germany holds the legitimate point of view [*auf dem berechtigten Standpunkte*] that the numerous expressions of desire for independence by legislative bodies, communal bodies, etc., in occupied provinces should be considered as a provisional basis for popular opinion which would be tested later by plebiscite on a broad basis. The Russian Government is now opposed to this point of view since it can as little recognize the right of existing organizations in Courland and Lithuania to speak in the name of these provinces as it can in Polish ones. The second difficulty is that Russia

demands that the plebiscite should take place after all German troops and administrative organs have vacated the occupied provinces, while Germany contends that by such evacuation, carried through to its extreme consequence, a vacuum would have been created, which undoubtedly would bring about irrevocably complete anarchy and the greatest misery. Here it must be explained that everything which to-day allows political life in the occupied provinces is German property. The railways, posts, telegraph, all industries and administrative parts of police and justice are in German hands. The sudden withdrawal of these parts would indeed create a condition which does not seem practically tenable. In both questions we must find compromise. The difference between these two points of view is in my opinion not big enough to justify the failure of the negotiations. But such negotiations cannot be completed over night. They take time.

Once we have reached peace with Russians a general peace cannot long be prevented in my opinion, despite all efforts of Entente statesmen. We have held (heard?) that it was not understood in places why I declared in the first speech after resumption of negotiations that it was now not a question of general peace but of separate peace with Russia in Brest-Litovsk. That was a necessary statement of clear fact, which Trotsky has inevitably recognized, and was necessary because we were treating on a different basis, that is, in a more limited scope, when the question was one of separate peace with Russia rather than a general peace. Although I have no illusions that the effort for a general peace will mature over night, I am still convinced that it is maturing and that it is only a question of our holding through whether we are to have a general honorable peace or not.

RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT WILSON

I have been strengthened in this view by the peace offer which the President of the United States of America has made. To the whole world this is a peace offer, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson develops the basis on which he attempts to bring about general peace. It is evident no such offer can be an elaboration acceptable in all details. Should this be the case negotiations would be unnecessary, for then peace might be made by simple acceptance—by a simple yes and amen. That, of course, is not the case. But I do not hesitate to say that I find in the last proposals of President Wilson considerable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view and among his proposals are some to which we can agree with great pleasure.

If I may now be permitted to go into these proposals in detail, there are

two things which I must say first. In so far as the proposals concern our allies—they mention the German possessions, Belgium and the Turkish Empire—I declare that, in loyalty to the obligations which we have undertaken, I am firmly determined to go to the utmost limits for the defense of those allies. We shall defend as our own the territorial *status quo ante bellum* [den vorkriegerischen Besetzstand] of our allies. That is the point of view of all four allies, and they maintain it with absolute reciprocity.¹

In the second place, I have to observe that I courteously but resolutely reject the advice as to how we are to govern ourselves. We have in Austria a Parliament elected by universal, equal, direct and secret franchise. There is no more democratic Parliament in the world, and this Parliament, together with the other constitutionally authorized factors, alone has the right to decide upon the internal affairs of Austria. I speak only of Austria, because I should regard it as unconstitutional to speak in the Austrian delegation of internal affairs of the Hungarian State. We do not interfere in American affairs and we want no foreign guardianship by any State.

Having said this in advance I allow myself to answer the remaining points as follows:

I.—I have nothing to say on the point which discusses abolishing secret diplomacy and complete publicity of negotiations. So far as public negotiation is concerned, I from my point of view have no objection to make to such a method if it is based upon complete reciprocity, although I have lively doubts as to whether it is in all circumstances the most practical and speediest way to reach a result. Diplomatic treaties are nothing but bargains.

Now, I can easily imagine cases in which, for example, commercial agreements are to be concluded between States without it being desirable that an incomplete result should be announced in advance to the whole world.

In such negotiations both parties naturally begin by screwing their wishes up as high as possible in order little by little to employ this or that wish as a concession until the balance of interests is finally reached, which must be reached before the conclusion of a treaty is possible.

¹The text of this passage was incorrect in the German copy supplied to the Associated Press and Reuter's Telegraph Agency at Basel by the German Wolff Telegraph Bureau. The passage as originally given publicly read:

"I must first lay down this principle, that in so far as these propositions concern her allies, whether in the case of Germany's possession of Belgium or in the case of Turkey—Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements to fight to the end in defense of her allies, will defend the possessions of her allies as she would her own. That is the standpoint of our allies, in regard to which there is perfect reciprocity."

The manager and secretary of Reuter's made this statement: "The discrepancies between our version and that of the 'Neue Freie Presse' were due to telegraphic mutilations of our telegrams in course of transmission. The version which we received admitted of no translation other than that which we published."—Manchester *Guardian*, February 7, 1918.

If such negotiations were conducted in public, it would be impossible to prevent the public from passionately espousing every one of the wishes originally expressed; consequently the abandonment of any one of such wishes, even though it had been expressed only for tactical reasons, would be regarded as a defeat. If, indeed, the public has taken a very strong stand in favor of such a wish, either the conclusion of a treaty may be rendered absolutely impossible, or the treaty, if it is concluded, will be regarded—perhaps on both sides—as a defeat. Thus, so far from peaceful relations being promoted, there would be a positive increase of friction among States. But what is valid for commercial treaties would be as valid for political ones which treat of political business.

If the abolition of secret diplomacy means that there are to be no secret treaties—that treaties cannot exist without the public knowing it—I have no objection to the realization of this principle. I do not, indeed, know how the principle can be carried out, and what supervision is intended. If the Governments of two States are at one, they will always be able to conclude a secret agreement, without anybody knowing anything about it. But these are secondary matters. I do not cling to forms, and I shall never wreck a sensible arrangement upon any more or less formal question. We can, therefore, discuss Point I.

II.—Point II relates to the freedom of the seas. In this postulate the President has spoken from the heart of all and I subscribe to this desire of America's completely, especially because the President adds the clause "outside territorial waters," that is, freedom of open sea, but I cannot subscribe to the violation of the sovereign rights of our faithful Turkish ally. Its point of view on this question will be ours.

III.—Point three, definitely against future economic war, is so just and so reasonable and has been so often demanded by us I have nothing to add to it.

IV.—Point four, demanding general disarmament, explains in especially good and clear style the necessity of reducing free competition in armaments after war to a point which the domestic safety of States demands. Wilson explains this clearly. I permitted myself to develop the same a few months ago in a Budapest speech.¹ It is part of my political creed and every voice which speaks in the same sense I gratefully greet.

VI.—As far as the Russian reference is concerned we are proving with deeds that we are ready to create friendly, neighborly relationship.

IX, XI.—As far as Italy, Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro are concerned, I can only repeat the point of view which I have expressed already

¹ The speech referred to was reported in the news dispatches of October 3, 1917.

in the Hungarian Delegation.* I refuse to figure as surety for enemy war adventures. I refuse to make one-sided concessions to our enemies, who remain stubbornly on the point of view of battle to final victory, concessions which would lastingly prejudice the Monarchy and give immeasurable advantage to our enemies and drag on the war endlessly and relatively without risk. I trust Mr. Wilson will use the great influence he doubtless has on all his allies so that they will explain the conditions under which they are willing to negotiate, and he will have gained the immeasurable merit of having called a general peace conference to life.

Just as openly and freely as I am here replying to President Wilson, I will also speak with all who show a desire to speak themselves, but it is quite comprehensible that the time and continuation of the war cannot remain without influence on our relations in this connection. I said this once before and may refer to Italy as an example. Italy had the opportunity before the war to attain great territorial acquisitions without a shot. This it refused, entered the war, lost hundreds of thousands of dead, billions in war costs and destroyed values, brought upon its population misery and need, and all this only for the advantage which it could have had once but which is now lost forever.

XIII.—Regarding point thirteen, it is an open secret that we are supporters of the idea that there must be “an independent Polish state which undoubtedly includes territory exclusively populated with Poles.” Regarding this I am also of the opinion that we could soon reach an agreement with Mr. Wilson.

XIV.—Nor will the President find anywhere in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy any opposition to his proposal regarding the idea of the league of nations.

AGREE ON PRINCIPLES AND SOME DETAILS

As may be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. Wilson, we agree not only on great principles in general, according to which the world is to be newly regulated after the end of this war, but our views

* Count Czernin's evident intention was to reiterate the remarks referred to as part of his reply to President Wilson. The Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Delegation at Vienna on December 4, 1917. The speech dealt with the Balkan origins of the war and closed, according to the Reuter account, as follows:

“Italy has dearly paid for her treachery toward us. Fertile regions of Italy are now in our hands as a costly pledge for peace negotiations. After having been misled, the Italian people is to-day faced with the collapse of the irredentist idea and imperialist hopes. Since the death of King Carol of Rumania in the autumn of 1914 the history of Rumania is that of continuous treachery. Up to the last moment the Rumanian Government lived under the illusion that it had succeeded in deceiving the Central Powers' diplomacy. Fate has terribly but justly punished Rumanian treachery. The populations of Serbia and Montenegro must ask themselves whether their dynasties and Governments were well advised when, under the influence of the Entente, they began war with us and our group. A series of bitter disappointments was the consequence of this policy.”—*London Times*, December 7, 1917.

also approach each other on several concrete peace questions. The remaining differences do not seem to me so great that a discussion at this point should not bring clearness and *rapprochement*. This situation, which probably arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary and the United States of America are two great powers among two groups of enemy states whose interests least conflict, suggests the thought that an exchange of ideas between these two powers might be the starting point for conciliatory discussions between all states which have not entered into peace conversations. So much for Wilson's propositions.

I now hasten to finish, and the conclusion is perhaps the most important thing I have to say. I am working on a peace with Ukrainia and with St. Petersburg. But peace with St. Petersburg does not change our definite situation. Nowhere do Austrian troops oppose those of the St. Petersburg Government. Ukrainian troops do oppose us. Nothing could be exported from St. Petersburg because it has nothing but revolution and anarchy to export, articles which Bolsheviks would like to export but acceptance of which I politely refuse. Still I desire peace with St. Petersburg also because it makes general peace nearer, as does the conclusion of any peace.

SEEKS FOODSTUFFS FROM UKRAINIA

Affairs with Ukrainia are definite, for Ukrainia has stocks of foodstuffs which it will export if we agree. The food question is to-day a world worry. Everywhere, with opponent as with neutral States, it plays an important rôle. The way to help out the population is by concluding peace with those Russian Governments which have for export a quantity of foodstuffs. We can and will hold out even without this aid, but I know my duty and it commands me to attempt everything to lessen the suffering of our population. Therefore, I will not reject this advantage for our population because of hysterical nervousness to bring about peace a few days or weeks earlier. Such a peace needs time. It cannot be concluded over night, for in the conclusion of peace it must be discovered whether, what and how the Russian fellow-peacemakers will supply us. This because Ukraine wishes to settle this business during the peace negotiations and not afterward. I have said already that the troubled relations of these newly created governments involve great hindrance and natural delay to the negotiations. If you attack me in the back, force me to finish hastily, then we will have no economic advantages and our people must go without the advantage which it might derive from peace. If a doctor has to make a difficult operation and people stand behind him with a watch and

force him to finish the operation in a few minutes, the operation will probably be done in record time, but the sick person will not be grateful for the technique of the operation. If you make a wholly wrong impression on your opponents that we must make peace at any price and immediately, we will not get a bushel of grain and success will be more or less platonic. Chiefly it is not at all a question of ending the war after we have agreed on a basis of no annexations. The question is not one—I repeat it the tenth time—of imperialistic or annexationist plans and intentions, but of assuring our population a finally deserved reward for steadily holding out and of giving it those foodstuffs which it will gladly accept.

But our partners are good reckoners and are observing exactly whether or not I am being forced into a bad position by you. If you want to spoil peace and refuse grain shipments then it is logical to force my hand by speeches, resolutions, strikes and demonstrations. It is a thousand times untrue that we are in a position where we would rather make a bad peace without economic advantages to-day than one with economic advantages. Food difficulties in the last analysis do not come from the lack of food. The crises which must be allayed are those of coal transportation and organization. If behind the front you arrange strikes you move in a vicious circle. Strikes increase and make more acute the existing crisis and the transportation of foodstuffs and coal more difficult. You are cutting your own flesh and all those who think that such means hasten peace are in awful error.

ASKS VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

People are said to spread rumors in the Monarchy that the Government is not unconcerned in the matter of strikes. I leave these people the choice of whether they desire to be considered criminal slanderers or fools. If you had a Government which wanted a different peace from that desired by the overwhelming majority of the population, if you had a Government which was continuing the war because of annexationist intentions, then the battle of the country behind the front against the Government might be comprehensible.

Since the Government wants exactly what the majority of the Monarchy wants—the soonest possible reaching of an honorable peace without annexations—it is madness to attack it in the back, slander it and disturb it. Those who do that, do not fight against the Government but blindly against the peoples whom they pretend to wish to help, and against themselves.

Gentlemen, you have not only the right but the duty to choose the following alternative. Either you have confidence in me that I will continue

the peace negotiations and must help me, or you have it not, and you must bring about my fall. I am sure I have the majority of the Hungarian Delegation behind me. The Hungarian delegation has given me a vote of confidence. If that is doubtful here please clear up the matter. The question of confidence will be put and if I have a majority against me I will immediately draw the conclusion. The pleasure of all those who want to remove me will be much less than my own. Nothing keeps me in my place except a sense of duty to remain as long as I have the confidence of the Emperor and the majority of the Delegation. Good soldiers do not desert. No minister of foreign affairs can carry on negotiations of this importance if he does not know, if all the world does not know, that he is borne up by the confidence of the majority of constitutional bodies. It is one thing or another: either you have confidence in me or not. You must help me or you must bring about my fall. There is no third choice.¹

8. EXCERPT FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE MEETINGS OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, HELD AT VERSAILLES, JANUARY 30 AND 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1918.²

The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterances of the German Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but was unable to find in them any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. This conviction was only deepened by the impression made by the contrast between the professed idealistic aims with which the Central Powers entered upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and their now openly disclosed plans of conquest and spoliation.

In the circumstances, the Supreme War Council decided that the only immediate task before them lay in the prosecution, with the utmost vigor and in the closest and most effective co-operation, of the military effort of the Allies until such time as the pressure of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy governments and peoples a change of temper which would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on terms which would not involve the abandonment, in face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism, of all the principles of freedom, justice, and the respect for the law of nations which the allies are resolved to vindicate. . . .

¹ A Reuter dispatch from Amsterdam dated January 28, 1918, says: By 14 votes against 7 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichsrath has adopted a vote of confidence in Count Czernin's policy. A telegram from Vienna to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* says that Czechs and South Slavs were responsible for four of the minority votes, and Czech, Italian, and German Socialists for the remaining three, while the Polish Socialist Daszynski abstained from voting. (London Times, January 29, 1918.)

² London Times, February 4, 1918, page 7.

The Allies are united in heart and will. Not by any hidden designs, but by their open resolve to defend civilization against an unscrupulous and brutal attempt at domination.

9. ADDRESS OF WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 11, 1918.¹

Gentlemen of the Congress:

On the 8th of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the 5th of January. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the 24th and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR'S REPLY

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of the 8th of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Governments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them, but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

COUNT VON HERTLING'S REPLY VAGUE

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He

¹ *Official Bulletin*, February 11, 1918.

is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities, and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the 23 States now engaged in the war must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood.

He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated, and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan states he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

CHANCELLOR'S METHOD IMPOSSIBLE

It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does

not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of the nineteenth of July or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state.

The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

SPEAKING IN THE COURT OF MANKIND

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE IN EUROPE'S AFFAIRS

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is intrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered, as nearly as may be, impossible.

RIGHTS OF THE SMALL NATIONS

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful Governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that injustice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential basis of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded to him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may be assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interests and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

TEST "SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS."

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States; and,

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

NO TURNING BACK FROM COURSE

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for a new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

NO WORD INTENDED AS THREAT

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words, but a passion which, once set in action, must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

10. ADDRESS OF COUNT GEORG FRIEDRICH VON HERTLING, CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE, TO THE IMPERIAL REICHSTAG FEBRUARY 25, 1918.¹

Gentlemen: The Reichstag has a right to receive information on the international political situation and the stand taken by the Imperial leaders in regard thereto. I am complying with the duty arising therefrom, even though I entertain certain doubts on the other hand regarding the utility and success of the former conversations held by the ministers and statesmen of the belligerent Nations before the public (Very correct—on the right). A Liberal member of the English Lower House and former minister, Mr. Walter Runciman, recently expressed the opinion² that peace would be brought much nearer if, instead, competent and responsible representatives of the belligerent powers would unite in a closer circle for a mutual expression of opinion (Very correct). I can only agree to this. This would be the way to remove all the many intentional and unintentional misunderstandings and to compel our opponents to take our words as they are meant and also come out for their own part in plain language. I can at least not find that the words which I have spoken here on two occasions have received an objective and unprejudiced consideration in the enemy countries (Very correct—on the right). Furthermore a discussion in a close circle could lead to an understanding on the many individual questions which come into consideration in connection with the settlement of present differences and which must be disposed of before an agreement can be reached. I am thinking in this connection particularly of our attitude toward Belgium. It has been repeatedly stated from here that we do not intend to keep Belgium or to make the Belgian Nation a part of the German Empire, but that, as was stated in the papal note of August 1 of last year, we must guard against the danger that the country with which we wish to live in peace and friendship after the war (Bravo!) should become the seat or the concentration place of hostile machinations in either direction. Such a circle should treat of the means of attaining this end and thus serve the general world peace. Therefore, if a motion to this effect

¹ Translation inclosed in No. 2073, The Hague, to the Department of State. It will be noted that the remarks of members of the Reichstag are interpolated.

² The opinion referred to was expressed in the House of Commons February 13, 1918. He said: "He believed that toward the end of the war the only common ground would be a desire for peace without any very definite notion about what that peace might mean. He would give almost anything to have the statesmen of the belligerent countries talking. No harm could be done by that, and the greatest contribution which could be made to the peace of the world at this moment would be that those who represented those nations should have some chance of drawing together and exchanging views. . . . Whatever transactions might take place, the people of this country were not likely to waver one hair's breadth from the objects which they had when they entered the war. The Government need not fear the weakening of the national will."—(London Times, February 14, 1918, page 10.)

came from the opposite side, say from the Government at Le Havre, we should not refuse to discuss it even though the discussion would naturally have at first a non-obligatory character (Very correct). For the present, however, it does not look as if the aforementioned suggestion of the English member of Parliament had any prospect of assuming tangible form, and therefore I must adhere to the previous method of the dialogue over the channel and the ocean.

While I am preparing for this, I gladly admit that the message of President Wilson of the 11th instant perhaps represents a slight step toward a mutual understanding. I will therefore pass over the lengthy preliminary remarks in order as far as possible to devote myself to the four principles which, in the opinion of Mr. Wilson, must be observed in a mutual exchange of opinions.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOUR PRINCIPLES

I.—The first paragraph states that each part of the final agreement must be essentially built up on justice in the case in point and based on such a compromise as shall afford the greatest likelihood of bringing about a lasting peace. We should like here to contradict¹ (Very correct! hilarity). The aphorism coined by the great church father Augustine 1,500 years ago: *justitia fundamentum regnorum* (justice is the foundation of kingdoms), still applies to-day, and it is certain that only a peace borne up in all its parts by the principles of justice has prospects of enduring.

II.—The second paragraph demands that peoples and provinces should not be shoved about from one national sovereignty to another as if it were merely a question of objects or counters in a game, even if this is now discredited for all time in the great game of the equilibrium of forces. These clauses can also be unconditionally agreed to. Indeed one wonders why the President of the United States considered it necessary to emphasize it again. The paragraph embodies a polemic against conditions and views which disappeared long ago, against cabinet politics and cabinet wars, and against the mixture of government domain and royal appanage, all of which belongs to an epoch far past. I do not wish to be impolite, but if one recalls previous utterances of Wilson, one might believe him to be laboring under the delusion that there exists in Germany an opposition between the (remaining?) autocratic government and the legitimate (?) mass of the people, and nevertheless the President of the United States, at least according to the German edition of his book on the State, is acquainted with German political literature and accordingly knows that in

¹ The Associated Press rendering is: Who would contradict this?

Germany princes and rulers are the highest members of the body of the people as a whole organized into a State, being supreme members with whom the final decision rests, but in such a way that, for the reason that they belong to the whole body (even though as supreme organs), their only guide in reaching a proper decision is the welfare of the whole body. It may be useful to impress this emphatically upon Wilson's countrymen.

When, finally, at the end of the second paragraph, he declares "the game of the balance of power" to be forever discredited we can but greet this with joy also. It is known that it was England that invented the principle of the preservation of the balance of power (Very correct!), in order to enforce it specially when one of the Nations on the European Continent threatened to become too powerful for her. It was only another expression for the sovereignty of England (Very correct).

III.—The third paragraph, according to which every solution of a question of territory raised by this war should be reached in the interest and in favor of the population concerned and not as a part of a special compromise of the claims of rival nations, is only the carrying out of what precedes in a certain direction, or rather a logical consequence therefrom, and may therefore be embraced within the consent given to it.

IV.—Finally comes the fourth paragraph, in which he demands that all clearly defined national claims should be given the greatest possible satisfaction that they can receive without engendering new or perpetuating old factors of antagonism which would be likely soon to disturb the peace of Europe and accordingly that of the whole world. To this I can also assent on general principles, and I therefore declare with President Wilson that a general peace may be discussed on such basic principles (Bravo!).

CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE

Only one reservation must be made. These principles would not only have to be proposed by the President of the United States but to be actually recognized by all nations and peoples (Very correct). Mr. Wilson, who accuses the German Imperial Chancellor of a certain amount of delinquency, seems to me, in his flight of fancy, to have gone far beyond the actual conditions of a union of nations based on justice and mutual unselfish recognition of all nations for the preservation of peace [by?] a court of arbitration established in the name of justice. There would be built up a condition of humanity in which, with all remnants of previous barbarism, war would have completely disappeared and there would be no more bloody victims, no self-mutilation of peoples, no destruction of laboriously acquired works of civilization. This were a consummation devoutly to be

desired but this aim has not yet been attained and no prospect of it exists (Lively applause). When Mr. Wilson takes occasion to say that the Imperial Chancellor speaks to the tribunal of the whole world, I must, as matters stand to-day, in the name of the German empire and its allies, decline this tribunal as prejudiced, however gladly I should welcome the existence of an impartial court of arbitration and however willingly I should co-operate in bringing about such an ideal condition.

Unfortunately, however, nothing can be discovered of a similar sentiment among the leading powers of the Entente (Very correct). The war aims of England, as they have been manifested recently in the speeches of Lloyd George, are still of an absolutely imperialistic nature and would impose upon the world a peace to England's liking. When England speaks of the right of self-determination of peoples, she does not think of applying the principle to Ireland or Egypt or India (Very correct!).

GERMAN WAR AIMS IN RUSSIA.

Our war aim has from the beginning been the defense of our native country, the maintenance of our territorial integrity and the freedom of our economic development in every direction (Very correct). Warfare, even where it must be conducted aggressively, is according to its aim defensive. I emphasize this just now with special stress in order not to allow any misunderstanding to arise regarding our operations in the east. After the breaking off of the peace negotiations on the part of the Russian delegation on the 10th of this month, we had a free hand toward Russia. The advance of our troops begun a week after that breaking off of negotiations, was solely for the purpose of assuring us the fruits of the peace concluded with Ukraine. Aims of conquest played no rôle in the matter. We were supported therein by the cry for help from Ukraine, asking us to support them in the organization of their new state against the disturbances fomented by the Bolsheviks.¹

¹The appeal referred to reads:

"To the German people. On February 9 this year we signed, in the deep and ardent desire to live in peace and friendship with our neighbors, a peace treaty with the States of the Quadruple Alliance in order to put an end to this useless and fratricidal war, and we united all our strength to one end, namely, to establish and insure the life of our own independent State.

"The joyful news of February 9, however, for which the working masses of our people so greatly longed, has brought us no peace in our land. The enemy of our freedom has invaded our country for the purpose once more, as 254 years ago, to subjugate the Ukrainian people with fire and sword. The Russian Maximalists, who, a month ago, dispersed the All-Russian Constitutional Assembly in Petrograd, consisting almost solely of Socialists, have now undertaken, as they call it, a holy war against the Socialists of the Ukraine.

"From the north, hired bands of Red Guards are falling upon our country. They unite themselves with Russian soldiers who have deserted from the front, and with liberated jail birds. Under the experienced command of former police gendarmes, they force their way into our towns; have our public men and leaders of public opinion shot; they levy contributions from the inhabitants; and after destroying and burning our towns they pass on, seeking new booty.

"This barbaric invasion of our northern neighbors once again, under hypocritical pretexts, sets up as its aim, as earlier in our history, the destruction of the independence of our State. Its real

If other military operations in other regions were connected with these, the same may be said of them. They are not pursued for purposes of conquest in any degree (Bravo!). They are undertaken solely at the urgent requests and representations of the populations that they be protected against the atrocities and devastations of the Red Guard and other bands. They were therefore measures undertaken in the name of humanity for the purpose of giving aid, and have no other character. It is a question of creating peace and order in behalf of the peaceful population. We do not intend for instance to establish ourselves in Esthonia or Livonia (Hear! Hear!—on the left), but merely entertain the desire to live after the war on friendly neighborly terms with the political organizations which we find there (Bravo!—left). Regarding Courland and Lithuania I need say nothing to-day. It is a question of furnishing to the populations of those countries organs for their self-determination and self-administration, or to strengthen those already being built up (Very correct!). We look with calmness toward their further development.

However, the military action in the east has accomplished a result which far surpasses the aims originally pursued and just characterized by me. One is already known to the gentlemen from the communications given out by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, to the effect that Mr. Trotsky has declared his willingness, in a statement which was soon followed by a written confirmation, to resume the interrupted peace negotiations. On our part we immediately answered by transmitting our peace conditions in the form of an ultimatum. Yesterday (and this is the highly gratifying communication which I have to make to you, gentlemen) the news was received that the St. Petersburg Government had accepted our peace terms (Hear! Hear! and lively applause) and has sent representatives for further

and ultimate objects lie, however, in the ignoble intentions and machinations of those who have an interest in seeing anarchy reign in the Ukraine, as also of those who are striving after the return of the old despotism.

"Before the whole world we declare that the Petrograd Commissioners of the People lie when they talk about a rising of the people in the Ukraine, and that they lie when they describe the Central Rada, the Parliament of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which consists of Ukrainian Socialists and has carried out far-reaching social-democratic reforms, as a Rada of *bourgeois*.

"The Petrograd Commissioners, who with words only have stubbornly defended the weal of the Ukraine, Poland, Courland and other peoples, have made use of a fine pose at Brest-Litovsk to recall from the front the remnants of the Russian army for the purpose of secretly throwing them against the Ukraine to rob us, to send our stocks of corn to the north, and to subjugate the country.

"Now, when, after four years, the rigid wall has fallen which separated us from our western neighbors, we raise our voice to proclaim the misfortune of our people. We must see the fruits of our own young Revolution in danger, and we fear for our newly-won freedom. Sanguinary collisions with Russian bands take place daily. In Volhynia and at other points we are collecting new forces to oppose the swarms who are ever anew pressing in from the north.

"In this hard struggle for our existence we look round for help. We are firmly convinced that the peaceful and order-loving German people will not remain indifferent when it learns of our distress. The German army, that stands on the flank of our northern enemy, possesses the power to help us, and, by its intervention, to protect the northern frontiers against further invasion by the enemy. This is what we have to say in this dark hour, and we know that our voice will be heard."

—(Reuter dispatch, London *Times*, February 19, 1918, page 6.)

negotiations to Brest-Litovsk. Accordingly the German delegates proceeded thither yesterday evening. It is possible that there may still be some dispute as to details, but the main point has been attained. The desire for peace on the part of Russia has been expressly manifested, our terms have been accepted, and the conclusion of peace must follow within a brief space of time.

Perhaps never before in history has Aristotle's saying that we must decide for war for the sake of peace received so brilliant a confirmation (Very correct). For the sake of insuring the fruits of our peace with Ukraine our army leaders drew the sword. The peace with Russia will be the happy result (heartly applause). We will not allow our joy over this to be marred by the foolish and inflammatory wireless reports which are circulated throughout the world again and again.

RUMANIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE WITH POLAND

Peace negotiations with Rumania began yesterday in Bukharest in the presence of the secretary of state for foreign affairs. It seemed necessary that he should be present there during the first few days of organization. He will now probably soon proceed to Brest-Litovsk. In the negotiations with Rumania we must remember that we are not alone concerned in them and that we are under obligations to defend the just interests of our faithful allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, and to seek to reconcile any conflicting desires. This may possibly involve difficulties, but with good will on all sides these difficulties can be overcome. However, even with respect to Rumania we must be guided by the principle that we must and wish to make future friends of the nations with which we are now concluding peace on the basis of the success of our arms.

If I may in this connection say a word about Poland, in which the Entente and also Mr. Wilson seemed recently to be specially interested, this country has, as is known, been freed by the united powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary from its former dependency upon Imperial Russia, with the intention of creating an independent state which shall, in the unhindered development of its national culture, at the same time become a pillar in the peace of Europe. The political problem in a narrower sense, the question as to what constitution the new state should receive, could naturally not be decided immediately and is still the subject of careful and detailed consideration on the part of the three countries concerned. To the many difficulties which have to be overcome in this connection (particularly economic difficulties) has been added a new one, arising from the collapse of the old Russia, consisting of the definition of the boundary between the

new nation and neighboring Russian territories. For this reason the announcement of the peace with Ukraine at first caused great unrest in Poland. However, I hope that with good will it will be possible, by taking ethnographical conditions into just consideration, to arrive at a compromise of all claims. The announced intention of making an earnest effort in this direction has already led to a marked feeling of quiet in Polish circles, a thing which I take satisfaction in noting. Germany will, when it comes to settling the boundary question, only demand that which is absolutely required by military considerations.

ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMAN ENEMIES

As you have gathered, gentlemen, from my statements, the prospect of peace on the whole eastern front from the Baltic to the Black Sea is coming tangibly nearer (Bravo!), and the world, which is tired of war, especially neutral countries, is feverishly inquiring whether this does not open up the way to a universal peace. However, the leaders of the Entente in England, France and Italy seem to be entirely disinclined to listen to the voice of reason and humanity, for, unlike the Central Powers, the Entente has from the beginning pursued aims of conquest. They are fighting for the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France. I have nothing to add to what I have said before on this subject (Very correct—on the right). There is no Alsace-Lorraine question in an international sense (stormy applause). If there is any such question it is a purely German question (renewed lively approval). The Entente is fighting for the acquisition of parts of Austro-Hungarian territory by Italy. If the fine words of holy aspirations have been invented in Italy, of holy selfishness, the demand for annexations is not removed thereby (very good). It [the Entente] is fighting for the abandonment of Palestine, Syria and Arabia by the Turkish Empire. England has her eyes directed especially toward the Turkish territory. She has suddenly discovered sympathy for the Arabs, and hopes, by using the Arabs as stalking horses, and perhaps by creating a buffer state under English suzerainty, to annex new territories to the British Empire. That the colonial war aims of England are directed toward increasing and rounding off the tremendous English possessions, particularly in Africa, has been repeatedly announced by English statesmen.

And in the face of this thoroughly aggressive policy, which is directed toward the acquisition of foreign domains, the statesmen of the Entente continually have the audacity to represent militaristic, imperialistic and autocratic Germany as the disturber of the peace which in the interest of world peace must be reduced to the closest limits, if not annihilated. By

a system of lies and calumny they are constantly endeavoring to stir up their own people and also neutral nations against the Central Powers, especially frightening the neutral nations with the specter of a violation of neutrality on the part of Germany. In the face of an intrigue such as has recently been carried on in Switzerland, I take this opportunity of declaring before the whole world that we have never thought for a moment and never shall think of violating Swiss neutrality (Very true—on the right). We know ourselves pledged to Switzerland by the principles of international law as well as our friendly relations of centuries' duration (Bravo!). We should feel respect and gratitude toward Switzerland and the remaining neutral nations—Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain, which is particularly exposed to difficulties owing to her geographical situation; likewise, though in less degree, toward the non-European countries which have not yet entered the war, for the steadfast attitude with which they have preserved neutrality in spite of all criticism and pressure (Bravo! on all sides). The world longs for peace (Very correct—on the left); it has no other wish than that the sufferings of war, from which it is groaning, should come to an end, but the Governments of hostile nations are always able to stir up anew the war fury among their populations. Continuance of the war to the utmost! As far as is announced, this was the watchword given out at the Conference at Versailles, and in the speeches of the British Prime Minister it is ever loudly re-echoed.

At the same time, other voices, it is true, have been heard recently in England. Besides the speech of Walter Runciman, which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech, an utterance of Lord Milner, along the same lines but perhaps still more conciliatory, though extra-parliamentary, has recently been published.

We can only wish that such voices should increase, and that the peaceful tendencies which doubtless also exist in the Entente countries might make themselves felt, for the world is now standing before the greatest and most ominous decision: either the enemies must decide to make peace—under what conditions we would be willing to enter negotiations they know—or else they intend to continue the criminal folly of a war of conquest; in that case our glorious troops will go on fighting under their skilful leaders. To what extent we are prepared for this is also thoroughly known to our enemies, and our brave, admirable people will hold out still longer; however, the blood of those who have fallen, the suffering of the mutilated, all misery and all pain of the peoples will fall upon the heads of those who obstinately refuse to lend an ear to the voices of reason and humanity (lively applause on all sides).

THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Back of the war are the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. They grouped the nations of Europe around what have proved to be the banners of two fundamentally opposite ideals. To know how the parties were bound is to understand how the world came to the present crisis; to know the circumstances and purposes of the bonds is to understand better what the foes are fighting for.

Of these arrangements no one but the expert in international affairs has had any real conception. To bring the texts together, to present them as wholes and thus reveal the spirit behind the engagements therefore seems worth while. The parties are given full opportunity for self-revelation in the following pages, and the record speaks for itself. Of the Triple Alliance Bismarck said: "No one will dare to measure himself with the Teuton fury which is manifested in case of an attack."¹ Kipling once defined the Triple Entente as "a linked and steadfast guard set for peace on earth."²

The engagements which caused the alignment of European powers in the world war were:

A. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In its first form this consisted of:

1. The Austro-German treaty of defensive alliance, signed at Vienna, October 7, 1879, by Count Julius Andrassy, Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, and Prince Henry VII of Reuss, German ambassador.

2. Treaty of alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary, signed at Vienna, May 20, 1882, by Count Kálnoky, Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, and Count Robilant, the Italian ambassador.

3. Treaty of alliance between Italy and the German Empire, signed at Vienna, May 20, 1882, by Prince Henry of Reuss and Count Robilant, the German and Italian ambassadors.

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, xxv, 305.

² Quoted by Ernest Lavisse, *London Times*, Weekly Edition, April 17, 1914, 309.

4. Adhesion of Rumania to the Triple Alliance, signed at Gastein, August/September, 1883, by Jean Bratiano on behalf of Rumania.

(Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were revised into a single document in 1887.)

5. Military conventions concluded, *mutatis mutandis*, between the powers concerned, possibly dating in their original form from 1882/83.

6. Exchanges of letters between the sovereigns, possibly dating from the conclusion of the alliance and certainly existing in 1889.

7. Exchange of letters between Austria-Hungary and Italy, December 15/19, 1909, relating to the Sandjak of Novibazar and alteration of the Balkan *status quo*.

To these may be added:

8. Treaty of alliance between the German and Ottoman Empires, signed at Berlin, August 4, 1914, and possibly incorporating an earlier understanding.

9. Treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and the German and Ottoman Empires and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, concluded at Sofia, July 17, 1915, Bulgaria becoming a belligerent on October 14, 1915.

B. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ITS FRIENDS

I. The Franco-Russian alliance, consisting of:

1. Exchange of letters at Paris, August 27, 1891, between Alexander Ribot, French minister of foreign affairs, and Baron Arthur Mohrenheim, Russian ambassador to France.

2. Military convention signed at St. Petersburg, August, 1892, by General Le Mouton de Boisdeffre, French assistant chief of the general staff, and General Obruchef, Russian chief of the general staff.

3. Agreement of alliance signed at Paris, March, 1894, by Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian minister of state, and Jean Casimir-Périer, French premier and minister of foreign affairs.

4. Naval convention signed at Paris, July 13, 1912, by Théophile Delcassé, French minister of marine, and Admiral Prince Lieven, Russian naval chief of the general staff.

II. The Anglo-French *entente*, first manifested in the treaty of general arbitration of October 14, 1903, consisting of:

1. Convention between Great Britain and France respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary

of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

2. Declaration and secret articles of Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

3. Declaration between Great Britain and France concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

4. Convention between Great Britain and France confirming the protocol signed at London on February 27, 1906, concerning New Hebrides, signed at London, October 20, 1906, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

5. Exchange of letters respecting armed assistance, London, November 22-23, 1912, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.

III. The Anglo-Russian *entente* was brought about by:

1. Convention respecting Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907, by Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador to Russia, and Alexander P. Izvolski, Russian minister of foreign affairs.

IV. The Anglo-Japanese alliance:

1. Agreement between Great Britain and Japan relative to China, Korea (alliance, etc.), signed at London, January 30, 1902, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Count Tadasu Hayashi, Japanese minister at London; revised and superseded by

2. Agreement between Great Britain and Japan relative to Eastern Asia (China and Korea) and India, signed at London, August 12, 1905, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Count Tadasu Hayashi, Japanese minister at London; revised and superseded by

3. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan respecting rights and interests in Eastern Asia and India, signed at London, July 13, 1911, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Takaaki Kato, Japanese ambassador at London.

V. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, under which Portugal took the attitude which resulted in the German declaration of war of March 9, 1916, dates from 1373 and is not only the oldest existing political engagement in the world but is the longest friendship in history. It consists of portions of the following:

1. Treaty of peace, friendship and alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373.

2. Treaty of alliance between England and Portugal, signed at Windsor, May 9, 1386.

3. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, January 29, 1642.

4. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Westminster, July 20, 1654.

5. Treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Whitehall, April 28, 1660.

6. Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal of marriage between his Majesty Charles II and the Princess Catherine, Infanta, signed at Whitehall, June 23, 1661.

7. Treaty of defensive alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Lisbon, May 16, 1703.

8. Convention of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, October 22, 1807.

9. Treaty of friendship and alliance between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, signed at Rio de Janeiro, February 19, 1810.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

Alexander II of Russia, Emperor William I of Germany and Emperor-King Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary met at Berlin September 5-12, 1872, the result being a general understanding among them and mutual explanations of foreign policies, without any written alliance. This League of the Three Emperors remained firm only three years. In 1876 the Tsar met Francis Joseph at Reichstadt and while in a carriage signed an understanding, converted into two formal documents signed at Vienna in January and March, 1877, by which Austria-Hungary secured the right of occupying Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for her neutrality in case of a successful Russian war against Turkey, while Bessarabia was to fall to Russia. Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as within the Austro-Hun-

garian sphere of influence or interest, and were to be territorially benefited in case of the dismemberment of Turkey.¹ This arrangement was effected without the knowledge or co-operation of Germany, according to the *North German Gazette*.

War broke out between Russia and Turkey on April 24, 1877, and was closed by the treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. The terms of this treaty being unsatisfactory to the powers, the Congress of Berlin was held June 13-July 13, 1878, and resulted in the treaty of Berlin, revising the terms negotiated at San Stefano.

Russia's former friendliness toward Germany cooled after the congress, and political conditions determined Bismarck to bind Germany and Austria-Hungary together while the opportunity offered. The occasion was made by him in a few months. In carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Berlin a mixed commission in 1879 was working in Novibazar to delimit the western frontier of Turkey. In three letters to the Emperor of Germany the Tsar demanded that the German representative yield in all instances to the wishes of his Russian colleague. Alexander II wrote in effect that the acceptance by Germany of this demand was the condition of the maintenance of peace between the two peoples. Bismarck, who was at Gastein for his health, wrote to the emperor after reading these letters that, if this demand had been made in a Russian diplomatic document, he would have advised mobilization of the armed forces against Russia. He therefore requested the Kaiser to get the sequel handled through official channels. So far as appearances went the incident blew over; for the Tsar and Kaiser had a cordial meeting at Alexandrovo on September 3. But Bismarck, fearing a change of policy at Vienna after the retirement of Count Julius Andr  ssy, made use of the incident by passing the correspondence to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. The latter, scenting the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance, replied that an Austro-German alliance would be the only counterweight. The Kaiser was unwilling to have such an alliance, but its terms were nevertheless negotiated by Bismarck and Andr  ssy on September 21-24, and the Kaiser's assent was obtained on the

¹ Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 95-114; *London Times*, April 29, May 9, 1879.

29th,¹ though only after strong pressure was exerted. The treaty of October 7, 1879, was the result.²

The value of this treaty to Bismarck, who laid the course which the Germany of to-day has so eagerly followed, was frankly—and cynically—expressed the next year to a Russian diplomat: "Austria would be very much deceived if she thought that the security resulting from her relations to us was complete. Our interests compel us to prevent her being *destroyed*, but she is not guaranteed against attack. A war between Russia and Austria would place us, it is true, in a most embarrassing position, but our attitude in such an eventuality will be determined by our own interests, and not by engagements which have no existence. Our interests demand that neither Russia nor Austria be mortally wounded. Their existence as great powers is equally necessary to us. That is what will determine our conduct, should occasion arise."³

ITALY ENTERS THE COMBINATION

Francesco Crispi, then president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, visited several European capitals in the autumn of 1877 and on September 16 had a conference with Prince Bismarck at which they discussed questions of policy and the possibility of an alliance. In conclusion Crispi said: "Then we must confine ourselves to a treaty of alliance in case we should be attacked by France." To which Bismarck rejoined: "I will take the Emperor's orders with a view to opening official negotiations for an alliance."⁴ In telegrams to the Italian king and the premier, Crispi stated that the alliance was to be defensive and offensive, that Germany refused an eventual treaty against Austria-Hungary, and that she was not interested in the Near Eastern question. Early in 1880, Italy again

¹ Hans Blum, *Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks. Politische Geschichte von 1871 bis 1890* (Leipzig und Wien, Bibliographisches Institut, 1893), 219-220; in greater detail in his *Fürst Bismarck und seine Zeit. Eine Biographie für das deutsche Volk* (München, C. H. Beck, 1894-95), V, 285 ff., and referred to by Victor von Strantz, *Das Deutsches Reich, 1871-1895* (Berlin, R. von Decker's verlag, 1895), 76-78. See also *Archives diplomatiques*, 1893, IV, 331-332; Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 255-272.

² "An analogous treaty between the two powers for defense against France has not been published."—Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 272.

³ James Young Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and the Sabouroff Memoirs," *Nineteenth Century and After*, January, 1918, 67.

⁴ Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, *Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, 37.

approached Bismarck with regard to an official alliance and received word that "the road to Berlin led through Vienna." In January, 1881, Italy sent an agent to Vienna, where Balkan affairs were discussed. As a result Italy felt that there was no serious obstacle to establishing a close and sincere friendship between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Formal negotiations between Berlin, Rome and Vienna followed.

The negotiations apparently continued for a year. They took a double form, Italy regarding Germany as a powerful friend to be conciliated and honored, while to her Austria-Hungary was a masked enemy to be mistrusted, watched and guarded against.¹

Bismarck was desirous of securing an engagement against France, but Italy would not consent to that, notwithstanding her disappointment at having seen France acquire Tunis by the treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881. And Austria-Hungary again defeated that German ambition, having already refused to include such an engagement in her alliance with Germany. Andrassy held that there was nothing to put Austria-Hungary at variance with France, and offered to resign rather than take an engagement against France.² So Bismarck had to forego his desire at that time.

The terms of the alliance seem to have taken form as a result of Italy's demands. She sought support for her position and ambitions in the Mediterranean. This was refused, and the incident explains why Art. I of the treaty promises only "mutual support within the scope of their own interests." Even this vague engagement was too much for Austria-Hungary and as an offset to it the Ballplatz secured Art. VII, with the effect of heading off Italian efforts to get Albania. Italy also demanded a guaranty of her territorial integrity, aiming to end all danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the papacy. Austria-Hungary finally consented because such a guaranty would hinder the Italian Government's advocacy of Italia Irredenta, while Germany was willing to have another security for her position in Alsace-Lorraine. Germany was not interested in the Balkans, and therefore the treaty signed by her with Italy omitted the clause relating to the Near East.³

¹ Emile Joseph Dillon, *From the Triple Alliance to the Quadruple Alliance*, 28.

² Count Vincent Benedetti, *Studies in Diplomacy*, 120-121.

³ Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 211-212.

RUMANIA FORCED IN

As early as 1881 Austria-Hungary desired to bring Rumania under her as a protectorate. Therefore she raised the question of the Danube. A conference on the subject was held February 8-March 10, 1883, at London. Rumania applied by a note of February 1 for admission to this diplomatic gathering, which vitally affected her fluvial artery. Count Münster, the German delegate, opposed the application on the ground that, "if a vote was given to Rumania, a position not at all desirable would be created, the power at her volition to impose her veto." Austria-Hungary supported this idea and demanded that Servia, which similarly sought admission, should be considered on equal terms with Rumania. This objection, in view of the customary unanimity in diplomatic gatherings, resulted in a conference resolution to "invite Rumania and Serbia to attend its sessions in order to consult them and to understand their point of view." The small states were to sit at the table of the family of nations only as children. Rumania on February 12 replied that it could "not accept a situation which would give it only a consultative voice and which would not permit it to take part in the decisions of the conference." Serbia accepted. The conference meant much to Rumania and it disturbed her deeply to see Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey handling a matter of vital interest to her, while she herself was made impotent regarding it at the behest of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, her avowed enemy by reason of the unredeemed Rumanian population west of the Carpathians. The Danube was in general controlled by the European Commission, consisting of the above-named powers, and locally by the Mixed Commission, which was subordinate to the European body but, by the system of voting employed, subject to the will of Austria-Hungary. This situation explains Rumania's disturbance when in the session of February 10 Count Karolyi, the Austro-Hungarian delegate, urged that the executive character of the Mixed Commission should come before the conference. This "seemed indispensable to my Government to assure the regular execution of the regulations prepared by the European Commission," he said. He hoped that Rumania

would no longer refuse to accede to this proposition. In the session of February 13 Count Karolyi read a project, in which France objected to the word "executory"; Russia took the same view. Count Karolyi then "declared himself ready to abandon the word." Rumania protested against the final action of the conference, but to no avail.¹

GERMAN PRESSURE FOR SECRET DIPLOMACY

Said Take Ionescu in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies: "Germany helped us, but at what price? The price, gentlemen, was our treaty of alliance with Austria." And he proceeds:

After that, as Rumania still objected, a new incident fell all of a sudden from the skies, which Austria seized upon. On June 5, 1883, at the unveiling of the statue of Stephen the Great at Jassy, Pierre Gradishteano . . . spoke at the banquet of the two pearls which were missing from the crown of Stephen the Great. Of these pearls, gentlemen, one, the larger, was beyond the Pruth, was Bessarabia; the other, the smaller, was the Bukovina.

No protest came from Russia, for Russia did not think that her military power would dissolve in a glass of champagne, so that she could no longer defend her frontier. But from beyond the mountains, where the desire was to pick a quarrel with us at any cost, and at any cost, as in the case of Serbia, to put an end to Rumanian arrogance, bred of the victories on the plains of Bulgaria, and regarded as menacing to Hungary—from beyond the mountains came formidable protests. Our excuses, the explanations which followed, availed us nothing. The situation had become intolerable. . . .

And then, gentlemen, Jean Bratiano went on leave for 40 days, on July 12; King Carol left on August 4. He met Jean Bratiano on August 6 at Breslau. On August 10, Bratiano returned home. From Berlin the King went to Vienna, and stayed at the Burg. He returned to Prédéal on August 16. Lastly, on August 23, Bratiano set off again, for 15 days, to Gastein. It was then that the alliance was concluded. . . .

The conclusion of this alliance came, not so much from our fear of Russia, as from the fact that our other neighbor made our life intolerable, and that we found no other means except the alliance to make our existence

¹ Ministerul afacerilor straine. *Cestunea Dunarei, Acte si documente* (Bucuresci, 1883), 833-840, 842, 912. The protocols are also printed in *Archives Diplomatiques*, 2^e série, VII, 216-262.

tolerable. In exchange the protocol about the Danube was naturally given up, for no one wishes to throttle an ally; that would be superfluous; one keeps that for neutrals or one's enemies.¹

In August or September, 1883, Rumania became a silent partner in the Triple Alliance, signing a treaty identical with that of Italy. How closely the text was guarded is shown by Alexander Marghiloman, former Rumanian foreign secretary: "I myself, though I was foreign secretary, had never seen that treaty . . . and knew only some of its stipulations from verbal communications made to me by the prime minister. . . . When the fateful Crown council was held at Sinaia, in 1914, which, under the presidency of King Carol, decided on Rumania's attitude, this treaty lay on the table, but only three of those present knew its contents, though it was to form the chief subject of the deliberations."²

CHANGES IN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In 1887 German policy had changed toward Balkan affairs and the presence of Rumania in the alliance also doubtless contributed to its being given a new form. The renewal of that year was made in a single document. It was probably at that time that the exchange of letters between the sovereigns took place, possibly having been preceded by similar letters of a less formal character. Doubtless the military undertakings of the alliance were revised at the same time.

The renewal of May 6, 1891, also involved a revision. Marquis di Rudini, Italian minister of foreign affairs, "imparted to it a marked economic character which, besides satisfying certain needs of his country, insensibly blunted the anti-French point of the alliance,"³ which had been given to it as a result of the commercial negotiations

¹ Take Ionescu, *The Policy of National Instinct*. A speech delivered . . . in the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies during the sitting of 16th & 17th December, 1915 (London, Sir Joseph Causton & Sons, 1916), pp. 79-83.

² War and Peace, February, 1918, page 185. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Rumania's participation in the alliance has been common in well-informed circles for 20 years. For instance, Andrew D. White, American ambassador to Germany and chairman of the American delegation to the First Hague Conference, referring to Germany's opposition to arbitration proposals at that conference, wrote in his diary on June 9, 1899: "There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies—the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey and Rumania—leading them to oppose it." (*Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II, 294.)

³ Emile Joseph Dillon, *From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance*, 35-36.

under the ægis of the treaty. This was accomplished only with difficulty and with after-effects. Italy desired a commercial treaty which Germany and Austria-Hungary refused to sign. Rudini gained his point by writing to Count Eberhard zu Solms-Sonnenwalde, the German ambassador at Rome: "Your Excellency, the delay in ratifying these commercial treaties is a species of blackmail on the part of the government you represent. I have the honor to inform you that if the pending treaty is not signed within 24 hours I shall tear up the Triple Alliance and announce the reasons to the world." The treaties in question were signed on December 6, 1891, being similar to each other in text.¹

MOMENTOUS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

Art. VII of the main treaty proved in the course of time to be its crucial provision. The publication of its text throws a flood of light backward upon the motley events of successive Balkan crises, while it establishes a certain continuity between various Balkan incidents dating from the treaty of Berlin in 1878. In 1882, when the alliance was concluded, Germany had been so little interested in the Balkans that she signed a separate treaty with Italy omitting reference to that region. Bismarck then considered the Near East an unavoidable pawn on the chessboard of relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia. But by 1887 he had altered that view and was willing to make the preservation of the Balkan *status quo* one of the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance for Germany. This change fixed Berlin's eyes upon the Near East, contributed to the birth of the *Drang nach Osten* idea, encouraged in its degree the development of the Berlin-Bagdad conception and the Turko-German *rapprochement*, which culminated in the actual alliance of 1914. Thus Art. VII proved to be the point of application for the inherent menace of the Triple Alliance to European peace. The Young Turk revival

¹Treaty of commerce, customs and navigation between Germany and Italy, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XVII, 712-809; treaty of commerce and navigation between Italy and Austria-Hungary, Neumann, *Traité de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, XV, 97-249. Germany signed a treaty of the same character with Austria-Hungary and Belgium on the same day. The treaty with Italy superseded the one of May 4, 1883. All the treaties mentioned represented a new German commercial policy.

The quotation is taken from an article in the *New York World* said to have been supplied to it from official Italian sources.

of the Ottoman constitution on July 10, 1908, was followed on October 1 by the declaration of Bulgarian independence from Turkey and on October 3 by Austria-Hungary's proclamation annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary under the terms of the treaty of Berlin. This violent rupture of the Balkan *status quo* created a crisis of magnitude and was the first of the train of circumstances which led directly to the world war—the Turko-Italian war, the Balkan wars and the ultimatum to Serbia.

The Bosnia-Herzegovinian crisis was a test for the Triple Alliance, its effect on the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary being recorded in the instructions of December 15, 1909, which are printed as part of the alliance.¹ The crisis had the effect of welding Germany and Austria-Hungary closer together. Early in the affair Emperor William sent to Francis Joseph a letter in which he is alleged to have asserted that "Germany stands steadfastly with Austria-Hungary not only in consequence of the alliance, but also by reason of the agreement of their interests."² That was assuredly Germany's attitude, for on September 21, 1910, the Kaiser had occasion to reply to a welcome by the burgomaster of Vienna, who referred to "the inmost joy of Austria-Hungary, which recently had occasion once more to recognize the Nibelung loyalty of the German Empire and of its exalted ruler." And Emperor William replied: "Me-thinks I read in your resolve the agreement of the city of Vienna with the action of an ally in taking his stand in shining armor at a grave moment by the side of your most gracious sovereign. This was at once an injunction of duty and of friendship; for the alliance has, to the weal of the world, passed into and pervaded as an imponderable element the convictions and the life of both peoples."³

ITALY STRAINS AT THE LEASH

Italy's position in the alliance was strained as a result of that part of the Turko-Italian war which extended Italian military operations to the Turkish islands. Austria-Hungary protested against

¹ See text, pages 221-222.

² London *Times*, Weekly Edition, October 23, 1909, 675.

³ *Ibid.*, September 23, 1910, 725.

the disturbance of the *status quo* and a rancorous correspondence ensued. After the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Italy was enabled to return the compliment in Austria-Hungary's own words. On July 26 the Duke of Avarna, Italian ambassador at Vienna, wrote to Count Berchtold, the Vienna minister of foreign affairs: "Should the threatening conflict lead to war and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Serbian territory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Art. VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim compensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in advance."¹ Austria-Hungary sought freedom of action and declared that, as she contemplated no territorial acquisitions, she would nevertheless be prepared to discuss "an eventual compensation" if she were "compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be considered as merely provisional."² Germany in the main sided against Austria-Hungary and held that the Italian interpretation of Art. VII should be acknowledged even if Italy remained neutral.³ After this expression of German opinion, Count Berchtold telegraphed on August 23, to Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome: "I authorize you to declare to the Rome cabinet, in conjunction with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian interpretation of the term '*dans les régions des Balkans*' in Art. VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration of the treaty. This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us."⁴ This did not quite meet the Italian contention, which was summarized by Count Berchtold on December 12, in the following language: "Under the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only temporary. We, therefore, should have notified the Italian cabinet and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier."⁵

¹ Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. XV, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, No. XV, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, No. XLII, p. 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. XLIV, 40-41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. LXXIV, 54; cf. Italian Green Book, No. 3.

TURKEY'S ENTRANCE INTO THE ALLIANCE

It is well known that the moving spirit in the Young Turk movement of 1908, Enver Bey, was a pronounced Germanophil. It is probable that the settlement of the 1908-9 Balkan crisis, which was relatively to Turkey's advantage, was due in this respect somewhat to German influence. In 1910 there was considerable discussion in well-informed quarters of Turkey's joining the Triple Alliance. During the Turko-Italian war Germany favored Turkey at the expense of Italy. Evidence of this, according to documents published by the *New York World*, exists in a dispatch from Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin, to the French Foreign Office dated in the spring or early summer of 1912. During a conference between Cambon and the Kaiser the Turkish ambassador was announced. "The Kaiser," says the account, "directed the caller to be shown in at once, and remarked to M. Cambon that he was just the man he wanted to see. M. Cambon asked if he should retire, but the Kaiser said 'No.' The Turk was shown into the room where the French ambassador still sat. The Emperor rushed to meet the caller, shook a quivering finger in his face, and cried, 'I am ashamed of you, I am ashamed of Turkey. We believed you could beat the Italians. Had we not thought so, we should not have backed you. Now we see we put our money on the wrong horse.'"¹ This evidence tends to give credence to the statements made by a diplomat at Athens to the correspondent of the *London Morning Post*² to the effect that Turkey made a secret treaty with Germany some years before 1914.

ANGLO-ITALIAN MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT

In February, 1887, Great Britain reached understandings with Austria-Hungary and Italy. For several years these caused Great Britain, apparently erroneously, to be associated with the Triple Alliance by the political wiseacres. Gottlieb von Jagow, former German secretary for foreign affairs, for instance, in replying to Prince Lichnowsky, referred to these agreements as an effort of Bismarck to bring Great Britain into a closer relationship to the Central European

¹ *London Times*, Weekly Edition, September 28, 1917, page 794.

² See page 222, note.

league, and make her share its burdens because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."

Marquis Antonio Starrabba di Rudini on June 29, 1891, declared in the Italian Parliament that the statements made on several occasions by Sir James Fergusson, British parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs, strictly conformed to the truth. These were in reply to questions by the late Henri Labouchère. On February 10, 1888, he stated that "no engagement pledging the material action of this country has been entered into by her Majesty's Government which is not known to this House," and a few days later defined the phrase "material action" as implying "military responsibility." On February 14, Labouchère asked whether "the statement in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, that the treaties which were signed last year between the Central European powers 'are supplemented by special arrangements between Italy, Austria and Great Britain, having for their object the defense of the Austrian and Italian coasts against a hostile country;' whether any arrangements of this nature . . . were a matter of diplomatic correspondence during last year; and, whether, if so, this resulted in any arrangement. . . ." In reply Fergusson stated "that we are under no engagements pledging the military—in which, of course, is included the naval—action of this country, except such as are already known to the House. . . ." On July 19, 1889, he asserted: "The action of her Majesty's Government, in the improbable event of war breaking out . . . , will doubtless be decided, like all other questions of policy, by the circumstances of that particular time and the interests of this country. Her Majesty's Government are under no engagements or understandings fettering their liberty in that respect." And still later on June 4, 1891, he said: "Her Majesty's Government retained their full liberty of judgment as to what action we should take and as to what means we should employ in any conceivable circumstances. At the same time, Italian statesmen are well aware that her Majesty's Government are at one with them in desiring that there shall be no disturbance of the existing order in the Mediterranean and adjacent seas, and that the sympathies of this country would be on the side of those who would maintain a policy so important for the British interest involved."¹

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, CCCXXII, 153; CCCXXII, 377; CCCXXXVIII, 850; CCCXXXIX, 1058; CCCLIII, 1607.

Julius Hansen writing of this understanding in 1891 gave a typically diplomatic view of it in the following words: "No treaty had been signed, it is true, between these two powers, the Foreign Office being opposed in principle to the conclusion of a secret alliance. But from an exchange of views between the London and Rome cabinets a promise of understanding resulted. The Foreign Office had in effect declared that in case of a war between Austria and Russia or between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, under the conditions foreseen by the protocols of the Triplice, England would intervene against Russia in the first case and against France in the second. But the Foreign Office did not, however, admit that this declaration involved for the British Government the obligations arising from a *casus foederis*."¹

The effect of the *rapprochement* was seen in protocols between the Governments of Great Britain and Italy for the demarkation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, signed at Rome, March 24 and April 15, 1891,² and an additional protocol of May 5, 1894.³ It is well known that the British-Italian friendliness continued and even increased.

CENTRAL POWERS IN ALLIANCE WITH AND AGAINST RUSSIA

The relations between the two sets of allies before the present war are very enlightening. In fact, the Franco-Russian alliance was the result of what Alexander Félix Joseph Ribot defined as a singular paradox. "At the same time that Germany made with Austria a treaty against Russia she obtained from Russia a promise of benevolent neutrality for the case where she found herself at war with another country, of such a character that we should have found

¹ Jens Julius Hansen, *L'Alliance franco-russe*, 83-84. Marquis Rudini in a letter to Maggiorino Ferraris was even more definite: "Should Italy be attacked, England would come to its aid from the maritime side. Any alteration of the *status quo*, which is inconsistent with the interests of both states, would result in a joint Anglo-Italian action and England also is obliged to protect Italy in case the latter should be drawn into war through its relation with the Triple Alliance. A special agreement between England and the Triple Alliance does not exist; England will participate in it only by means of Italy."—(Cited in Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken, *Frankreich, Russland und der Dreibund*, 155; Arthur Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, 262-263.)

² Texts in 83 British and Foreign State Papers, 19-21; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XVIII, 175-179; *Archives diplomatiques*, XXXVIII, 259-260; Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, XIX, 686-688. Notes exchanged between the British and Italian Governments respecting the Italian agreement of 1905 with Seyid Mahamed-bin-Abdulla, London, March 19, 1907 (100 British and Foreign State Papers, 543-546) showed that the *rapprochement* continued in the colonial sphere, while the two powers eventually made a series of agreements respecting Aden, the Red Sea, the Adalia-Burdur line in Asia Minor and other points of contact.

³ Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, XIX, 689-690.

ourselves isolated if war broke out, but that Russia found herself exposed on her side to isolation and thus delivered up to the superior arbitration of Germany. She desired to recover her independence; she did not do it simply from sympathy for France, she acted from the feeling of her permanent interest."¹

The treaty thus referred to was an alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia signed at Berlin, June 18, 1881, for a period of three years by Petr Saburov, Prince Bismarck and Count Széchenyi, and in its first form provided:

1. In case one of the three powers should find itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two will preserve a benevolent neutrality toward it, and will devote their efforts to the localizing of the conflict.

This stipulation shall also apply to a war between one of the three powers and Turkey, but only in case a previous agreement has been arranged between the three courts relative to the results of that war.

In the special case that one of them shall have obtained from one of its two allies a more positive assistance, the obligation of the present article shall continue in full force for the third.

This treaty was revised and re-signed for a period of three years on March 27, 1884, at Berlin by Prince Bismarck, Count Orlov and Count Széchenyi, and expired June 27, 1887.²

This treaty, lasting through six years, underwrote Germany against a French attack. "Our stake," said Bismarck to Saburov before the negotiations commenced, "is the conservation of Alsace-Lorraine," and he suggested the line of his policy by adding later that "a mutual guaranty against coalitions is perhaps preferable nowadays to a territorial guaranty."³ The negotiations were conducted primarily between Bismarck and Saburov and during their course called forth various remarks from Bismarck derogatory to Austria-Hungary. On one occasion he said: "Our projected arrangement . . . offers us the great advantage of keeping Austria better in leading strings and forcing her, should occasion arise, into an *entente*." And again:

¹ *Annales du Sénat. Débats parlementaires*, LXXVIII, 461 (April 6, 1911).

² On this treaty see: Serge Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," *American Historical Review*, XXIII, 324-349; James Young Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and the Sabouroff Memoirs," *Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1917, 1111-1123; January, 1918, 60-75; Hermann Hofmann, *Fürst Bismarck (1890-98)*, II, 370-372.

³ Simpson, *loc. cit.*, December, 1917, 1114.

"The only power that will have any inclination to default is Austria. That is why, with her, an alliance *à trois* is preferable to an alliance *à deux*."¹

GERMANY "REINSURES" WITH RUSSIA AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

It is probable that the arrangements effected between Great Britain and Italy and Austria-Hungary in February, 1887, had something to do with the events that immediately followed. But the character of those agreements in no wise excused Bismarck's next step. On May 11, 1887, Count Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, Russian ambassador at Berlin, broached to him the question of a dual agreement. Bismarck responded favorably and in the course of the conversation read to the Russian the text of the Austro-German alliance of 1879.² This in itself was a violation of the terms of Art. III of the alliance, which enjoins absolute secrecy. The negotiations for a Russo-German treaty were soon completed and on June 18 the text of this re-insurance treaty was signed. Its first article, containing the most important provision, was drafted by Bismarck himself on Shuvalov's request after the Russian had confessed that he did not feel strong enough to contend with the German over the matter. The treaty itself, the text of which has been available only since January last, reads:

The Imperial Courts of Russia and Germany, animated by an equal desire to confirm general peace by an understanding designed to assure the defensive position of their respective states, have resolved to embody in a special arrangement the accord established between them, against the expiration on June 15/27, 1887, of the treaty signed in 1881 and renewed in 1884. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the two courts have agreed on the following articles:

Art. I. In the case that one of the high contracting parties should find itself at war with a third great power, the other would maintain toward it a benevolent neutrality and would devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict.

This provision shall not apply to a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two powers by one of the high contracting parties.

¹ Simpson, *loc. cit.*, January, 1918, 68, 70.

² Saburov during his negotiations in 1880-81 with Bismarck was certain of the existence of the Austro-German alliance.

Art. II. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The two courts pledge themselves to permit no modification of the territorial *status quo* in that peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as it arises, every attempt to disturb that *status quo* or to modify it without their consent.

Art. III. The two courts recognize the European and naturally obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, founded on the law of nations, confirmed by treaties, and set forth in the declaration made by the second plenipotentiary of Russia at the Congress of Berlin, in the session of July 12 (Protocol 19).¹ They will take care in common that Turkey makes no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any government by lending to military operations of a belligerent power that portion of its empire adjoining the straits. In case of infraction or to prevent infraction in case it is in prospect, the two courts shall warn Turkey that they would consider her, if such were to take place, as having put herself in a state of war with the injured party, and as having deprived herself henceforth of the benefits of security assured to her territorial *status quo* by the treaty of Berlin.²

In a protocol signed the same day, it was declared that, in order to complete the stipulations of Arts. II and III of the treaty, the two courts had agreed upon the following points:

1. Germany, as in the past, will aid Russia to re-establish in Bulgaria a regular and legal government. She promises that she will in no case give consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battenberg.

2. In case the Emperor of Russia should find himself obliged to take over the task of defending the entrance into the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany engages to lend benevolent neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the measures which his Majesty shall deem it necessary to take in order to guard the key of his empire.³

¹ "The plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able to accept completely the proposition of the second plenipotentiary of Great Britain concerning the closing of the straits, are minded to request on their side insertion in the protocol of the observation:

"That in their opinion the principle of the closing of the straits is a European principle, and that the provisions concluded on this matter in 1841, 1856 and 1871, and now confirmed by the treaty of Berlin, are obligatory on the part of all the powers, conformably to the spirit and the letter of the existing treaties, not only toward the Sultan but toward all the powers signatory of these transactions."—*Das Staatsarchiv*, XXXIV, 274.

² Serge Goraiunov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," *American Historical Review*, XXIII, 338-339.

³ *Ibid.*, 339.

The treaty was to expire in 1890. In 1889 the Russian minister of foreign affairs was directed to study whether renewal of the treaty should take place. The decision was that it should, and on December 19 the Tsar ordered arrangements to that end, the renewal negotiations not to begin before April, 1890. In a conversation on February 12, 1890, Bismarck said to Shuvalov: "I vote for the continuance of our entente." Shuvalov was doubtless right when, in reporting this conversation, he ventured the opinion that "to Bismarck our entente is in some sort a guarantee that no written agreement exists between us and France, and that is very important for Germany." William II of Germany dropped Bismarck as his pilot on March 20, 1890. Three days before, when the Kaiser had already accepted the Prince's resignation, Shuvalov had seen the prince and had been told that William II had objected to his chancellor's Russophil policy. Yet the Kaiser sent for the Russian ambassador in the night of March 21 and, at the ensuing interview at 8 A.M., declared: "I beg you to tell his Majesty that on my part I am entirely disposed to renew our agreement. . . . Nothing has changed either in my personal sentiments toward him or in my policy in regard to Russia." The Tsar annotated this dispatch: "We shall see by the sequel whether deeds correspond with words." And the sequel was that the Berlin pundits first determined to transfer the negotiations to St. Petersburg, and when General Schweinitz, German ambassador to Russia, opened his long-awaited instructions to proceed he found they were orders to refuse to renew the treaty. "In my secret heart, I am well content," wrote the Tsar on the report of the incident.¹ Russia was free to cultivate the friendship of France.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA MAKE FRIENDS

An entirely different spirit from that of the Triple Alliance—as different as the purposes of the contesting sides in the present war—is evident from the beginning in the history of the Triple Entente which was taking form as the new ruler of Germany was breaking from his Russian moorings.

¹ Goriainov, *loc. cit.*, 341-344. Chancellor Georg Leo von Caprivi was, of course, the person technically responsible for the decision and his explanation was that the Germany's treaty relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia were "too complicated." Bismarck retorted that they "of course required a considerable degree of diplomatic skill." (Hofmann, *Fürst Bismarck*, II, 4.)

The Triple Entente had for its foundation the Dual Alliance between France and Russia. Instead of a friendship forced by grim necessity and based on sharp dealings, we here find amity the natural result of mutual interest based on a ready acceptance of the equality and the equal rights of the parties.

In 1888 Russian bonds were depressed on the Berlin exchange. On November 20 a Russian 4% loan of 500 million francs was authorized, and was offered at Paris, London, Amsterdam and St. Petersburg. In France alone 1,163,000,000 francs was subscribed and Russian rentes rose everywhere except at Berlin. At that time Charles Louis de Saulces de Freycinet, minister of war in the Floquet cabinet, advocated a program of military reorganization. One day Major-General Baron Frederiks, Russian military attaché and an old friend, called upon him and engaged him in a familiar conversation. Russia, he at length proposed, would like to rearm its troops with a French modeled rifle. The proposal was submitted to the cabinet and agreed to. Shortly after, early in November, Grand Duke Vladimir, brother of the Tsar, asked M. Freycinet to examine the French Lebel rifle and its ammunition. After this examination, Baron Frederiks called on the minister of war and inquired if France would manufacture 500,000 of the weapon for Russia.

"We ask nothing better than to satisfy you," said M. Freycinet in a tone half serious, half jocular. "Only we would have to be assured that the guns would never shoot at us."

"We understand that perfectly," returned the Russian in the same voice, "and we will give you every guaranty on that point."

A few days later M. Freycinet met Baron Arthur Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador, and repeated his conversation with the attaché. The baron said:

"Not only do I approve what Frederiks said to you, but I am myself ready to use his words on my own account."

"That being so," continued M. Freycinet, "would you accept a conversation on the subject with M. Goblet, our minister of foreign affairs?"

"Certainly," replied Baron Mohrenheim, and negotiations began without delay.¹

¹ Pierre Albin, *La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894)*, 264-267.

Between that conversation and the actual signing of any document there was a period of nearly three years. Franco-Russian relations during this time grew more cordial, notwithstanding several incidents capable of creating tension. Events recent at the time suggested the possibility that Great Britain might associate herself with the powers of the Triple Alliance, and this created in the mind of Alexander III a noticeable pro-French disposition. The expiration of the Russo-German treaty on June 18, 1890, left Russia free to make new arrangements.

The actual Franco-Russian negotiations were rapidly conducted when once seriously begun.

Alexander Ribot was minister of foreign affairs in the fourth Freycinet ministry in the spring of 1891. Lefebvre de Laboulaye, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, was on leave at Paris in April and he, M. Ribot and Baron Mohrenheim, together with Premier Freycinet, began *pourparlers* which lasted about two months. On July 22 a French squadron anchored at Kronstadt, Admiral Gervais and his men enjoying extraordinary courtesies during their stay in Russian waters, which lasted until August 10. On August 12 Baron Mohrenheim was ordered to St. Petersburg, where he had an audience of the Tsar on the 18th. At that time a text was agreed upon and it was formally signed immediately after Mohrenheim's return to Paris on the 22nd.

DISTANCE DOES NOT SEPARATE

The fact of the agreement was announced almost immediately. On August 31 Baron Mohrenheim, speaking at Cauterets in reply to an ovation, said: "The preparations you have made for my return would almost justify me in believing I had not been absent. It is true that distance does not always separate and that absence may itself be a drawing together." Premier de Freycinet on September 10 referred at a luncheon to general officers and military attachés to France as being "in a new situation."¹ On September 29 at Bapaume, M. Ribot, minister of foreign affairs, referred to the "profound sympathies" uniting Russia and France as illustrated by recent manifestations. "What is true of internal policy is even more true

¹ Jens Julius Hansen, *L'Alliance franco-russe*, 69, 71, 72-73; *Archives diplomatiques*, XL, 212-213.

of external policy; results are not improvised; they are the consequence and the reward of a long series of efforts.”¹

The exchange of notes of August 27, 1891, satisfied neither the French Premier Freycinet, nor the actual military alignment of Europe. Since the conversation of 1888 there had been more or less interchange of military ideas between France and Russia. In 1891, with the approval of General Vannovski, Russian minister of war, Russian officers had got into touch with the French general staff “to initiate arrangements for transportation of troops and provisioning.”² In October an Austro-German mixed commission composed of general staff officers was appointed for the purpose of assuring the eventual collaboration of the allied forces against Russia. Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian minister of state, arrived in Paris November 17, 1891, and left five days later. On the 21st at a conference between him, Ambassador Mohrenheim, Premier Freycinet and Minister Ribot a military convention was agreed to in principle. Negotiations were well advanced when the Freycinet ministry fell on February 18, 1892, to be followed by a Loubet ministry in which Ribot and Freycinet respectively retained the portfolios of foreign affairs and war. Negotiations continued and the French assistant chief of the general staff, General Le Mouton de Boisdeffre, went to Russia in mid-August for the ostensible purpose of attending the Russian maneuvers. Toward the end of the month he exchanged with General Obruchef the signed copies of the Franco-Russian military convention.

ALLIANCE SIGNED AFTER NAVAL FRATERNIZING

Political events in 1893 caused both France and Russia keenly to appreciate the advantages of their mutual friendship. On October 13 a Russian squadron under Admiral Avellane anchored at Toulon and for two weeks was the object of unbridled French enthusiasm, culminating in an exchange of cordial telegrams between President Carnot and the Tsar. Under the impulse of this courtesy Jules Develle, minister of foreign affairs at Paris, and M. Giers at St. Petersburg virtually concluded negotiations for a formal alliance by the end of November. The Dupuy cabinet, of which Develle

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, XL, 214.

² Albin, *op. cit.*, 334; Hansen, *op. cit.*, 86.

was a member, was succeeded on December 3 by a ministry in which Jean Paul Pierre Casimir-Périer was both premier and minister of foreign affairs. In February, 1894, Baron Mohrenheim went on leave and on March 6 had an audience of the Tsar during which the text of the Franco-Russian alliance was approved. A few days later M. Giers at St. Petersburg and M. Casimir-Périer at Paris formally signed the documents, apparently an exchange of notes, which transformed the entente of 1891 into an alliance and rendered the military convention of 1892 diplomatically executory.

The alliance, known to exist, was officially announced in the session of the Chamber of Deputies on June 10, 1895. Gabriel Albert Auguste Hanotaux, the historian, then referred to it in these words:

Two great powers drawn to each by the attraction of their sentiments and their respective interests have given each other their hands. They have entered into an entente which brings them naturally together in the incessant work of current policy and which, always pacific, guarantees a reciprocal security.¹

Premier Ribot followed with a more definite statement:

We have allied the interests of France to the interests of a great nation. We have done it for the safeguarding of peace and the maintenance of European equilibrium. And if there has been no change in aspirations, in the superior guidance and in the supreme purpose of our policy, there has perhaps been something of change in Europe since 1891.²

And at the end of the discussion a vote was taken, 362 against 105, by which "the Chamber, approving the declaration of the Government," passed to the order of the day.³

Seventeen years later, on April 6, 1911, M. Ribot told of the scope and spirit of the alliance in the French Senate. He said:

It is pacific, that is certain; it was made with pacific intentions. It is defensive; who is surprised at that? . . . When two great nations make an alliance of long duration, they bind their policies not only with a view to maintaining peace, . . . they bind themselves with a view to all the eventualities which cannot be foreseen and which they do not control.

¹ *Journal officiel*, Chambre des députés, June 10, 1895, 1647, col. 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1651, col. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 1653, col. 3; 1654.

They reserve the right to follow events, to concert policy and, the case arising, to draw from it all advantages. . . . The two powers were in concert on all questions which affected the general peace. That was a necessity of the contract; that was the engagement which had been taken. The necessity for this concerting has perhaps some times been forgotten in the practice of the alliance. . . . The concert does not only presuppose demonstrations of friendship or sympathy, it presupposes conversations, and not only conversation on incidents already born, . . . but conversations in view of hypotheses which may be presented, in order that common action may be arranged in time to avoid hesitations and uncertainties which might overtax the alliance itself.¹

TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED GROUPS

The next developments were between members of the allied groups. Balkan and Mediterranean problems were the subjects of the arrangements. On the one hand Austria-Hungary and Russia established spheres of influence in the Near East and on the other France and Italy reached an understanding on the political problems of the Middle Sea. The Near Eastern arrangement produced nothing permanent and encouraged no friendship nor genuine co-operation for peace, but the Franco-Italian agreement created an entente which resulted in an increasing friendliness, a real *modus vivendi* between two adjacent states whose alliance engagements elsewhere tended to make them hostile. International politics can improve only when the possibility of friendship is emphasized in policy equally with the possibility of hostility. The next ten years, between the signing of the Franco-Russian alliance and the conclusion of the Anglo-French entente, afford examples of each possibility.

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN EFFORT TO KEEP BALKAN PEACE

An understanding was arranged between Austria-Hungary and Russia during the visit of Emperor-King Francis Joseph to St. Petersburg, April 25-29, 1897. According to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 16, 1898, the treaty was obligatory until May 1, 1902, unless prolonged by tacit agreement, and had as its purpose the main-

¹ *Annales du Sénat. Débats parlementaires*, LXXVIII, 461.

tenance of peace and of the *status quo* in the Balkans. It divided this peninsula into two parts, each of which in turn was subdivided into a sphere of immediate interests and a sphere of secondary interests for each contractant. Serbia constituted the sphere of immediate Austro-Hungarian interests; Bulgaria that of immediate Russian interests. Macedonia up to Saloniki and Albania—with the exception of certain districts southeast of the Montenegrin frontier—became the zone of secondary Austro-Hungarian interests, while for Russia this zone comprised the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula. The two signatory states engaged, each in the radius of influence thus assigned to it, to look after the maintenance of peace. If Serbia or Bulgaria provoked complications, the power whose interests were affected would have a separate right of armed intervention. The text was to be communicated to Germany entire; to Italy with the exception of the passage concerning Albania.¹

This agreement was supplemented later, as appears from a letter of the Tsar to the Kaiser of November 23, 1904:

Hearing that the Emperor of Austria has written to you about an arrangement signed between Russia and Austria, I think it my duty to inform you also from my side. Wishing to strengthen our efforts in keeping peace and tranquillity in the Balkan affairs according to the agreement of 1897, the Emperor and I resolved to sign a secret declaration for the observation of a loyal and strict neutrality in case one of the Empires should be in a state of war, alone and without provocation on its part, with a third country, the latter wishing to endanger the existing *status quo*. Naturally this declaration does not concern any small Balkan country, and it will last as long as Russia and Austria continue their policy of peace in Southeastern Europe.²

The understanding affected Balkan affairs much longer than the five years during which it was known contemporaneously to exist. For instance, there is an indication in the documents published by the Bolshevik régime at Petrograd that it was in force 12 years later, and that it had consequently been prolonged by failure to denounce. A

¹ W. Beaumont, "La politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie," *Questions coloniales et diplomatiques*, V, 283-287; Elie de Cyon, *Les deux politiques russes* (Paris, La Nouvelle revue, 1898), 13. The existence of a "treaty" was denied in explicit terms by Vienna, and a constructive denial built up by Russia. Later evidence, however, is conclusive that there was an *accord*, not unreasonably in the terms revealed by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

² The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, 84-85.

project of agreement between Russia and Germany proposing that Germany should associate herself with the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 and guarantee that Austria-Hungary should refrain from all aggressive action in the Balkans was submitted to the Tsar in a memorandum by M. Charikov on May 4, 1909, according to a document printed in the Bulletin of the Soviets on November 25, 1917.¹

Another evidence of the persistent existence of the agreement of 1897 was given in 1910, when Austria-Hungary and Russia passed through one of the frequent minor crises which characterized European politics. The exchange of views was semi-hostile, both sides asserting a point of view which the other did not accept. Throughout, Russia endeavored to consider the Balkan problem as an international question, and Austria-Hungary tried to keep the discussion between the two powers. Count Aehrenthal, Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, on February 5, 1910, suggested that the necessary contact for re-establishing an exchange of views would appear to be most easy "since the cabinet of Vienna maintains always the principles laid down in the agreement of 1897 which permit it at all times to enter into conversation with the St. Petersburg cabinet." M. Izvolski, the Russian foreign minister, considered that the exchange "could not have the character of the agreement of 1897 and must on the other hand be given a form which would permit associating all the interested powers in it." Russia proposed a start from the following points, "which must be brought to the knowledge of the other powers: 1. Maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula; 2. The new Turkish régime being based on equality of rights for all populations, maintenance and consolidation of the order of things; 3. Independence, consolidation and pacific development of the small Balkan states."

Austria-Hungary replied on February 20 in an aide-mémoire. She "had not thought to revive by the present *pourparlers* the agreement of 1897." In Vienna's opinion, "nothing at present threatens to rupture the *status quo* in the Balkans;" while not opposing a communication to the powers in a form permitting their participation,

¹London *Times*, November 28, 1917, page 5. The documents published by the Bolsheviks in November and December, 1917, were distributed between the *Izvestiya* of the Soviets and the *Pravda*, the Bolshevik organ.

"it at present is sufficient to publish" the *communiqué* of the two Governments, "giving mutual recognition to the principles of their policy," which "permit them to enter into relations at any time." Russia on February 24 expressed the opinion that a "simple *communiqué* in the form proposed by the cabinet of Vienna would not be sufficient." Russia renewed the proposal to inform the other states of the points on which the two cabinets were in agreement, "so that, if events menaced the *status quo*, an exchange of views could be promptly established among all the interested powers." Austria-Hungary objected on March 14 that an official communication of the results of the exchange to the powers "would give a basis for supposing that a formal agreement exists between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which does not enter into the views of the Vienna cabinet." On March 20 M. Izvolski telegraphed that he intended to inform the powers of results obtained in the *pourparlers* and to communicate the correspondence. This was done on that day and the following *communiqué* issued:

The recent negotiations between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna have attained a satisfactory result. This exchange of views having shown that in the field of Balkan affairs there was between Russia and Austria-Hungary an entire conformity of political principles, the normal diplomatic relations between the two Governments have been re-established.

The three points thus being placed on an international basis, Austria-Hungary made the best of its attempt to avoid that obligation in a *communiqué* of March 21 in which it insisted that "the intention of concluding a formal agreement" had not "for a moment" arisen; that "there was no need to make to the powers a communication on the *pourparlers*"; and that, "the known principles of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans" remaining the same, there was "therefore no new fact to furnish a motive for" the present communication.¹

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, CXIII, 425-429. See also two articles by Jacques Docobantz, "Les conversations austro-russes" and "Les communiqués austro-russes," *Questions coloniales et diplomatiques*, XXIX, 329-337, 403-8.

FRANCE AND ITALY COMPOSE MEDITERRANEAN RIVALRY

France and Italy in February, 1902, before the renewal of the Triple Alliance in that year, reached their arrangement respecting the Mediterranean.¹ With France a growing and successful colonizing power on the littoral of the Middle Sea, with possessions adjoining both Tripoli—on which Italy had her eye—and Morocco—of which she had some hopes—, it was natural that the policy of the two Latin states should be potentially antagonistic. Nevertheless, their foreign offices had long been in close relations and each appreciated the value of the other's friendship. Primarily, also, France was ready to forego her possibility of eventually keeping Italy from acquiring Tripoli if the Consultá would return the compliment respecting French ambitions in Morocco. So each refrained from making the other trouble in a field where it was little interested. Probably it was during these negotiations that France received assurances as to Italy's freedom under the terms of the Triple Alliance from any duty of menacing her. Said Théophile Delcassé, minister of foreign affairs, in the French Chamber of Deputies, July 3, 1902:

We concerned ourselves with the extent to which this diplomatic act corresponded with the relations of interests and friendship so opportunely resumed between France and Italy. Our preoccupation was natural; I hasten to add that it was not lengthy, the Government of the king having taken care itself to clear up and define the situation. And the declarations which have been made to us permit us to acquire the certainty that the policy of Italy as resulting from her alliances is neither directly nor indirectly directed against France; that it in no case involves a menace for us either under a diplomatic form or by virtue of protocols or international military provisions; and that in no case and in no form can Italy become either the instrument or the auxiliary of aggression against our country.²

The terms of the agreement of 1902 have not been published, but they were undoubtedly of the same tenor as the revision which took place at Paris on October 28, 1912, and which at that time was

¹ The agreement was signed by MM. Delcassé and Prinetti.

² *Journal Officiel, Chambre des députés, Débats parlementaires, séance du 3 juillet 1902, 2081.*

substantially repeated in an arrangement with Spain. The Franco-Italian declaration of 1912 read:

The Royal Government of Italy and the Government of the French Republic, desirous of executing in the most friendly spirit their agreements of 1902, confirm their mutual intention of reciprocally not bringing forward any obstacle to the realization of all measures they consider it opportune to take (*édicter*), Italy in Libya and France in Morocco.

They agree likewise that the most-favored-nation treatment shall be reciprocally assured to Italy in Morocco and to France in Libya: the said treatment being applicable in the largest sense to the nationals, products, establishments and enterprises of both states, without exception.¹

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE TAKES FORM

After the lease of Port Arthur to Russia on April 9, 1898, Russia desired to connect the city with the Siberian railroad. For this purpose money was needed and Serge Witte, the Russian minister of finance, found the money markets of France and Germany tight at the time. "We must therefore seek a market for our national bonds in your country," he said to the British representative. "To make any issues a success we must first secure the goodwill of the British people. Russia is therefore planning to give your countrymen greater freedom to engage in the Russian coastal trade, to introduce British industries, and other commercial privileges." The plan, however, was not then carried out.²

In 1900 Count Tadasu Hayashi took up his post at London as Japanese minister. In the spring of 1901 Baron von Eckardstein, German chargé d'affaires at London, suggested to Minister Hayashi a triple alliance between Japan, Great Britain and Germany respecting affairs in the Far East. Hayashi reported the remark to Tokyo and was authorized on April 16 to sound the British Government on his own responsibility. The next day, during a discussion, Lord Lansdowne thought an Anglo-Japanese arrangement might be ad-

¹ *Rivista di diritto internazionale*, VII, 425-6 (1913) and *Revue de droit international public*, XX, Documents, 9. Italy signed the same text, *mutatis mutandis*, with Spain respecting the Spanish zone in Morocco on May 4, 1913.

² Andrew M. Pooley, "The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi" (New York, Putnam, 1915), 107-108.

visible. In a conversation on May 15 the matter was further discussed. On July 15 Sir Claude MacDonald, British minister at Tokyo, who had just had an audience of King Edward VII, called on Count Hayashi and stated that the King considered an Anglo-Japanese arrangement desirable. He expressed a fear that Japan might make an alliance with Russia respecting the Far East. "In fact the German ambassador has been to the Foreign Office and said that there was a possibility of such action on the side of Japan," said Sir Claude.¹

Other private conversations followed and on October 16 formal negotiations commenced. On November 13, 1901, Count Hayashi received telegraphic instructions to meet Marquis Hirobumi Ito at Paris and communicate to him all telegrams he had received. Ito was under tentative instructions to conclude a Russo-Japanese arrangement while in Europe. On learning of the progress made in the Anglo-Japanese negotiations Ito gave his approval and it was agreed that so long as negotiations were in progress at London no discussion of a convention should occur at St. Petersburg unless proposed by Russia.² On November 20 Great Britain indicated that Japanese negotiations with Russia during the *pourparlers* with Great Britain would displease the latter. In reply to Hayashi's report of this conversation the Tokyo foreign office, the Kanumigaseki, said that Japan had no intention of playing a double game and stated that Marquis Ito had no official mission to Russia.

Negotiations continued from that time on without interruption. The first Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed January 30, 1902, and was to last five years. However, the Russo-Japanese war began on February 8, 1904, and the next summer a correspondence obviously intended to put Russia at odds with Great Britain was initiated by the Kaiser with the Tsar. On October 27 the Kaiser, criticizing the quality of British neutrality, spoke of a new danger which "would have to be faced in community by Russia and Germany together." The next day the Tsar wrote that "the only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence."³ Further discussion ensued and they actually signed a treaty August

¹ Pooley, *op. cit.*, 128.

² *Ibid.*, 149-150.

³ Herman Bernstein, *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 68, 74-75.

24, 1905.¹ But on August 12, 1905, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in a form revised to include within its scope British India and the intervention of a third power in the current war, and the Russo-German rulers let their scheme fall into abeyance. The alliance was again revised July 13, 1911, on the initiative of Great Britain who at the time was about to sign a treaty with the United States providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes. The alliance text of 1905 was so worded that, in the event of war between the United States and Japan, Great Britain might find it her duty to participate on the Nipponese side. It was a point of British honor to have no conflicting engagements, and her ally showed her own goodwill by readily consenting to the change.

ORIGIN OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

Edward VII succeeded to the throne of the British Empire on January 22, 1901. A man of 69 years, he had long been a student of European affairs and was welcomed as one who would prove a tranquilizing influence among the powers. Even his nephew the Kaiser, who did not like him, wrote in a moment of candor that "Uncle Albert's . . . wish for peace is quite pronounced, and is the motive for his liking to offer his services wherever he sees collisions

¹ The text of the treaty as published in a correspondence dispatch of the Associated Press of February 28, 1918, read:

"POLYARNAYA ZVEZDA" (Polar Star),
"BJÖRKE, 24 August, 1905.

"Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of All Russia on the one hand and the Emperor of Germany on the other, with a view of insuring the peace of Europe, have agreed to the following points of a treaty regarding a defensive union:

"Point 1. Should either of these empires be attacked by any other European power the ally shall come to its aid in Europe with all its land and naval forces.

"Point 2. The contracting parties obligate themselves not to make a separate peace with the common enemy.

"Point 3. The present agreement shall come into force at the signing of a peace between Russia and Japan and shall remain in force until a period, the date of which shall be fixed upon a year in advance.

"Point 4. The Emperor of All Russia, on the coming into force of the above treaty, shall take necessary steps to inform France of said treaty and shall propose that France should join the same as an ally.

(Signed) "WILHELM,

"NICHOLAS.

(Countersigned) "VON TSCHIRSKY,

"BENKENDORF,

"A. BIRILEV."

The text was communicated to Serge Witte by the Tsar on the former's return from Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations (Bernstein, Willy-Nicky Correspondence, 127-128). Witte himself stated to his friend B. Glinski, editor of the *Russkoye Slovo*: "It was I who was responsible for the annulment of the double treaty, for both offensive and defensive war, concluded between Nicholas II and Wilhelm at Björke." (See also Emile Joseph Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, 312-370, 393-415.)

in the world.”¹ He therefore naturally threw his weight in favor of an Anglo-French cordial understanding.

An address advocating an arbitration treaty between France and Great Britain was delivered on March 27, 1901, by Thomas Barclay before the French Arbitration Society. Barclay forthwith organized and conducted an active propaganda for Anglo-French friendship which culminated in the signing of a general arbitration treaty on October 14, 1903.

Edward VII was a frequent visitor to Paris and did much to cultivate the friendly feeling which had thus been privately inspired. In May, 1903, he visited Paris in his official capacity and President Émile Loubet of France returned the courtesy on July 6-9. At that time the decision to negotiate a settlement of all outstanding frictional questions was decided upon by the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries. The decision then taken had, however, been cultivated in diplomatic circles for several years. Pierre Paul Cambon had gone to London as French ambassador in 1898, and had had not a little to do with preparing the ground. “When my brother,” said Jules Martin Cambon, then French ambassador at Berlin, to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on June 11, 1911, in urging a similar attitude on the part of Germany, “was appointed ambassador to London, the situation between France and England was very delicate; one morning by mutual agreement it was resolved to examine the difficulties which divided the two countries, to take account of the legitimate grievances of both; they were discussed in good faith, and the *entente cordiale* resulted from that.”²

The negotiations begun in July, 1903, were concluded by the series of documents signed on April 8, 1904.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION RESPECTING ASIA

Great Britain continued the effort to improve political conditions, turning to Russia with whom relations in Asia had proverbially been difficult. The spirit behind the ensuing negotiations was well expressed by Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Berlin, in a letter to

¹ Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, 47.

² Ministère des affaires étrangères. *Documents diplomatiques*, 1912. *Affaires du Maroc*, VI, page

M. Davignon, his minister for foreign affairs, June 22, 1907, when he wrote:

International understandings are the fashion. After the Franco-Russian alliance we had the understanding of Italy with France and England on the Mediterranean, the alliance between England and Japan, and finally the agreement between England and France by which they settled their bargain over Egypt and Morocco. At present England is negotiating with Russia concerning the regulation of boundaries and spheres of influence in Asia. All these understandings arose either from a desire to put an end to old differences or to prevent new ones from arising. . . .

The resulting treaty, signed August 31, 1907, left three great countries without mutual suspicions regarding each other.¹ The effort at appeasement continued. Parliamentary and commercial visits were exchanged, and Anglo-Russian friendship became a subject for sympathetic public discussion. All of this attained a new significance when King Edward visited the Czar at Reval on a yachting cruise, June 9-11, 1908. Exchange of courtesies was from ship to ship and the occasion was interesting because it was the first time in history that the standards of Russia and Great Britain floated from one masthead. The toasts delivered at the exchange of visits on June 9 included the following words:

The Tsar: . . . I trust that this meeting, while strengthening the many and strong ties which unite our houses, will have the happy result of drawing our countries closer together and of promoting and maintaining the peace of the world. In the course of the past year several questions of equal moment both to Russia and to England have been satisfactorily settled by our Governments. I am certain that your Majesty appreciates as highly as I do the value of these agreements, for, notwithstanding their limited scope, they cannot but help to spread among our two countries feelings of mutual goodwill and confidence. . . .

¹ The value of the convention from this point of view was discussed by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament, July 10, 1912, when he said: "But for that agreement Russia would have been constantly under the misapprehension that we in southern Persia were going to take advantage of the chaos and the situation to prejudice her interests and the old state of suspicion, of intrigue and squabble, which used to exist between Great Britain and Russia, would have been intensified many fold under the present condition of affairs. Instead of that, however much we may differ as to the merits of the agreement, there has never been for a moment any suspicion on either side that either Russia or Great Britain has been attempting to exploit the situation in Persia to the disadvantage of the other. The fact that that has been so has not only been in the interest of the two countries, but has also been in the interests of peace."—(Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons, XL, 1982-1983.)

The King: . . . I most heartily indorse every word that fell from your Majesty's lips with regard to the convention recently concluded between our two Governments. I believe it will serve to knit more closely the bonds that unite the peoples of our two countries, and I am certain that it will conduce to the satisfactory settlement in an amicable manner of some momentous questions in the future. I am convinced that it will not only tend to draw our two countries more closely together, but will help very greatly toward the maintenance of the general peace of the world.¹ . . .

HOW THE TRIPLE ENTENTE RIPENED

M. Izvolski, Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an audience of King Edward, August 21, 1908.² At that time the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress had just thrown Abd ul Hamid out of power and restored the constitution of 1876. On October 1, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared his independence of Turkey and assumed the title of Tsar of the Bulgars. On October 3, the monarch of Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces up till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary by virtue of Art. 25 of the treaty of Berlin. These events created the Balkan crisis of 1908-9 in which the German Kaiser a year later said that he stood "by the side of his ally in shining armor." Before he assumed the posture M. Izvolski had a second audience of King Edward on October 11, 1908.³ During the crisis, which lasted until the next May—a period of six months in which Germany kept her armor shining and Austria-Hungary brandished her mailed fist in the face of the Balkans—France, Great Britain and Russia were a unit in upholding the public law of Europe. Though for technical reasons not unconnected with the German attitude, the idea of a conference to revise the treaty of Berlin was abandoned, they were consistent and successful in applying the principle established by the treaty of London of March 13, 1871. This treaty was brought about by a Russian unilateral denunciation of three articles of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, and was negotiated as a result of a declaration of the conference on January 17, 1871, in which it was

¹ *London Times*, Weekly Edition, June 12, 1908, page 376.

² *Ibid.*, August 28, 1908, 555.

³ *Ibid.*, October 16, 1908, 664.

recognized "that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the provisions thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement." Owing to the stand taken by France, Great Britain and Russia, with the assistance of Italy, but on the initiative of the British Government, Art. 25 and six paragraphs (5, 7-11) of Art. 29 of the treaty of Berlin were abrogated and a revision substituted for the sixth paragraph of Art. 29.¹ The phrase, the Triple Entente, referring to France, Great Britain and Russia as a triumvirate aiming at the maintenance of peace, became current immediately these facts were public property.

No formal document established the Triple Entente, but it probably gained strength from that circumstance. Numerous evidences of close relations between the three governments constantly came to public attention. Of the more formal of these the following farewell to England issued by the Tsar after his visit to the British King at the Cowes regatta, August 2-5, 1909, may be cited:

The Emperor is deeply impressed by his visit to this country. The affectionate welcome accorded to him and the Empress by the Royal family, the reception given by the magnificent naval force which saluted him at Cowes, the attitude of British statesmen, people and press, are all happy auguries for the future. It is the Emperor's firm desire and belief that this all too brief visit can only bear the happiest fruit in promoting the friendliest feeling between the Governments and peoples of the two countries.²

EFFECTS OF THE AGADIR CRISIS

Triple entente friendliness and co-operation grew as occasion occurred in the complicated web of European politics. The Agadir crisis, precipitated on July 1, 1911, by Germany's sending the warship *Panther* to that Moroccan Atlantic port, created a situation of great tension during that summer, and resulted in agreements between France and Germany signed November 4, 1911. Great Britain throughout supported in general the attitude of France and, with

¹ K. U. K. Ministerium des äussern. *Diplomatische aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Hercegovina, Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909*, Nos. 156, 162, 175, 177, 184, 192.

² London *Times*, Weekly Edition, Supplement, August 13, 1909, iii.

Russia, again proved the stanchness of the understanding between them. Reviewing the whole affair in an important speech in the House of Commons on the following November 27, Sir Edward Grey spoke particularly of France:

I trust that the fact that we have with France during the last seven years gone hand in hand through a great deal of rough diplomatic weather, without for a moment losing touch with each other, will have its influence in perpetuating in France and here confidence in our mutual good faith and good will, our intention to keep in touch.¹

It was typical of the closely organized political groups of the period that Anglo-French-Russian co-operation during such a crisis should have caused rumors of alliances about to be born from the *entente*. The British prime minister denied the existence of such formal arrangements on the same day Sir Edward Grey spoke, and also on December 6, in reply to a question by Gordon Harvey who "asked the prime minister if the fact that there is no secret arrangement of any sort or kind which has not been disclosed is applicable to treaties which exist between this country and powers other than France." Mr. Asquith said in reply:

As has been stated,² there were no secret engagements with France other than those that have now been published, and there are no secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any other power. There are none of them of recent date.³

NAVAL AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE ENTENTE

After the Agadir crisis had passed the Triple Entente was sure enough of itself to extend the scope of its protective measures. Germany was developing both her army and fleet beyond the necessities of defense, and in particular her sea forces reached a strength which disturbed the balance of naval power. Between friendly nations there constantly occur conversations of the most intimate and frank character respecting the conditions they might be called on jointly

¹ Parl., Deb., 5th Series, XXXII, 64-65.

² *Ibid.*, 107.

³ *Ibid.*, 1400.

to face. Undoubtedly the powers of the Triple Entente had previously adjusted their forces as a result of such conversations. After Agadir changes took place to meet the situation as it was.

The first document resulting from such exchanges of views was the agreement extending the Franco-Russian alliance to the naval forces of the two states, signed at Paris July 13, 1912, by Théophile Delcassé, French minister of marine, and Admiral Prince Lieven, chief of the Russian naval general staff. This technical agreement was not only a logical rounding-out of the alliance but a proper new development in view both of the importance of European navies and of the rebuilding of the Russian fleet.

During the same period Great Britain and France rearranged their fleets in order to distribute them more economically. Britain had previously maintained the two-power standard both in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. In recent years naval increases in Europe had centered in the northern waters by reason of Germany's building program. No one doubted that the German naval power was pointed at British supremacy. On the other hand, Franco-Italian relations were cordial and lacking in mutual suspicion. Without changing any political element of naval power, it was therefore possible for Great Britain to rely somewhat on French defense of her Mediterranean interests and to strengthen her North Sea fleet at the expense of her squadrons in the Middle Sea. This disposition of the fleets, Sir Edward Grey definitely stated, was "not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war."

Great Britain and France on November 22-23, 1912, by exchange of letters reached an understanding that they would examine together "the question whether both Governments should act together" in the event of either "having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace." These letters are considered as part of the Entente Cordiale and are printed below.

Use of British land forces is implied in the exchange of letters, if the Governments should decide on common action. Both Governments were entirely free to decide that question according to their own interests. This was made clear by Prime Minister Asquith on March 24, 1913, when he answered two questions in Parliament:

Sir William Byles asked the prime minister whether he will say if this country is under any, and, if so, what, obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies to operate in Europe; and, if so, what are the limits of our agreements, whether by assurance or treaty with the French nation?

Joseph King asked the prime minister (1) whether the foreign policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements or obligations under which British military forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on the Continent and join in military operations; and (2) whether, in 1905, 1908 or 1911, this country spontaneously offered to France the assistance of a British army to be landed on the Continent to support France in the event of European hostilities?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith): As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament which compels it to take part in any war. In other words, if war arises between European powers there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the Government and Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which public statements can be made beforehand.¹

If the Triple Entente had been aggressive in its nature naval and military conventions between Russia and Great Britain would have been negotiated. No suggestion of a military convention was made, and no naval agreement was concluded. This was very definitely stated by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament on June 11, 1914:

Joseph King asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain; and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain?

Sir William Byles asked the secretary of state for foreign affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany; and will he lay papers?

Sir Edward Grey: The hon. member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, L, 1316-1317.

again done to-day. The prime minister then replied that, if war arose between European powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the prime minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament.¹

"TURNS OF THE ITALIAN WALTZ"

It would be unfair to Italy not to relate in this summary what have been called the "turns of the Italian waltz." By this term is meant the engagements or understandings on matters possibly within the scope of the Triple Alliance which Italy developed with countries outside the alliance. In reality, these were the only dependable efforts made on the part of its members to keep the political situation healthy in Europe. They were stabilizing in their effect, and it was noticeable that Italy's relations were usually better with her friends than with her allies. This condition was almost a permanent one in European politics, and was one of its important imponderables.

In October, 1891, M. Giers, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an interview with Marquis di Rudini, the Italian foreign minister, at Monza, where they found their policies were in no wise antagonistic.² At Milan in November an agreement was concluded "by which Russia probably consented to intervene with France under certain hypotheses in the Near East."³ Italy's previous agreement with Great Britain respecting the Mediterranean was thus supplemented, and five years later, on September 28, 1896, the question of Tunis, whose acquisition by France in 1881 had been a blow to Italian ambitions, was laid to rest between the two powers.

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, LXIII, 457-458.

² London Times, October 20, 1891, page 3; *Le Mémorial diplomatique*, 1891, 660, 676, 678.

³ Albin, *La Guerre allemande. D'Agadir à Serajevo*, 231.

On that date three conventions relating to commerce, navigation, consular rights and privileges, establishment and extradition and applicable solely to Tunisia were signed by France and Italy, all being ratified on January 23, 1897.¹ It is noteworthy that these, as well as the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902, all with states outside the Triple Alliance, proved permanent.

It was different with the separate arrangements with Austria-Hungary, as the sequel showed. In 1897 Austria-Hungary and Italy sought to settle their respective claims in Albania. Albin² cites the treaty of November 6, 1897, respecting Albania, signed by Count Agenor von Goluchowski for Austria-Hungary and by Count Emilio Visconti-Venosta and Marquis di Rudini for Italy. By it the contracting powers declared their respective territorial disinterestedness in Albania; declared in favor of the *status quo* (Ottoman sovereignty); guaranteed, if the *status quo* were altered, Albanian autonomy and independence, and that the territory should not fall under the sovereignty of a third power.

Yet in 1910 the situation remained so unsatisfactory that after an exchange of views only this indefinite *communiqué* was issued:

Count Aerenthal and Marquis di San Giuliano acquired the absolute conviction of concordance of ideas of Austria-Hungary and Italy on questions of the Orient and especially on the Turkish question, and that neither of the two powers pursues in the Orient particular purposes or seeks special advantages.³

Only a year later Italy was at war with Turkey and was being hard pressed by demands from the Ballhausplatz for compensation.

Before this occurred Italy had opportunity to learn the quality of Entente-cordiale diplomacy. On December 13, 1906, two agreements were signed at London between Great Britain, France and Italy respecting Abyssinia, whose proximity to Eritrea made it really within the Italian sphere of influence. One of these related to the

¹ De Clerq, *Les Traités de la France*, XX, 597-625; *Trattati, convenzioni*, etc., XIV, 309-350. The French position in Tunisia was subsequently recognized by declarations as follows: Russia and Switzerland, October 14, 1896; Germany, November 18, 1896; Belgium, January 2, 1897; Spain, January 12, 1897; Denmark, January 26, 1897; Netherlands, April 3, 1897; Sweden and Norway, May 5, 1897; Great Britain, September 18, 1897 (De Clerq, *loc. cit.*, 626-632).

² *La Guerre allemand. D'Agadir à Serajevo*, 229-230.

³ *Archives diplomatiques*, CXV, 381-382.

importation of arms and ammunition,¹ and the other confirmed Italy's special interests in the country by this provision:

Art. 1. France, Great Britain and Italy are in agreement to maintain the political and territorial *status quo* in Ethiopia as determined by the existing state of affairs. . . .²

THE WORLD'S OLDEST ALLIANCE

Great Britain and Portugal have been allies for 545 years. No political alignment can compare with it for permanence. Through the storms and stress of half a millennium these two nations have remained friends and at peace with each other "against all men that may live or die," despite causes of difference as numerous and many times as serious as those arising between any other nations. It would almost seem that the negotiators of the first alliance spoke only the literal truth in the treaty jargon of the time when they declared a perpetual friendship and league of pure affection.

A word as to the origin of this alliance, which, originating 119 years before Columbus discovered America, brought Portugal into the fight against Germany in 1916. When the alliance began it was in a different world from ours, a medieval world in which communities were the units. Twenty years before the present alliance was concluded there was signed at London, on October 20, 1353, a treaty of commerce between Edward III, king of England, and the merchants, mariners and marine companies of the maritime states and cities of Portugal, which was in reality an alliance and which is here rendered into English, it is believed, for the first time:

1. There shall be good understanding and firm alliance both by sea and land between the said contracting parties for 50 years reckoned from the date of this treaty.

2. In consequence whereof, the vassals of the king of England will not be injured nor maltreated, either in their persons or their ships, merchandise or other objects belonging to them, by the merchants and mariners or maritime companies of the cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

¹ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 252-253; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 561.

² 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 486-490; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 733.

3. Likewise, merchants and companies of the said cities will not receive injury, vexation or prejudice in their persons, ships, merchandise or other objects from the mariners of England, Gascony, Ireland and Wales, nor from any subject of the king of England.

4. None of the populace or subjects of either party shall contract an alliance with the enemies, opponents or adversaries of the other, cause prejudice nor lend them aid or succor.¹

The circumstances which originated the alliance 20 years later were dynastic. Ferdinand I of Portugal after the death of Peter the Cruel of Castile in 1367 or 1368 pretended to the throne of that kingdom and from 1369 to 1371 was on that account at war with Henry II of Trastamara, who made good his claim to the kingdom. Ferdinand celebrated a treaty of league with the Moorish king of Granada against Henry, while the king of Aragon had recognized him by treaty as sovereign of Castile. Intending to make a new war against Henry, he wrote to the Duke of Lancaster, who had pretensions to the Castilian throne through his mother, inviting him to join the venture. A treaty of peace and alliance was celebrated at Braga in July, 1372, directed against Henry of Trastamara and Peter IV of Aragon. Ferdinand thereupon sought to use this treaty as a basis for a similar union with England, the Duke of Lancaster being the third son of Edward III. Accordingly, he issued full powers to negotiators on November 27, 1372, and the alliance was signed on June 16, 1373.²

¹ Visconde Manuel Francisco de Barros de Santarem, *Quadro elementar*, XIV, 40-41; Rymer's *Foedera*, V, 763.

² Santarem, *Quadro Elementar*, XIV, xlii-xlv.

APPENDIX.

A. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.I. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY
OCTOBER 7, 1879.¹

Inasmuch as their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, and the German Emperor, King of Prussia, must consider it their imperative duty as monarchs to provide for the security of their empires and the peace of their subjects, under all circumstances;

inasmuch as the two sovereigns, as was the case under the former existing relations of alliance, will be enabled by the close union of the two empires to fulfill this duty more easily and more efficaciously;

inasmuch as, finally, an intimate co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe as established by the stipulations of Berlin;

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, and the Emperor of Germany, while solemnly promising each other never to allow their purely defensive agreement to develop an aggressive tendency in any direction, have determined to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defense,

For this purpose their most exalted Majesties have designated as their plenipotentiaries:

His most exalted Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, his actual privy councillor, minister of the imperial household and of foreign affairs, Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Count Julius Andrassy of Csik-Szent-Király and Kraszna-Horka, etc., etc.,

His most exalted Majesty the German Emperor, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII of Reuss, etc., etc.,

Who have met this day at Vienna, and, after the exchange of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art. I. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of

¹Reprinted from Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary* (edited by Coolidge), Vol. I, 25-31.

the two high contracting parties, one of the two empires be attacked by Russia, the high contracting parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

Art. II. Should one of the high contracting parties be attacked by another power, the other high contracting party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude toward its fellow contracting party.

Should, however, the attacking party in such a case be supported by Russia, either by an active co-operation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Art. I of this treaty, for reciprocal assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two high contracting parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

Art. III.¹ The duration of this treaty shall be provisionally fixed at five years from the day of ratification. One year before the expiration of this period the two high contracting parties shall consult together concerning the question whether the conditions serving as the basis of the treaty still prevail, and reach an agreement in regard to the further continuance or possible modification of certain details. If in the course of the first month of the last year of the treaty no invitation has been received from either side to open these negotiations, the treaty shall be considered as renewed for a further period of three years.

Art. IV.² This treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretation, be kept secret by the two high contracting parties, and only communicated to a third power upon a joint understanding between the two parties, and according to the terms of a special agreement.

The two high contracting parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication at present; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectations, prove to be erroneous, the two high contracting parties would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.

¹The text as heretofore made public (G. F. von Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2d series, xv, 478; *British and Foreign State Papers*, lxxiii, 270) does not contain this article.

² This article corresponds to Art. III, as heretofore published.

Art. V.¹ This treaty shall derive its validity from the approbation of the two exalted sovereigns and shall be ratified within 14 days after this approbation has been granted by their most exalted Majesties.²

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty with their own hands and affixed their arms.

Done at Vienna, October 7, 1879.

ANDRÁSSY.

L. S.

H. VII v. REUSS.

L. S.

2. MAIN TREATY OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE, AS REVISED IN 1912.³

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary, the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, and the King of Italy, firmly resolved to assure to their States the continuation of the benefits which the maintenance of the Triple Alliance guarantees to them, from the political point of view as well as from the monarchical and social point of view, and wishing with this object to prolong the duration of this alliance concluded on May 20, 1882, renewed a first time by the treaties of February 20, 1887, a second time by the treaty of May 6, 1891, and a third time by the treaty of June 28, 1902, have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary: Count Leopold Berchtold von und zu Ungarschitz, his minister of the Imperial and Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs, president of the Common Council of Ministers; His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia: the Sieur Heinrich von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, his ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary; and His Majesty the King of Italy: Duke Giuseppe d'Avarna, his ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary, who, after exchange of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art. I. The high contracting parties mutually promise peace and

¹ This article is not found in the text heretofore published.

² Ratification of Emperor and King Francis Joseph I, Gödöllő, October 17, 1879; of Emperor William I, Baden-Baden, October 16, 1879; protocol of exchange of ratifications, Vienna, October 21, 1879. The treaty was renewed in 1884.

³ Reprinted from Pribram, *loc. cit.*, 244-259.

friendship and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their states.

They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

Art. II. In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other contracting parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the party attacked.

This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.

Art. III. If one or two of the high contracting parties without direct provocation on their part should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more great powers nonsignatories of the present treaty, the *casus fœderis* will arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

Art. IV. In case a great power nonsignatory of the present treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the high contracting parties and the threatened party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its ally.

Art. V. If the peace of one of the high contracting parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding articles, the high contracting parties shall concert with one another in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual co-operation.

They engage, henceforth, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.

Art. VI. Germany and Italy, having in mind only the maintenance, so far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the Orient, engage to use their influence to forestall on the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or the other of the powers signatory to the present treaty. To this end, they will communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of other powers.

Art. VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, having in mind only the main-

tenance, so far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the Orient, engage to use their influence to forestall any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or the other of the powers signatory to the present treaty. To this end, they shall communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of other powers. However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Ægean Sea should become impossible and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two powers, based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present *status quo* and giving satisfaction to the interests and well-founded claims of the two parties.

Art. VIII. The stipulations of Arts. VI and VII apply in no way to the Egyptian question with regard to which the high contracting parties preserve respectively their freedom of action, regard being always paid to the principles upon which the present treaty rests.

Art. IX. Germany and Italy engage to exert themselves for the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the North African regions on the Mediterranean, to wit, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Tunisia. The representatives of the two powers in these regions shall be instructed to put themselves into the closest intimacy of mutual communication and assistance.

If unfortunately, as a result of a mature examination of the situation, Germany and Italy should both recognize that the maintenance of the *status quo* has become impossible, Germany engages, after a formal and previous agreement, to support Italy in any action in the form of occupation or other taking of guaranty which the latter should undertake in these same regions with a view to an interest of equilibrium and of legitimate compensation.

It is understood that in such an eventuality the two powers would seek to place themselves likewise in agreement with England.

Art. X. If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African

territories, or even to have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute *ipso facto*, on the demand of Italy, and at the common charge of Germany and Italy, the *casus fœderis* foreseen by Arts. II and V of the present treaty, as if such an eventuality were expressly contemplated therein.

Art. XI. If the fortunes of any war undertaken in common against France by the two powers should lead Italy to seek for territorial guaranties with respect to France for the security of the frontiers of the kingdom and of her maritime position, as well as with a view to stability and to peace, Germany will present no obstacle thereto, and, if need be, and in a measure compatible with circumstances, will apply herself to facilitating the means of attaining such a purpose.

Art. XII. The high contracting parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents of the present treaty.

Art. XIII. The signatory powers reserve the right of subsequently introducing, in the form of a protocol and of a common agreement, the modifications of which the utility should be demonstrated by circumstances.

Art. XIV. The present treaty shall remain in force for a period of six years dating from the expiration of the treaty now in force; but if it has not been denounced one year in advance by one or another of the high contracting parties, it shall remain in force for the same duration of six more years.

Art. XV. The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna, within a period of a fortnight or sooner if may be.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Vienna, in triplicate, the fifth day of the month of December one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

L. S.

L. S.

L. S.

BERCHTOLD.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

AVARNA.

3. PROTOCOL.

At the moment of proceeding to the signing of the treaty of this day between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of these three powers, thereto duly authorized, mutually declare as follows:

1. Under reserve of parliamentary approval for the executory stipulations proceeding from the present declaration of principle the high contract-

ing parties promise each other, from this moment, in economic matters (finances, customs, railroads) in addition to most-favored-nation treatment, all of the facilities and special advantages which would be compatible with the requirements of each of the three states and with their respective engagements with third powers.

2. The accession of England being already acquired, in principle, to the stipulations of the treaty of this day which concern the Orient, properly so-called, to wit, the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the high contracting parties shall exert themselves at the opportune moment, and to the extent that circumstances may permit it, to bring about an analogous accession with regard to North African territories of the central and western part of the Mediterranean, including Morocco. This accession might be realized by an acceptance, on the part of England, of the program established by Arts. IX and X of the treaty of this day.

In witness whereof the three plenipotentiaries have signed the present protocol in triplicate.

Done at Vienna, the fifth day of the month of December one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

BERCHTOLD.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

AVARNA.

4. PROTOCOL.

At the moment of proceeding to the signature of the treaty of this day between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of these three powers, thereto duly authorized, mutually declare as follows:

1. It is understood that the territorial *status quo* in the North African regions on the Mediterranean mentioned in Art. IX of the treaty of June 28, 1902, implies the sovereignty of Italy over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

2. It is likewise understood that Art. X of the same treaty has for its basis the existing territorial *status quo* in the North African regions at the moment of the signing of the treaty.

3. It is understood that the special arrangements concerning Albania and the Sanjak of Novibazar agreed upon between Austria-Hungary and Italy on December 20, 1900/February 9, 1901, and on November 20/December 15, 1909, are not modified by the renewal of the treaty of alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy.

In witness whereof the three plenipotentiaries have signed the present protocol in triplicate.

Done at Vienna, the fifth day of the month of December one thousand nine hundred and twelve.

L. S.

BERCHTOLD.

L. S.

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.

L. S.

AVARNA.

5. MILITARY AND NAVAL CONVENTIONS.

On February 1, 1888, a military convention was concluded between Italy and Germany, which contemplated the employment of Italian troops against France to the west of the Rhine. A similar agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, with reference to the employment of Italian troops in the east—against Russia—was projected, but never came into effect. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in accordance with the treaty, merely bound itself to provide for the transportation and feeding of the Italian troops destined for Germany. On the other hand, agreements were made between all three states with reference to the employment of their navies in time of war. The first naval agreement, concluded on December 5, 1900, contemplated independent operations. It was superseded in the year 1913 by another agreement, in which united action of the combined naval forces was provided for. The chief aim of this was the securing of naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the prevention of the transportation of French colonial troops from Africa to the European theater of war.—Pribram, *loc. cit.*, 11-12.

Naval agreement between the Naval Section of the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry, the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy and the Admiralty Staff of the Italian Navy, prepared in draft, June 23, 1913; revised, August 2, 1913; in force, November 1, 1913; with distribution of forces for joint operations in time of war "valid for 1914."—Pribram, *loc. cit.*, 282-305.

To prevent the trouble that would be inevitable if Rumanian troops marched with Hungarians, it was stipulated that in case of war Italy should send 40,000 men to fight beside the Rumanians.—Summary of interview with Take Ionescu by M. Tavernier, special correspondent of the *Paris Temps* at Bukharest, *New York Times*, September 21, 1916.

It is thanks to it [the alliance] that so many Rumanian officers have studied in Germany and Austria without any advantage to our arms. It is because of it that we have no artillery, infantry, mountain artillery, fortifications in the Carpathians or factories for munitions or guns.—Take Ionescu to M. Tavernier, special correspondent of the *Paris Temps* at Bukharest, quoted in *New York Times*, September 21, 1916.

6. INSTRUCTIONS OF COUNT GUICCARDINI TO THE DUKE OF AVARNA,
DECEMBER 15, 1909, HANDED BY THE LATTER TO COUNT AEHRENT-
HAL ON DECEMBER 19, 1909.¹

In the conversations which have lately taken place between Count Aehrenthal and yourself with a view to specifying and perfecting Art. VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, you have firstly agreed that, Austria-Hungary having renounced the rights which the treaty of Berlin had conferred upon her in respect of the Sanjak of Novibazar, the provisions of the aforesaid article of the treaty of Triple Alliance apply equally to the Sandjak as to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. If, therefore, Austria-Hungary, in consequence of the impossibility of maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, shall be compelled by force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary or permanent occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar, that occupation shall only be effected after a previous agreement has been reached with Italy, based on the principle of compensation.

Faithful to the spirit which has inspired the treaty of Triple Alliance, and with a view to defining exactly and by mutual consent the mode of procedure which the two allied cabinets intend to adopt in certain eventualities, you have also arranged with Count Aehrenthal as follows:

Each of the two cabinets binds itself not to effect with a third power any agreement whatsoever concerning the Balkan question without the participation of the other cabinet on a footing of absolute equality. The two cabinets also bind themselves to communicate to one another all propositions which may be made to the one or to the other by a third power, contrary to the principle of non-intervention and referring to a modification of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas.

It is understood that Art. VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, which is defined and completed only by the aforesaid provisions, shall remain in force in its entirety.

As to the duration of the obligations which the two cabinets assume by virtue of the aforesaid, it is understood that it shall coincide with that of the treaty of Triple Alliance, in such a manner that these obligations will be implicitly renewed with the renewal of the Triple Alliance.

Conforming with the analogous provisions of this treaty, the two cabinets mutually promise secrecy on the obligations thus entered into. Only

¹Austro-Hungarian Red Book, Appendix II.

the Berlin cabinet, in its capacity as an ally, shall be informed by the two Governments without delay.

In order to define exactly all that has been agreed upon in the conversations I have conducted through your mediation with the Austro-Hungarian Government, I request you to communicate this telegram to the minister of foreign affairs and to leave with him a copy thereof.

7. RUMANIA AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.¹

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary, and His Majesty the King of Rumania, animated by an equal desire to maintain the general peace in conformity with the purpose pursued by the Austro-Hungarian-German Alliance, to assure the political order and to guarantee against all eventualities the perfect friendship which binds them together, having taken into consideration the stipulations of the treaty signed to this end on July 25, 1892, between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, a treaty which by its essentially conservative and defensive nature pursues only the aim of forestalling the dangers which might menace the peace of their States, and desiring to record once more the understanding established between their Majesties in prospect of certain eventualities mentioned in the treaty of July 25, 1892, the duration of which has been prolonged until July 25, 1903, by the protocol signed at Sinaia on September 30, 1896, and which has been renewed by the treaty signed at Bukharest on April 17, 1902, have resolved to renew and to confirm by a new agreement the engagements contained in the aforesaid treaty.

For this purpose their said Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

¹ The accession of Germany, dated at Bukharest, February 13/26, 1913, provided that "His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, takes in the name of the German Empire toward their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary, and the King of Rumania by the undersigned, Sieur Charles Emil Prince von Fürstenberg, His Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Rumania, and the Sieur Titus Majoresco, President of the Council of Ministers, His Minister of Foreign Affairs, duly authorized for this purpose take toward His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, the same engagements by which the High Contracting Parties have mutually bound themselves according to the stipulations of the said treaty inserted above."

The accession of Italy, dated at Bukharest, March 5, 1913, provided that the King of Italy "accedes to the said treaty within the limits indicated below so far as concerns the stipulations of Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty of July 25, 1892, between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, articles which are reproduced in Article I of the treaty inserted above, to wit:

"If eventualities that could give rise to the *casus fœderis*, as it is foreseen in the said Articles 2 and 3, should chance to occur, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary, the King of Italy and the King of Rumania assume a mutual engagement to concert with one another in ample time as to common action, the detailed procedure of which shall be regulated by a special convention.

"The present accession shall be in force dating from July 8, 1914, for the whole duration of the principal treaty of February 5, 1913, unless it may be denounced by one of the high contracting parties in the proper time."

The texts are reprinted from Pribram, *loc. cit.*, 260-273.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic-King of Hungary: the Sieur Charles Emil Prince von Fürstenberg, His Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Rumania, Chevalier of the Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold and of the Iron Crown, Third Class, His Majesty the King of Rumania: the Sieur Titus Majoresco, President of the Council of Ministers, His Minister of Finances and ad interim, Grand Cross of the Order of the Star of Rumania, and of the Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold, who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art. I. Renewed and confirmed by common agreement are the stipulations contained in Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the treaty signed on July 25, 1892, between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, and the text of which follows below:

“Art. I. The high contracting parties promise one another peace and friendship and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against either of their states. They engage to follow a friendly policy and to lend one another mutual support within the limit of their interests.

“Art. II. If Rumania, without any provocation on her part, should be attacked, Austria-Hungary is bound to bring her in ample time help and assistance against the aggressor. If Austria-Hungary be attacked under the same circumstances in a portion of her states bordering on Rumania the *casus fœderis* will immediately arise for the latter.

“Art. III. If one of the high contracting parties should find itself threatened by an aggression under the above-mentioned conditions, the respective Governments shall put themselves in agreement as to the measures to be taken with a view to co-operation of their armies. These military questions, especially those of the unity of operations and of passage through the respective territories, shall be regulated by a military convention.

“Art. IV. If, contrary to their desire and hope, the high contracting parties are forced into a common war under the circumstances set forth in the preceding articles, they engage neither to negotiate nor to conclude peace separately.

“Art. VI. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents of the present treaty.”

Art. II. The articles reproduced above shall remain in force until July 8, 1920. If the present treaty is not denounced one year before its expiration or if its revision is not demanded by either of the high contracting parties it shall be considered as prolonged for a period of six years and so on from six years to six years in default of denunciation.

Art. III. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of three weeks or sooner if may be.¹

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed it and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Bukharest, the fifth day of the month of February in the year of grace one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

L. S.

PRINCE CHARLES EMIL VON FÜRSTENBERG.

L. S.

T. MAÏORESCO.

8. TREATY OF FORMAL ALLIANCE WITH TURKEY, SIGNED ON AUGUST 2, 1914.²

CONSTANTINOPLE, AUGUST 2, 1914.

1. The two contracting powers mutually engage to observe strict neutrality in presence of the existing conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

2. If Russia should intervene with active military measures,³ and should thereby create for Germany the *casus fœderis* toward Austria-Hungary, this *casus fœderis* would equally enter into force for Turkey.

3. In the event of war, Germany shall leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey.

The latter, for her part, assures to the said military mission an effective influence upon the general conduct of the army, in accordance with what has been directly agreed between his excellency the minister of war and his excellency the chief of the military mission.

4. Germany engages, if necessary by the arms of——⁴ Ottoman territory if it should be menaced.

5. This agreement, which has been concluded with a-view to safeguarding the two empires against the international complications that might result from the present conflict, enters into force from the moment of its signature by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain in force, with analogous mutual obligations, until December 31, 1918.

6. In the event of its not having been denounced by one of the high contracting parties six months before the expiration of the term fixed above, this treaty shall continue to be in force for a new period of five years.

¹ Protocol of exchange of ratifications, Bukharest, January 30/February 12, 1913.

² *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, III, 183-184.

³ Germany had, in fact, declared war on Russia the previous evening, August 1 at 7 P.M. (French Yellow Book, No. 134.)

⁴ Figures lacking, and apparent omission.

7. The present instrument shall be ratified by His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one month from the date of signature.

8. The present agreement shall remain secret and may be made public only after an agreement between the two high contracting parties.

In witness whereof, etc.

BARON VON WANGENHEIM. SAID HALIM.

9. TREATY BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND TURKEY, CONCLUDED AT SOFIA, JULY 17, 1915.

The treaty provided for the cession to Bulgaria of the whole of Albania, and the new Serbian and Greek acquisitions in Macedonia, in return for Bulgarian participation in the war.

Patris of Athens stated that the secret treaty provides for the cession to Bulgaria of the whole of Albania, of the new Serbian territories, including Monastir, Ghevveli, and Doiran; and of Greek Macedonia, including Saloniki, Kavalla, Seres, Drama and Castoria.

According to *Hestia*, the treaty was concluded during Prince Hohenlohe's visit to Sofia.—*London Times*, Weekly Edition, October 15, 1915, 870.¹

¹Auguste Gauvain, *The Greek Question* (New York, American-Hellenic Society, 1918), 27, note. The Tsar's proclamation to his subjects stated: "The Central powers have promised us parts of Serbia, creating an Austro-Bulgarian border line which is absolutely necessary for Bulgaria's independence of the Serbians."—(*Frankfurter Zeitung*, quoted by Overseas News Agency dispatch in *Current History*, November, 1915, 220-221.)

"A treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey in July, 1916, by which: "Bulgaria obtains the whole extent of the line traversing Turkish territory, together with the stations of Haragarh, Demotika and Kuleli Burgas. The Bulgarian frontier will coincide with the Maritsa, all territory west becoming Bulgarian."—(R. B. Mowat, *Select Treaties and Documents* . . . , 134, citing *London Times*, July 26, 1916.)

B. ALLIANCES OPPOSED TO THE CENTRAL POWERS.

I. FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

1. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, AUGUST 27, 1891.

a. M. MOHRENHEIM, AMBASSADOR OF RUSSIA AT PARIS, TO M. RIBOT,
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.¹

PARIS, August 15/27, 1891.

During my recent stay at St. Petersburg, where I was ordered by my august sovereign, it pleased the Emperor to provide me with special instructions contained in the letter subjoined in copy addressed to me by his Excellency, M. de Giers, minister for foreign affairs, and which his Majesty has deigned to order communicated to the Government of the Republic.

In execution of this supreme order, I have made it my express duty to bring this document to the knowledge of your Excellency in the firm hope that its contents, previously concerted and formulated in common agreement between our two cabinets, will meet the full approbation of the French Government, and that you may be good enough, Mr. Minister, conforming with the wish expressed by M. de Giers, to honor me with a response indicating the perfect agreement fortunately established henceforth between our two Governments.

Later developments, of which the two points thus agreed upon are not only susceptible, but which will complement them, may be made the subject of confidential and intimate *pourparlers*, which either cabinet will consider it possible to take up at the proper time.

Holding myself for this purpose at the entire disposition of your Excellency, I am happy to be able to take advantage of such an occasion to ask you to be good enough to accept the renewed homage of my highest consideration and of my most unalterable devotion.

MOHRENHEIM.

¹ Ministère des affaires étrangères. Documents diplomatiques. Alliance Franco-Russe, 1890-1893, No. 17; Pages d'histoire, No. 159, 26-28. The translation is very literal.

Annex.

LETTER OF M. DE GIERS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA, TO
M. MOHRENHEIM, AMBASSADOR FOR RUSSIA AT PARIS.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 9/21, 1891.

The situation created in Europe by the open renewal of the Triple Alliance and the more or less probable adhesion by Great Britain to the political objects which that alliance pursues, caused during the recent stay here of M. Laboulaye, between the former Ambassador of France and myself, an exchange of ideas tending to define the attitude which in present junctures and in the presence of certain eventualities, might seem best to our respective Governments, which, henceforth in complete league, are none the less sincerely desirous of surrounding the maintenance of peace with the most efficacious guaranties.

Therefore we have been led to formulate the following two points:

I. In order to define and consecrate the entente cordiale which unites them, and desirous of contributing by a common agreement to the maintenance of the peace which forms the object of their sincerest wishes, the two Governments declare that they will concert upon every question of a nature to bring the general peace into question;

II. For the case where this peace should be in fact endangered, and especially if one of the two parties should be menaced by an aggression, the two parties agree to reach an understanding on the measures which the two Governments would have immediately and simultaneously to adopt upon the occurrence of this eventuality.

Having submitted to the Emperor both the fact of this exchange of ideas and the text of the conclusions resulting therefrom, I have the honor to inform you to-day that his Majesty has deigned to approve completely these principles of agreement and would view with favor their adoption by the two Governments. In informing you of these sovereign decisions, I request that you be good enough to bring them to the knowledge of the French Government and to communicate to me the decisions which it may take on its side.

GIERS.

b. M. RIBOT, FRENCH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. MOHRENHEIM,
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT PARIS.¹

PARIS, August 27, 1891.

You have been good enough, by order of your Government, to communicate to me the text of the letter of the minister of foreign affairs of the Empire, wherein are contained the special instructions with which the Emperor Alexander had determined to provide you, after the last exchange of ideas with regard to the general situation in Europe had taken place between M. de Giers and the ambassador of the French Republic at St. Petersburg.

Your Excellency was charged to express at the same time the hope that the contents of that document, previously concerted and formulated by a common agreement between the two cabinets, should meet the full approbation of the French Government.

I hasten to thank your Excellency for this communication.

The Government of the Republic can only view as does the imperial Government the situation created in Europe by the conditions in which the renewal of the Triple Alliance occurs, and believes with it that the moment is come to define the attitude which in the present junctures and in the presence of certain eventualities the two Governments should agree upon, both being equally desirous to assure the guaranties which result from equilibrium between the European forces for the maintenance of peace.

I am, therefore, glad to inform your Excellency that the Government of the Republic gives its entire adhesion to the two points which form the subject matter of the communication of M. de Giers and which are formulated as follows:

I. In order to define and consecrate the entente cordiale which unites them, and desirous of contributing by a common agreement to the maintenance of the peace which forms the object of their sincerest wishes, the two Governments declare that they will concert upon every question of a nature to bring the general peace into question.

II. For the case where this peace should be in fact endangered, especially if one of the two parties should be menaced by an aggression, the two parties agree to reach an understanding on the measures which the two Governments would have immediately and simultaneously to adopt upon the occurrence of this eventuality.

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 18.

I furthermore hold myself at your disposal for the examination of all questions which in the actual state of general politics impose themselves more particularly upon the attention of the two Governments.

Moreover, the imperial Government will without doubt take account, as do we, of the importance of confiding to special delegates, who should be designated as soon as possible, the practical study of the measures destined to prevent the eventualities contemplated by the second point of the agreement.

In requesting you to bring the response of the French Government to the knowledge of the Government of his Majesty, I cannot help saying how much I cherish the opportunity to participate in the consecration of an agreement which has been the constant object of our common efforts.

RIBOT.

c. FURTHER UNDERSTANDINGS.

M. de Giers had two interviews with M. Ribot at Paris on November 20-21, 1891. In the second interview the Russian suggested that the arrangement of August 27 be made more precise. M. de Giers on December 14, 1891, sent a long dispatch to M. de Nelidov, Russian ambassador at Constantinople, in which the lines of Russian policy in the Near East were laid down. Its salient points were: "We must reunite our efforts to maintain the present *status quo*" in the Ottoman Empire; M. de Nelidov is instructed that France has no designs on Tripoli and that he is to quiet the apprehensions of the Porte on that subject; he is to concert with the French ambassador advice to the Sultan respecting the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. The illegal status of Bulgaria constituted "the delicate point of the eastern situation." The Sultan's primary interest should be the re-establishment of a legal régime. Although the Sultan had made concessions "under pressure of the cabinet which protects Prince Ferdinand," he himself had a fundamental interest in respecting the provisions of the treaty of Berlin. "A correct and reserved attitude regarding Bulgaria" was enjoined, in concert with France. The French claim to protect Catholics in the Near East and the Russian tradition of protection of the Orthodox Church created difficulties to be avoided by "sedulously refraining from giving the violent character of political quarrels" to the defense of the respective coreligionists. "The almost permanent" pressure of British naval forces in the Levant had disquieted Turkey. "A counterweight to this intimidation" and an equilibrium might be established if French and Russian vessels likewise sailed along the Turkish coasts.

On January 16, 1892, M. Ribot instructed Paul Cambon, French ambassador at Constantinople, inclosing a copy of the Russian instructions. Of Egypt he wrote: "We will not cease to devote ourselves to the pacific solution of a question which puts in jeopardy the integrity of Turkey, the equilibrium of the Mediterranean and the freedom of the communications of Europe with the Far East." The execution of "certain attempts visibly inspired by the example of what has been done in Egypt" was to be prevented in Tripoli by the concerted action of the French and Russian ambassadors near the Sublime Porte. As to Bulgaria, France desired to prevent "every complication of a nature to endanger the rights of the Sultan or the general interests of peace." In a frank discussion of the religious difficulty, M. Ribot emphasized the conviction that "if, by its very nature, it did not permit a community of action between the representatives of the two powers at Constantinople, it did not exclude on either side concerted efforts with a view to preventing a political divergence between the two countries resulting from it." Referring to the naval situation M. Ribot reiterated M. de Giers' statements and stated that France had just decided to station a squadron permanently in the Levant.

These dispatches were sent by the French courier to Constantinople on January 30, 1892, and their receipt there completed the political phase of the alliance.

2. MILITARY CONVENTION, AUGUST, 1892.

a. GENERAL DE BOISDEFFRE TO THE MINISTER OF WAR AT PARIS.¹

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18, 1892.

In continuation of my report No. 4 of August 10, I have the honor to render account of events occurring since my arrival in camp.

.

PROJECT OF MILITARY CONVENTION.²

France and Russia being animated by an equal desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to provide against the necessities of a defensive war provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance on one or other of the two, have agreed upon the following provisions:

¹ Ministère des affaires étrangères. Documents diplomatiques. Alliance Franco-Russe, 1890-1893, No. 71; Pages d'histoire, No. 159, pages 140, 144-145, 147, 152.

² This document is preserved in an envelope bearing this autographic notation: "The military convention is accepted by the letter of M. de Giers to M. de Montebello giving the force of treaty to this convention. (Signed) Félix Faure. October 15." See Document No. 91. [Official note.]

I. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will employ all her available forces to fight Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France will employ all her available forces to fight Germany.

II.¹ In the event of the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the powers composing it, being mobilized, France and Russia at the first news of the event and without any preliminary arrangement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces and move them as near as possible to their frontiers.

III.¹ The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the side of France 1,300,000 men, on the side of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

These forces shall engage to the full, with all speed, in order that Germany may have to fight on the east and west at once.

IV. The general staffs of the armies of the two countries will confer at all times to prepare and facilitate the execution of the measures contemplated.

They will communicate to each other during the time of peace all information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which is or will be known to them. Ways and means of corresponding in times of war will be studied and arranged in advance.

V. France and Russia will not conclude peace separately.

VI. The present convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.

VII.¹ All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept rigorously secret.

Signature of the minister:

Signature of the minister:

General aide-de-camp,

chief of the General Staff,

Signed: OBRUCHEV.

General of division, Councillor of state
sub-chief of the General Staff of the Army.

Signed: BOISDEFFRE.

.

August 18. This morning, Tuesday, I have received from the minister of war a letter dated August 5/17, by which in transmitting to me officially

¹ On the final form of these articles see documents *b* and *c* following.

one of the two copies of the project of a convention which I have signed with General Obruchev he informs me that the Emperor had approved in principle the whole of the project.

I inclose in this report the said letter and signed project.

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Annex to the Report of General Boisdeffre under date of August 18, 1892.

AUGUST 5/17, 1892.

Dear General:

I have had the honor to submit to his Imperial Majesty the project of the military convention worked out by the two general staffs. His Majesty, having approved in principle the whole of the project, has ordered me, in view of the character of several of its provisions, to have it submitted for the examination of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my high consideration.

Signed: PETR VАНNOVSKIĬ.

b. M. RIBOT, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. DE MONTEBELLO,
FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURG.¹

PARIS, August 27, 1892.

(Private.)

I have telegraphed you this morning that the President of the Republic had approved the whole of the project of convention, under reserve of some changes in editing. . . .

(a) Art. II:

"In event of the Triple Alliance or one of the powers composing it setting the general mobilization of its forces into operation, France and Russia,"

(b) Art. III:

"The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the side of France 1,200,000 to 1,300,000 men. . . ."

(c) Art. VII reads thus:

"All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept rigorously secret."

It has seemed to the President of the Republic that this wording is of a nature to raise some objections, from the constitutional point of view.

In principle, the President of the Republic cannot conclude *secret* treaties, that is to say, having to be submitted to the control of Parliament, after

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 75.

the security or interest of the state shall have ceased to justify the refusal to communicate them.

What the Emperor desires is that the treaty should not be published or divulged without his consent. It seems to us that satisfaction could be given to the desire of the Emperor and to the legitimate scruples of the President of the Republic by making Art. VII read:

"The clauses given above shall be divulged only with the consent of the two parties."

.

c. REPORT OF CAPTAIN PAUFFIN DE SAINT-MOREL TO GENERAL DE BOIS-DEFFRE RESPECTING INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL OBRUCHEV.¹

The general dictated to me the following: . . .

"Arts. II and III,—I have no adverse remarks,—and I write in this sense to the minister of war.

"As to Art. VII, it is necessary to understand that the Emperor sets much store upon it; it determined his approval." . . .

The general thought to attempt a wording, *in the following sense*, which perhaps would smooth over everything:

"The above clauses shall not be divulged without the consent of the two parties.

"Secrecy shall be rigorously maintained on all the military provisions resulting from the present convention."

d. M. DE GIERS, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. DE MONTEBELLO, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURG.²

ST. PETERSBURG, December 15/27, 1893.

(Very secret.)

After having examined, by supreme order, the project of military convention drawn up by the Russian and French general staffs in August, 1892, and after having submitted my appreciation thereof to the Emperor, I now have the duty of informing your Excellency that the text of that arrangement, as approved in principle by his Majesty and signed by Aide-de-Camp General Obruchev and General of Division de Boisdeffre, may henceforth be considered as having been definitively adopted in its present

¹ Annex to the dispatch of September 1, 1892, of General de Boisdeffre to M. Ribot, *Ibid.*, No. 76.

² Annex to the dispatch of M. Casimir Périer, president of the council, minister of foreign affairs, dated St. Petersburg, December 30, 1893, *Ibid.*, No. 91.

form.—The two general staffs will also have the faculty of consulting each other at any time and of reciprocally communicating to each other all information which they may deem useful.

GIER.S.

e. M. MONTEBELLO, FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURG, TO M. DE GIER.S, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.¹

ST. PETERSBURG, December 23, 1893/January 4, 1894.

I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honor to address to me on December 15/27, 1893, by which you announced to me that after having, by supreme command, examined the project of military convention drawn up by the French and Russian general staffs and submitted your opinion to the Emperor, you had the duty of advising me that this arrangement, as approved in principle by his Majesty and signed in August, 1892, by Aide-de-Camp General Obruchev and General of Division de Boisdeffre, both delegated for this purpose by their respective Governments, may be considered henceforth as definitively adopted.

I have hastened to communicate this decision to my Government, and I am authorized to declare to your Excellency, with the request that you bring this resolution to the knowledge of his Majesty the Emperor, that the President of the Republic and the French Government likewise consider the said military convention, whose text is approved in every part on either side, as henceforth executory.

In consequence of this agreement, the two general staffs will from now on have the faculty of consulting together at any time and of reciprocally communicating to each other all information which may be useful to them.

MONTEBELLO.

3. EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONFIRMING ARRANGEMENTS OF 1891-1894.

a. COUNT MURAVIEV, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. DELCASSÉ, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.²

ST. PETERSBURG, July 28/August 9, 1899.

The few days that your Excellency has just spent among us will, I hope, permit the determination again of the solidity of the bonds of lively and unchanging friendship which unite Russia to France.

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 92.

² *Ibid.*, No. 93.

In order to give a new expression to these sentiments and to respond to the request that you have expressed to his Majesty, the Emperor has deigned to authorize me, Mr. Minister, to propose to you an exchange of notes between us with the purpose of establishing that:

The imperial Government of Russia and the Government of the French Republic, always solicitous for the maintenance of the general peace and of equilibrium among the European forces,

Confirm the diplomatic arrangement formulated in the letter of August 9/21, 1891, to M. de Giers, that of August 15/27, 1891, to Baron Mohrenheim and the letter in reply of M. Ribot, likewise bearing the date of August 15/27, 1891.

They have decided that the project of military convention which is the complement thereof and which is mentioned in the letter of M. de Giers of December 15/27, 1893, and that of Count de Muraviev of December 23, 1893/January 4, 1894, will remain in force as long as the diplomatic agreement concluded for safeguarding the common and permanent interests of the two countries.

The most absolute secrecy as to the tenor and even as to the existence of said arrangements must be scrupulously observed on both sides.

In addressing this communication to you, Mr. Minister, I profit by the occasion to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

COUNT MURAVIEV.

b. M. DELCASSÉ, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
TO COUNT MURAVIEV, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.¹

ST. PETERSBURG, July 28/August 9, 1899.

Mr. Minister:

Sunday last, when with his consent I laid before his Majesty the Emperor my opinion as to the utility of confirming our diplomatic arrangement of the month of August, 1891, and of fixing for the military convention which followed the same duration as that arrangement, his Majesty was good enough to declare to me that his own sentiments responded perfectly to the views of the Government of the Republic.

By your letter of this morning, you have done me the honor to inform me that it has pleased his Majesty the Emperor to approve the following formula which, on our side, has the entire adhesion of the President of the

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 94. The political considerations behind the exchange of notes are stated in No. 95, M. Delcassé's report to the President of the Republic on his visit.

Republic and of the French Government, and upon which agreement was previously established between your Excellency and myself:

[The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th paragraphs of Count Muraviev's letter are here repeated.]

I congratulate myself, Mr. Minister, that these days spent in St. Petersburg have permitted me to prove once more the solidity of the bonds of lively and unchanging friendship which unite France to Russia, and I pray you to accept the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

DELCASSÉ.

4. NAVAL UNDERSTANDING.

a. PROJECT OF NAVAL CONVENTION.¹

Art. I. The naval forces of France and Russia shall co-operate in all eventualities where the alliance authorizes and stipulates combined action of the land armies.

Art. II. The co-operation of the naval forces will be prepared in time of peace.

To this end the chiefs of staff of both navies are henceforth authorized to correspond directly, to exchange all information, to study all war hypotheses, to concert on all strategic problems.

Art. III. The chiefs of staff of both navies shall confer in person at least once a year; they will draw up minutes of their conferences.

Art. IV. As to duration, effectiveness and secrecy, the present convention is assimilated to the military convention of August 17, 1892, and to the subsequent agreements.

PARIS, July 16, 1912.

Chief of the general staff
of the French Navy:

Signed: AUBERT

Minister of Marine:

Signed: M. DELCASSÉ

Chief of the general staff of
the imperial Russian Navy:

Signed: PRINCE LIEVEN

Minister of Marine:

Signed: J. GRIGOROVICH.

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 102. "The original of this document is at the Ministry of Marine."—[Official note.]

b. CONVENTION FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE
RUSSIAN NAVY AND THE FRENCH NAVY.¹

As the result of an exchange of views reached in the current month of July, 1912, between Vice Admiral Prince Lieven, chief of the general staff of the imperial Russian navy, and Vice Admiral Aubert, chief of the general staff of the French navy, the following decisions of principle have been reached between the two conferees:

1. From September 1/14, 1912, the chief of the general staff of the Imperial Russian navy and the chief of the general staff of the French navy shall exchange all information of their respective navies, and regularly every month, in writing, information which these two countries may obtain. Telegraphic cipher may be used in certain urgent cases.

2. To avoid any indiscretion and any divulgence relative to this information, it is indispensable to adopt the following procedure of transmission:

Any request for information on the French Marine of interest to the Russian Marine will be addressed by the Russian naval attaché at Paris to the chief of the general staff of the French navy; and, reciprocally, any request for information on the Russian Marine will be addressed by the French naval attaché at St. Petersburg to the chief of the general staff of the Russian Marine.

This procedure will be exclusive of any other: In principle, therefore, a direct request is not to be made to the naval attachés for information respecting their own navies.

PARIS, July 16, 1912.

Chief of the general staff
of the French Navy:

Signed: AUBERT

Chief of the general staff of
the imperial Russian Navy:

Signed: PRINCE LIEVEN

The approval of the project was announced, on the part of the Russian Emperor, in a note from the Russian minister of foreign affairs to the French minister of foreign affairs dated Saint Petersburg, August 2/15, 1912; and on the part of France in a note from the French minister of foreign affairs to the Russian minister of foreign affairs, dated Saint Petersburg, August 3/16, 1912 (Nos. 106 and 107).

¹ "The original of this document is at the Ministry of Marine."—[Official note.]

II. ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE CORDIALE.

SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS.

The Entente Cordiale consisted of the following treaties:

1. Convention between Great Britain and France respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, signed at London, April 8, 1904. (Ratifications exchanged at London, December 8, 1904.)¹

2. Declaration between Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, signed at London, April 8, 1904, and secret articles of even date.²

3. Declaration between Great Britain and France concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, signed at London, April 8, 1904.³

4. Convention between Great Britain and France confirming the protocol signed at London on February 27, 1906, concerning the New Hebrides, signed at London, October 20, 1906. (Ratifications exchanged at London, January 9, 1907.)⁴

The condominium in the New Hebrides is a most enlightening example of international administration and it is planned to devote a subsequent number of a League of Nations to its operation.

¹ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 31-38; Treaty Series, No. 5 (1905); Parl., Pap., 1905, CIII, 265; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 29-37; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 9-13.

The convention was completed by the following:

Agreement between Great Britain and France relative to the arbitral tribunal and the inquiries into the claims for indemnity contemplated by Art. III of the Convention of April 8, 1904, respecting Newfoundland, signed at London, April 7, 1905. (98 British and Foreign State Papers, 49-51; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 363-366.)

French decree attacking the Iles de Los to the Government of French West Africa, Paris, July 4, 1905. (98 British and Foreign State Papers, 859.)

Convention between Great Britain and France respecting the delimitation of the frontier between the British and French possessions east of the Niger (confirming protocol of April 9, 1906), signed at London, May 29, 1906. [In fulfilment of article VIII, pars. 6 and 7 of the convention of 1904.] (Ratifications exchanged at London August 29, 1906.) (99 British and Foreign State Papers, 194-202; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 463.)

Agreement between the United Kingdom and France respecting the delimitation of the frontier between the British and French possessions east of the Niger, signed at London, February 19, 1910. (Treaty Series, No. 1, 1912, Cd. 6013; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, VII, 362.)

² 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 39-53; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 15-19; Treaty Series, No. 6, 1905; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 6-8.

³ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 53-55; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 37-43; Treaty Series, No. 7, 1905.

⁴ 99 British and Foreign State Papers, 229-252; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, I, 523-564; Treaty Series, No. 3, 1907; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 179-200.

The convention was completed and rendered operative by:

Exchange of notes between Great Britain and France. Arrangements under the convention of October 20, 1906, respecting the New Hebrides, signed at London, August 29, 1907. (100 British and Foreign State Papers, 499-536; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, I, 564-589.)

British order in council making further provision for the exercise of His Majesty's jurisdiction within the New Hebrides, London, October 24, 1911. (104 British and Foreign State Papers, 113.)

2. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

Owing to their ready accessibility, their length and technical character, official summaries of the contents and purport of the documents is substituted for the texts:

- a. CIRCULAR ADDRESSED APRIL 12, 1904, BY M. DELCASSÉ, FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO FRENCH AMBASSADORS AT BERLIN, BERN, CONSTANTINOPLE, MADRID, ST. PETERSBURG, VIENNA, WASHINGTON, NEAR THE KING OF ITALY, NEAR THE HOLY SEE, THE MINISTER AT TANGIER AND THE DIPLOMATIC AGENT AND CONSUL GENERAL AT CAIRO.¹

PARIS, April 12, 1904.

The great interests both moral and material connected with the understanding of England and France called for a friendly regulation of the questions which divided the two countries and from which in certain circumstances a conflict might result. At London as at Paris, the Governments were aware of that. The visits exchanged last year between King Edward and the President of the Republic showed that opinion on both sides of the Channel was favorably disposed.

In the course of the interview which I had the honor of having with Lord Lansdowne on July 7, 1903, the eminent secretary of state for foreign affairs and I examined successively all the problems which were placed before us. It was recognized that it was not impossible to find for each of them a solution equally advantageous to both parties.

Our common efforts, which have not ceased to be directed by a spirit of conciliation, resulted in the agreements of April 8, the authentic texts of which I send you annexed, adding some explanations on their nature and import.

The affairs of Newfoundland were among those which, after numerous attempts, had given place to discussions more and more delicate [*épineuses*]. The origin was far in the past. Art. 13 of the treaty of Utrecht [1713] abandoned to Great Britain Newfoundland and the adjacent islands. It was now only on the western and a part of the eastern coasts that we could come to take and dry fish, and only during the customary fishing season. Every permanent [*sédentaire*] establishment was prohibited to us. . . .

¹ De Clerq, *Recueil des traités de la France*, XXII, 525-536; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 43-57.

It is seen that, to avoid risks of conflict which threatened to become disquieting, we only abandoned in Newfoundland privileges defensible with difficulty and hardly necessary [drying of fish on the coast], while keeping the essential, that is, fishing in territorial waters, and for the future throwing out of any possible dispute a precious right, fishing freely, or of buying bait for codfish on the whole extent of the French Shore. These compensations are, however, not the only ones to which we have consented.

We received others in West Africa of an importance very considerable for the development of our colonial empire. The concessions of England related to three places: Gambia, Los Islands and the region between the Niger and the Tchad.

The river Gambia constitutes sort of a happy anomaly in the hydrographic régime of the West African coast. When most of the water courses are almost impracticable for part of the year the Gambia, for a distance of 300 kilometers as the crow flies from its mouth, is navigable for seagoing vessels. It is one of the principal waterways in this region; we were excluded from it up to now. . . . It is open to us to-day. . . .

The Los Islands (formerly the Idolo Islands), which England has just ceded to us, are six in number, three of them large. . . . Situated less than five kilometers from the coast, in front of the recently built port of Konakry, the capital of French Guinea, this group commands immediate access to it. . . . We have built at Konakry a port which, if the future responds to what results already realized seem to promise, will be one of the great commercial entrepôts of this coast. The key of this port is since yesterday in our hands.

An important part of the arrangement just signed is devoted to the regions between the Niger and the Tchad. It was no less a question than the alteration or, better, a transformation to our great advantage, of the whole of the frontier determined by the convention of June 14, 1898. . . . The desert separated our possessions in the Sudan from those on the Tchad and by a combination of unforeseen circumstances the homogeneity of our African empire, so long sought, was not obtained. . . . Our communications by boat between the rivers of the north and south were impossible without passing through British waters. . . . In equity we needed a route, and we have obtained it. In law, however, that was not at all obligatory. . . .

The capital part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco. Of all questions affecting the interests of France, none in fact has an importance comparable with that of Morocco; and it is evident that on its solution depended the solidity and the development of our African empire

and even the future of our situation in the Mediterranean. . . . In obtaining from England, whose strong position in Moroccan ports is known, the declaration that it belongs to France to look after the tranquility of this country and to lend its aid for all needed administrative, economic, financial and military reforms, as well as the engagement not to hinder her action to this end, we have attained a result whose value it is superfluous to emphasize. . . .

As concerns Egypt, you will note that the political condition is subjected to no change. The principal interest in the negotiation just completed is financial. A great part of the Egyptian debt is placed in France. It was a question of assuring our holdings the largest guaranties, while adapting them to the new conditions resulting from the financial resurrection of Egypt.

The defense of our own interests has not diverted our attention from a final question of general purport, even universal since it concerns the entire world, that of the free use of the Suez Canal. Remaining faithful to her traditions, the Government of the Republic was fortunate in being able to bring the British Government to engage to maintain in its entirety the freedom of one of the most important routes of international traffic. It must record with a particular satisfaction the adhesion of Great Britain to putting into force the treaty of October 29, 1888.

By the terms of the declaration of London of January 15, 1896, France and Great Britain had in a way neutralized the central provinces of Siam. . . . They engaged to acquire no privilege or particular advantage of which the benefit was not common to the two signatories. They further engaged to enter into no separate arrangement which permitted a third power to do what they reciprocally forbade themselves by this declaration. All these provisions had a rather negative character. The arrangement just concluded with the London cabinet, while maintaining the clauses which precede for those territories, establishes that the Siamese possessions situated east and southeast of this zone and the adjacent islands shall henceforth be considered amenable to French influence, while the regions situated to the west of the same zone and of the Gulf of Siam shall be amenable to English influence. While repudiating the idea of annexing any Siamese territory and engaging strictly to respect the existing treaties, the two Governments agree, regarding each other, that their respective action shall be freely exercised in each of the spheres of influence thus determined, which gives a practical bearing to the new agreement.

The special situation of the New Hebrides had given room for disputes touching the validity of acquisitions of land either by British subjects or

French citizens. The absence of any jurisdiction in these islands rendered insoluble the differences arising on this matter. It has been agreed that an arrangement shall be concluded to put an end to these difficulties.

Finally the two powers have profited by the negotiations under way to regularize the situation of Great Britain in Zanzibar and that of France in Madagascar. This was to put an end to embarrassing claims which, for many years, had hampered our action in the great island of the Indian Ocean.

Thus, thanks to a mutual good will, we managed to regulate the various questions which for a long time weighed on the relations of France and England. The first expressions of opinion abroad show the great importance attached to this settlement and that it is considered as a precious further guaranty for general peace. Moreover, the favorable appreciations of which these arrangements are also the subject in England and in France indicate sufficiently that they safeguard fully the essential interests of each, a condition necessary for a durable and fruitful understanding.

DELCASSÉ.

b. DISPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT PARIS FORWARDING AGREEMENTS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE OF 18TH APRIL, 1904.¹

FOREIGN OFFICE,
April 8, 1904.

(EXTRACT.)

After giving an analytical account of the agreements similar to the French summary and stating that they were believed to be desirable "if considered by themselves and on their intrinsic merits," the Marquess of Lansdowne wrote to Sir Edward Monson:

It is, however, important to regard them not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming a part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the international relations of two great countries.

From this point of view their cumulative effect can scarcely fail to be advantageous in a very high degree. They remove the sources of long-standing differences, the existence of which has been a chronic addition to our diplomatic embarrassments and a standing menace to an international friendship which we have been at much pains to cultivate, and which, we rejoice to think, has completely over-shadowed the antipathies and suspicions of the past.

¹Parl. Pap., 1904, CX 313 (Cd. 1952); *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 1-15.

There is this further reason for mutual congratulations. Each of the parties has been able, without any material sacrifice of its own national interests, to make to the other concessions regarded, and rightly regarded, by the recipient as of the highest importance. . . . For these reasons it is fair to say that, as between Great Britain and France, the arrangement, taken as a whole, will be to the advantage of both parties.

Nor will it, we believe, be found less advantageous if it be regarded from the point of view of the relations of the two powers with the Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Siam. In each of these countries it is obviously desirable to put an end to a system under which the ruler has had to shape his course in deference to the divided counsels of two great European powers. Such a system leading, as it must, to intrigue, to attempts to play one power off against the other, and to undignified competition, can scarcely fail to sow the seeds of international discord, and to bring about a state of things disadvantageous and demoralizing alike to the tutelary powers, and to the weaker state which forms the object of their solicitude. Something will have been gained if the understanding happily arrived at between Great Britain and France should have the effect of bringing this condition of things to an end in regions where the interests of those two powers are specially involved. And it may, perhaps, be permitted to them to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the general peace.

C. SECRET ARTICLES RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO SIGNED AT LONDON

APRIL 8, 1904.¹

(These articles are reprinted here because of their political importance.)

Art. 1.—In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken toward

¹ 101 British and Foreign State Papers, 1053-1059; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 664; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 26-30; Treaty Series, No. 24, 1911.

Spain made a declaration of adhesion to the whole declaration on October 3, 1904. (*Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 666; 104 British and Foreign State Papers, 374; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 8-9; and VI, 30.)

Simultaneous agreements were made between France and Spain, Great Britain and Spain at London May 16, 1907, for the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* of the three countries in the Mediterranean and in that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa. (American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 425; 100 British and Foreign State Papers, 570-571; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 692.)

each other by Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration¹ of to-day's date would remain intact.

Art. 2.—His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that his Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Art. 3.—The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebu shall be intrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Arts. 4 and 7 of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

¹ The articles referred to read:

Art. 4.—The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

Art. 6.—In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the treaty of the 29th October, 1888 [for text see 79 B. and F. S. P., 18], and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of Par. 1 as well as of Par. 2 of Art. VIII of that treaty will remain in abeyance.

Art. 7.—In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco, comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebu.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

Art. 4.—If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

Art. 5.—Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Art. 1 of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged and Unified Debts [of Egypt] after the 15th July, 1910.

d. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS RESPECTING ARMED ASSISTANCE MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND PAUL CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, NOVEMBER 22-23, 1912.¹

i. SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. CAMBON.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
November 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If

¹ Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2 in dispatch No. 105, British Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the Outbreak of the European War.

these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.,

E. GREY.

ii. M. CAMBON TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

(TRANSLATION.)

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON,
November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours etc.,

PAUL CAMBON.

III. ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE CORDIALE.

- I. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA RELATING TO PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET, SIGNED AT ST. PETERSBURG, AUGUST 31, 1907.¹ (RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT ST. PETERSBURG, SEPTEMBER 23, 1907.)

No. I.—SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 29, 1907.

Sir,

I have to-day authorized your Excellency by telegraph to sign a convention with the Russian Government containing arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.

The arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the regions of that country touching the respective frontiers of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not part of those regions, and is only part in Persian territory. It has not therefore been considered appropriate to introduce into the convention a positive declaration respecting special interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf, the result of British action in those waters for more than a hundred years.

His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that this question will not give rise to difficulties between the two Governments should developments arise which make further discussion affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary. For the Russian Government have in the course of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this arrangement explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf—a statement of which His Majesty's Government have formally taken note.

In order to make it quite clear that the present arrangement is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.

His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their efforts to the

¹ 100 British and Foreign State Papers, 555-560; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 398-406.

preservation of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so, they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) E. GREY.

No. 2.—SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 31, 1907.

Sir,

I have the honor to transmit herewith the convention which was signed to-day by M. Izvolski and myself for the settlement of certain questions affecting the interests of Great Britain and Russia in Asia.

I also beg leave to forward a note which I received from M. Izvolski in response to a communication from me, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, on the subject of the entry of scientific missions into Tibet.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

INCLOSURE 1 IN No. 2.—CONVENTION.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Izvolski, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA.¹

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:

I.—Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through, Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

II.—Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places

¹ Persia has informed Holland that it regards as null and void all treaties imposed on Persia in recent years, and especially the Russo-British treaty of 1907 regarding the spheres of influence in that country. The other treaties may be revised later, the communication from the Persian Government states, but that of 1907, with its appendices, is definitely annulled.—(Associated Press dispatch, May 3, 1918.)

The British secretary of state for foreign affairs, replying on May 13, 1918, to a parliamentary question, said: "We have informed the Persian Government that his Majesty's Government will be prepared to regard the 1907 convention, in so far as it applies to Persia, as being in suspense."

Persia was notified of the arrangement by a joint Anglo-Russian note of September 11, 1907 (102 British and Foreign State Papers, 906-907; see also 103 *ibid.*, 644-974).

are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

III.—Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Arts. I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Arts. I and II are maintained.

IV.—It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the “Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de Perse” up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the posts and telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V.—In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the “Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de Perse” and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

CONVENTION CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN.

The High Contracting Parties, in order to insure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention:

Art. I.—His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

Art. II.—The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905,¹ that they recognize the Agreement and the engagements² concluded with the late Ameer AbdurRahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements already contracted by him toward His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

Art. III.—The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

Art. IV.—His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter, obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

¹ 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 36-37; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXIV, 641-648.

² 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 1048-1049.

Art. V.—The present Arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above.

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING TIBET.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Arrangement:

Art. I.—The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Art. II.—In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British commercial agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Art. V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September, 1904,¹ and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906;² nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Art. I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Arrangement.

Art. III.—The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lassa.

Art. IV.—The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

Art. V.—The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

¹98 British and Foreign State Papers, 148-151; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 80-83.

²99 British and Foreign State Papers, 171-173; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 78-80.

ANNEX TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA
CONCERNING TIBET.

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,000,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Art. II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th/31st August, 1907.

(L. s.)	A. NICOLSON
(L. s.)	IZVOLSKI.

INCLOSURE 2 IN No. 2.—SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON TO ALEXANDER IZVOLSKI.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18/31, 1907.

M. le Ministre,

With reference to the Arrangement regarding Tibet, signed to-day, I have the honor to make the following Declaration to your Excellency:

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the Russian Government, for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever, on condition that a like assurance is given on the part of the Imperial Russian Government.

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government propose, moreover, to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period; the Russian Government will, as a matter of course, take similar action.

"At the expiration of the term of three years above-mentioned His Britannic Majesty's Government will, if necessary, consult with the Russian Government as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

INCLOSURE 3 IN No. 2.—ALEXANDER IZVOLSKI TO SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18/31, 1907.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

In reply to your Excellency's note of even date, I have the honor to declare that the Imperial Russian Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the British Government, for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever.

Like the British Government, the Imperial Government propose to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period.

It is understood that at the expiration of the term of three years the two Governments will, if necessary, consult with each other as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) IZVOLSKI.

IV. ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

I. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO CHINA AND KOREA (ALLIANCE, ETC.), SIGNED AT LONDON, JANUARY 30, 1902.¹

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in

¹ 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 83-84; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXX, 650-651; (XXXI, 258-26); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, 514; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 14-15.

The dispatch forwarding the text of the agreement to the British minister at Tokyo is printed, 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 84-86; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXI, 258-61.

securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

Art. I.—The high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the high contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the high contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

Art. II.—If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, the other high contracting party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

Art. III.—If in the above event any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other high contracting party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Art. IV.—The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

Art. V.—Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

Art. VI.—The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London the 30th January, 1902.

[L. S.] LANSDOWNE,
*His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.*

[L. S.] HAYASHI,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
at the Court of St. James.*

2. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO EASTERN ASIA (CHINA AND KOREA) AND INDIA, SIGNED AT LONDON, AUGUST 12, 1905.¹

The following provisions appeared in the revision of August 12, 1905, which otherwise was identic with the preamble, Arts. I, II, III, V and VI of the revision of 1911:

Art. III.—Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Art. IV.—Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

Art. VI.—As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other power or powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

¹ 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 136-138, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 403-405; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 15-17; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, 288.

A dispatch forwarding a copy of the agreement to the British ambassador at Tokyo dated September 6, 1905, is printed, 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 138-140; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 402-3.

3. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN RESPECTING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN EASTERN ASIA AND INDIA SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911.¹

PREAMBLE.

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions:

Article I—It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

Art. II—If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Art. III—The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with

¹ 104 British and Foreign State Papers, 173-174; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 3-4; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, V, 276-278; Treaty Series, No. 18, 1911.

another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this agreement.

Art. IV—Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

Art. V—The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Art. VI—The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

*His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.*

TAKAAKI KATO,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan at the Court of St. James.*

V. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the oldest instance of political co-operation in the world and the longest-existing alliance in history, has been continuously effective since 1373 and at the present writing is 545 years old. Of the various treaties constituting it those portions which indicate the limits of the alliance are printed below:

I. TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT LONDON, JUNE 16, 1373.¹

Whereas the Fidalgo John Ferdinand de Andeiro, of the Army, and the venerable and discreet Senhor Velasco Domingo, Precentor of the Cathedral of Braga, deputed by the Illustrious and Magnificent Prince the Lord Ferdinand, by the grace of God King of Portugal and Algarve, and by the Most Illustrious Lady Eleanor, Queen and Consort of the same, did, some time ago, come personally, as ambassadors, proctors, and special messengers, to the presence of the above-mentioned Lord our King, in order to manifest the alliances, unions, confederacies and leagues of pure affection reciprocally entered into, contracted and ordained, between the said King of Portugal and the Queen, and the Illustrious and Magnificent Prince, the Lord John, by the grace of God King of Castile and Leon, Duke of Lancaster, the very dear Son of our said Lord the King of England, and the sentiments of sincere affection derived not only thence but from the bonds of near consanguinity and ancient friendship between them and their ancestors, of revered memory, which affection the said King and Queen of Portugal had cherished, and would ever cherish, from their hearts, as well toward the person of the said Lord our King, as toward his Sons and rights, and to their subjects, ardently wishing their welfare and honor, and desirous to make a firm stand against the malice of their enemies, and the fraudulent machinations and designs wickedly conceived against the afore-said King our Lord, and against his sons, realm, dominions, lands and subjects, as also cordially solicitous to enter into, contract and agree upon amities, alliances, unions, good confederacies and leagues of pure love, with our Lord the King, and with his first-born Son, the Lord Edward,

¹ British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 462-466. For the original Latin and Portuguese texts see Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 15, and *ibid.* (Hague edition), III, Part 2, 8. The English full powers were dated June 1, 1373, and are printed in Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 11.

Prince of Wales, and with the other Sons of the same Lord our King (with whom they had not yet formed any alliances), with the Kingdom of England, and all his future Successors in the said Kingdom of England; and, finally, with the other lands, dominions or places, and his faithfully obedient vassals and subjects, against all men that may live or die, of whatever station, condition, rank or dignity they may be, and against their kingdoms, dominions, lands and provinces, (alone, and especially excepting and preserving intact and inviolate the State of the Apostolic See, and of our Lord the Pope,) . . .

We, on our part, anxious strictly to obey the Royal Orders of our aforesaid Liege Lord, as our fidelity requires, and duly to execute what in this respect belongs to our duty, in virtue of the power conferred upon us to this effect, and of the trust which we have assumed, after sufficient deliberation, contract, make and establish with the ambassadors above-mentioned, who have expressly consented to it in lieu and in the names of the Persons before stated, in manner and form hereinafter set forth, alliances, confederacies, friendships, unions and leagues of sincere affection, which, under favor of the Most High, shall for ever more inviolably be observed.

Art. I. In the first place, we settle and covenant that there shall be from this day forward between our abovesaid Lord Edward, King of England and France, and the Lord Ferdinand, King of Portugal and Algarve, and the Lady Eleanor Queen and his Consort, their Successors in the aforesaid Kingdoms of England and Portugal, and their realms, lands, dominions, provinces, vassals and subjects faithfully obeying them, whatsoever, true, faithful, constant, mutual and perpetual friendships, unions, alliances and leagues of sincere affection, and that as true and faithful Friends they shall henceforth reciprocally be Friends to Friends, and Enemies to Enemies, and shall assist, maintain and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity, station, rank or condition they may be, and against their lands, realms and dominions.

They shall strive for and preserve, as much as in them lies, the personal safety, security, interest and honor, and the harmlessness, conservation and restitution of their rights, property, effects, and Friends, whatsoever they be.

They shall everywhere faithfully prevent the hurts and injuries, disgrace or baseness which they know or which one Party knows to be at any future time intended or contemplated against the other Party, and shall provide remedies for them; and they shall as expeditiously as may be, by letters

or messengers, or in any better way which they can contrive without reserve and fully inform, forewarn and usefully counsel the other Party against whom such things are meditating, relative to what has just been mentioned.

II. Also, neither Party shall form friendships with the Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors of the other Party; or knowingly himself or through others advise, aid or favor the Enemies, Rivals, or Persecutors of the other Party, to his detriment, hurt or prejudice; or gratify them in any way, receive them into his Kingdom or Kingdoms, Lands, Dominions, Provinces or Places, or knowingly suffer them to be gratified, received, countenanced or harbored, either publicly or privately under any specious excuses, contrivances or pretexts; without, however, including under the domination of Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors, such as shall now or hereafter for any reason whatsoever have fled, been exiled or banished from the Kingdom or from the other Provinces, Lands, Dominions or Places of either of the same Kings, but, on the contrary, declaring it lawful reciprocally to grant to such Persons reception and countenance in the Kingdom, and in any Lands and Places subjected to the other King, unless indeed such fugitives, exiles and outlaws shall have been capitally convicted of high treason, and as traitors to the King and the Kingdom, or shall lie under the suspicion of having afforded occasion for reasonable fear of their design to compass the hurt, disgrace, injury or exasperation of both Parties or either of them, so that they ought to be justly avoided as Foes and Persecutors; in which case either Party, on being required by the other, shall be obliged either to deliver up such men as have been before described, if demanded, to the requiring Party, or to expel, banish or dismiss them from his vicinity, his Kingdoms, Dominions and Lands.

III. Also if the Kingdom, Lands, Dominions or Places of the other Party should happen to be infested, oppressed or invaded by sea or by land by Enemies, Persecutors or Rivals, or if these Enemies should at least purpose, prepare, or in any manner appear anxious to infest, oppress or invade, and the other Party, or his Successors, be through that Party against whom similar attempts are making, by letters or by trusty messengers applied to for assistance or succor of troops, archers, slingers, ships, galleys, sufficiently armed for war, or any other kind of defense (provided such defense, or any of those before mentioned, exist or be used in the Kingdom of which the above succor is demanded), then shall the said Party so required *bona fide* furnish, supply and send the said succor to the requiring Party for the protection of the Kingdom menaced with such invasions, or of the other Provinces, Dominions or Places, and for the

recovery of them when lost by the like invasions, against the said Enemies, Invaders or Persecutors, or against such as intend to invade or persecute, of whatever station, condition, rank and dignity they may be, as often as, and whenever such Party shall, without great injury to his Country, be able to spare a certain proportion of armed troops, archers, slingers, ships and galleys sufficiently supplied with all requisites and other kinds of defense (except when their price is excessive or they are needed in the Country), at the cost, expense and pay of the Party requiring, to be strictly estimated by four military men of experience or able and discreet members of the legal profession (of whom two are to be deputed or chosen by each Party) according to the quality of the individuals to be sent, and their grades, to the circumstances of the times, and to the markets of the places in which the persons dispatched shall have to exert their valor or military skill, within such times as, after the aforesaid requisition, a similar succor ought to be prepared and sent, regard being had both to the pressing occasion of the Party requiring, and to the possibility of the Party called upon being able to complete his preparations, it being understood that throughout these proceedings no duplicity and unfairness shall appear, but that the strait path of equitable dealing and benignity shall be pursued.

Furthermore, to the end that the above, collectively and singly, may really be fulfilled and faithfully observed, we the aforesaid proctors, in lieu and in the names of those above mentioned, promise *bona fide* and take our oath on the soul of our said Lord the King of England by touching the holy Gospels; that he, our Lord the King, will with all his might and senses keep, fulfil and inviolably observe, in whole and in part, the above-written alliances, friendships, unions, confederacies and conventions, and all the articles and clauses of them (provided always that they do not interfere with former alliances), will cause them to be kept, fulfilled and inviolably observed, and will neither transgress at any future time nor knowingly suffer to be in any way transgressed the above stipulations, or any of them, in whole or in part, by breaking, infringing or violating them knowingly, or by causing or suffering them to be infringed, violated or broken, on pretense of any excuse or exception, fraud or deceit, error, coercion, written law, custom, act or intention, or privilege obtained or to be obtained.

2. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT WINDSOR, MAY 9, 1386.¹

VII. Further, it is agreed, that if either of the aforesaid Parties can learn, discover or anticipate any injury, contumely or disadvantage to have been planned or meditated against the other Party, on sea or land, manifestly or privately, he shall prevent it as much as in him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the injury and contumely intended to his own interest, and shall endeavor, by all means in his power, that such design, with all the particulars connected with it, may be brought to the notice of the other Party against which it is so intended, and every artifice, deceit and invention shall be abstained from.

3. TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT LISBON, MAY 16, 1703.²

I. All former treaties between the abovesaid Powers are hereby approved, confirmed and ratified, and are ordered to be exactly and faithfully observed, except in so far as by the present treaty is otherwise provided and established; so that there shall be between the said Kingdoms and States, their people and subjects, a sincere friendship and perfect amity; they shall all of them mutually assist one another; and each of the said Powers shall promote the interest and advantage of the rest, as if it were his own.³

¹ British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 472; Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 515. On the preceding April 28 England signed a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with King John of Castile, Duke of Lancaster (Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 510). The Portuguese treaty of alliance was confirmed on June 20 (Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 525).

² British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 502.

³ The present Government of Portugal, following its accession to power as the result of revolution, issued the following statement on December 18, 1917:

"Efforts are being made in certain quarters to suggest the idea that the recent revolution in Portugal was carried out in the interest of the monarchy with the assistance of Spanish and other foreign elements and that it was essentially a movement in favor of Germany and against the Allies.

"There is not a scintilla of truth in any one of these suggestions. They are merely one more device of the all-pervading German propaganda intended to sow dissension among the Allies. Their character can easily be appraised by noting the quarters in which they are put forth.

"The foreign policy of the new Portuguese government rests and will continue to rest on the maintenance of the alliance with England in hearty co-operation with the other allies.

"The hostile attitude of the German press toward the new situation in Portugal and the bombardment of the Portuguese port of Funchal by a German submarine, directly the success of the revolution became known, clearly show the flimsy nature of the German propaganda's latest stratagem."

—(Associated Press dispatch, December 18, 1917.)

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AFTER THE WAR *

By GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON,

Professor of International Law, Harvard University.

The President of the United States on January 22, 1917, addressing the Senate, said, "perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the people of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back," and proposed "that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world." The President, referring to the propositions as to "the foundations of peace among the nations," also said, "I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say;" and later in the same address he asserted, "I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere."

As President of the United States, Mr. Wilson's words may unquestionably and properly be regarded in foreign countries as expressing the policy of the United States Government. As the head of the Government of a neutral state occupying an important place in the world, when many other states were engaged in war, the claim to be speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere was not wholly presumption.

It can also certainly be claimed that a President of the United States in 1917 has an equal right with a President of the United States in 1823 to state what American policy is, and, if in 1917 the policy of 1823 is reaffirmed, then such policy would be worthy of even greater consideration in international affairs.

President Wilson on January 22, 1917, while proposing a concert of power, government by consent of the governed, freedom of

* See also address National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under auspices American Academy of Political Science, Long Beach, New York, May 30, 1917, in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, VII, No. 2, 297-302.

the seas, limitation of armament, and advocating "that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world," explained that, under this world doctrine, "no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

Clearly, this recently announced American policy would for the period after the war enlarge the scope and operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The realization of this fact is evident in foreign opinion. On January 24 Bonar Law, chancellor of the exchequer, in a speech at Bristol, England, said of the address of President Wilson, "what President Wilson is longing for, we are fighting for." On January 26 it was announced from Petrograd, that Russia "can gladly indorse President Wilson's communication." The part relating to the freedom of the seas found partic-

¹"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

"It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

"That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions. . . .

"The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be,

ular response in Russia.² From other countries came statements that the ideals of the address were approved, but that the task involved was appalling, considering the condition of the world.

As the United States has been the supporter of the Monroe Doctrine in the past,³ it must doubtless be its supporter after the

not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."—(Address of President Wilson, January 22, 1917.)

² "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guaranty which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it."—(Address of President Wilson, January 22, 1917.)

³ "It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

"Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers;

war. It would be reasonable to conclude that the President, speaking on January 22, 1917, was speaking of the probable attitude of the Government of the United States toward the doctrine. The principles of the doctrine would therefore be involved in the American ideas for the settlement of world difficulties. After a test of nearly one hundred years it is but a natural tendency that the doctrine should cease to be narrowly American and should have a world basis. If it means merely that each state should be allowed unhampered opportunity for development and that "good faith and justice toward all nations" should prevail, such an ideal would meet little formal opposition.⁴ If it means that the United States should be recognized as controlling the destinies of the American continents there would doubtless be opposition.⁵

to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference."—(Message of President Monroe, December 2, 1823.)

For full statement see Appendix, pages 286-287.

⁴"Observe good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?"—(Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.)

⁵In 1895 Secretary of State Olney said:

"Is it true, then, that the safety and welfare of the United States are so concerned with the maintenance of the independence of every American state as against any European power as to justify and require the interposition of the United States whenever that independence is endangered? The question can be candidly answered in but one way. The States of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by an European power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us. But that is not all. The

Even if expanded into the doctrine of America for Americans or some form of Pan-Americanism⁶ there might be question of world-wide approval. The doctrine may therefore be passing even now to a wider field of influence.

people of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government. They have secured the right for themselves and their posterity at the cost of infinite blood and treasure. They have realized and exemplified its beneficent operation by a career unexampled in point of natural greatness or individual felicity. They believe it to be for the healing of all nations, and that civilization must either advance or retrograde accordingly as its supremacy is extended or curtailed. Imbued with these sentiments, the people of the United States might not impossibly be wrought up to an active propaganda in favor of a cause so highly valued both for themselves and for mankind. But the age of the Crusades has passed, and they are content with such assertion and defense of the right of popular self-government as their own security and welfare demand. It is in that view more than in any other that they believe it not to be tolerated that the political control of an American state shall be forcibly assumed by an European power.”—(Olney to Ambassador Bayard, July 20, 1895, Moore, Digest of International Law, VI, 552-553.)

President Roosevelt in 1904 declared:

“Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.”—(Annual Message, December 6, 1904.)

For other passages from this message see Appendix, pages 296-297.

⁶ Secretary of State Hay in 1901 made the following statement:

“As respects controversies between the states of this hemisphere, the attitude of the United States has been repeatedly made clear. We wish to maintain equally friendly and close relations with all. We deplore any dissidences among them which may embarrass their common advancement. Our precept and example are before them to induce harmony and good will in all their mutual relations, but always in the line of the most absolute impartiality. While our good offices are at any time cheerfully at the disposal of our fellow republics to aid in composing their disputes, we hold that it is not our province to interfere in the adjustment of any questions involving their sovereign rights in their relations to one another. Although we may and do deeply regret whatever causes of division may arise between them, we abstain from forming a judgment on the merits of the difference, or espousing the cause of any one state against another, for to do so would impair the frank impartiality with which we stand ready to lend our friendly assistance toward a settlement whenever we have assurance that our counsels or our services will be acceptable to the parties concerned.

It should be said, however, that the United States is no longer sole arbiter as to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, as it once was, because under a large number of conventions this Government has agreed to refer differences even when relating to the Monroe Doctrine to investigation by a commission.' Indeed,

"The Government of the United States has on many occasions expressed its strong desire that peace and harmony shall prevail among the countries with which it holds friendly relations, and especially among the republics of the American continents whose systems of government rest upon a common basis, and whose material interests are intimate and interdependent. It has taken several favorable opportunities to advocate the resort to arbitration in settlement of difficulties not adjustable in the ordinary channels of intercourse, and has itself set an example by recurring to this humane and intelligent international forum. In one notable instance its counsels and offices were lent to bring about the arbitration of a boundary dispute between a Spanish-American state and a European power, doing so in furtherance of the national policy announced nearly eighty years ago."—(The Secretary of State to the Chilean Minister, January 3, 1901, Moore, Digest of International Law, VI, 603-604.)

The general form of these agreements follows:

The United States of America and the Republic of Salvador, being desirous to strengthen the bonds of amity that bind them together and also to advance the cause of general peace, have resolved to enter into a treaty for that purpose and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States, the Honorable William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State; and

The President of Salvador, Señor Don Federico Mejía, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Salvador to the United States;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ART. I. The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding Article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report.

ART. II. The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from each country, by the Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments. The expenses of the Commission shall be paid by the two Governments in equal proportion.

The International Commission shall be appointed within four months after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty; and vacancies shall be filled according to the manner of the original appointment.

ART. III. In case the high contracting parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the International Commission for investigation and report. The International Commission may, however, act upon its own initiative, and in such case it shall notify both Governments and request their co-operation in the investigation.

The report of the International Commission shall be completed within one year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend the time by mutual agreement.

under these treaties disputes of every nature whatsoever are to be referred to a commission. Such treaties are operative with nearly all the great states except Germany and Japan, and with most of the smaller powers.

Again, it may be said that it is to be presumed that these treaties were made to be observed. The commissions established or to be established in accordance with the terms of these treaties are international rather than American. Therefore, under the treaties by which the United States is already bound and has been bound since 1913, the Monroe Doctrine, if the subject of a difference with a treaty power, must be referred to an international commission. For the parts of the world now under these treaties the doctrine has had since 1913 something of the aspect which President Wilson's address may be forecasting for an area much larger than the Americas.

Of these treaties there are in fact now ratified twenty or more, and about half as many more have been negotiated. If thus for half the states of the world the Monroe Doctrine may now be subjected to international standards of judgment, its purely national and American character may be said already to have been waived. The next step—the recognition by the world of the general principles underlying the doctrine as likewise sound for world policy—would not now be a long step for the United States.

When the Monroe Doctrine was originally published in Europe it met with approval from liberal statesmen, who hailed it as shed-

The report shall be prepared in triplicate; one copy shall be presented to each Government, and the third retained by the Commission for its files.

The high contracting parties reserve the right to act independently on the subject-matter of the dispute after the report of the Commission shall have been submitted.

ART. IV. Pending the investigation and report of the International Commission, the high contracting parties agree not to increase their military or naval programs, unless danger from a third power should compel such increase, in which case the party feeling itself menaced shall confidentially communicate the fact in writing to the other contracting party, whereupon the latter shall also be released from its obligation to maintain its military and naval *status quo*.

ART. V. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and by the President of the Republic of Salvador, with the approval of the Congress thereof; and the ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

ding "joy, exultation, and gratitude over all free men in Europe."⁸ The reactionary Metternich, "who hated all constitutions," maintained that it was a natural consequence following the establishment of free states, and "that great calamities would be brought upon Europe by the establishment of these vast republics in the New World." Later, Bismarck regarded it as a piece of "international impertinence." At home the propositions of Monroe had been received with a degree of proud self-satisfaction.⁹ By many it was regarded as giving to the Declaration of Independence a wider scope.

Many other interpretations followed, and these were frequently adapted to temporary policies, but the doctrine was always regarded as a special American contribution toward the well-being of the western continent.

It shall take effect immediately after the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue in force for a period of five years; and it shall thereafter remain in force until twelve months after one of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of an intention to terminate it.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.

Done in Washington on the seventh day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirteen.

⁸ "The question with regard to Spanish America is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation and gratitude over all the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the President of the United States."—(Henry Brougham, the English statesman, cited in Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 411.)

⁹ Secretary Olney, reviewing the attitude on the doctrine, said in 1895:

"Its pronouncement by the Monroe administration at that particular time was unquestionably due to the inspiration of Great Britain, who at once gave to it an open and unqualified adhesion which has never been withdrawn. But the rule was decided upon and formulated by the Monroe administration as a distinctively American doctrine of great import to the safety and welfare of the United States after the most careful consideration by a Cabinet which numbered among its members John Quincy Adams, Calhoun, Crawford and Wirt, and which before acting took both Jefferson and Madison into its counsels. Its promulgation was received with acclaim by the entire people of the country irrespective of party. Three years after, Webster declared that the doctrine involved the honor of the country. 'I look upon it,' he said, 'as part of its treasures of reputation, and for one I intend to guard it,' and he added,

"'I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will help neither to erase it nor to tear it out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish that honor.'"—(Olney to Ambassador Bayard, Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 549.)

It is now proposed by President Wilson not that no European nation should seek to extend its authority over an American nation but "that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people."

The reason for the early acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine was the physical power of the United States and the remoteness geographically of the area to which the doctrine applied. President Cleveland in his special message of December 17, 1895,¹⁰ stated that the doctrine "cannot become obsolete while our republic endures" and that it found its basis in "the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced." Secretary of State Olney at the same period pointed out to Great Britain that "the people of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government" and that the British policy in reference to the Venezuelan boundary was so threatening to American policy and rights that his Government could not permit, "if the power of the United States is adequate," the accomplishment of the British ends. There is thus involved, if the Monroe doctrine is to be maintained, the existence of a power behind it which will insure respect.

In a sense the Monroe Doctrine aimed in 1823 to make the western hemisphere "safe for democracy." The President's war message of April 2, 1917, said: "The world must be made safe for democracy." In this broad conception the United States may thus be said to be fighting for a Monroe Doctrine for the world. Experience has shown that the western hemisphere has not been "safe for democracy" at all times and that the United States has had to be ready to use force to maintain the rights of self-governing nations.¹¹ Accordingly in the same message and else-

¹⁰ See Appendix, pages 293-294.

¹¹ In his message of December 3, 1901, President Roosevelt said:

"Just 78 years have passed since President Monroe in his annual message announced that 'the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.' In other words, the Monroe doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power or American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the

where President Wilson has expressed the conviction that there must be "a partnership of democratic nations" to maintain their institutions.¹² This idea had already received general acceptance among the leading nations of the world¹³ and has been more and more generally approved as the war has dragged from weeks into months and from months into years.

universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere.

"During the past century other influences have established the permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the New World nations."

For other passages from this message see Appendix, pages 295-296.

¹² "I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

"And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

"These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."—(President Wilson, Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.)

¹³ "President Wilson's aim is to have peace now and security for peace in the future. That is our aim, and it is our only aim. He hopes to secure this by

President Wilson in his war message to Congress on April 2, 1917, stating that his mind had not changed since January 22, said:

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

Monroe, looking to the political system of central Europe in 1823, had taken a similar position, saying of the attitude of the powers belonging to the so-called Holy Alliance that it was impossible that they "should extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord."

It is evident now that the United States does not desire to maintain alone the principles of such a doctrine as that enunciated by Monroe, for President Wilson in his address to Congress on April 2, 1917, said:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

means of a league of peace among the nations, and he not only spoke in favor of such a league but he is trying to induce the American Senate to take the steps necessary to give effect to it. It would not be right to regard this proposal as something altogether Utopian. You know that almost up to our own day dueling continued, and just as the settling of private disputes by the sword has now become unthinkable, so, I think, we may hope that the time will come when all the nations of the world will play the part which Cromwell described as his life work—to act as constable and keep peace. That time will come, I hope. . . .

"Our aim is the same as President Wilson's. What he is longing for we are fighting for. Our sons and brothers are dying for it, and we mean to secure it. The heart of the people of this country is longing for peace. We are praying for peace, a peace which will bring back in safety those who are dear to us, but a peace which will mean this—that those who will never come back shall not have laid down their lives in vain."—(Andrew Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, January 24, 1917.)

Certainly some kind of league will be needed if the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are to receive general respect. There is developing a growing opinion favorable to a sanction for international security and peace through co-operation or joint action of some kind. Whether this sanction be furnished by a league to enforce peace¹⁴ or by some other guaranty, it is certain that the world seems weary of the old system under which any ruler might, if he decided it to be for his interest, disturb the peace of the world and subdue weaker peoples. Monroe in 1823 had said of the then weaker states to the south of the United States that this Government would view as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States . . . any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny." These states were at that time democracies and they were small and weak. The United States placed behind them the considerable power which the nation at that time wielded, and the democratic form of government has prevailed

¹⁴The program of the League to Enforce Peace is as follows:

"We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

"First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

"Second: All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

"Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

"The following interpretation of Article Three has been authorized by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

"Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One."

upon the western continents. The United States, by treaty agreement putting the Monroe Doctrine to the test of fair international opinion, has in recent years in many treaties shown its willingness to justify the doctrine upon its merits.

Now with broader policy the United States proposes that after the war the powers of the world unite to guarantee for the larger area what it has guaranteed for the Americas—that democracy shall have an opportunity to develop without foreign intervention. The acceptance of this idea by the states of the world is not yet certain.

The American argument is not difficult, however. If it is good for the Americas that states and peoples should have complete freedom for self-realization, it is likewise good for the other states of the world. Of this belief the United States and other American states are now giving proof by action. While such a doctrine may imperil thrones, it builds up peoples, and for its extension even hostilities may be justified, as has been officially asserted:

We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

The United States cannot under such principles claim isolation as a justification for its policies, but the Monroe Doctrine, if it is to survive after the war, must rest upon the broader support which its fundamental character merits. It is possible that in its narrower interpretation as applied to the Americas because of their "free and independent condition" the Monroe Doctrine may still be maintained after the war, but it is to be hoped that under the broader scope of the principles of the doctrine, through a concert of the nations life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness may be permanently secure under governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

APPENDIX.

The following summary of historical events and collection of documents has been prepared to accompany Professor Wilson's paper and is intended to elucidate the political situation which called forth the original Monroe Doctrine and to afford material for a broad comparison of that situation with the present one, which has called forth President Wilson's declaration respecting a Monroe doctrine for the world.

The texts of the original message of President Monroe, of explanatory or expansive statements by subsequent Presidents and other public documents of the United States which relate to the subject matter of the doctrine are also printed.

I. THE EUROPEAN BACKGROUND OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The European rulers opposed to Napoleon objected to him because to them he represented the French Revolution and its ideas. The established rulers were by no means reconciled to his assumption of imperial powers for, though it was a tacit tribute to their status in the world, it involved admitting a parvenu to their circle and was followed by Napoleon's setting up many plebeians on thrones. These circumstances deeply grieved hereditary royalty, which considered the conditions an affront against their divine right to rule. It was inevitable that, after Napoleon's abdication on April 6, 1814, they should combine to restore the "legitimate" ruler in the person of a Bourbon, Louis XVIII.

The powers who had accomplished the overthrow of Napoleon might perhaps have left the principle of legitimacy there had it not been for their desire to assure that France should be removed from the hegemony of Europe, which she had held for nearly two centuries. Accordingly they prepared to make certain of the future impotence of France by excluding her from any important part in the Congress of Vienna. By a protocol of September 22,

1814, they agreed that, "as France has adopted a legitimate government," she would not be banished completely from the discussions, but that she "ought to be satisfied" with being "admitted only when the other parties are already of one mind."¹

France was aware of this intention and the instructions to Prince Talleyrand, the principal French delegate to the Congress of Vienna, were drawn up with a view to protecting French interests, prestige and future influence to the greatest extent possible, especially on the basis of the balance of power. These instructions² had a single refrain, "legitimacy," expressed in the terms of the recognized legal term of sovereignty, by which, however, was to be understood for the purpose the fee-simple rights of "sovereigns" over the territory they ruled. The development of this principle in Europe during the next decade was the circumstance that called forth the Monroe Doctrine, for it underlay the Holy Alliance, whose activities made the pronouncement of the American President an act of statesmanship.

The religiously mystical influences that gave the Holy Alliance its textual form might have rendered it beneficent, but the principle of legitimacy on which the treaty of Vienna was based insured the opposite effect. The following quotations from Talleyrand's letters to Louis XVIII indicate the extent to which the settlement of 1815 was founded upon the theory which France adduced for her own diplomatic defense:

March 14, 1815: The principles of legitimacy, which had to be drawn from beneath the ruins under which the overthrow of so many ancient and the establishment of so many new dynasties had, as it were, buried them, which were accepted so coldly by some and rejected by others when we first produced them, have at last become appreciated. Your firmness in supporting them has not been without its effect. The whole honor of it belongs to your Majesty, and the unanimity with which the powers have pronounced against Bonaparte's last attempt is entirely due to it.³

¹ Georges Pallain, *The Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and King Louis XVIII*, 405-406.

² Comte d'Angeberg-(Leonard Boreyko Chodzko), *Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815*, 215-238. The instructions are dated September, 1814.

³ Pallain, *op. cit.*, 393.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE KING DURING HIS JOURNEY FROM
GHENT TO PARIS, JUNE, 1815.

We showed that the principles of legitimacy must be held sacred in the interest of the people themselves, because legitimate governments can alone be strong and durable, whereas illegitimate governments, relying upon force only, fall to pieces the moment that support fails them, and then the people are delivered over to a succession of revolutions of which no one can foresee the end.

It took much time and trouble to get a hearing for these principles: They were too strict for the policy of some of the courts; they were contrary to the system adopted by the English in India, and probably inconvenient for Russia, who had certainly ignored them in several important and recent transactions; and before we succeeded in obtaining their recognition the Allied Powers had already made arrangements directly at variance with them. . . .⁴

Their [the French delegates'] enlightened co-operation alone enabled me to overcome the many obstacles, to extinguish the ill feeling, and to remove the bad impressions with which I had to deal—enabled me, in a word, to restore to your Majesty's Government the influence which is justly its due in the councils of Europe. It was by determining to uphold the principle of legitimacy that we obtained this important result. . . .⁵

The principle of legitimacy was also imperiled, and most seriously imperiled, by the foolish conduct of the defenders of legitimate power, who did not distinguish between the source of power and its exercise, and believed, or acted as if they believed, that legitimate power must necessarily be absolute and unquestioned.

However legitimate a power may be, its exercise nevertheless must vary according to the objects to which it is applied, and according to time and place. Now, the spirit of the present age in great civilized states demands that supreme authority shall not be exercised except with the concurrence of representatives chosen by the people subject to it. . . .⁶

It cannot be denied that, great as may be the advantages of legitimacy, it may nevertheless lead to abuses. This is felt strongly, because during the twenty years immediately preceding the Revolution the tendency of all political writing was to expose and exaggerate these abuses. Few persons know how to appreciate the advantages of legitimacy, because they are all in the future; but everybody is at once struck by its abuses,

⁴ Pallain, *op. cit.*, 523.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 538.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 540.

because they may occur at any moment and show themselves upon every occasion. Has any one during the last twenty years reflected enough to perceive that none but a legitimate government can be stable? A government that offers to every ambitious man the chance of upsetting it and placing another in its stead, lives a threatened life, and bears within itself a fermenting spirit of revolution, ready at any moment to break out. The notion unhappily prevails that legitimacy affords a sovereign too much facility for setting himself above all laws, by securing him in the possession of the throne, however ill he may govern.⁷

The Holy Alliance was signed at Paris September 26, 1815, and received the limited approval of the British Prince Regent on October 6.⁸ It was published by the Tsar on the following Christmas day with a prefatory statement instinct with sounding religious sentiment. The documents which follow are the essential pronouncements of the Alliance and prove better than any comment the purposes of the allies.

1. THE HOLY ALLIANCE.⁹

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the last three years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased divine Providence to shower down upon those states which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, having acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the powers, in their reciprocal relations, upon the sublime truths which the holy religion of our Savior teaches;

⁷ Pallain, *op. cit.*, 541-542.

⁸ France "acceded" to it November 11, 1815, apparently without the action being accepted.

The British letter stated:

"As the forms of the British constitution . . . preclude me from acceding formally to this treaty, in the shape in which it has been presented to me, I adopt this course of conveying to the August Sovereigns who have signed it, my entire concurrence in the principles they have laid down, and in the declaration which they have set forth, of making the divine precepts of the Christian religion the invariable rule of their conduct in all their relations, social and political, and of cementing the union which ought ever to subsist between all Christian nations."
(3 British and Foreign State Papers, 213.)

⁹ Translated from 3 British and Foreign State Papers, 211-212.

They solemnly declare that the present act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity and peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns must have an immediate influence upon the counsels of princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence, their Majesties have agreed on the following articles:

Art. I. Conformably to the words of the holy Scriptures which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow-countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves toward their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect religion, peace and justice.

Art. II. In consequence, the sole principle in force, either between the said Governments or between their subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affection which ought to animate them, of considering themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation; for the three allied princes look on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia and Russia, and thus confess that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our divine Savior, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend, with the most tender solicitude for their peoples, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a good conscience and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the divine Savior has taught to mankind.

Art. III. All the powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all

the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardor and affection into this holy alliance.

Done in triplicate and signed at Paris, the year of grace 1815, the 14th (26th) September.

FRANCIS.

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

ALEXANDER.

2. DECLARATION OF THE FIVE CABINETS, SIGNED AT AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, NOVEMBER 15, 1818.¹⁰

At the period of completing the pacification of Europe by the resolution of withdrawing the foreign troops from the French territory; and when there is an end of those measures of precaution which unfortunate circumstances had rendered necessary, the ministers and plenipotentiaries of their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of France, the King of Great Britain, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias have received orders from their sovereigns to make known to all the Courts of Europe, the results of their meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle, and with that view to publish the following declaration:

The convention of the 7th of October, which definitively regulated the execution of the engagements agreed to in the treaty of peace of November 20, 1815,¹¹ is considered by the sovereigns who concurred therein as the accomplishment of the work of peace and as the completion of the political system destined to insure its solidity.

The intimate union established among the monarchs, who are joint parties to the system, by their own principles no less than by the interests of their people offers to Europe the most sacred pledge of its future tranquility.

¹⁰ No. VII in Convention . . . for the evacuation of the French Territory. . . . (Parl. Pap. 1819, XVIII, 351); *Archives diplomatiques pour l'histoire du tems et des états*, III, 526-527; Angeberg, *op. cit.*, 1760.

A protocol signed the same day declared the joint policy of the courts.

The political system known as that of the Holy Alliance had its origin in the treaty of Chaumont of March 1, 1814 (1 British and Foreign State Papers, 121-129) and the treaty of Vienna of March 25, 1815 (*ibid.*, 2, 443). Its purely secular embodiment was the so-called quadruple alliance signed at Paris, November 20, 1815 (*ibid.*, 3, 273-280).

¹¹ The treaty referred to ended the military occupation of French territory:

"Art. I. The troops composing the army of occupation shall be withdrawn from the territory of France by the 30th of November next, or sooner, if possible."

The object of this union is as simple as it is great and salutary. It does not tend to any new political combination—to any change in the relations sanctioned by existing treaties. Calm and consistent in its proceedings, it has no other object than the maintenance of peace, and the guaranty of those transactions on which the peace was founded and consolidated.

The Sovereigns, in forming this august union, have regarded as its fundamental basis their invariable resolution never to depart, either among themselves or in their relations with other states, from the strictest observation of the principles of the right of nations; principles which, in their application to a state of permanent peace, can alone effectually guarantee the independence of each government and the stability of the general association.

Faithful to these principles, the Sovereigns will maintain them equally in those meetings at which they may be personally present, or in those which shall take place among their ministers; whether they be for the purpose of discussing in common their own interests or whether they shall relate to questions in which other governments shall formally claim that interference. The same spirit which will direct their councils and reign in their diplomatic communications will preside also at these meetings; and the repose of the world will be constantly their motive and their end.

It is with these sentiments that the Sovereigns have consummated the work to which they were called. They will not cease to labor for its confirmation and perfection. They solemnly acknowledge that their duties toward God and the people whom they govern make it peremptory for them to give to the world, as far as lies in their power, an example of justice, of concord and of moderation; happy in the power of consecrating, from henceforth, all their efforts to protect the arts of peace, to increase the internal prosperity of their states, and to awaken those sentiments of religion and morality whose influence has been but too much enfeebled by the misfortune of the times.

For Austria:	METTERNICH.
France:	RICHELIEU.
Great Britain:	CASTLEREAGH.
	WELLINGTON.
Prussia:	HARDENBERG.
	BERNSTORFF.
Russia:	NESSSELRODE.
	CAPO D'ISTRIA.

3. THE CONFERENCES OF TROPPAU.

a. CIRCULAR OF THE AUSTRIAN, PRUSSIAN AND RUSSIAN MISSIONS TO FOREIGN COURTS.¹²

TROPPAU, December 8, 1820.

Informed of the rumors, as extravagant as false, which the malevolence and the credulity of others have succeeded in spreading and caused to be believed on the object and results of the conferences of Troppau, the allied Courts have considered it necessary to furnish their respective missions in foreign countries authentic information so that they can be in a position to correct errors and suspicions which have been formed about them. The subjoined document is destined to fulfil this purpose. There is no question of making it the subject of any formal communication but there is nothing to prevent its being confidentially read. This same summary will be addressed to the ministers of ——— of ———. You will be good enough to concert with them on the precise use to make of it.

Inclosure: Short summary of the first results of the conferences of Troppau.

The events which took place March 8 in Spain, July 2 at Naples and the Portuguese catastrophe¹³ have necessarily given rise to a deep feeling

¹² Translated from 8 British and Foreign State Papers, 1149-1151; *Archives diplomatiques pour l'histoire du tems et des états*, I, 290-297; Comte d'Angeberg (Leonard Boreyko Chodzko), *Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815*, 1801.

A meeting which did much to discourage liberal movements in Germany was held at Carlsbad August 6, 1819, resulting in the reactionary decrees of that date.

¹³ The events referred to are:

On March 8, 1820, Ferdinand VII of Spain issued a rescript decreeing "that all persons who are imprisoned or arrested on account of political opinions, in any place in the kingdom whatsoever, should be set immediately at liberty. They may return to their homes, as may all those who for the same reason are abroad." March 9-17 he issued decrees establishing a cabinet, abolishing the inquisition, ordering constitutional elections for municipal authorities, granting freedom of the press and reorganizing the courts. (*Archives diplomatiques*, III, 107-119.)

On July 2, 1820, a regiment stationed at Nola began a march to Naples under the banner of the Carbonari, a secret political society of liberal tenets. On July 7 Ferdinand I's son as viceregent ratified the Spanish constitution of 1812 for Naples. The conditions presented by the revolution were a formal oath to the constitution by the King, appointment of a junta to prepare its introduction and appointment of the revolutionary leader as commander-in-chief of the army. These terms were complied with on July 9.

On August 24, 1820, the city of Oporto, Portugal, rose and formed a provisional supreme junta to rule in the name of King John VI until the Cortes was convened. Lisbon did likewise and the two juntas convoked the Cortes to revise the Spanish constitution of 1812 to meet Portuguese needs.

of uneasiness and chagrin in all those who are under the obligation of watching over the tranquility of states, but at the same time has made them recognize the need of reuniting and deliberating in common upon the methods of preventing all the evils which menace the foundations of Europe.

It was natural that these sentiments should make an especially keen impression upon the powers that had recently put down revolution and that had seen it again raise its head. It was not less natural that these powers, to combat it for the third time, should have recourse to the same methods of which they had made use with such success in that memorable struggle which delivered Europe from a yoke it had borne for 20 years.

Everything gave ground for hoping that this alliance, founded in the most critical circumstances, crowned with the most brilliant success, affirmed by the conventions of 1814, 1815 and 1818, at the same time that it prepared, established and affirmed the peace of the world and delivered the European continent from the military tyranny of the representative of the revolution, would also be in a position to put a check on a force not less tyrannical and less detestable, that of revolt and of crime.

Such were the motives and the purpose of the meeting at Troppau. The first are so evident that they require no development. The latter is so honorable and so salutary that the wishes of all good men undoubtedly will accompany the allied Courts in the noble combat they have just entered upon.

The enterprise, which imposes upon them the holiest engagements, is great and difficult; but a happy presentiment makes them hope that they will attain their purpose, invariably maintaining the spirit of those treaties to which Europe owes the peace and union existing among all its states.

The powers have exercised an incontestable right in commonly concerting measures of safety against the states in which an overturn of the government effected by revolt can only be considered as a dangerous example, which must have for a result an attitude hostile against all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exercise of this right of necessity became still more urgent when those in that situation sought to communicate to neighboring states the evil in which they themselves were plunged and to propagate revolt and confusion among them.

There is in this attitude and this conduct an evident rupture of the part which guarantees to all the Governments of Europe, besides the inviolability of their territory, the enjoyment of peaceable relations which exclude all reciprocal encroachment on their rights.

This incontestable fact is the starting point for the allied Courts. The ministers who have been furnished at Troppau with positive instructions on the part of their Courts consequently concerted among themselves on the principles of conduct to follow toward states whose form of government had sustained violent attacks, and upon pacific or coercive measures which, in cases where it might have important effects and a salutary influence, might bring these states into the body of the alliance. The results of these deliberations have been communicated to the Courts of Paris and London in order that they can take them into consideration.

As the revolution of Naples daily takes deeper root, because nothing else exposes the tranquility of neighboring states to a danger so certain and so imminent and because it is not possible to act elsewhere so immediately and promptly, we are convinced of the necessity of proceeding against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in accordance with the principles declared above.

For the purpose of preparing measures of conciliation to this end, the Monarchs in session at Troppau invited the King of the Two Sicilies to meet with them at Laibach, a proceeding whose sole purpose was to free the will of his Majesty from all external constraint and to constitute this Monarch the mediator among his separated peoples and the states whose tranquility they threaten. The allied Monarchs being resolved not to recognize a government produced by open revolt, they can enter into negotiations only with the person of the King. Their ministers and agents at Naples have consequently received the necessary instructions....

b. CIRCULAR DISPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S MISSIONS TO FOREIGN COURTS.¹⁴

FOREIGN OFFICE,

January 21, 1821.

Sir,

I should not have felt it necessary to have made any communication to you, in the present state of the discussions begun at Troppau and transferred to Laibach, had it not been for a circular communication

¹⁴ Parl. Pap., 1821, XXII, 1; 8 British and Foreign State Papers, 1160.

This dispatch was apparently published as the result of a Parliamentary discussion February 21, 1821 (Hansard, New Series, IV, 836-895), on a resolution of Sir James Mackintosh which read:

"That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, copies or

which has been addressed by the Courts of Austria, Prussia and Russia to their several missions and which his Majesty's Government conceive, if not adverted to, might (however unintentionally) convey, upon the subject therein alluded to, very erroneous impressions of the past, as well as of the present, sentiments of the British Government.

It has become therefore necessary to inform you, that the King has felt himself obliged to decline becoming a party to the measures in question.

These measures embrace two distinct objects: 1st, The establishment of certain general principles for the regulation of the future political conduct of the allies in the cases therein described; 2dly, The proposed mode of the dealing, under these principles, with the existing affairs of Naples.

The system of measures proposed under the former head, if to be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of this country. But even if this decisive objection did not exist, the British Government would nevertheless regard the principles on which these measures rest to be such as could not be safely admitted as a system of international law. They are of opinion that their adoption would inevitably sanction, and, in the hands of less beneficent Monarchs, might hereafter lead to, a much more frequent and extensive interference in the internal transactions of states, than they are persuaded is intended by the august parties from whom they proceed, or can be reconcilable either with the general interest, or with the efficient authority and dignity, of independent sovereigns. They do not regard the alliance as entitled, under existing treaties, to assume, in their character as allies, such general powers, nor do they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be assumed in virtue of any fresh diplomatic transaction among the allied Courts, without their either attributing to themselves a supremacy incompatible with the rights of other states, or, if to be acquired through the special accession of such states, without introducing a federative system in Europe, not only unwieldy and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most serious inconveniences.

With respect to the particular case of Naples, the British Government, at the very earliest moment, did not hesitate to express their strong disapprobation of the mode and circumstances under which that revolution

extracts of such representations as have been made on the part of his Majesty's Government to the allied powers, respecting the interpretation given by them to the treaties subsisting between them and Great Britain, with reference to the right of general interference in the internal affairs of independent states, and respecting the measures proposed to be taken by them in the exercise of such right."

The resolution was lost by a majority of 69,—ayes 125, noes 194.

was understood to have been effected; but they, at the same time, expressly declared to the several allied Courts, that they should not consider themselves as either called upon, or justified, to advise any interference on the part of this country: They fully admitted however that other European states, and especially Austria and the Italian powers, might feel themselves differently circumstanced; and they professed that it was not their purpose to prejudge the question as it might affect them, or to interfere with the course which such states might think fit to adopt with a view to their own security, provided only that they were ready to give every reasonable assurance that their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandizement, subversive of the territorial system of Europe, as established by the late treaties.

Upon these principles, the conduct of his Majesty's Government with regard to the Neapolitan question has been, from the first moment, uniformly regulated, and copies of the successive instructions sent to the British authorities at Naples, for their guidance, have been, from time to time, transmitted for the information of the allied Governments.

With regard to the expectation, which is expressed in the circular above alluded to, of the assent of the Courts of London and Paris to the more general measures proposed for their adoption, founded, as it is alleged, upon existing treaties; in justification of its own consistency and good faith, the British Government, in withholding such assent, must protest against any such interpretation being put upon the treaties in question, as is therein assumed.

They have never understood these treaties to impose any such obligations; and they have, on various occasions, both in Parliament and in their intercourse with the allied Governments, distinctly maintained the negative of such a proposition: That they have acted with all possible explicitness upon this subject, would at once appear from reference to the deliberations at Paris in 1815, previous to the conclusion of the treaty of alliance;—at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818;—and subsequently in certain discussions which took place in the course of the last year.

After having removed the misconception to which the passage of the circular in question, if passed over in silence, might give countenance; and having stated in general terms, without however entering into the argument, the dissent of his Majesty's Government from the general principle upon which the circular in question is founded, it should be clearly understood, that no Government can be more prepared than the British Government is, to uphold the right of any state or states to interfere, where their own immediate security or essential interests are

seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state. But as they regard the assumption of such right as only to be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby, they cannot admit that this right can receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular state or states, or be made prospectively the basis of an alliance. They regard its exercise as an exception to general principles, of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case; but they at the same time consider that exceptions of this description never can, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule, as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations.

As it appears that certain of the ministers of the three Courts have already communicated this circular dispatch to the Courts to which they are accredited, I leave it to your discretion to make corresponding communication on the part of your Government, regulating your language in conformity to the principles laid down in the present dispatch. You will take care, however, in making such communication, to do justice, in the name of your Government, to the purity of intention, which has no doubt actuated the august Courts in the adoption of the course of measures which they are pursuing. The difference of sentiment which prevails between them and the Court of London on this matter, you may declare, can make no alteration whatever in the cordiality and harmony of the alliance on any other subject, or abate their common zeal in giving the most complete effect to all their existing engagements.

I am, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

4. DECLARATION OF THE MINISTERS AND PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THE EMPERORS OF AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA AND OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA BY ORDER OF THEIR MONARCHS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF LAIBACH, MAY 12, 1821.¹⁵

Europe knows the motives for the resolution taken by the allied Sovereigns to snuff out conspiracies and put an end to the troubles which

¹⁵ Translated from *Archives diplomatiques pour l'histoire du tems et des états*, II, 390-397; 8 British and Foreign State Papers, 1201; Angeberg, *op. cit.*, 1811.

threaten the existence of this general peace, whose establishment has cost so much in effort and sacrifice.

At the very moment their generous resolution was accomplished in the Kingdom of Naples, a rebellion of a still more odious character—if that was possible—broke out in Piedmont.¹⁶

Neither the bonds which for so many centuries bound the reigning House of Savoy to its people nor the benefits of an enlightened administration, under a wise prince and paternal laws, nor the sad perspective of the evils to which the country had just been exposed were able to restrain the designs of the perverts.

The plan of a general overturn was traced. In this vast combination against the repose of nations, the conspirators of Piedmont had their assigned rôle. They were hastening to fulfil it.

The throne and the state have been betrayed, oaths violated, military honor contemned, and the forgetting of all duties has speedily brought the scourge of all disorders.

Everywhere the evil has presented the same character, everywhere a single spirit directed these baleful revolutions.

Not being able to find a plausible motive to justify them, nor national support to sustain them, it is in false doctrines that the authors of these overturns seek a defense, it is on criminal associations [Carbonari] that they found a more criminal hope. For them the salutary empire of laws is a yoke that it is necessary to break. They renounce the sentiments which inspire true love of country, and, putting in place of known duties the arbitrary and indefinite pretexts of a universal change in the constituted principles of society, they prepare calamities for the world without end.

The allied Sovereigns have recognized the dangers of this conspiracy in all their extent, but they have penetrated at the same time the real weakness of the conspirators through the veil of appearances and declamations. Experience has confirmed their presentiments. The resist-

¹⁶ The Piedmontese army on March 10, 1821, declared that it "could not abandon the King to Austrian influence," which "impeded the good intentions of the Prince to satisfy his peoples, who desire to live under the reign of laws and to have their rights and interests assured by a liberal constitution." They looked to Victor Emmanuel to realize these intentions, in which case they would "defend the person of the King and the dignity of his crown against any enemy." Victor Emmanuel abdicated on March 13, Charles Albert of Savoy, Prince of Carignan, becoming regent on the same day and simultaneously promulgating the Spanish constitution of 1812. (*Archives diplomatiques*, II, 16-35.) With Austrian aid the ensuing revolution was ended on April 10-11 by the occupation of Turin and Alessandria.

ance which legitimate authority has encountered has amounted to nothing, and the crime has disappeared before the sword of justice.

It is not to accidental causes, it is not even to the men who fared so badly on the day of combat that we can attribute the ease of such a success. It rests on a principle more consoling and more worthy of consideration.

Providence has struck terror to consciences so culpable, and the disapproval of the peoples, whose fate is compromised by the makers of trouble, has made the arms fall from their hands.

Solely intended to combat and to repress rebellion, the allied forces, far from supporting any interest of their own, have come to the aid of subjugated peoples, and the peoples have considered its employment as an aid in favor of their liberty and not as an attack against their independence. From that time war ceased; from that time the states which suffered the revolt have been no more than states friendly to the powers, which have never desired anything but their tranquility and their well being.

In the midst of these grave events and in a situation so delicate, the allied Sovereigns in accord with their Majesties the King of the Two Sicilies and the King of Sardinia have considered it indispensable to take the temporary measures of precaution indicated by prudence and prescribed by the common safety. The allied troops, whose presence was necessary for the re-establishment of order, have been stationed at suitable places, with the sole view to protecting the free exercise of legitimate authority and to aiding the preparation under this *ægis* of the benefits which must efface the traces of evils so great.

The justice and disinterestedness which have presided over the deliberations of the allied Monarchs will always regulate their policy. In the future as in the past they will always have the purpose of preserving the independence and the rights of each state, as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result of even a movement so dangerous will still be, under the auspices of Providence, the confirmation of the peace which the enemies of the peoples seek to destroy and the consolidation of an order of things which will assure to the nations their repose and their prosperity.

Penetrated by these sentiments, the allied Sovereigns in closing the conferences of Laibach have desired to announce to the world the principles which have guided them. They are determined never to recede from them, and all the friends of good will see and constantly find in their union an assured guaranty against the attempts of disturbers.

It is with this purpose that their imperial and royal Majesties have ordered their plenipotentiaries to sign and publish the present declaration.

Laibach, May 12, 1821.

For Austria: METTERNICH.
BARON VON VINCENT.
Prussia: KRUSEMARCK.
Russia: NESSELRODE.
CAPO D'ISTRIAS.
POZZO DI BORGIO.

5. FINAL CIRCULAR OF THE CONGRESS OF VERONA ADDRESSED BY ORDER OF THE THREE SOVEREIGNS OF AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA, TO THEIR LEGATIONS NEAR DIFFERENT COURTS.¹⁷

Sir:

VERONA, December 14, 1822.

You were informed by the documents sent to you on the closing of the conferences of Laibach in the month of May, 1821, that the reunion of the Monarchs and their cabinets would take place in the course of the year 1822, and that they would then consider the term to be fixed to the measures which, on the proposals of the Courts of Naples and Turin, and with the consent of all the Courts of Italy, had been judged necessary to reaffirm the tranquility of the peninsula after the baleful events of the years 1820 and 1821. This reunion has just taken place, and we are therefore going to inform you of its principal results.

After the convention signed at Novara on July 24, 1821,¹⁸ the occupation of a military line in Piedmont by a corps of auxiliary troops had been finally fixed to last a year, subject to examination by the reunion of 1822, if the situation of the country should permit its cessation or render its extension necessary. . . . It has been recognized that the aid of an allied force was no longer necessary for maintaining the tranquility of Piedmont. . . . And it has been decreed by a new convention that the departure of these troops from Piedmont shall commence December 31 of this year and will be definitely ended by the transfer of the fortress of Alessandria on September 30, 1823.

¹⁷ *Archives diplomatiques pour l'histoire du tems et des états*, III, 538-544; Comte d'Angeberg (Leonard Boreyko Chodzko), *Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815*, 1817; 10 British and Foreign State Papers, 921-925.

¹⁸ *Archives diplomatiques*, II, 180-193.

On the other hand, his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies has declared to the three Courts participating in the convention signed at Naples October 18 that the actual state of his country would permit him to propose a reduction in the number of the auxiliary troops stationed in different parts of his kingdom. The allied Sovereigns have not hesitated to lend themselves to this proposal, and the army of occupation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies will be reduced to 17,000 men in the shortest possible time.

Thus is realized, to the extent that events have responded to the desires of the Monarchs, the declaration made at the close of the congress of Laibach: "That, far from wishing to prolong beyond the limits of a strict necessity their intervention in Italian affairs, their Majesties desired sincerely that the state of things which this painful duty imposed upon them should cease as soon as possible and would never occur again." Thus vanished the false alarms, the hostile interpretations, the sinister predictions which ignorance and bad faith had caused to resound through Europe in order to mislead the opinion of the peoples upon the frank and loyal intentions of the Monarchs. . . .

The purpose of the Congress of Verona, as designed by a positive engagement, would have been fulfilled by the resolutions adopted for the relief of Italy. But the Sovereigns and Cabinets in assembly have not been able to refrain from regarding two serious complications whose development had constantly occupied them since the meeting of Laibach.

An event of great importance broke out toward the end of this last meeting. What the revolutionary spirit began in the western peninsula, what it tried in Italy, it has succeeded in accomplishing at the eastern extremity of Europe. At the time when the military revolts of Naples and Turin yielded to the approach of a regular force, the brand of insurrection was hurled into the midst of the Ottoman Empire [Greek revolution]. . . . The Monarchs, determined on repulsing the principle of revolt in whatever place or under whatever form it might show itself, hastened to punish it with an equal and unanimous reproof. . . .

Other events worthy of all solicitude on the part of the Monarchs have fixed their attention on the deplorable situation of the western peninsula of Europe. Spain undergoes the fate reserved for all countries which have the misfortune to seek good in ways which never lead to it. To-day it describes the fatal circle of its revolution, a revolution which deceived or perverted men pretend to represent as a benefit, even as the triumph of an enlightened century. . . .

The legitimate power enchained and itself serving as the instrument for overturning all legal rights and liberties, all classes of the population in turmoil from the revolutionary movement, arbitrariness and oppression exercised under the forms of law, a kingdom delivered over to all kinds of convulsion and disorder, rich colonies justifying their emancipation by the same maxims on which the mother country has founded its public law, and which it tries in vain to condemn in another hemisphere, civil war consuming the last resources of the state—such is the picture which the actual situation in Spain presents to us. . . .

6. EUROPE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SPAIN AND THE LATIN-AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

The foreign ministers of Austria, Prussia and Russia between November 22 and December 14, 1822, during the Congress of Verona, sent notes to Spain indicating their agreement with the proposal that France should intervene in that country, where the "legitimate" ruler was a captive of the republican revolution. The tone of these notes is sufficiently illustrated by Metternich's remarks:

By the eternal decrees of Providence, good can never be secured for states any more than for individuals by forgetting the first duties imposed on man in the social order. . . . Military revolt can never form the basis of a happy and durable government.

On December 25, 1822, the French cabinet sent to Spain a note in which it was announced that France, "intimately united with her allies in the firm purpose of destroying by every means the revolutionary principles and movements," would take effective measures to protect herself—and her friends—from the contagion. The ensuing French invasion freed Ferdinand VII in September, 1823, and the revolutionary leaders were executed wholesale.

The next move was perfectly clear to any observer of political events. The Holy Alliance, with the scalps of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese revolutions at its belt, would forthwith crusade against freedom in Spanish America and Greece, and then would be in a position to attack directly the United States, which was

the typical example of freedom from "legitimate" rulers. That the drive against Spanish America was coming is proved by a circular note of the Spanish minister of state to the Holy Alliance which was anticipated by President Monroe's message by just 24 days. In this circular the Count of Ofalia said:

The King, our sovereign, being restored to the throne of his ancestors in the enjoyment of his hereditary rights, has seriously turned his thoughts to the fate of his American dominions, distracted by civil war and brought to the brink of the most dangerous precipice. . . .

These reflections powerfully animate his Majesty to hope that the justice of his cause will meet with a firm support in the influence of the powers of Europe. Accordingly, the king has resolved upon inviting the cabinets of his dear and intimate allies to establish a conference at Paris, to the end that their plenipotentiaries, assembled there along with those of his Catholic Majesty, may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted countries of America. . . . His Majesty, confiding in the sentiments of his allies, hopes that they will assist him in accomplishing the worthy object of upholding the principles of order and legitimacy, the subversion of which, once commenced in America, would presently communicate to Europe; and that they will aid him, at the same time, in re-establishing peace between this division of the globe and its colonies.¹⁹ . . .

Great Britain, with George Canning as foreign minister, refused to participate in the French invasion of Spain. The instructions to the Duke of Wellington of September 27, 1822, before the Congress of Verona, said that "the uselessness and danger of any such interference" in Spain were "so objectionable in principle" that the duke was "at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his Majesty will not be a party." The Duke of Wellington made a categorical statement to this effect on November 22, 1822, in reply to a French questionnaire.²⁰

Canning received a copy of the Count of Ofalia's note of December 26, 1823, to the Holy Alliance and replied to it on Jan-

¹⁹ ¹¹ British and Foreign State Papers, 55-57; Parliamentary Papers, 1824, XXIV.

²⁰ ¹⁰ British and Foreign State Papers, 4-5, 11-12.

uary 30, 1824. He then reviewed Great Britain's attitude toward the Spanish question, and in the course of his statement declared:

In a communication made, in the first instance to France, and afterward to other powers [Austria, Russia, Prussia, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United States], as well as to Spain, the same opinions were repeated.²¹

The opinions referred to have become famous because they have been held by some to prove that the Monroe Doctrine was originated by Canning. The statement just quoted clearly indicates that Canning's well-known letter to Richard Rush, the American minister at London, was not an exclusive communication to the United States, and that as a consequence the British suggestions were not a special invitation to the United States to associate itself with an attitude assumed to make an appeal solely to the American Republic.

The principles declared by Canning in his letter to Rush of August 20, 1823, were:

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediments in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.

If these feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them in the face of the world?²²

²¹ 11 British and Foreign State Papers, 61-62.

²² John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, VI, 389.

II. THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

I. PRESIDENT MONROE'S ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 2, 1823.²³

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.²⁴ (Paragraph 7.)

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our

²³ James Daniel Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 778, 786-788.

²⁴ On the Adams-Tuyl correspondence which preceded this declaration see Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 397-399.

rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. (Paragraph 48.)

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government *de facto* as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those

relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power; submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course. (Paragraph 49.)

2. PRESIDENT POLK'S ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 2, 1845.²⁵

It is well known to the American people and to all nations that this Government has never interfered with the relations subsisting between other governments. We have never made ourselves parties to their wars or their alliances; we have not sought their territories by conquest; we have not mingled with parties in their domestic struggles. . . . We may claim on this continent a like exemption from European interference. The nations of America are equally sovereign and independent with those of Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign interposition, to make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their internal affairs. The people of the United States can not, therefore, view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere

²⁵ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 2248-2249.

President Polk in a special message of April 29, 1848, further said:

"[The inhabitants of Yucatan] have, through their constituted authorities, implored the aid of this Government to save them from destruction [by an insurrection of Indians], offering in case this should be granted to transfer the 'dominion and sovereignty of the peninsula' to the United States. Similar appeals for aid and protection have been made to the Spanish and the English Governments.

"Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of the 'dominion and sovereignty' over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' either to Spain, Great Britain or any other European power." (Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2431-2432.)

with the independent action of the nations on this continent. The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe. . . . We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the "balance of power" which they may desire to maintain upon this continent. Near a quarter of a century ago the principle was distinctly announced to the world, in the annual message of one of my predecessors. . . .

This principle will apply with greatly increased force should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America. In the existing circumstances of the world the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy. The reassertion of this principle, especially in reference to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a policy which **no** European power should cherish the disposition to resist. Existing rights of every European nation should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.

3. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 9, 1868.²⁰

. . . While the United States have on all occasions professed a decided unwillingness that any part of this continent or of its adjacent islands shall be made a theater for a new establishment of monarchical power, too little has been done by us, on the other hand, to attach the communities by which we are surrounded to our own country, or to lend even a moral support to the efforts they are so resolutely and so constantly making to secure republican institutions for themselves. . . .

Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction the acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union of the several adjacent

²⁰ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 3886-3887.

continental and insular communities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith or honor. Foreign possession or control of those communities has hitherto hindered the growth and impaired the influence of the United States. . . .

. . . The conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that with the increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth the principles of free government, as embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world.

4. PRESIDENT GRANT'S MESSAGES.

a. FIRST ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 6, 1869.²⁷

The United States have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this continent. . . . These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another. When the present relations of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers.

b. SPECIAL MESSAGE, MAY 31, 1870, ON THE ANNEXATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.²⁸

The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power.

c. SPECIAL MESSAGE, JUNE 13, 1870, ON THE REVOLT IN CUBA.²⁹

The strict adherence to this rule of public policy [admission of insurgency] has been one of the highest honors of American statesmanship, and has secured to this Government the confidence of the feeble powers on this continent, which induces them to rely upon its friendship and absence of designs of conquest and to look to the United States for

²⁷ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 3986.

²⁸ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 4015.

²⁹ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 4021.

example and moral protection. It has given to this Government a position of prominence and of influence which it should not abdicate, but which imposes upon it the most delicate duties of right and of honor regarding American questions, whether those questions affect emancipated colonies or colonies still subject to European dominion.

d. SPECIAL MESSAGE, APRIL 5, 1871, ON THE ANNEXATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.³⁰

I believed . . . that our institutions were broad enough to extend over the entire continent as rapidly as other peoples might desire to bring themselves under our protection. I believed further that we should not permit any independent government within the limits of North America to pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a European power. . . .

In view of the facts which had been laid before me, and with an earnest desire to maintain the "Monroe Doctrine," I believed that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not take measures to ascertain the exact wish of the Government and inhabitants of the Republic of San Domingo in regard to annexation and communicate the information to the people of the United States.

5. PRESIDENT HAYES' SPECIAL MESSAGE, MARCH 8, 1880, REGARDING AN ISTHMIAN CANAL.³¹

The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States can not consent to the surrender of this control to any European power, or to any combination of European powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way of this policy—a contingency which is not apprehended—suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it.

The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other countries in such an enterprise must, in a great degree, look for protection to one or

³⁰ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 4083.

³¹ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 4537-4538.

more of the great powers of the world. No European power can intervene for such protection without adopting measures on this continent which the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the protection of the United States is relied upon, the United States must exercise such control as will enable this country to protect its national interests and maintain the rights of those whose private capital is embarked in the work.

An interoceanic canal across the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than that of all other countries, while its relations to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace and safety are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States. No other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and welfare.

6. PRESIDENT HARRISON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS, MARCH 4, 1889.³²

We have happily maintained a policy of avoiding all interference with European affairs. We have been only interested spectators of their contentions in diplomacy and in war, ready to use our friendly offices to promote peace, but never obtruding our advice and never attempting unfairly to coin the distresses of other powers into commercial advantage to ourselves. We have a just right to expect that our European policy will be the American policy of European courts.

It is so manifestly incompatible with those precautions for our peace and safety which all the great powers habitually observe and enforce in matters affecting them that a shorter waterway between our eastern and western seaboard should be dominated by any European Government that we may confidently expect that such a purpose will not be entertained by any friendly power.

³² Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 5445.

7. PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S SPECIAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 17, 1895,
RELATIVE TO THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE.³³

Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions, and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and can not become obsolete while our Republic endures. . . .

If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be "dangerous to our peace and safety." . . .

Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim, it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned; and when the United States is a suitor before the high tribunal that administers international law the question to be determined is whether or not we present claims which the justice of that code of law can find to be right and valid.

The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.

. . . The dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to that end should of course be conducted carefully and judicially. . . . When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain

³³ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 6088-6090.

of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.

8. RESERVATION MADE BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, 1899 AND 1907.³⁴

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be so construed as to require the relinquishment, by the United States of America, of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

A reservation of like purport was made to the general act of the international conference of Algeciras, signed April 7, 1906. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, 1492.)

9. SECRETARY OF STATE HAY'S CIRCULAR NOTE ON THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA, 1899.³⁵

First. The recognition that no power will in any way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any leased territory or within any so-called "sphere of interest" it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through

³⁴ William M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., of the United States, 1776-1909*, II, 2032.

³⁵ Mr. Hay to Mr. Tower, September 6, 1899, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899*, 140-141. The same text with slight verbal changes was also sent to Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.

such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its non-nationals transported over equal distances.

On March 20, 1900, Secretary Hay, in instructions to London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome and Tokyo, wrote:

You will please inform the Government to which you are accredited that the conditions originally attached to its acceptance—that all other powers concerned should likewise accept the proposals of the United States—having been complied with, this Government will therefore consider the assent given to it by [France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia] as final and definitive.³⁶

10. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGES.

a. FIRST ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 3, 1901.³⁷

The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States. . . . [The Monroe Doctrine] is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere.

During the past century other influences have established the permanence and independence of the smaller states of Europe. Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the New World nations.

This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. In other words, it is really a guaranty of the commercial independence of the Americas. We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.

³⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, 142.

³⁷ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 6662-6663.

Our attitude in Cuba is a sufficient guaranty of our own good faith. We have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbors. We wish to work with them hand in hand, so that all of us may be uplifted together, and we rejoice over the good fortune of any of them, we gladly hail their material prosperity and political stability, and are concerned and alarmed if any of them fall into industrial or political chaos. We do not wish to see any Old World military power grow up on this continent, or to be compelled to become a military power ourselves. The peoples of the Americas can prosper best if left to work out their own salvation in their own way.

b. SECOND ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 2, 1902.³⁸

The Monroe Doctrine should be treated as the cardinal feature of American foreign policy; but it would be worse than idle to assert it unless we intended to back it up, and it can be backed up only by a thoroughly good navy. A good navy is not a provocative of war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.

c. FOURTH ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 6, 1904.³⁹

It is not merely unwise, it is contemptible, for a nation, as for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are ridiculous if unsupported by potential force, and then to refuse to provide this force. . . .

It is our duty to remember that a nation has no more right to do injustice to another nation, strong or weak, than an individual has to do injustice to another individual; that the same moral law applies in one case as in the other. But we must also remember that it is as much the duty of the Nation to guard its own rights and its own interests as it is the duty of the individual so to do. . . .

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. . . . If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in

³⁸ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 6762.

³⁹ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 7051-7054.

America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. . . .

We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. . . .

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela and Panamá, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. . . . In extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few. . . .

d. FIFTH ANNUAL MESSAGE, DECEMBER 5, 1905.⁴⁰

That our rights and interests are deeply concerned in the maintenance of the doctrine is so clear as hardly to need argument. This is especially true in view of the construction of the Panama Canal. As a mere matter of self-defense we must exercise a close watch over the approaches to this canal; and this means that we must be thoroughly alive to our interests in the Caribbean Sea.

There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all

⁴⁰ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 7375.

that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. . . . If all of the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need for us to be the especial champions of the doctrine will disappear, for no stable and growing American Republic wishes to see some great non-American military power acquire territory in its neighborhood.

11. SUBSTANCE OF NOTES EXCHANGED BY JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES DECLARING THEIR POLICY IN THE FAR EAST, NOVEMBER 30, 1908.⁴¹

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing *status quo* in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the *status quo* as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

12. SENATE RESOLUTION, AUGUST 2, 1912.⁴²

Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation

⁴¹ Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1776-1909, I, 1045-1047.

⁴² Congressional Record, Vol. 48. 10046-10047. The resolution was introduced July 31, 1912, by Mr. Lodge of Massachusetts as S. Res. 371 and was the subject of Senate Report 996 (*ibid.*, 9923). The vote upon the text was 51 yeas,

or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.

13. PRESIDENT WILSON'S SPECIAL ADDRESS TO THE SENATE, JANUARY 22, 1917, PROPOSING THE MONROE DOCTRINE AS THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORLD.

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE: On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identic note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and

4 noes, 39 not voting. The Magdalena Bay incident, to which the resolution relates, was, by S. Res. 272, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., the subject of a report by the Secretary of State (S. Doc. 640, *ibid.*, 4170, and Cong. Docs., Vol. 6177).

Senator Lodge, on request, made a statement on the resolution just before its passage. He said:

"This resolution rests on a generally accepted principle of the law of nations, older than the Monroe doctrine. It rests on the principle that every nation has a right to protect its own safety, and that if it feels that the possession by a foreign power, for military or naval purposes, of any given harbor or place is prejudicial to its safety, it is its duty as well as its right to interfere. . . .

"It has been made necessary by a change of modern conditions, under which, while a Government takes no action itself, the possession of an important place of the character I have described may be taken by a corporation or association which would be under the control of the foreign Government.

"The Monroe doctrine was, of course, an extension in our own interests of this underlying principle—the right of every nation to provide for its own safety. The Monroe doctrine, as we all know, was applied, so far as the taking possession of territory was concerned, to its being open to further colonization, and naturally did not touch upon the precise point involved here.

"The passage of this resolution has seemed to the committee, without division, I think, to be in the interest of peace. It is always desirable to make the position of a country in regard to a question of this kind known beforehand, and not to allow a situation to arise in which it might be necessary to urge a friendly power to withdraw when that withdrawal could not be made, perhaps, without some humiliation. The resolution is merely a statement of policy, allied to the Monroe doctrine, of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it."

acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that

will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But

the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all,—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the people themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable,—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession

and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same

purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

LANGUAGES OF BELGIUM

The divisional line between the Flemish area to the north and the Walloon area to the south is based upon the texts of the German decrees of October 15, November 15 and December 13, 1916, relative to the employment of languages in the postal service, modifying the communal use of Flemish, and determining the competence of the Flemish and Walloon sections of the ministry of sciences and arts.



NATIONAL BOUNDARIES ---

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES - - - -

DUTCH IIII

FLEMISH IIII

WALLOON IIII

FRENCH IIII

HIGH GERMAN IIII

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE BELGIUM

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Belgium has been the storm center of the war, and her fate at the peace will be the test of victory or defeat. Upon this unoffending people the German Empire laid its heavy hand, and during four years subjected it to a martyrdom that is but the fulfilment of a "specifically German way of thinking and feeling." As German philosophers have written in books, line upon line, precept upon precept, so in Belgium the German army has made manifest in deeds the Fatherland's "ritual of envy and broken faith and rapine." Not to have rescued Belgium from this living death would be for us a confession of defeat, and for Germany a substantial victory.

It is therefore a fortunate circumstance, auguring well for the future, that the allied and American Governments are of one accord in respect to Belgium. Without qualification and without dissent they have declared that Belgium must be restored; and the words of President Wilson may stand as the expression, in this respect, of the purpose to which all the enemies of Germany are committed:

"Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired."¹

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE.—In preparing this pamphlet I have used, as the foundation, the admirable work of Fernand Passelcq, *La question flamande et l'Allemagne* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1917). In addition, the books and pamphlets on

¹ Address to Congress, January 8, 1918.

The Imperial German Government has often stated its intentions with respect to Belgium. At the beginning of the war, in the ultimatum presented to Belgium on August 2, 1914, the German Government declared that, "in the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government binds itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full"; otherwise the "eventual adjustments of the relations of the two states to each other must be left to the decision of arms."¹ Two days later, in his speech before the Reichstag on August 4, the chancellor, Bethmann-Holweg, defined the purposes of Germany more precisely, and more narrowly. He said:

Gentlemen, we are now defending ourselves in circumstances of extreme necessity (*wir sind jetzt in der Notwehr*), and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, have perhaps already set foot on Belgian territory. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the rules of international law (*das widerspricht den Geboten des Völkerrechts*). . . . We were forced to disregard the legitimate protest of the Luxemburg and the Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong that we are thus doing, we will try to make good again as soon as our military end is attained.²

Such was the expressed purpose of the German Government at the opening of the war. Meantime, the German army overran and conquered the greater part of Belgium. It did more. As a necessary part of attaining their military ends, the Germans in-

Belgium in the offices of the American Historical Review, material compiled by Professor Van den Ven for the Belgian Information Service, extracts made from the German newspapers by Richard Jente for the Committee on Public Information, and official dispatches of Brand Whitlock, American minister to Belgium, under date of August 10, 1917, February 3 and 23, March 6, 13 and 27, 1918, together with a number of documents transmitted with these dispatches, have been placed at my disposal.

¹ *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (London, 1915), 310. Miscellaneous No. 10 (1915), Cd. 7860.

² The German text from the official Reichstag reports, for this part of the speech, together with a translation, is printed in J. R. O'Regan, *The German War of 1914*, 49. Aside from three slight changes, I have followed Mr. O'Regan's translation. The original speech was published for propagandist purposes in *Der Kriegausbruch 1914* (Berlin, 1914), 11.

stituted in Belgium a reign of terror such as has not been known among civilized nations. Nothing was omitted that might serve to break the spirit of the people. The record of senseless crimes and cruelties, of bestial acts, of nameless obscenities and revolting savagery which must be charged to the account of the German army in Belgium recalls those deeds by which "the Huns, under their king Attila, a thousand years ago, made a name for themselves which is still mighty in tradition and story."

PROMISES NO LONGER BINDING

After the conquest and spoliation of Belgium, the promises which the German Government had formerly made were thought to be no longer binding. "The conquest of Belgium has simply been forced upon us," said Freiherr von Bissing, the German governor general of Belgium. "I will not discuss the views of those who dream that the German Government is bound by the declaration made at the beginning of the war."¹ In its subsequent declarations of policy, the German Government has accordingly held a different language from that used by Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4, 1914.

These subsequent official declarations of policy in respect to Belgium were in substance much the same; and it will be sufficient to quote the last of them—the latest and the most precise—that of Chancellor von Hertling, before the Main Committee in the Reichstag, on July 11, 1918:

That we do not contemplate holding Belgium in possession permanently—that has been our policy from the beginning of the war. As I said on November 29, the war has been for us, from the very beginning, a war of defense and not a war of conquest. The invasion of Belgium was a necessity forced upon us by the conditions of war. In the same way, the occupation of Belgium was a necessity forced upon us by the war. . . . Belgium, in our hands, is a pledge for future negotiations. A pledge signifies security against known dangers, which one may avoid by having this pledge in his hand. One surrenders this pledge, therefore, only when

¹ General von Bissing's Testament: a Study in German Ideals (London, Fisher Unwin, 1917), 24.

these dangers are removed. The Belgian pledge therefore signifies for us that we must guard ourselves in the peace negotiations, as I have already pointed out, against the danger of Belgium ever again becoming the deploying ground of our enemies: not only in a military sense, Gentlemen, but also in an economic sense. We must guard ourselves against the danger of our becoming, after the war, economically isolated (*abgeschnürt*). By virtue of her relations, her position and her entire development, Belgium is assigned to Germany. If we enter into close economic relations with Belgium in the economic sphere, that is also wholly in the interest of Belgium herself. If we succeed in establishing close economic ties with Belgium, if we succeed in coming to an understanding with Belgium in respect to political questions which touch the vital interests of Germany, we have the certain prospect that we shall thereby have the best security against the future dangers which might threaten us from England and France by way of Belgium or in respect to Belgium.¹

¹ *Preussische Kreuzzeitung*, July 15, 1918. The most important earlier official statements of German policy with respect to Belgium are the following:

"We will obtain sure guaranties in order that Belgium should not become a vassal state of England and France and should not be used as an economic and military bulwark against Germany." (Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, April 5, 1916; taken from Passelecq, "Belgian Unity and the Flemish Movement," *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1916.)

"Point seven has to do with the Belgian question. Concerning the Belgian question, my predecessors have repeatedly declared that at no time during the war has the forcible incorporation (*Angliederung*) of Belgium with Germany formed a part of the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to that complex of questions, the details of which are to be arranged by war and peace negotiations (*durch die Kriegs- und Friedensverhandlungen zu ordnen sein werden*). So long as our opponents do not unreservedly take the position that the territorial integrity of the Central Powers is the sole possible basis of peace discussions, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto always taken, and decline to exclude the Belgian affair from the general discussion." (Hertling in the Reichstag, January 24, 1918, *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 25, 1918.)

"From this rostrum it has been repeatedly affirmed that we do not contemplate retaining Belgium, that we do not contemplate making the Belgian state an integral part of the German Empire, but that, as was pointed out in the Papal note of August 1 of last year, we must be safeguarded against the danger that a country, with which we wish after the war to live once more in peace and friendship, should become the object or the center of hostile machinations. The means by which this end is to be attained, and the cause of universal peace thereby served, ought to be discussed in a circle of that kind [referring to the unofficial suggestion of Walter Runciman in the House of Commons that it would be well if responsible representatives of the belligerent powers should get together in an intimate meeting for discussion]. If, therefore, a proposal looking in that direction should come from the opposite side—for example, from the Belgian Government at Havre—we would not assume an attitude of rejection, even if the discussion could at first, as is self-evident, be only tentative." (Hertling in the Reichstag, February 25, 1918, *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 26, 1918.)

Germany's officially proclaimed policy in Belgium therefore amounted to this: Germany did not intend to annex Belgium; but she intended to use it as a pledge, or pawn, to obtain "guaranties" against England and France. How did she intend to use it? What were the guaranties? Much light is thrown on these questions by the administrative policy which Germany had carried out in Belgium since the war began. If we may judge from her conduct in Belgium, the purpose of the German Government was to destroy the Belgian state and to dissolve the Belgian nation. If her measures had succeeded, there would be no Belgium.

I. THE FLEMISH QUESTION

In recent years the Germans have adopted the theory that there never has been any Belgian nation, but only a Belgian state, which is an "artificial creation of European diplomacy," dating from the year 1830. The Germans say that this artificial creation, which is largely the work of English and French machinations, was already tending toward dissolution before the war, and that the inevitable result of the war will be to complete the process. This theory is fundamentally false; but the facts of Belgian history and the facts of Belgian social life, regarded in a purely external way, furnished the Germans with a basis sufficient for their very practical purposes.

It is true that before 1830 Belgium was never an independent state. In the middle ages the country now included in Belgium and Holland was a group of feudal principalities and chartered cities, more or less independent of each other, and commonly distinguished from the outside world by the collective term "Low Countries"—Netherlands. In the 15th century the Netherlands came under the suzerainty of the Dukes of Burgundy; as parts of the Burgundian possessions they passed to the Hapsburgs; and finally, when the Spanish and Austrian territories of Charles V were divided in 1556, they went with Spain to Philip II.

A distinguishing characteristic of the people of the Netherlands, in all this early history, was the stubbornness with which they

defended their local franchises. The city of Ghent was so intractable that it came to be known as the *Cité Ardente*—the “Fiery City”:—“Pig-headed Gantois,” Charles the Bold called the burghers on one occasion. And so Philip II found them still in the latter part of the 16th century when he attempted to subject them to the direct control of the Spanish crown. They were so pig-headed that even the Duke of Alva, no mean artist in the application of *Schrecklichkeit*, backed up by the best troops in Europe, failed to accomplish that object. The northern (Dutch) Netherlands finally won complete independence in 1648, while the southern Netherlands (Belgium) remained under Spanish control but were allowed to retain their former privileges.

The southern Netherlands might have won independence at this time also if they had been willing to join with the northern provinces. This they were unwilling to do precisely because they were already conscious of being a distinct people, differing in many respects from the Dutch. They were altogether Catholic in religion, while the Dutch were Protestant; and they were mainly an agricultural and industrial people, while the Dutch were chiefly commercial. It was at this time that the term Belgium, *Belgique*, which may be sometimes found in medieval manuscripts, was much used to distinguish the southern Netherlands; and even at this early date the Belgians not infrequently referred to their little country as the *Patrie*. And so the southern Netherlands preferred, on condition of retaining their local privileges, to remain under Spanish rule, rather than join the Protestant and commercial republic of Holland.

BELGIAN DETERMINATION TO BE INDEPENDENT

Under Spanish rule they remained until 1713, when they were transferred, as a result of war and treaties, to Austria. At that time their local franchises were again confirmed in the Treaty of the Barriers and in a charter known as “The Joyous Entry of Charles VI.” When, in 1788, Joseph II attempted to abolish this charter, and to incorporate Belgium into a centralized and imperial administrative system, the Belgians rebelled; and although the rebellion was suppressed, the charter was finally restored. Mean-

time, the French Revolution had broken out, and in 1792-1794 Belgium was conquered by the French armies and annexed to the French Republic.

If the Belgians had to choose some country to be annexed to, that country would undoubtedly be France. In almost every respect the Belgians have more in common with the French than with any other people: their political ideas and institutions are similar to those of France; their religion is the same; the great European currents of intellectual and spiritual life that have shaped their art and literature have come to them mainly by way of France. Nevertheless, during the 20 years when the Belgians were under French control, and in spite of the fact that they enjoyed the same institutions and privileges that all Frenchmen enjoyed, they were never reconciled. They still considered themselves Belgians, and not Frenchmen; still persisted in the desire to live their own life and govern themselves in their own way; and in 1815, when the empire of Napoleon was overthrown, their wish was to be allowed to establish an independent Belgian state.

This privilege the great powers assembled at the Congress of Vienna, concerned less with the wishes than with the uses of small nations, refused to grant; and, in order to establish a strong "barrier" state on the lower Rhine against future French aggression, Belgium, against its will, was joined with Holland to form the Kingdom of Holland under the Dutch king. This new kingdom was indeed an "artificial creation of European diplomacy," and as such was destined to disappear. After 15 years of unhappy strife, the Belgians revolted in July, 1830, and with the aid of France and England won their independence. A constitutional convention, elected by the people, adopted the Constitution of 1830, which provided for a popular and liberal form of government. The independence of Belgium was recognized by the great powers in 1830 at the London Conference, and again in 1839 when it was agreed by Austria, Prussia, France, Great Britain and Russia that Belgium should "form an independent and perpetually neutral state."

These are the outstanding facts of Belgian history; and the Germans, having studied Belgian history, doubtless with their

customary patience and exactness, came to the conclusion that the Belgian state is "an artificial creation of European diplomacy." This conclusion is, however, closely connected with the other half of the German theory, namely, that there is no Belgian nation; and this idea they derive mainly from the contemporary social conditions in Belgium.

The basic fact of the Belgian social structure, which the Germans know but do not understand, is that the population is made up in about equal parts of the Walloons who speak one language, and the Flemish who speak another. The Walloons, who number something over three millions and live in the southern part of Belgium, speak essentially Romance dialects and employ French as a literary language; while the Flemish, who number over four millions and live in the northern part of Belgium, employ a language (Flemish) which in its dialect and written forms is essentially the same as Dutch. Practically all educated Belgians (871,228, according to the census of 1910) speak both the Walloon (French) and the Flemish (Dutch) languages; while a considerable number (52,547) speak these two languages and German beside.

USE OF EITHER LANGUAGE OPTIONAL

The legal status of languages in Belgium is defined in the Constitution of 1830, in Art. 23:

"The employment of the languages used in Belgium is optional; it can be regulated only by law, and solely for the acts of public authority and for judicial affairs."¹

After 1830, when Belgium won independence from Holland, there was naturally a strong reaction against everything Dutch; and so it happened that until about 1870 law and practice combined to favor the use of French. The laws were debated, voted and promulgated in French; justice was rendered and administrative correspondence carried on in French; instruction in the four universities and in the secondary schools was exclusively in French. In a word, although nearly half the people spoke nothing but

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 40.

Flemish, and more than half were of Flemish origin, French was the language of public life, of society, of education and of literature.

Opposition to this state of affairs found expression in what is known as the Flemish movement, which has been an increasingly important question in Belgian politics since about 1870—that is to say, about the same period of time during which the Alsace-Lorraine question has been prominent in German politics. There is, however, this difference in respect to what has been achieved in the two countries: after 44 years the Alsace-Lorraine question was as far as ever from solution, while the Flemish question, at the moment when the war broke out, was virtually settled. Concessions to the demands of the Flemings were made as early as 1873, in the law providing for the use of Flemish in the criminal courts; and between 1873 and 1914 at least ten important laws were passed extending the use of the Flemish language in government and administration, in the army, and in the schools. In 1914 the question of a Flemish university was almost the only outstanding issue in the Flemish movement; and even this was practically settled, inasmuch as the legislature had voted in favor of transforming the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish institution.

GERMAN THEORY OF TWO "PEOPLES"

This division of the Belgians into Walloons and Flemings and the long conflict over the Flemish question (which is in fact a conflict chiefly among the Flemings themselves) furnished the Germans with a basis for their theory that the Belgians are not a nation, but in reality two peoples held together against their will by an "artificial" state constructed by England and France to serve their own interests. The Flemings, so the Germans said, belong properly with those groups of Germanic peoples, all of whom would naturally wish, and whose destiny it is, to be gathered under the flag of the empire. Like the Dutch and the German-speaking people of Switzerland, the Flemish are *Deutschen im Ausland*—Germans in a foreign land. Subjected to the Walloon yoke, they have long struggled in vain to emancipate themselves. It was therefore a duty laid upon Germany, a duty which

she was faithfully performing, to liberate this kindred people. This was the German theory.

The theory was not, indeed, so very old, not much older than the war; but during the last four years it had been solidly based and impregnably buttressed by economists, historians, ethnologists, philologists and bureaucrats of the highest reputation in Germany. It goes without saying that the Pan-Germans, with their well known hospitality to divergent ideas, accepted it without question; and among the arguments which they marshaled in favor of German expansion, this humane theory marched valiantly side by side with the most robust ideas of *Realpolitik*. "Belgium became a state only two generations ago, never having been one before. . . . A national unity it has never known. . . . There now exists in the land a deep line of cleavage. . . . If a German dominion (*Oberleitung*), with the determined separation of the Germanic and Romance districts, were introduced, helping the Flemings in the schools, in the courts, in the administration, . . . it can be assured a ready acceptance and will attach to itself this Germanic part of the country more and more rapidly from year to year. . . . The task remains to save this *Kultur*, Germanic in race and in essence, from being covered and hidden by French varnish." ¹ And finally, this theory, fathered by scientists and fostered by Pan-Germans, had been officially adopted and proclaimed by the government as the basis of its policy. "Germany cannot," said Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking in the Reichstag on April 5, 1916, "abandon to Latin influence the Flemish people who have been so long enslaved." ²

According to this theory therefore, although contrary to the general impression, Germany entered Belgium as a liberator. In behalf of the principle of the self-determination of nations, she undertook to break up the "artificial" Belgian state in order to "free the Flemings from the Walloon yoke." The means upon which she chiefly relied to attain this end were the transformation of the

¹ From the "Manifesto" of the "Independent Committee for a German Peace," published in *Das Grossere Deutschland*, January 27 and February 5, 1917; translated and printed by Charles Waldstein, *What Germany is Fighting For* (London, 1917), 76-77.

² Passelecq, *op. cit.*, I.

University of Ghent into a Flemish university, the administrative separation of Belgium, and the establishment of an independent Flemish state.

II. THE FLEMISH UNIVERSITY OF GHENT

Before the war there were in Belgium four universities granting diplomas of equal value: two state universities, Liège and Ghent; and two "free" universities, Louvain (Catholic) and Brussels (Liberal). Until recent times the instruction in all four was exclusively in French.

As the Flemish movement gathered force, one of the chief points in the program of the Flemish party came to be the demand for an exclusively Flemish university; and in the last years before the war this was the all-important question at issue. The great importance (social rather than political or literary) which the Flemings attached to the possession of a Flemish university is admirably expressed in the following statement:

"Wallonia is the chief center of those industries (metallurgy, mines and quarries, glass works) in which high wages and relatively short hours obtain. Flanders is the center of those industries (textiles) in which long hours and low wages obtain. This fundamental inequality can only be remedied by augmenting the productivity of the Flemish population, and thereby raising the general standard of living. To attain this result it is necessary to promote education, provide for superior technical and industrial instruction, and insure the spread of ideas and the diffusion of progress. This task belongs properly to those who have access to the universities and the centers of scientific research. . . . [But in Flanders] these classes do not speak the same language as the uneducated common people; their higher culture and their professional knowledge, finding expression in French, remain inaccessible to the people, because the people do not understand French. [To remedy this situation it is necessary therefore] either to substitute for the language spoken by the people—that is to say, Flemish—the language spoken by the

intellectuals, that is to say, French; or, conversely, to create an intellectual class which speaks the language of the people.”¹

This, in a word, is the end aimed at by the creation of a Flemish university: to create an intellectual class which speaks the language of the people.

The creation of such a university was already assured before the war broke out. March 31, 1911, three prominent leaders of the Flemish movement prepared a bill for the gradual Flamandization of the University of Ghent. November 19, 1912, the bill was again proposed; and after thorough discussion in the sections (committees) of the Chamber, the *principle* was adopted—that is to say, it was voted to transform the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish university. This was the state of the case when the war broke out; and it was then, and is now, generally understood in Belgium that nothing remains except to work out in detail a practicable plan for effecting this transformation.

UNIVERSITY TO “LIBERATE” FLEMINGS

The Germans were scarcely established in Belgium before they hit upon this question of a Flemish university as an excellent point of departure from which to begin the “liberation of the Flemings from the Walloon yoke.” In the spring of 1915, and again in the fall, the faculties of the University of Ghent were requested by the German authorities to resume instruction. In both instances the faculties declined; whereupon on December 31, 1915, the governor general, ignoring a vigorous protest by prominent leaders in the academic and political world, issued a decree for the Flamandization of the University of Ghent.

The task was assigned to a *Studien-Kommission* appointed in March, 1916, and composed entirely of Germans, with Professor von Dyck of Munich as secretary. A primary object was to enlist in the new university as many members of the existing faculties as possible. To this end, in February, even before the *Studien-Kommission* had been appointed, Dr. von Sandt, chief of the civil

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 280–282, quoting F. van Langenhove in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* of Lausanne for December, 1916.

administration, requested the professors in the University of Ghent to state "whether they were or were not able to teach in Flemish." Although very many of them were undoubtedly able to teach in Flemish, only eight replied affirmatively; the great majority made it clear, by the evasiveness of their replies, that they would take no part in any university, Flemish or other, that might be opened under the auspices of the German Government. The leaders in this movement of passive resistance were undoubtedly the two famous historians, Henri Pirenne and Paul Frédéricq. On March 18, 1916, Pirenne and Frédéricq were both arrested and, without trial, on the pretext of having violated their promise of loyalty to the German Government of occupation, were carried away to a German prison camp.

Some months later a second question was put to the faculties of the university, in the form of an invitation from the German authorities, in Flemish, asking them individually if they were disposed to begin instruction in the Flemish language in the fall. Seven members replied affirmatively. Of these seven, five only were Belgians; and of the two foreigners, one was a German. So far the prospect for a Flemish university was not bright. As Professor von Dyck said in his official report, "there would be one, or at most two professors in each of the four faculties." As to the character of the seven, they were, according to a good authority, men without distinction—"pedagogues of no more than mediocre ability."¹

TEACHERS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN

Meanwhile, the *Studien-Kommission* sought to obtain in Holland the teachers which could not be recruited in Belgium. A considerable number of Dutch professors accepted positions in the new university; but in his interesting report of October 20, 1916, Professor von Dyck admitted that "it was not easy to find in Holland the elements of intelligent collaboration. . . . It is only gradually that we have succeeded in securing for the University of Ghent a group of Hollanders who share our views." Professor von Dyck goes on to specify some of these "Hollanders" who share

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 145.

the German views. "They were naturally found among those who have hitherto sustained scientific relations with Germany. The Zoologist Versluys who, for eight years, studied at Giessen; a young chemist working at Leipzig; a philologist who obtained at Berlin degrees in science; a fourth, member of an ancient Dutch family, who is teaching at Berlin, in the Educational Institute. . . . I may mention also the Dutchman Labberton, *the well known apologist for the German invasion of Belgium*, whom we have been able to win over, not without having encountered stubborn scruples of all sorts. Finally, the distinguished Germanist, Kossmann, who abandons the fine position which he holds at The Hague in order to serve the Flemish cause."¹ Among the illustrious "Hollanders" who accepted positions in the new university, mention should also be made of Dr. Jolles, a naturalized German citizen of Dutch descent, who had served in the German armies in the present war, very probably on the western front.

STUDENTS GOT BY SCHOLARSHIPS

Students as well as professors were thought to be necessary for opening the university. No effort or expense was spared to obtain them. Young men who entered were relieved of many restrictions imposed on other Belgians; Flemish prisoners of war in Germany were offered their liberty if they would enroll; and 240 annual scholarships of 400 francs each were placed at the disposal of students who were, for one reason or another, without adequate funds to carry on their studies. Nevertheless, Professor von Dyck admitted in his report that "the number of students is still very limited on the eve of the opening of the university. We have to-day 40 students enrolled, and about 30 who have declared their intention of enrolling."²

The official report of Professor von Dyck was read October 20, 1916. On the following day the new university was formally

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 151. A useful pamphlet on the Flamandization of the University of Ghent is Kristoffer Nyrop, *The Imprisonment of the Ghent Professors* (London, 1917). For the attitude of the Dutch toward the "Hollanders" who accepted positions in the new university, see Chapter 7.

² Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 161. According to the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* of February 1, 1917, the number of students at that date was about 60.

opened. The Bavarian minister of education and many other high German officials assisted at the ceremonies, of which the chief event was an address by Freiherr von Bissing, the governor general of Belgium. In the course of his address the governor general said:

“Laboring hand in hand with the Flemings, and well-advised by German and Dutch friends, the *Studien-Kommission* has negotiated the nominations and created the organization of the new educational establishment. . . . It is thus that Germans and Flemings work at a common task, in mutual confidence and with perfect understanding. De Raet chose as the motto of his first publication concerning a Flemish university these words: ‘*Two Valkyries, epic sisters, dominate the world—thought and the sword.*’ An admirable decree of Providence has willed that these words, written in 1822, should in a singular manner be fulfilled at the University of Ghent. This university is born of the thought of many men concerned for the fate of Flanders during the years of struggle and suffering. The God of War, with sword drawn, has held it under the baptismal font. May the God of Peace show it mercy through the centuries.”¹

By a curious coincidence, it was in this same city of Ghent, almost on the very day on which the God of War, “with sword drawn,” was holding the new university under the baptismal font, that some thousands of Belgian citizens were herded into cattle cars at the point of Prussian bayonets and carried away into slavery.² These men may have consoled themselves with the thought that, although subject to outward constraint, it would presently be their high privilege to dwell in the land of “inner freedom.”

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 164.

² Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 166; Passelecq, *Les déportations belges* (Paris, 1917), 25-27; Nyrop, *Imprisonment of the Ghent Professors*, 64. The first Ghent deportations occurred between October 12 and 21, 1916.

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF BELGIUM

From the point of view of the German theory that Belgium is not a nation, but two peoples held together against their will, nothing could be more logical than the conclusion that the administrative division should be made to correspond to the linguistic division. It has never occurred to the Belgians to make such an administrative arrangement. The actual situation in Belgium is thus described by Fernand Passelecq:

"The territory of Belgium has, on the map, the general configuration of a triangle divided, from the linguistic point of view, by an imaginary line running . . . from east to west, and crossing six of the nine provinces: namely, Liège, Limburg, Brabant, Hainaut, and the two Flanders. The part to the north of this line is Flemish, the part to the south is Walloon. The principal administrative divisions of the country, civil (provinces) as well as religious (dioceses), do not coincide with the 'linguistic frontier.' The provinces of Limburg, Antwerp, West Flanders and East Flanders are classed, in Belgian legislation on the employment of languages, as *Flemish* provinces; those of Liège, Luxemburg, Namur, and Hainaut as *Walloon* provinces; the (central) province of Brabant as *mixed*, because it comprises two Flemish districts (Brussels and Louvain), and one Walloon district (Nivelles). In fact, according to the linguistic frontier, the province of Namur is the only one exclusively Walloon, and the province of Liège the only one exclusively Flemish."¹

The Belgians have apparently never had any serious desire to change this arrangement. There was, indeed, in the years 1912-1914, a kind of "political gesture" in that direction. This movement did not originate with the Flemings, who are "subject to the Walloon yoke," but among the Walloon socialists, who were then complaining loudly of "the intolerable pretensions of the Flemish Clerical party." The truth seems to be that the Socialists, who are in a minority in Belgium as a whole but are very strong in

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 33.

Wallonia, perceived that if Belgium were divided into two autonomous countries, each with its own legislature, they would have an excellent chance of carrying in their own country the socialist reforms which they could not carry in Belgium as a whole. The Flemish movement offered them an excellent opportunity for executing a party maneuver. Asserting that the political division of Belgium was the only way out of the interminable language dispute, they demanded the transformation of the "unitary state into a confederation of two autonomous states with a single sovereign and a common (foreign) frontier." The movement does not appear to have obtained a very general support in Wallonia. It is possible that the Socialists themselves desired only to place a stumbling block in the path of the Flemish Clerical party. At all events the Flemings, including the Flemish Socialists, characterized the whole affair as an "artificial" movement in no way justified by the real grievances of the Flemings.¹

If the German authorities had really desired to meet the wishes of the Flemings, it would have been possible to find out whether they favored the administrative separation of Belgium by a very simple device: they might have submitted the question to the representatives of the people—the permanent Deputations of the Communal and Provincial Councils. This they neglected to do. Without consulting any responsible Belgians, and without consulting the Hague conventions (need one say?), the governor general issued a series of decrees dated February 25, April 22, 29, 1916, which modified the Belgian law of 1914 in respect to the use of language in the schools.² These changes, not perhaps very serious in themselves, mark the beginning of the policy of separation; and on October 25, 1916, a further decree provided for two

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 51-54.

² The series of decrees was promulgated in the *Bulletin officiel des lois et arrêtés pour le territoire belge occupé*, and the texts are available in Charles Henry Huberich and Alexander Nicol-Speyer, *German Legislation for the Occupied Territories of Belgium*, 7th Series, 115-140, 205, 226. The Hague provision referred to is Art. 43 of the conventions of 1899 and 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war and on land, as follows:

"The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, *while respecting*, unless absolutely prevented, *the laws in force in the country.*"

educational administrative departments, with two budgets, one for the Flemish language and one for the Walloon (French) language, both under the ministry of science and arts but otherwise entirely distinct from each other. Similar ordinances effected a similar division in all other administrative departments, with the exception of the ministries of railroads, foreign affairs, colonies, and war. These were the preliminary steps in the administrative separation of Belgium.¹

Before the final step was taken certain events occurred which are not without interest from the point of view of high international comedy, and as an illustration of the working of the German mind in matters calling for a certain delicacy and finesse. The comedy was opened February 4, 1917, at Brussels, where about 250 individuals met in what was called the Flemish National Congress. This body issued a manifesto addressed to the Flemings and favoring the establishment of Flemish autonomy; provided for a permanent executive committee of 30 members, to be known as the Council of Flanders; and appointed a deputation of seven from this council to go to Berlin in order to arrange, in collaboration with the imperial authorities there, the details of Flemish reform.

In due time the deputies (with official permits in their pockets) arrived at Berlin; and on March 3, 1917, they were received by the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, who made them a friendly address.² Adverting to the racial and historical influences that created an "affinity" between the Germans and the Flemings, and to the fact that for many centuries the Flemings had been "forced" to follow paths that separated them from their ancient kinsmen, the chancellor noted the fortunate circumstance that "to-day, thanks to God, in the midst of bloody conflicts, Germans and Flemings have become conscious that, in the struggle against the invasion of barbarism, the same road ought to lead us to the same goal." What the chancellor desired chiefly, however, was to assure the deputies that the Flemings, in their endeavor to emancipate themselves from the Walloon yoke, could count upon the active co-operation of the German Empire:

¹ Huberich and Nicol-Speyer, 7th Series, 161-174, 208-213, 246-247, 298-303.

² Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 3-4.

"The governor general . . . has introduced preliminary measures tending to furnish for the Flemish people the possibility, which has up to the present been refused them, of an autonomous cultural and economic development. . . . I know myself to be in accord with the governor general in giving you the assurance that this policy, which is, as you yourself have urged, in conformity with the fundamental principles of international law, will be pushed with all the energy possible, and that it will be pursued even during the occupation, with the object of achieving a complete administrative separation, such as has been demanded for a long time in the two parts of Belgium. The linguistic frontier ought to become, as soon as possible, the dividing frontier of the two districts. . . . The collaboration of the German authorities with the representatives of the Flemish people will succeed in attaining this end. The difficulties are not slight; but I know they can be overcome by the disinterested collaboration of all those Flemings who have comprehended, in a profound sense of duty, what questions the love of country presents to them in this decisive epoch. . . . I salute your union as the best guaranty of the success of our work. . . . The German Empire during the negotiations, and also after the conclusion of peace, will do everything that may serve to facilitate and to assure the free development of the Flemish race."

GERMANY ENTERTAINS "FLEMISH DEPUTIES"

After this fraternal address of welcome the seven deputies were invited to meet Vice Chancellor Helfferich and other high officials at an informal evening reception, a *Bierabend*, offered by the chancellor in their honor and in honor of the Belgians whom they represented. Afterward an official banquet was given, which the seven attended as guests of the German Government; and, before they returned, in order to crown the festivities and perpetuate the memory of these pleasant days, the deputies allowed themselves to be photographed as a group, in company with a helmeted German officer, Count Harrach, chief of the "Political Division" at Brussels, who had throughout served as their guide and prompter.¹

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 206.

Prophets are not without honor save in their own country; and it seems that the distinguished seven, upon their return to Belgium, were less honored there than they had been at Berlin. This may have been due to the fact that they were less well known at home than abroad. A Belgian professor has described the seven deputies as follows:

“Of these delegates, supposed to be the flower of the Activists [a term used to designate those Belgians who lend themselves to German schemes] two, Vernieuwe and Verhees, were formerly minor officials at the central administration in Brussels; three others, Borms, Lambrichts and Tack, were formerly unknown teachers in the high schools; another, Dumon, is a physician who sells cigars; the seventh, Van der Broeck, a lawyer with no practice.”¹

These men, M. Passelecq assures us, were unknown as leaders in the Flemish movement; and Camille Huysmans, one of the leaders of the Flemish movement, describes them as altogether obscure men: “They are nobodies; they have no standing.” This may have been true formerly; but after they returned from Berlin they had a very definite standing, being pointed out everywhere as men to be stared at and spit upon in the streets, as men who had sold themselves to the despoilers of their country, as men who were to be no longer called Belgians but renegades—“individuals living in Belgium.”

OPINION OF REAL FLEMINGS

The “Activists,” under the most favorable circumstances, could perhaps rally to the support of the German program a thousand men—let us say two thousand—out of a population of seven and a half millions. Over against the opinion of this insignificant and nondescript group, it is interesting to place the opinion of the Belgian people, expressed upon every occasion and in every conceivable way by every kind of responsible group, but never better

¹ Belgian Information Service, *Release* of March 31, 1918.

expressed than in the protest addressed to Bethmann-Hollweg March 10, 1917, and signed by 77 of the most distinguished citizens of the country:

Excellency:

On March 3 you received at Berlin a deputation from an organization which styles itself "Council of Flanders," but which in our own country is altogether unknown. From communications that have been made to the press the impression is conveyed that this deputation has expressed the claims of the Flemish people, or of a considerable part of that people, and that it was itself composed of persons having some prestige and authority in this country. Nothing could be more dangerous than to allow, without contradiction, such an opinion to gain credit. The persons who, in the midst of war, have taken it upon themselves to offer to the German Government their aid in dividing the country and in radically changing its internal organization, have no right whatever to speak in the name of the Flemish people, and do not represent in any way either its desires or its aspirations.

Before the war, our Flemish populations designated, in complete independence, their representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate, to the number of 113 deputies and 57 senators. Out of these 170 representatives, only two have joined what is called the activist movement.

The petition addressed to the Belgian Government, on the subject of the transformation of the University of Ghent into a Flemish University, was formerly signed by 2,000 university alumni. Only 100 have been prevailed upon to approve the new policy, and out of that small number several have already openly withdrawn their signatures, while others make no secret of the fact that they have been imposed upon, or that they were misinformed, and that they regret their action.

REAL FLEMISH MOVEMENT NOT REPRESENTED

The Flemish country and the Flemish movement have for years been represented by large and influential associations of a literary and political character, such as the *Willemsfonds*, the *Dauidsfonds*, the *Nederlandsche Bond* and the *Liberale Vlaamsche Bond* of Antwerp, the *Liberale Volksbond* of Brussels, the associations of workingmen affiliated with our three political parties, the Association of Flemish Lawyers, the Congress of Flemish Doctors and Naturalists, and many others. The adhesion of none of these

great associations to this anti-patriotic policy has been obtained; on the contrary, their heads and representatives have taken the opportunity to express themselves energetically against it in the Memorandum which they addressed to Governor General von Bissing under date of January 8, 1916, on the subject of the University of Ghent.

During recent years, no Flemish reform has been demanded by the Flemish populations with a unanimity equal to that with which they have asked that their rights be respected in this question of the university. A bill concerning the transformation of the University of Ghent was laid before the Chamber of Deputies by Flemish members to whom, in hundreds of meetings, the entire Flemish people had given that mandate. Of the six signers of that bill, five still live: all have protested against this meddling of the German power in a question that is exclusively internal; all are opposed to administrative separation.

Besides, we know the sentiments of the directors and editors-in-chief of the Flemish press who constituted, before the war, one of the great forces in the Flemish movement: all, unanimously, *are opposed* to this policy. Finally, and above all, our king, to whom we are all entirely devoted, our Government, which continues to keep our flag flying high under the protection of our valiant army, have unreservedly condemned the movement of the so-called activists.

These facts are established, and they suffice to reduce to its true significance that deputation of unknown men representing a council without a mandate. Besides, the very circumstances under which that council came into being are sufficient to deprive it of all authority. You doubtless are not unaware that in Belgium all associations of a political character have been dissolved by the occupying power; that the right of assembly is suppressed; that the liberty to express one's thought is forbidden under penalty of banishment or imprisonment; that distinguished Flemings, such as Professor Paul Frédéricq, Professor de Bruyne, Alfons Stevens, have been carried off to Germany; that of all the Flemish newspapers, mouth pieces of public opinion in our country, not one is any longer being published in the occupied territory. What value, under such conditions, would an impartial observer attach to the opinion of those for whom all these restrictions have been suspended by the grace of the enemy and who hold a language and commit acts that serve the policy of that enemy in opposition to their own king?

SEPARATION NOT FLEMISH PROGRAM

The division of our country into a Flemish administrative region and a Walloon administrative region is the end which these gentlemen pursue. As your own declaration states: "The linguistic frontier must become as rapidly as possible the limit of two regions united under the authority of the governor general, but otherwise separated *from an administrative point of view*." Our response to this policy will be brief: *Administrative separation is no part of the Flemish program*. When, a few years ago, certain Walloons, in an hour of forgetfulness and without finding any echo in their own country, talked of administrative separation, it was with the consent of all the Flemings that one of the most radical among them made to the separatists the following categorical response:

"I assume here the authority to declare, clearly and categorically, on this solemn occasion and in the presence of so great a number of Flemings and of leaders of the Flemish movement belonging to all the religious confessions and to all the political parties: *Never before*, not even in the darkest hours of the history of Flanders since 1830, *has a single voice been raised in our ranks demanding anything which could possibly resemble administrative separation*." . . .

Moreover, does your Excellency think that the reasons expressed so clearly in 1912 in the name of the entire Flemish movement have lost any of their force in 1917, after all that has occurred in our country? Do you think that we, Flemings, after our populations with admirable heroism have shed their blood and sacrificed their property in the defense of our flag and of our honor, are so blind as to accept as the result of this effort the division of our country, the parcelling out of our nationality, in order finally, after an apparent and temporary restoration, to become the easy prey of ambitious and conquering neighbors? . . .

Your Excellency appears, furthermore, to have an inaccurate idea of the Flemish movement. Its object is not to resist the Walloons or France, but to rehabilitate, in the midst of our own Flemish country, our old and beautiful language, so unjustly ignored. Flemish Belgians are not a race forcibly incorporated in some great country. They are free associates in a free democracy. They are, in a general way, masters of their own destinies, and they have not awaited the intervention of the foreigner to obtain a redress of those grievances which they rightly complained of in the matter of languages. That fact is demonstrated by the following:

- The Flemish law of 1873 on judicial organization;
- The law of May 22, 1878, on administrative organization;
- The law of 1883 on official secondary instruction;
- The law of May 3, 1889, on judicial organization;
- The law of September 4, 1891, and of February 22, 1908, on the same matter;
- The law of April 18, 1898, on the publication of the laws, by which the equality of the two national languages was officially sanctioned;
- The law of May 12, 1910, on free secondary instruction;
- The law of July 2, 1913, on the army;
- The law of 1914 on primary instruction.

FLEMINGS WORK UNDER CONSTITUTION

Your Excellency can judge for yourself whether the peoples inhabiting Germany but not speaking the German language have obtained, in the same space of time, reforms of equal extent.

It is true that the work of justice and reform in the Flemish country is neither perfect nor complete, but the measures which are still lacking and above all those relating to higher education—we desire that they be carried, like all former measures, according to the provisions of our Constitution, and in complete independence—and we are firmly convinced that the common struggles and sufferings have served only to strengthen the secular ties that bind the Flemings to their Walloon brothers. Whatever shall have been done by the occupying power in the meantime, will, so far as we are concerned and by virtue of international law, be nonexistent from the day the occupation ceases.

It is true that your Excellency declared in Berlin “that the German Empire, *during the negotiations of peace and also after the negotiations of peace*, would do everything it could to facilitate and to assure the free development of the Flemish race.” We understand that *your* policy leads you to hold this language; but you will equally understand that the honor, the dignity and the patriotism of our populations admit of but one reply:

Never will we accept a peace by which it shall be permitted to your Government, or to *any foreign state whatever*, to meddle in our internal affairs. Let the war last as long as it may, the independence of our country must be the same after the war as it was before: *just as complete, just as genuine, and as much so toward the north and the east as toward the south: from no point of view, neither economic nor political, will we accept any subjugation whatever in respect to anyone.*

Excellency,

It does not enter into our intentions and moreover it is not within our power to begin, in time of war, an agitation concerning the project which we are discussing; but as deputies of the people, as heads of important Flemish associations and institutions, we owe it to truth and to ourselves not to leave you in ignorance concerning the real facts and our own sentiments.

In ordinary times thousands of signatures would be added to ours. At the present moment it is not possible for us to reach all of the signers of the protest against the intervention of the German authority in the organization of the Flemish University of Ghent. But all those who know our Flemish populations know that we have expressed the general opinion in a faithful and moderate manner. If your Excellency doubts this, let your Excellency suspend the restrictions that now limit the exercise of the right of free speech and the press, and, from the Ardennes to the sea, the attitude of the Separatists will be overwhelmingly disapproved, and our whole people will say to you:

All of us, Flemings and Walloons, have to-day but one wish, one desire, one thought:

THE BELGIAN COUNTRY FREE AND INDIVISIBLE!¹

This protest was ignored by the German authorities. They preferred to accept the declaration of the Congress of Flanders as the true expression of the wishes of the Flemish people. On March 21, 1917, General von Bissing accordingly signed the decree for the administrative separation of Belgium:²

There are established in Belgium two administrative regions, one of which comprises the provinces of Antwerp, Limburg, East Flanders and West Flanders, as well as the districts of Brussels and Louvain: the other comprises the provinces of Hainaut, Liège, Luxemburg and Namur, as well as the district of Nivelles. The administration of the first of these two regions shall be directed from Brussels; that of the second region from Namur. . . .

¹ Passelecq, *op. cit.*, 180.

² Huberich and Nicol-Speyer, *op. cit.*, 10th Series, 201-202; Passelecq, 5. August 9, 1917, a decree was issued providing that in the Flemish administrative region "Flemish is the exclusive official language" for all public authorities and institutions, including schools. Huberich and Nicol-Speyer, *op. cit.*, 12th Series, 583.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF FLEMISH INDEPENDENCE

As a protest against the decree of administrative separation, all of the heads of departments at once resigned. The German Government had deprived the Belgians of most of their rights, but one right it had permitted them to retain: January 4, 1915, the civil officials in Belgium had been informed that the German Government would allow them to resign their offices, if they so desired, without prejudice except, naturally, the loss of their salaries. Even this privilege was now withdrawn; and 14 officials who had resigned were immediately arrested and imprisoned in Belgium or sent to Germany for exercising rights recognized by the Hague conventions and specifically confirmed by the German authorities.

Meanwhile, the Flemish "Activists" continued to work, as Von Bissing had said, "hand in hand" with the German Government for the "liberation" of the Flemings. They organized meetings in those parts of Belgium where German liberty was maintained, and paraded through streets made safe by German arms. One of the most largely attended of these meetings was held in Brussels, November 11, 1917. It is said that 1,200 people attended, of whom one-third at least were Belgians: and these 400 Belgians, supported by 800 Dutch and Germans, bound themselves "not to recognize the Government at Havre . . . but to look to the authorities in control in Belgium, which alone have the power to create a Flemish state, to grant a people of German origin the same rights as Poland, and complete political separation."

Many people have thought the rights of Poland not wholly enviable; but the Belgian "Activists" were perhaps of a temper to be thankful for small favors. At least they must have known that the German Government was the chief dispenser of small favors, and the only authority from which men might still hope to obtain the "same rights as Poland." It was perhaps with this idea in mind that the Council of Flanders, on December 22, 1917, received the German secretary of state, Von Wallraff, at Brussels and requested from him the authorization of his master, the German Emperor, to effect a complete political separation of the

Flemish and Walloon provinces, with a German protectorate for Flanders.¹ The secretary authorized this to be done; and shortly after, apparently on the same day, the Council of Flanders proclaimed the independence of the Flemish provinces.² January 19, 1918, the Council announced that it would submit to re-election. On the day following, accordingly, some 600 persons, Belgians and foreigners, men, women and children, assembled in a Brussels theater and approved by acclamation, as a kind of *entr'acte* between speeches, the election of 22 deputies to the Council of Flanders and 52 provincial councillors.³ It was in this expeditious and happy manner that the people of Brussels, a city of 200,000 electors and more than a million of inhabitants, were permitted to express their will.

PEOPLE MOB FLEMING LEADERS

The greater part of the Flemish people were not content with obtaining, at least in this manner, the "same rights as Poland." Multiplied protests from public bodies flowed in upon the German authorities. Small groups of "Activists," attempting to celebrate the independence of Flanders, were mobbed in Antwerp, Brussels, Malines and Turnhout, in spite of the presence of German troops. February 7, 1918, the Court of Appeals in Brussels ordered the prosecution of "Activist" leaders; and two members of the "Provincial Government of Flanders," Borms and Tack (two of the famous seven), were arrested and arraigned for treason. At this point the German authorities intervened. Borms and Tack were released; three Belgian judges were arrested and taken to Germany; the Court of Appeals was suspended on the ground of having associated itself with political manifestations; and the Communal Councils were in future forbidden, perhaps in accordance with the

¹ Brand Whitlock to the Secretary of State, February 23, 1918; protest of the Belgian Senators and Deputies (no date).

² A declaration of the Council of Flanders of June 20, 1918, printed in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 25, states that the Council declared the independence of Flanders on December 22, 1917. The Belgian Information Service, *Release* of March 31, gives the date as January 14, 1918.

³ Brand Whitlock to the Secretary of State, February 23, 1918; protest of the Belgian Senators and Deputies; Belgian Information Service, *Release* of March 31.

principle of the self-determination of nations, to deliberate upon the question of Flemish autonomy.¹

As soon as the Court of Appeals was suspended, the judges of all the Belgian courts, from the Supreme Court down to the Justices of the Peace, refused to continue their functions; whereupon the governor general announced, March 26, 1918, that in order to assure the maintenance of public order, in conformity with Art. 43 of the Hague Conventions, "the military *Kommandaturs* are charged with the duty of repressing crimes and delinquencies." Early in April German civil and criminal courts were accordingly established in Belgium. In these courts the judges were Germans, and justice was rendered in the German language and according to the procedure of the imperial German civil and penal codes. It was announced that these courts would continue until such time as the Belgian judges might "enter upon their duties."²

Such was the state of affairs in Belgium. The "artificial creation of European diplomacy" known as the Belgian state has been broken up by processes natural and peculiar to the Germans; and the Flemish people, whose independence has been declared under the sanction of the German military authorities, are at last possessed of those rights and liberties which Prussian Poland has so long enjoyed.

V. GERMAN POLICY IN RESPECT TO BELGIUM

In all German discussions of the terms of peace in Belgium, the vital consideration, at least with those whose opinion carries weight in official circles, was this: Belgium must under no circumstances become an economic or a political dependency of France and England. To this statement, which is only another way of saying that Belgium must become a dependency of Germany, all parties were agreed.

¹ Brand Whitlock to the Secretary of State, February 23, 1918; Belgian Information Service, *Release* of March 31.

² Brand Whitlock to the Secretary of State, March 13, 1918; Belgian Information Service, *Release* of March 31; *New York Times Current History*, August, 1918, 333-334.

As to the means of accomplishing this end, opinion divided. The moderate opinion may be represented by Hans Delbrück, the distinguished professor of history at Berlin. Professor Delbrück opposed annexation, but he said that the "restoration of liberty" did not mean the "restoration of the state of things before the war." The *status quo ante* had been made an "obsolete proposition. . . . The administrative division between the Flemish and Walloon regions . . . cannot be undone again, and must have the most powerful effects. Even if, after we have evacuated Belgium, a certain reaction of the idea of Belgian unity sets in against the Flemish manifestos of independence, . . . nevertheless, when a movement of this kind has once been set going, it has a very marked vitality of its own . . . and will tend to prevent Belgium from becoming a mere dependency of the Anglo-French alliance."¹ These were the moderate views in Germany.

Over against the moderates stand the extreme annexationists, whose ideas are nowhere better expressed than by Freiherr von Bissing, the late governor general of Belgium, who has left us, in his political "Testament," a deliberate and reasoned statement of what he considered the "sacred duty" of Germany in respect to the future disposition of Belgium. Having discussed the great importance of Belgium for Germany, both in a military and an economic sense, he reaches this precise conclusion:

"Belgium must be seized and held, as it now is, and as it must be in future. . . . *For years to come we must maintain the existing state of dictatorship.* . . . Germany is strong enough, and it is to be hoped that, especially after this war, she will have plenty of efficient men to do in Belgium, in a German sense, what unfortunately was not done in Alsace and Lorraine. Surely we shall have learnt from the mistakes that were made, and we shall never again have recourse to the vacillating policy of conciliation which was so disadvantageous, not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also in Poland. . . . Half measures and a middle course must be condemned most of all."²

¹ *Preussische Jarrbücher*, February, 1917, quoted in Waldstein, What Germany is Fighting For, 23-24.

² General von Bissing's Testament, 15, 20, 24, 27.

Such measures would require patience, resolution and sacrifice, since no people "which has been appointed to play a creative part in the history of the world will find pigeons dropping already roasted into its mouth"; but such measures are necessary because "a restored Belgium, whether declared a neutral country or not, will not only be forced over naturally into the camp of our enemies, but will be actually drawn over by them." These were the extreme views in Germany.

GERMANY SOUGHT CONTROL.

The later policy of the German Government lay somewhere between these two extremes: it did not contemplate annexing Belgium, as Bissing advised; it did not apparently share Professor Delbrück's faith that the separation of Flanders and Wallonia would have a "marked vitality of its own" if German influence were entirely withdrawn. The precise object, as the German Government saw it, appeared to be this: to restore Belgian "independence," and yet retain a degree of influence in Belgium which would make it a military or an economic dependency of Germany. This object it hoped to attain by creating, during the war, a situation in Belgium which would enable the German Government, at the peace conference (in that *kleinem Kreise*—(narrow circle)—of which Chancellor Hertling spoke so often), to demand the continued separation of Belgium and Flanders, *on the ground that this was the wish of the Flemish people themselves*. Thus Belgium would be "restored"; and thus Germany would obtain its "guaranties" against England and France.

This interpretation of German policy is in harmony with Chancellor Hertling's official statements, and particularly with his last statement—that of July 11, 1918. It is borne out by the whole policy of the German Government in Belgium since the war began. It is particularly confirmed by a recent declaration of the "Council of Flanders" (a very reliable mouthpiece of the German Government), and by a semi-official comment on the declaration which was published in Germany at the same time.

The declaration of the Council of Flanders is dated June 20, 1918, and the essential parts of it are as follows:

"Our Flemish people are a disinterested and oppressed people. The supremacy for centuries of a nationality essentially different from ours, has stifled in their descendants the heart beat of fathers who once enriched Europe with their superabundance of vigor and power. But the eye that is able to distinguish the character of our people, the ear that knows its voice, will now recognize that the nature of our people is again forcing its way to the surface. . . . In spite of the difficult conditions in which the occupying power finds itself, the German Government has made possible for the Flemings the realization of a great part of their wishes in respect to language, schools, and administration. The Belgian Government on the contrary has had only an arrogant 'No' for all the wishes of the Flemish people. . . . Therefore, we all know that a Belgian Government restored to its former position of power, even if, at the time of peace negotiations, a golden bridge of beautiful promises to the Flemings were constructed, will nevertheless bring to us Flemings only Belgian hatred, to our civilization French ridicule, to our national life English tutelage, and to our economic life American capital with American creditors. . . .

Situated economically, politically and strategically at the threshold of Germany, Flanders knows that its independence is a real defense for Germany, but also that it can be realized only by German aid. This independence will be a secure and ever unassailable basis of our national life only if it is a political independence, with our own legislative bodies, our own government and our own judicial power, and making it possible for us so to shape our political, economic, and cultured development as the natural destiny of our country and people demands. In full consciousness of responsibility to our people, we therefore believe that the freeing of Flanders from every foreignizing force signifies also the freeing of Germany from hostile threat in the west." ¹

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 25, 1918.

This declaration, which bears on its face sufficient evidence of having been "made in Germany," was published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* June 25, 1918. At the same time the *Kölnische Zeitung* published,¹ from a "special source," a communication which is obviously no more than an official comment upon the declaration. The essential parts of this communication are as follows:

"This making of Flanders and Wallonia independent states would naturally not prevent these two countries from entering into a union with each other, which would make it possible for them to settle by a common legislation those affairs which especially require a common settlement because of the close economic relations between them. The example of Austria-Hungary perhaps shows a practical way. By such a settlement a 'real guaranty' would be obtained for Germany, namely, that French influence would be actually suppressed in Belgium. In such an arrangement Germany will also have obtained one of the absolutely essential securities designated by Count Hertling in his speech of February 25, 1918, namely, that this country would not again become a strategical point of attack for our enemies. A free Flanders, built upon a Germanic basis, has as vital an interest as Germany in keeping French or English armies from its borders. . . . In the very nature of the case, however, such an independent Flanders needs in economic respects the support of the German Empire. Firm and definite articles in the treaty of peace must make this support easy and permanently secure. These articles must also include Wallonia, whose economic advantages neither Flanders nor Germany wishes to forego. Thus nothing will prevent the two countries from establishing and developing their own government according to their own will. No annexation, no Germanizing of Flanders under compulsion, but a free Flanders in close economic relation to the natural hinterland, Germany;—that is and remains the desired aim which will best serve the well-being of all concerned."

¹ Reprinted from the *Kölnische Zeitung* in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 26, 1918.

Such is the way in which the German Government was preparing to "restore" Belgium. From the Belgian point of view, which is happily the point of view of the Allies also, this is not restoration, but exploitation under another name. This would be, as Brand Whitlock says, "worse than the atrocities, worse than the deportations. They kill the body, this would kill the soul."

One of the dangers to which the world is exposed, says Vernon Lyman Kellogg, is that "the Germans really believe much of what they say." On the whole, this is perhaps the most serious aspect of the world conflict. The more one reads German writings, the more one reads, for example, the letters or the "Testament" of Von Bissing, the more one realizes that what he says is monstrous, and the more one is convinced that he really believes much of what he says. Between the facts as they are revealed in the history, the deeds, and the words of the Belgian people, and the conclusions which the Germans draw from these facts, there intervenes a "specifically German way of thinking and feeling" which is in great part an impenetrable mystery. Who shall disengage the various elements of brazen effrontery and sly cunning, of angular and unplastic logic, of massive but honest stupidity, of sentimental perversion, of naïve egoism and moral obliquity that enter into the German mentality? Perhaps the problem is insolvable; but somehow or other the Germans really believe much of what they say.

This does not mean that they are under any illusion as to the overwhelming opposition of the Belgians to their clumsy policy of conciliation. They understand perfectly the weakness of the Activist movement. "As soon as we remove our protecting hand," says Von Bissing, "the Flemish movement will be branded by the Walloons and Frenchlings as pro-German, and will be completely suppressed." This is the exact fact. The governor general knows it for a fact; but he finds that it does not properly follow from the established premises. The Belgians are two peoples, one of which, being of German origin and speech, must naturally wish to unite with the Germans; but the fact is they spurn the Germans. This is the fact; but logically it should not be the fact—it is somehow or other, and eventually, a cosmic

error. As the governor general contemplates this fact, therefore, he can only blink and say: "The character of the Belgian people is a psychological enigma."

The enigma, as M. Passelecq says, is "so simple that it takes a German not to understand it." In truth the "enigma" was long since easily solved by Ernest Maurice Arndt, a German contemporary of the Revolution of 1830. "The fundamental principle of the Belgian Revolution," he said, "that which gives it character and distinguishes it from other events of the same order, resides in the most intimate essence of the people. It is the aspiration to an independent national existence, . . . which, during many centuries, the Belgians have labored for."¹ But in speaking of national aspirations, we have to do with an influence of the moral and spiritual order—thus rising above the level along which the Prussian mind travels.

¹ *Revue des deux mondes*, June 1, 1918, 527, quoted from Van Langenhove, *La volonté nationale belge en 1830*, 93.

A VICTORY PROGRAM

At the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees of World Peace Foundation, November 30, 1918, it was unanimously voted "that the World Peace Foundation approves the principles of which a statement¹ is here subjoined":

The war now happily brought to a close has been above all a war to end war, but in order to insure the fruits of victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe there should be formed a league of free nations, as universal as possible, based on treaty and pledged that the security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the whole. The initiating nucleus of the membership of the league should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the war.

The league should aim at promoting the liberty, progress and fair economic opportunity of all nations, and the orderly development of the world.

It should insure peace by eliminating causes of dissension, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by uniting the potential force of all the members as a standing menace against any nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world.

The advantage of membership in the league, both economically and from the point of view of security, should be so clear that all nations will desire to be members of it.

For this purpose it is necessary to create:

1. For the decision of justiciable questions, an impartial tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the assent of the parties to the controversy; provision to be made for enforcing its decisions.

¹This program was prepared with a view to its being generally adopted by organizations by a special committee of the League to Enforce Peace consisting of William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Oscar S. Straus, Theodore Marburg, Hamilton Holt, Talcott Williams, William H. Short and Glenn Frank. It was adopted by the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace and by the League of Free Nations Association on November 23, 1918, and by other organizations. A joint committee for Massachusetts to promote a league of free nations in accordance with this program has been formed to conduct an active co-operative campaign.

2. For questions that are not justiciable in their character, a council of conciliation, as mediator, which shall hear, consider and make recommendations; and, failing acquiescence by the parties concerned, the league shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken.

3. An administrative organization for the conduct of affairs of common interest, the protection and care of backward regions and internationalized places, and such matters as have been jointly administered before and during the war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods and through machinery that will insure both stability and progress, preventing, on the one hand, any crystallization of the *status quo* that will defeat the forces of healthy growth and change, and providing, on the other hand, a way by which progress can be secured and necessary change effected without recourse to war.

4. A representative congress to formulate and codify rules of international law, to inspect the work of the administrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the tranquility of the world or the progress or betterment of human relations. Its deliberations should be public.

5. An executive body, able to speak with authority in the name of the nations represented, and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered.

The representatives of the different nations in the organs of the league should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they assume. The rules of international law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity.

A resort to force by any nation should be prevented by a solemn agreement that any aggression will be met immediately by such an overwhelming economic and military force that it will not be attempted.

No member of the league should make any other offensive or defensive treaty or alliance, and all treaties of whatever nature made by any member of the league should at once be made public.

Such a league must be formed at the time of the definite peace or the opportunity may be lost for ever.

THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

INTRODUCTION

Since the armistice the text of this monograph has been submitted to James A. Field, London representative of the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, to whom we are indebted for additional facts, especially in relation to the important organizations associated with the Supreme War Council. Material for a more detailed study of all these organizations has been assembled with a view to publication in a subsequent issue.

This account of the Supreme War Council has a double claim on public attention, because it is the first available description of a great international organization which has already played a large part in securing victory, and because it seems destined in some measure to serve as the groundwork for the superstructure of a League of Nations. For, as stated by the author of the accompanying notes: "There are not a few to-day who believe that the surest foundation of a real and workable League of Nations is to be found in the joint international administration of economic affairs, in which the war has helped us to recognize a common international interest." This belief applies less to the Supreme War Council itself than to the organizations subordinate to it.

For it must be borne in mind that the Supreme War Council is a political body whose members are primarily the executive heads of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. This accounts for the prominence given to the speeches of Lloyd George in the text; because they happened to be the only direct word available from it. Such statements are to be viewed as sources of information. Political exigencies constantly weigh with the Supreme War Council, and its announcements of policy have been affected thereby.

The reader will therefore appreciate that the same freedom of development is not possible for the Supreme War Council as for

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the organizations concurrently resulting from the Interallied Conference at Versailles in December, 1917, and which were officially listed on September 15, 1918, as follows:

- I. ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, with associated or subordinate bodies as follows:
 - a. The Food Council, consisting of the four food controllers, developed in the summer of 1918 in connection with the Program Policy Committee of the Transport Council. The ordinary executive powers of this council are exercised by the Committee of Representatives¹ sitting in London and co-ordinating the work of the Wheat Executive, the Meats and Fats Executive, the Oils and Seeds Executive, and an unnamed body dealing with sugar. Two New York organizations, the Wheat Export Company and the Allied Provisions Export Commission, are subordinate to the Wheat and Meats Executive exclusively. There is an Interallied Sugar Committee at Washington.
 - b. The Munitions Council at Paris, developed in the summer of 1918 in connection with the Program Policy Committee of the Transport Council, with subordinate committees as follows: Technical Munitions Committee; Steel Committee; Nonferrous Metal Committee; Explosives Committee; Aircraft Committee; Nitrates Executive; Chemical Committee; and the Interallied Transportation Committee in Liaison.
 - c. Program Committees, at present directly responsible to the Transport Council, and dealing with raw materials as follows: Wool Committee; Cotton Committee; Jute, Flax and Hemp Committee; Hides, Leather and Tanning Materials Committee; Paper and Paper-making Material Committee; Timber Committee; Tobacco and Matches Committee.
 - d. The Petroleum Conference; and the incipient Coal and Coke Committee.

¹ The Committee of Food Representatives is the permanent executive organization of the Food Council and bears to the Food Council substantially the same relation which the Allied Maritime Transport Executive bears to the Maritime Transport Council, and which the Board of Military Representatives bears to the Supreme War Council.

COUNCILS AND COMMISSIONS

2. **INTERALLIED COUNCIL ON WAR PURCHASES AND FINANCE** deals with international exchange purchases in America for allied account. It has come to exercise an important influence on allied purchases in other parts of the world. It is closely in touch with the British Treasury and is ordinarily appealed to by any of the other interallied bodies which become conscious of difficulties of finance. The council owed its creation and development largely to Oscar T. Crosby, formerly assistant secretary of the Treasury, who accompanied Colonel House to the Interallied Conference.
3. **COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE RAVITAILLEMENT**, an organization of diminishing importance, arranging supply and incidental finance for France, Italy and the small Allies.
4. **ALLIED BLOCKADE COMMITTEE**, concerned with control of exports to northern neutrals, has absorbed the Contraband Committee. The committee was evolved from earlier devices for controlling exports to the northern neutrals of Europe. It has become an administrative committee which sits daily in London and dispatches large amounts of detailed business. It is connected with our Government through the London representative of the War Trade Board and with the British Government, primarily through the British Ministry of Blockade.

The Allied Rationing and Statistical Committee is a sub-committee.
5. **INTERALLIED SCIENTIFIC FOOD COMMISSION**, with two members from the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States and one from Belgium, investigates dietaries and nutrition in relation to food programs.
6. **INTERALLIED CHARTERING EXECUTIVE** manages chartering of neutral vessels for European Allies.
7. **COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM.**

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In addition to the above, there are:

1. **BOARD OF MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES**, organized as a result of the Rapallo agreement of November, 1917, whose individual "function is to act as technical" advisers to the Supreme War Council. They "receive from the Government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war" and "watch day by day the situation of the forces and the means of all kinds of which the allied armies and the enemy armies dispose." France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States made up the board.
2. **ALLIED NAVAL CONFERENCE** is a body analogous to the Board of Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council; that is to say, it is a technical body, responsible, of course, to the Supreme War Council, so far as ultimate military policies are concerned. It meets at frequent intervals in London or Paris, on which occasions high officers of the allied navies attend.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL

Of the nine major institutions in this list the Allied Maritime Transport Council is of the most far-reaching importance and significance. The following authentic statement respecting it is consequently printed in this place:

The Allied Maritime Transport Council was organized in London in March, 1918, in accordance with the decision of the Interallied Conference which had been held at Versailles the preceding December. The council was created as an interallied organization to investigate the resources of merchant shipping available to the Allies, to consider the demands of the Allies upon this shipping and to recommend to the Governments associated in the council a concerted shipping policy for the effective conduct of the war. The Transport Council is thus essentially an advisory body. It is without final executive power: it makes recommendations to the executives of the respective Governments or to the Supreme War Council.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN NEEDS BALANCED

The council is not concerned directly with the actual operation of ships. It deals with general shipping policy. This distinction is important, for it has been misunderstood. Ship owners or others who object to governmental control of shipping have contended that ships are operated much less efficiently under government direction than when they are left in the practiced hands of professional shipping men. In a sense, this is doubtless true. If all that was desired were to load ships rapidly to their full capacity and to send them promptly about their business there would be little justification for disturbing the ordinary course of the shipping industry; but such achievements, however desirable in themselves, are only the minor tactics of shipping operation in time of war. There remains a sort of maritime grand strategy—an ultimate military and political policy in the use of ships. This is something largely outside the experience of practical shipping men. It is something necessarily to be decided by the policy leaders of the belligerent nations. The Transport Council was designed to assist in decisions of this character. The real test of the council's services is to be found in the character of the broad policies which it has recommended.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN NEEDS CARED FOR

In dealing with all the specific shipping problems which have presented themselves, the council has had to strike a balance between the needs of the immediate military situation and the general needs of staple industries and civilian populations. In military crises the tendency is to press all ships into the transportation of troops and munitions, but military success, in the long run, depends quite as fundamentally on at least the minimum of food and clothing required to sustain the civilian population, and on the raw materials for industries which indirectly underlie the operations of the armies in the field.

A second general aim of the council has been to bring all materials from the nearest practicable source. Ships have been drawn from distant parts of the world and concentrated, to an extraordinary extent, in the North Atlantic and Western Mediterranean. The wheat and wool of Australia and, to a lesser extent, the similar resources of South America, have been left unused so long as the wants of the Allies could, in any way, be supplied from regions nearer at hand.

The council has supervised the assignment of chartered neutral tonnage to the uses of the several Allies and has exercised a general supervision over the employment of all shipping, chartered, loaned and owned

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outright. In 1918 no allied nation could use even its own ships wastefully without, in effect, wasting the shipping of the other Allies.

Among the special problems which confronted the council, one of the most persistent and difficult was the supply of coal to France and Italy. The demand for coal in all the belligerent countries was abnormal. Railroad facilities were overtaxed and congested. Unusually large quantities of coal had therefore to be carried to Italy directly by ship, through seas peculiarly menaced by submarines. The problem, already difficult, became acute when the German advance of March and April brought the Paris-Amiens railroad line under fire and virtually cut off the coal producing region of the Pas de Calais. To meet this new emergency without permanently diverting to collier service large ocean steamers indispensable for other work was then, and has remained, a matter of great difficulty. However, by interallied co-operation the most urgent needs of Italy and France were met at the same time that the increased troop transport of last summer was being maintained.

More recently the council was obliged to recommend an apportionment of the shipping prospectively available for 1919 between the transport of troops, the carriage of munitions and the supply of food to the Allies.

The agreement, which was reached after long investigation and conference, involved not merely a revision of the scale of all these programs, but an intricate arrangement of priorities of shipment, giving the preference at one period of the year to troop movements and at other periods to munitions and food, respectively. The importance of such an agreement would have been difficult to exaggerate if the war had continued into 1919.

TWO MEMBERS FROM EACH NATION

The Transport Council consists of two members from each of the four participating nations. The United States is represented on the Council by the Honorable Raymond Bartlett Stevens, vice chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and Honorable George Rublee. The senior British representative has been Lord Robert Cecil, formerly minister of blockade, later assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs, and now the British specialist on the League of Nations at the Peace Conference. Associated with him was Sir Joseph Maclay, the British shipping controller. The French representatives are M. Clémentel, minister of commerce, and M. Loucheur, minister of munitions. The Italian food controller, Signor Silvio Crespi, has been one of the Italian representatives on the council from the beginning. Associated with

OVERCAME SHIPPING SHORTAGE

him, from time to time, have been Signor Bianchi, in charge of the Italian railway transportation, General dall'Olio, of the munitions ministry, Signor Villa, minister of marine, and other high officials.

The council is thus an organization of ministerial rank. As such it meets only at intervals. The execution of its decisions and the conduct of the investigations upon which those decisions are based are the tasks of an underlying permanent organization,—the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, which rests in turn on the work of expert staffs of the several nations. The most considerable of these national staffs is the staff of the British ministry of shipping. The American shipping mission in London, in co-operation with other American representatives abroad, acts for the United States. Similar missions are maintained in London by the French and Italian Governments.

The Transport Executive, collaborating with the various national missions, maintains systematic records of the shipping available for the use of the Allies, including careful reports of new construction, charters, sinkings, etc. The movements of all these vessels are also constantly reported to the executive. To assist in this work, the British minister of shipping has turned over to the Transport Executive its elaborate card catalogue record of the particulars and movements of British, allied and neutral ships—an imposing compilation, which occupies one entire floor of a large building and requires a large staff, working day and night, receiving and recording cabled shipping intelligence from all parts of the world.

IMPORT PROGRAM COMMITTEES ORGANIZED

Thus equipped with information concerning available shipping facilities, the technical staff of the council has, from the first, sought equally complete information regarding the necessary demands upon the ships. Immediately after the first meeting of the council last spring, estimates were prepared by Great Britain, France and Italy, setting forth the minimum requirements of commodities to be imported overseas during 1918. It was found that even these minimum requirements exceeded the capacity of the shipping prospectively available by nearly ten million tons of goods. A re-survey of the requirements was therefore obviously necessary. To make this survey a new and interesting international machinery was set up in the form of the so-called Import Program Committees.

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Previous estimates of import requirements had been made nation by nation. France, for example, would submit its official summary of requirements, including requirements of munitions, food stuffs, cotton, coal, etc. The other countries would do likewise. When it was discovered that the aggregate of the different national demands was in excess of the physical possibilities of transportation, it would be necessary to submit the claims of each nation to criticism, by the others, with a view to their reduction. This procedure was likely to arouse international friction and was not well fitted to secure an intelligent and equitable revision of all the import schedules in detail. It was therefore decided to take the adjustment of import programs out of the sphere of high politics and assign it to international groups of experts, designated to deal separately and specifically with each of the more important commodities. There were thus set up a score or more of International Import Program Committees. For example, committees were created for cotton, for wool, for timber, for wheat and other cereals, for meats and fats, for petroleum, for nitrates, etc. Some of these Program Committees were developed from pre-existing international organizations, like the Wheat Executive. Others were newly created. When the Food Council and Munitions Council were established last summer the Program Committees dealing with food were placed under direct charge of the International Committee of Food Representatives. The committees on steel, non-ferrous metals, explosives, etc., were organized under the Munitions Council. But the results of the deliberation of the Program Committees, whether reported directly to the Transport Executive or through the Food Council and the Munitions Council, became finally the basis of the recommendations of the Transport Council and therefore of the official decision of the Allies, with reference to the authorized uses of shipping.

DEVELOPED INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The significance of this system of Program Committees is not to be measured merely by the import programs which they formulated. The constant collaboration of the different national representatives in these committees, month after month, gave rise to habits of joint action and a free interchange of information which exerted an important influence in the development of international co-operation and good will.

The armistice has foreshadowed the end of the Allied Maritime Transport Council as a war organization, and the Allies, after their brief expe-

MACHINERY READY FOR PEACE

rience of economic co-operation, must now decide whether the Transport Council and similar agencies are to be continued through the period of peace negotiations and whether such agencies, in modified form, may be serviceable as permanent forms of international co-operation. Opinions naturally differ on questions like these; but many persons have come to feel that the experience and good will that have resulted from international joint action are not lightly to be discarded. As Lord Robert Cecil has put it, the economic machinery which has been built up in time of war ought to be turned by the Allies to the uses of peace. His views have been echoed by statesmen of the other allied nations. There are not a few to-day who believe that the surest foundation of a real and workable League of Nations is to be found in the joint international administration of economic affairs, in which the war has helped us to recognize a common international interest.

THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

I. PURPOSE AND MEANING

It will, of course, be long after the close of the world war that the full story of the remarkable co-operative administration of the powers pitted against the Central Quadruple Alliance which is associated with the name of the Supreme War Council¹ can be told from the documents themselves, but it is possible now to give an accurate idea of the origin and main lines of activity of the council, which, since it resulted in the decision for a unified command in May, 1918, has been universally recognized by the enemies of the Central Powers as the foremost vehicle of victory itself.

The Supreme War Council is the creation of circumstances. Like most institutional organs of value necessity was the mother of its invention. The state system of the Central Powers, all bureaucratic in character, offered little fundamental difficulty to establishing both unified command and common—if not single—control of supplies. These advantages, coupled with their possession of interior military lines, accounted for a number of their successes in battle, and were at the bottom of the Italian disaster in October, 1917. After it the Allies were forced for their own sake to do something to make their strength liquid enough for use on whatever part of the front it was needed.

The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, making available to the Allies its enormous resources and its potential man power. It was obvious that its millions of soldiers would not appear on the fighting fronts for several months, but its navy was ready for action and immediately began bearing its share of the brunt of the maritime operations. Also ready for action, to the extent of shipping facilities, were the resources of America,

NOTE: The facts and statements in this publication are chiefly taken from the news columns of the London *Times*.

¹The French name is Conseil supérieure de guerre.

monetary and material. On land and sea the heart, soul and substance of the United States were in the fight against Prussianism. It was natural that the Washington Government should assume an important part in the councils of the enemies of Germany, for America's entry into the war was recognized as the makeweight that insured victory. American influence was exerted in two directions—co-operation of the fighting forces and equitable distribution of the supplies which it was furnishing in generous quantities.

In November, 1917, therefore, the military requirement of a more closely unified command and the inevitable problem of the allocation of American supplies rendered necessary a review of the whole subject of co-operation.

The first forecast of coming events, so far as the public was concerned, was the sailing of an American mission to Europe on October 27, 1917. It arrived in England on November 6 and two days later the Department of State made an announcement which emphasized that the forthcoming meeting was a "war conference with the object of perfecting a more complete co-ordination of the activities of the various nations engaged" against Germany.¹

THE RAPALLO AGREEMENT

The next day a dispatch from Rome semi-officially announced that a decision was reached in the conference at Rapallo a few days before to create a Supreme Political Council of the Allies for the whole of the western front. This council was to be assisted by a permanent central military committee. The following were appointed members of this committee:

France—General Ferdinand Foch.

Great Britain—General Sir Henry Wilson.

Italy—General Luigi Cadorna. (To take General Cadorna's place in the supreme command, the king nominated General Diaz, chief of the general staff, and under him Generals Badoglis and Giardino.)

¹For text see Appendix I, page 402.

As a result of the Rapallo conference an agreement was taken by France, Great Britain and Italy in the following terms:

1. With a view to better co-ordination of military action on the western front, a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the prime minister and a member of the Government of each of the great powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other great powers.

2. The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decision of the Governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution and reports thereon to their respective Governments.

3. The general staffs and military commands of the armies of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

4. The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, insures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

5. Each power delegates to the Supreme War Council one permanent military representative, whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the council.

6. The military representatives receive from the Government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

7. The military representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces and the means of all kinds of which the allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

8. The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places, as may be agreed upon, according to the circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.¹

The United States afterward adhered to this agreement.²

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 389-390.

² The War Cabinet. Report for the year 1917, page 15.

“MACHINERY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS”

No one in official life has since made it his business to tell the story of the developments which followed so far as they relate to the present co-ordination in the Supreme War Council, which amounts to an international government for the purpose of pooling and distributing resources in the interest of a common victory. In the absence of details, however, we are fortunate to have accounts of its main lines of accomplishment and material for determining its significance in the words of actual participants.

“It would be rather interesting,” said Premier Lloyd George of Great Britain in a review of the year for the House of Commons on December 28, 1917, “if it were possible to project ourselves into the year 2017, to look at the year 1917, and to observe the events of this particular year. I should like to know what in the opinion of many who are present here to-day would be the outstanding events a hundred years hence. There is no doubt that the Russian revolution would hold a very conspicuous position. . . . Another great fact of this year which will loom large in the future will be the advent of America for the first time, not into the war, but into world politics, a gigantic event in itself. . . .

“. . . Another event which will hold a conspicuous position in history, according to the use which is made of it, will be the setting up of the International Council at Versailles, where for the first time we have had provided the machinery of the League of Nations, where nations have come together to set up a complete machine which is a clearing house not merely in military matters and in naval matters, but for financial, for economic, for shipping, for food purposes, and for all the other things that are essential to the life of the nations. All these matters are raised there and are discussed there. Information on them all is classified there and interchanged; and, still more, the machinery is there not merely for registering or recording, but for decisions which affect all these nations. That in itself is going to be the beginning of something which will have a greater effect in international relations than anyone can imagine at this particular moment.

"Perhaps the House, having had one or two discussions on that topic, would like to know something as to how that idea is being carried out. I am very glad to say that so far it has been a conspicuous success. Not merely has it been free from friction, but it has helped to remove friction. The general staffs of all the various countries have found in it a means of discussion and of interchanging views, and it has helped them to come to decisions, a means which they did not possess before. . . . They are using it freely and it has been helpful to them, and they are constantly resorting to it. And I have no doubt at all that if that great machinery already started, to which the four Governments have given some of their very best men and minds, goes on working as it does at the present moment and developing strength it will have a very potent influence in unifying the war direction, and not merely the war direction, but the economic direction of the four great countries which are represented on this council."

SCOPE OF THE COUNCIL

The Supreme War Council consists of the premiers of Great Britain, France and Italy, and the President of the United States, that is to say, of the executive heads of the four Governments. It decides finally upon recommendations made by interallied councils and committees where these have not been normally referred by national representatives on those bodies to their own Governments for transmission to the Supreme War Council, or for decision otherwise. In this way the Supreme War Council comes into contact with the Board of Military Representatives and the Allied Naval Council; the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and its subordinate Food and Munition Councils, the Program Committees and the Petroleum Conference; the Interallied Council on War Purchases and Finance, the Commission internationale de ravitaillement, the Allied Blockade Committee, the Interallied Scientific Food Commission, the Interallied Chartering Executive, and the Commission for Relief in Belgium.

Its object "is to create a real unity of policy in the conduct of the war—a unity of policy which takes account of all factors, economic and political, as well as purely military and naval, for the

one end of gaining the victory.”¹ But it is well to observe that it is composed of statesmen and not military men.

It is therefore the combined executive of four great states for definite purposes, which purposes can be increased in number whenever occasion demands.

The Supreme War Council itself is primarily a political body. It may be concluded that each member state has a single vote. The American ballot has been cast by the President by cable,² while the British, French and Italian Governments customarily send a delegation to the meetings consisting of the premier and at least one cabinet minister. Those present at the sessions vary from meeting to meeting, experts on subjects under consideration being invited to lay their views before the council or being regularly attached to its staff.

PROGRESS OF THE COUNCIL

The advance made by this organization was described by Lord Milner, British secretary of state for war, in an address at Plymouth on February 20, 1918, and his words must suffice for the time as an internal picture of the operation of the Supreme War Council:

The co-ordination of effort among the allied nations, which in theory has always commended itself to all of us, is most uncommonly difficult to realize in practice. Indeed, you may take it that it will never be perfectly realized; yet I hold it to be the very first duty of statesmen to get as near it as we possibly can. More progress has been made in that direction in the last three months than in the preceding three years, and if a great deal remains to be done we have at last got something like reasonable machinery for doing it. It has been my duty, during the 15

¹ Reuter dispatch, February 3, 1918.

² This statement is made on the authority of the *New York Times* (October 14, 1918), quoting Newton D. Baker, secretary of war. The following questions in the British Parliament are noted in this connection:

“The Chancellor of the Exchequer, asked by Mr. D. Mason whether the recent manifesto issued after the Versailles Conference represented the views of all the Allies, including the United States of America, said: The answer is in the affirmative.

“Mr. Chancellor: Was the President of the United States consulted? The Chancellor of the Exchequer: The President of the United States never had any opportunity of assenting or dissenting, but the diplomatic representative of the United States in conference was present.” (*London Times*, February 15, 1918, page 10.)

months that I have been in office, to attend some half-dozen interallied conferences of generals and statesmen. All I can say is that the last one or two at which I had the honor to be present were incomparably more businesslike than those which I attended a year ago, and that I believe the improvement is certain to be progressive. The reason is that we have now got in the Supreme War Council a body which has a definite constitution, and regular, though not too frequent, meetings, where formerly there were only a number of scratch conferences, of uncertain composition, summoned on the spur of the moment, passing resolutions, which it was often nobody's special business to carry out, and with nothing to connect one such conference with another.

The essence of the present system is that there now exists, under the Supreme War Council, a permanent body of experts, always at work together, always studying war problems from the point of view of the alliance as a whole, not from the separate points of view of the several nations, preparing the *agenda* for the meetings of the council, and providing for continuity of deliberation and action. I remember a year ago being present at a conference which spent the greater part of two days discussing the transfer of a single division from one theater of war to another. When I think of the nature and importance of the business transacted at recent meetings of the Supreme Council I realize the immense distance we have traveled in the direction of doing real business and giving a concrete meaning to the conception of a single allied front.

Lord Milner's statement of the relation between the council and the military problems of the war suggests the relations between it and all interallied organizations. The council consists primarily of the executive heads of the Governments concerned, but the five principal boards are made up of men of cabinet rank or administrative officials, who of necessity are subordinate to premiers or other executives. It is consequently certain that all decisions on interallied affairs not capable of determination by any board are put up to the Supreme War Council. Evidence increases that the great mechanism of victory centered in the Supreme War Council as the highest executive power in the world to-day.

But while the Supreme War Council is the physical machine of the existing League of Nations, it is not all-inclusive. It comprises only the executives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, whereas the Governments associated against Ger-

many in the war number 21. Diplomatic interallied conferences are held when matters affecting them all are to be determined. In the intervals, the smaller Governments make their requisitions through the interallied organizations. Before these and the Supreme War Council existed such allied¹ or interallied conferences were the only means of taking executive decisions possessed by the whole group of nations at war with Germany.

PREVIOUS ALLIED CONFERENCES

Therefore, "during the early period of the war there were inter-governmental conferences at fairly frequent intervals whose purpose it was to adjust the plans of the different Allies. Indeed, from the beginning there has been a strongly marked tendency to substitute frequent personal meetings between members of Governments, ministers and departmental chiefs for the older and more formal channels of communication. Of late, however, the importance of treating the war as a single whole and the necessity for pooling the resources of the Allies so as to meet equitably the needs of all, as war demands increased and supplies diminished, had led to far closer and more frequent consultation. Thus; during 1917 there were conferences between the heads of the Governments or their specially delegated plenipotentiaries upon the major issues of diplomacy and the war in London, Paris, Rome, Petrograd, St. Jean de Maurienne, Calais, Folkestone and Rapallo."

"Intercommunication developed very rapidly during 1917. A special allied mission was sent to Russia by Great Britain in January to co-ordinate the preparations for the allied offensive, but its plans were disorganized by the Russian revolution. Immediately after the revolution, however, a member of the British War Cabinet went on a special mission of a political character to Petrograd, and this was followed by the visit of Arthur J. Balfour, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, to Washington, after

¹ The adjective "allied" and the noun "Allies" in an accurate sense in the present war refer to the signatories of the declarations of September 5, 1914, and November 30, 1915, that is, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia. The last recognized government in Russia was that headed by Kerenskii.

the entry of the United States into the war. This last mission developed into a permanent organization of considerable size.¹

"During the year, however, an increasing number of inter-governmental and inter-departmental conferences took place both on diplomatic and military questions and on problems connected with the distribution between the Allies of imported supplies. This gradual integration of the Alliance was brought to a head toward the end of the year by the Rapallo agreement. During the year the democratic Alliance has thus acquired the rudiments of a permanent machinery."²

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS "DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE"

The significance of all this executive and administrative apparatus is more than the compelling fact that it won the war, more even than the necessary circumstance that it makes the return to peace simpler, quicker and surer than it otherwise could be. Its real significance lies in the impetus it gives to world organization.

Before the war governments had been combining for common purposes ever since the Congress of Vienna had stipulated that "states separated or traversed by a single navigable river engage to regulate the navigation of such river by common agreement." Posts, telegraphs, railroads, maritime navigation, and many other matters of mutual interest had similarly been the subjects of international arrangements, until at the outbreak of the war there were 53 institutions carrying out the will of the nations generally, and half as many conventions providing for unified practice which did not require administrative offices. All these international institutions withstood the effects of war and continued functioning during it, with the exception of those, like the European Commission of the Danube, that were deliberately and for their own interests put out of business by the Central Powers. To concentrate and combine them after the war³ is to establish the whole physical basis

¹ On the details of the activities of this mission see the little volume "Who's Who in the British War Mission," a new edition of which is about to be issued.

² The War Cabinet. Report for the year 1917, 15-16, v-vi.

³ Jean Perrinjaquet, "Projet pour la création d'un Bureau général international permanent," *Revue générale de droit international public*, XVIII, 216-237 (with

of a League of Nations upon the firmest possible foundations of mutual, legal, financial, commercial, economic and social co-operation. The Supreme War Council and the two dozen councils and committees subordinate to it have become the integrated system which can and should include and develop all previous activities as the administrative organ of a League of Nations.

Those who object to a League of Nations on account of the difficulties which it presents will find a convincing answer to their doubts in the success which has attended the solution of the problems connected with establishing this *de facto* League of Nations, as represented by the Interallied Conference, the Supreme War Council and the organizations associated with it.

II. DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME

The date set for the "war conference" was November 16. The participants began to gather at Paris immediately after the Rapallo conference. On November 12 David Lloyd George, premier of Great Britain, at a luncheon in the old tapestry-room at the French ministry of war delivered a speech before the French Army Council, Senate and Chamber which lighted up the problem of a Supreme War Council for the world's public like a flash of lightning from a clear sky on a moonless night. Later Lloyd George explained the purpose of this speech, which is best introduced by his own words in the House of Commons:

We went to Rapallo with a document most carefully prepared—and may I say also, in order to explode another myth, that it was submitted to the [British] Cabinet before I left. The document which was passed was hardly different. Of course, we had to discuss things with our Allies, but in substance it was the document prepared here, discussed

French text of American project of convention); Denys P. Myers, "La Concentration des organismes internationaux publics," *La Vie internationale*, III, 96-122. This second article proposes, in elaboration of the earlier plan and on the basis of existing organs, international bureau departments of public law, private law, commerce, science, hygiene and morals, agriculture, land transportation, maritime transportation, posts and telegraphs, monetary unity, literary property and industrial property.

line by line in the Cabinet, which I had in my pocket after the last Cabinet meeting held a few hours before I left. But I was afraid of this, that here was a beautifully drafted document in which you had concerned a considerable number of men, including distinguished soldiers—for a member of the general staff was one who was most helpful to me in drafting the document—prepared, and carried by the Allies at two or three conferences. Nothing happened. Simply an announcement in the papers that at last we had found some means of co-ordination. There has been too much of that, and I made up my mind to take risks, and I took them, in order to arouse public sentiment, not here merely, but in France, in Italy and in America—to get public sentiment behind, to see that this document became an act. It is not easy to rouse public opinion. I may know nothing about military strategy, but I do know something of political strategy. To get public opinion interested in a proposal and to convince the public of the desirability of it is an essential part of political strategy. That is why I did it, and it has done it. I might have gone over there and delivered a speech—passing eulogies upon the armies, upon generals, upon Governments and peoples, and they would have said—probably civility would have made them say it—"That is a very fine and eloquent speech." But it would have had not the slightest effect.

So I set out to deliver a disagreeable speech, that would force everybody to talk about this scheme. They have talked about it throughout two or three continents. The result is that America is in, Italy is in, France is in, Britain is in, and public opinion is in, and that is all I wanted.¹ . . .

BRITISH PREMIER'S STARTLING SPEECH

In the speech itself on November 12 the British premier said:

I must claim your indulgence for taking up the time of so many men who hold great and responsible positions in the state and the legislature at a moment when they can ill spare from the conduct of important affairs time for listening to speeches. My only apology is that I have important practical considerations to submit to you, which affect not merely the future of your own country and of mine, but the destiny of the world. I have one advantage in speaking of this war, in that I am almost the only minister in any land, on either side, who has been in it from the beginning to this hour. I therefore ought to know something

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 901-902.

about the course of events and their hidden causes. Of both I want to say something to you to-day.

My friend and comrade, M. Painlevé, has explained to you the important decision taken by the Governments of France, Italy and Great Britain in setting up a Supreme Council of the Allies whose forces operate in the west to insure the united direction of their efforts on that front. As he has already explained, that council will consist of the leading ministers of the allied countries, advised by some of their most distinguished soldiers, and the choice which has already been made by these countries of their experts proves that the Governments mean this council to be a real power in the co-ordination of their military effort.

AMERICA AND RUSSIA

Unfortunately, there was no time to consult America and Russia¹ before setting up this council. The Italian disaster and the need of immediate action to repair it rendered it essential that we should make a start with the powers whose forces could be drawn upon for action on the Italian front. But in order to insure the complete success of this great experiment—an experiment the success of which I believe to be essential to victory for the allied cause—it is necessary that all our great Allies should be represented in its deliberations, and I look forward with confidence to securing the agreements of those two great countries and to their co-operation in the work of this council.

There are two questions which may be asked with reference to the step we have taken. Why are we taking it now? That is easy to answer. For the second question it is more difficult to find a satisfactory answer—why did we not take it before?

NEED FOR GREATER UNITY DEMONSTRATED

I propose to answer both. In regard to the first question, the events of the war have demonstrated, even to the most separatist and suspicious mind, the need for greater unity among the Allies in their war control. The Allies had on their side—in spite of all that has happened they still have at their command—all the essential ingredients of victory. They have command of the sea, which has never yet failed to bring victory in the end to the power that can hold out. On land they have the advantage in numbers, in weight of men and material, in economic and

¹The Russo-German armistice was not signed until a week after the delivery of the speech.

financial resources, and beyond and above all in the justice of their cause. In a prolonged war nothing counts as much as a good conscience. This combined superiority ought ere now to have insured victory for the Allies. At least it ought to have carried them much further along the road to victory than the point which they have yet reached. To the extent that they have failed in achieving their purpose, who and what are responsible? . . .

No, the fault has not been with the armies. It has been entirely due to the absence of real unity in the war direction of the allied countries. We have all felt the need of it. We have all talked about it. We have passed endless resolutions resolving it. But it has never yet been achieved. In this important matter we have never passed from rhetoric into reality, from speech into strategy.

In spite of all the resolutions there has been no authority responsible for co-ordinating the conduct of the war on all fronts, and in the absence of that central authority each country was left to its devices. We have gone on talking of the eastern front and the western front and the Italian front and the Saloniki front and the Egyptian front and the Mesopotamia front, forgetting that there is but one front with many flanks; that with these colossal armies the battlefield is continental.

EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT UNITY

As my colleagues here know very well, there have been many attempts made to achieve strategic unity. Conferences have been annually held to concert united action for the campaign of the coming year. Great generals came from many lands to Paris with carefully and skilfully prepared plans for their own fronts. In the absence of a genuine Inter-allied Council of men responsible as much for one part of the battlefield as for another there was a sensitiveness, a delicacy about even tendering advice, letting alone support for any sector other than that for which the generals were themselves directly responsible. But there had to be an appearance of a strategic whole, so they all sat at the same table and, metaphorically, took thread and needle, sewed these plans together, and produced them to a subsequent civilian conference as one great strategic piece; and it was solemnly proclaimed to the world the following morning that the unity of the Allies was complete.

That unity, in so far as strategy went, was pure make-believe; and make-believe may live through a generation of peace—it cannot survive a week of war. It was a collection of completely independent schemes

pieced together. Stitching is not strategy. So it came to pass that when these plans were worked out in the terrible realities of war the stitches came out and disintegration was complete.

I know the answer that is given to an appeal for unity of control. It is that Germany and Austria are acting on interior lines, whereas we are on external lines. That is no answer. That fact simply affords an additional argument for unification of effort in order to overcome the natural advantages possessed by the foe.

You have only to summarize events to realize how many of the failures from which we have suffered are attributable to this one fundamental defect in the allied war organization. We have won great victories. When I look at the appalling casualty lists I sometimes wish it had not been necessary to win so many. Still, on one important part of the land front we have more than held our own. We have driven the enemy back. On the sea front we have beaten him, in spite of the infamy of the submarine warfare. We have achieved a great deal; I believe we should already have achieved all if in time we had achieved unity.

There is one feature of this war which makes it unique among all the innumerable wars of the past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are blockading two huge empires. It would have been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly grasped the fact that in a siege not only must every part of the line of circumvallation be strong enough to resist the strongest attack which the besieged can bring to bear upon it; more than that, the besieging army must be ready to strike at the weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may be. Have we done so? Look at the facts.

THE GATEWAY TO THE EAST

The enemy was cut off by the allied navies from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence he had been drawing enormous stores of food and material. On the east he was blockaded by Russia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain and Italy. But the south, the important south, with its gateway to the east, was left to be held by the forces of a small country with half the population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by the struggles of three wars and with two treacherous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportunity to knife it when it was engaged in defending itself against a mightier foe.

What was the result of this inconceivable blunder? What would any man whose mind was devoted to the examination of the whole, not merely to one part of the great battlefield, have expected to happen?

Exactly what did happen. While we were hammering with the whole of our might at the impenetrable barrier in the west, the Central Powers, feeling confident that we could not break through, threw their weight on that little country, crushed her resistance, opened the gate to the east, and unlocked great stores of corn, cattle and minerals, yea, unlocked the door of hope—all essential to enable Germany to sustain her struggle.

Without these additional stores Germany might have failed to support her armies at full strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid fighting material were added to the armies which Germany can control—added to her and lost to us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly exhausted its resources for war, cut off from the only possible source of supply, was re-equipped and resuscitated, and became once more a formidable military power, whose activities absorbed hundreds of thousands of our best men in order to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the east. By this fatuity this terrible war was given new life.

Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? The answer is simple. Because it was no one's business in particular to guard the gates of the Balkans.

“TOO LATE”

The one front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed in other spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Russia had a 1,000-mile frontier to guard, and, even if she had not, she could not get through to help Serbia, because Rumania was neutral. It is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were sent when the mischief was complete.

Half of those forces sent in time—nay, half the men who fell in the futile attempt to break through on the western front in September of that year—would have saved Serbia, would have saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of Germany.

You may say that is an old story. I wish it were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial which has been running to this hour. 1915 was the year of tragedy for Serbia; 1916 was the year of tragedy for Rumania. The story is too fresh in our memories to make it necessary for me to recapitulate events. What am I to say? I have nothing but to say that it was the Serbian story almost without a variation. It is incredible when you think of the consequences to the allied cause of the Rumanian defeat. . . .

If you want to appreciate thoroughly how we were waging four wars and not one, I will give you one fact to reflect upon. In 1916 we had the

same conference in Paris and the same appearance of preparing one great strategic plan. But when the military power of Russia collapsed in March, what took place? If Europe had been treated as one battlefield you might have thought that when it was clear that a great army which was operating on one flank and could not come up in time, or even come into action at all, there would have been a change in strategy. Not in the least.

PLANS ESSENTIALLY INDEPENDENT

Their plans proceeded exactly as if nothing had occurred in Russia. Why? Because their plans were essentially independent of each other and not part of a strategic whole. You will forgive me for talking quite plainly because this is no time for concealing or for glossing over facts. War is pre-eminently a game where realities count. This is 1917. What has happened? I wish there had even been some variety in the character of the tragedy. But there has been the same disaster due to the same cause. Russia collapsed. Italy was menaced. The business of Russia is to look after her own front. It is the concern of Italy to look after her own war. "Am I my brother's keeper?" Disastrous! Fatal! The Italian front is just as important to France and Britain as it was to Germany. Germany understood that in time. Unfortunately we did not.

It is no use minimizing the extent of the disaster. If you do, then you will never take adequate steps to repair it. When we advance a kilometer into the enemy's lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can and shall win.

But what if we had advanced 50 kilometers beyond his lines and made 200,000 of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his best guns, with enormous quantities of ammunition and stores? What print would we have for our headlines? Have you an idea how long it would take the arsenals of France and Great Britain to manufacture 2,500 guns?

At this moment the extent to which we can prevent this defeat from developing into a catastrophe depends upon the promptitude and completeness with which we break with our past and for the first time realize in action the essential unity of all the allied fronts. I believe that we have at last learned this great lesson. That is the meaning of this Superior Council. If I am right in my conjectures then this council

will be given real power, the efforts of the Allies will be co-ordinated, and victory will await valor. We shall then live to bless even the Italian disaster, for without it I do not believe it would have been possible to secure real unity. Prejudices and suspicions would have kept us apart. Had we learned this lesson even three months ago what a difference it would have made!

A DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON

I must read to you a message which appeared in *The Times* three days ago from its Washington correspondent. It is a message of the first importance, for, in the words of an old English saying, "Outsiders see most of the game." And these shrewd men in America, calmly observing the course of events from a distance of thousands of miles, have come to conclusions which we would have done well to make ours years ago:

"It is realized here that delicate questions of prestige exist between the great European nations engaged in the war, and that this militates against quick decisions and effective action when these are most needed. It is believed by some of President Wilson's closest advisers that Germany owes much of her success in this war to her unity of control, which permits the full direction of all Teutonic efforts from Berlin. Indeed, it is felt here that unless the Allies can achieve a degree of co-ordination equal to that which has enabled Germany to score her striking, though perhaps ineffectual, successes, she will be able to hold out far longer than otherwise would have been believed possible. American military experts believe that if the allied help rushed to General Cadorna's assistance to stem the tide of invasion had been thrown into the balance when Italy's forces were within 40 miles of Laibach, the Allies would have been able to force the road to Vienna. Victory at Laibach would have spelled a new Austerlitz, and the magnitude of the prize almost within his grasp is believed here to have justified General Cadorna in taking the risk of advancing his center too far and temporarily weakening his left flank. The lack of co-operation between France, Great Britain and Italy is blamed here for the disaster which ensued, and which it is believed would not have occurred if one supreme military authority had directed the combined operations of the Allies with the sole aim of victory without regard to any other considerations."

You may say the American estimate of the possibilities of the Italian front for the Allies is too favorable. Why? It is not for me to express an opinion. I am but a civilian; but I am entitled to point out that the Austrian army is certainly not better than the Italian. On the

contrary, whenever there was a straight fight between the Italians and the Austrians the former invariably won. And the Germans are certainly no better than the British and French troops. When there has been a straight fight between them we have invariably defeated their best and most vaunted regiments. And as for the difficulties of getting there, what we have already accomplished in the course of the last few days is the best answer to that.

THE SECOND QUESTION

But now I will answer the other question—Why was this not said before and why was this not done before? I have said it before, and I have tried to do it before, and so have some of my French colleagues that I see here. For weeks, for months, for years, at committees, at conferences, at consultations, until I almost became weary of the attempt, I have written it where it may be read and will be read when the time comes. I should like to be able to read you the statement submitted to the conference in Rome in January about the perils and the possibilities of the Italian front this year, so that you might judge it in the light of subsequent events. I feel confident that nothing could more convincingly demonstrate the opportunities which the Allies have lost through lack of combined thought and action.

We have latterly sought strenuously to improve matters by more frequent conferences and consultations, and there is no doubt that substantial improvement has been effected. As the result of that conference in Rome and the subsequent consultations, arrangements were made which shortened considerably the period within which aid could be given to Italy in the event of her being attacked. And if the tragedies of Serbia and Rumania are not to be repeated—and I feel assured that they will not, in spite of the very untoward circumstances—it will be because the preparations made as the result of the Rome conference have materially affected the situation. But if there had been real co-ordination of the military efforts of the Allies we should now have been engaged in Italy, not in averting disaster from our Allies, but in the inflicting of disaster upon our enemies. That is why we have come to the conclusion that for the cumbrous and clumsy machinery of conferences there shall be substituted a permanent council whose duty it will be to survey the whole field of military endeavor with a view to determining where and how the resources of the Allies can be most effectively employed. Personally I had made up my mind that, unless some change were effected,

I could no longer remain responsible for a war direction doomed to disaster for lack of unity.

NATIONAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES

The Italian disaster may yet save the alliance, for without it I do not believe that even now we should have set up a real council. National and professional traditions, prestige and susceptibilities all conspired to render nugatory our best resolutions. There was no one in particular to blame. It was an inherent difficulty in getting so many independent nations, so many independent organizations, to merge all their individual idiosyncrasies and to act together as if they were one people. Now that we have set up this council our business is to see that the unity which it represents is a fact and not a fraud.

It is for this reason that I have spoken to-day with perhaps brutal frankness, at the risk of much misconception here and elsewhere, and perhaps at some risk of giving temporary encouragement to the foe. This council has been set up. It has started its work. But particularism will again reassert itself, because it represents permanent forces deeply entrenched in every political and military organization. And it is only by means of public opinion awakened to real danger that you can keep these narrow instincts and interests, with the narrow vision and outlook which they involve, from reasserting their dominance and once more plunging us into the course of action which produced the tragedies of Serbia and Rumania and has very nearly produced an even deeper tragedy for Italy. The war has been prolonged by sectionalism; it will be shortened by solidarity.

If this effort at achieving solidarity is made a reality I have no doubt of the issue of the war. The weight of men, material and morale, with all its meaning, is on our side. I say so, whatever may happen to, or in, Russia. I am not one of those who despair of Russia. A revolutionary Russia can never be anything but a menace to Hohenzollernism. But even if I were in despair of Russia, my faith in the ultimate triumph of the allied cause would remain unshaken. The tried democracies of France, Great Britain and Italy, with the aid of the mighty democracy of the west, must win in the end. Autocracy may be better for swift striking, but Freedom is the best stayer. We shall win, but I want to win as soon as possible. I want to win with as little sacrifice as possible. I want as many as possible of that splendid young manhood which has helped to win victory to live through to enjoy its fruits.

REAL, NOT SHAM, UNITY

Unity—not sham unity, but real unity—is the only sure pathway to victory. The magnitude of the sacrifices made by the people of all the allied countries ought to impel us to suppress all minor appeals in order to attain the common purpose of all this sacrifice. All personal, all sectional, considerations should be relentlessly suppressed. This is one of the greatest hours in the history of mankind. Let us not dishonor greatness with pettiness.

I have just returned from Italy, where I saw your fine troops marching cheerily to face their ancient foes, marching past battlefields where men of their race once upon a time wrought deeds which now constitute part of the romance of this old world—Arcola, Lodi, Marengo. We met the King of Italy on the battlefield of Solferino, and we there again saw French soldiers pass on to defend the freedom which their fathers helped to win with their blood. When I saw them in such environment I thought that France has a greater gift for sacrificing herself for human liberty than any nation in the world. And as I reflected on the sacrifices she had made in this war for the freedom of mankind I had a sob in my heart. You, assembled here to-day, must be proud that you have been called to be leaders of so great a people at so great an hour. And as one who sincerely loves France, you will forgive me for saying that I know that, in the discharge of your trust, you will in all things seek to be worthy of so glorious a land.

FRENCH PREMIER'S INDORSEMENT

Premier Paul Painlevé of France in his speech on the same occasion paid a glowing tribute to the services of Italy to the Allies, declaring that no Frenchman could forget that it was the benevolent neutrality of Italy in 1914 which enabled France to meet the invader with her full strength. Continuing he said:

Now, along every railway, every road, French and British soldiers, guns and munitions are pouring over the Alps. The help will be commensurate with the danger. The Allies must pool all their resources, all their energy, all their will to conquer. One Front, One Army, One Nation—that is the program of the future victory.

After contrasting enemy unity, which entailed brutality and the subjection of one people to another, M. Painlevé continued:

We are free peoples who refuse to accept this subjection. The task of the new Interallied War Committee or Supreme War Council which has just been formed by the great allied nations will be to reconcile this independence with unity of leading. . . . To hold on—that is the whole question. There is no need to count our enemies. The whole matter is to be resolved to make the necessary effort to beat them and to be convinced that we can do it.

The next day Premier Painlevé made a formal statement to both houses of the French Parliament, in which he reviewed the whole situation. It throws additional light on the military situation of the period¹ and resulted in a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, 250 ayes, 192 noes.

Shortly after the favorable vote in the Chamber on the speech that body took up the discussion of the date of the interpellation on the defeatist scandals, involving broadly the Bolo Pasha, Malvy and Caillaux affairs. The ministry insisted on fixing November 30 as the date and the Chamber rejected the proposal, 277 noes to 186 ayes. The Painlevé ministry left the Chamber to resign.

A BRITISH POLITICAL CRISIS

In England the news of the Rapallo agreement and the speech of Lloyd George on November 12 generated the first of a series of political crises due to the fear on the part of a certain section of the House of Commons that the Supreme War Council might curtail the freedom of decision of the chief of the general staff. The matter came up on November 14 when the former premier, Herbert Henry Asquith, asked the premier "whether he would now state the precise functions of the interallied council, and, in particular, of its military staff; whether it was proposed that the council, if so advised by its staff, should have the power to interfere with and override the opinion on matters of strategy of the general staff at home and the commanders-in-chief in the field; whether the military staff of the interallied council was to have intelligence and operations departments, or either of them, of its own; whether the ultimate decision as to the distribution and

¹ For text see Appendix II, page 403.

movement of the various armies in the field was to rest on the council or on the Governments represented on it; and whether opportunity would be given to discuss the proposed arrangements and the statements made in connection therewith in the premier's Paris speech."

Premier Lloyd George in reply said that the best way of answering the question was to read the actual terms of the agreement between the British, French and Italian Governments, which he did. He made a further explanation, saying:

From the foregoing it will be clear that the council will have no executive power, and that the final decisions in matters of strategy, and as to the distribution and movements of the various armies in the field, will rest with the several Governments of the Allies. There will therefore be no operations department attached to the council. The permanent military representatives will derive from the existing intelligence departments of the Allies all the information necessary in order to enable them to submit advice to the Supreme Allied Council. The object of the Allies has been to set up a central body charged with the duty of continuously surveying the field of operations as a whole and, by the light of information derived from all fronts and from all Governments and staffs, of co-ordinating the plans prepared by the different general staffs, and, if necessary, of making proposals of their own for the better conduct of the war.¹

PROPOSED BY MILITARY COMMANDERS

He promised to make a more extended statement on the following Tuesday, and at that time silenced all criticism. Replying to a speech of Mr. Asquith on that day, November 19, Lloyd George said:

Who was the first to suggest the idea? It is rather important I should inform the House, because there has been a good deal of suggestion outside that this is an attempt to interfere with the staffs—an attempt on the part of civilians to interfere with the soldiers. Who was the first to suggest a council of this kind? Lord Kitchener. I have taken trouble to look up the records. In 1915 Lord Kitchener proposed it almost in the

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 390.

very terms in which I recommended it in Paris. That was in 1915, and I have no hesitation in saying if his advice had been carried out—I admit there were difficulties then and that it is easier to do it now than in 1915—but if his advice in 1915 had been carried out by all the Allies, I say without any hesitation we should have been further forward. . . .

The second time it was proposed was in July this year at a meeting of the commanders-in-chief. I forget whether all were there, but all the chiefs of staff were. At any rate, Sir William Robertson, General Pershing, General Cadorna and General Foch were there. They recommended, as a means for dealing with the situation, the setting up of an interallied council. Their proposal was “the realization of unity of action on the western front by the help of a permanent interallied military organization which will study and prepare the rapid movement of troops from one theater to another.” When it is suggested that all this is a device on the part of civilians to get control of strategy I am glad of the opportunity which has been afforded me to quote the authority of these great soldiers as proof that the initiation of the suggestion came from them in the first instance, and not from politicians.

HOW TO CO-ORDINATE

I come to the second point. Having agreed that it is desirable to get some sort of central authority in order to co-ordinate—I use the word [Mr. Asquith] used, there is no better—what is the best method of doing it? He examined three alternatives. I am in complete agreement with him in his views with regard to the first two. The first has been put forward in very responsible quarters, and that is the appointment of a generalissimo, a generalissimo of the whole of the forces of the Allies. . . .

The second suggestion is a suggestion which finds favor, not only in France but in America. America, France, Britain, Italy have agreed to join in this allied council, but, so far as I am able to gauge American opinion by the criticisms which have appeared in responsible newspapers, America would have preferred a council with executive powers—with greater powers. The criticism is not that we have gone too far, but that we have not gone far enough. There has been no criticism in any allied country on the ground that we have gone too far. . . .

The last alternative is the one we have adopted, a council representative of all allied countries with technical advisers drawn from all the allied armies to help the various Governments to co-ordinate their efforts. That is the present proposal. What are the advantages of this proposal

over the present and existing system? The first is that the information which is at the disposal of each of the allied staffs would then be at the disposal of this central council. Nominally that is so now, but it is only nominal. [Mr. Asquith] suggested that we should have something in the nature of *liaison* officers. That is the present system, and I do not believe that any general staff would say that it has at its disposal now all the information which is possessed by every general staff, even with regard to their own front, let alone with regard to the enemy. This central body will have distinguished representatives of each army upon it. Each of these representatives will be supplied with information from his own general staff. They will therefore be able, in the first instance, to co-ordinate information, and information is the basis of good strategy.

MILITARY COUNCIL SITS PERMANENTLY

What is the second point? They would sit continuously; it would be a permanent body. If the House will recollect, those are the very words used by the soldiers in that document which I have read when they recommended the setting up of a central permanent organization. Permanency is an essential part of it. The present system is a sporadic one, where you have got meetings perhaps once every three or four months, and barely that, for there is only one meeting a year between the whole of the staffs—that has been the rule—for the purpose of settling the strategy of the Allies over the whole of the battle fronts, which extend over thousands and thousands of miles, with millions of men in embattled array upon these fronts. A single day, with perhaps a morning added! No generals, however great their intuition, no generals, whatever their genius, could settle the strategy of a year at a sitting which only lasts over five or six hours. Utterly impossible! Therefore it is an essential part of the scheme that this body should be permanent, that they should sit together day by day, with all the information derived from every front before them, with the view to co-ordinating the plans of the general staffs over all the fronts.

COUNCIL SURVEYS WHOLE FIELD

The third point is that it will be the duty of this central body to survey the whole field and not merely a part of it. It may be said that each general staff does that at the present moment. In a sense they are bound, of course, to consider not merely their own front, but other fronts as

well, but it is a secondary matter. They naturally do not devote the same study to other fronts, and there is always a delicacy on the part of any general staff when it comes to interfere with the sphere of another general staff and another general. It is quite natural that they may say, "It is quite as much as we can do to look after our own particular front." There is a delicacy even in making suggestions. . . .

We have come to the conclusion that the mere machinery of *liaison* officers, the mere machinery of occasional meetings of ministers, of occasional meetings of chiefs of the staff, once or twice a year is utterly inadequate, utterly inefficient, for the purpose of securing real co-ordination, and that you must have a permanent body that would be constantly watching these things, constantly advising upon them, constantly reporting upon them to the Governments, whether it is our front, the French front, the Italian front, or the Russian front.

INFORMATION FROM NAVY

Now I come to the next point put by [Mr. Asquith] with regard to the navy. I quite assure [him] that the representation of the navy here is not an afterthought. It is essential that all the information with regard to naval operations and co-operation, it is essential that these military advisers should have someone there constantly in touch with them to inform them about that. It is a different thing from a naval council to co-ordinate naval strategy. There is a good deal to be said for that. We are suffering even in that sphere, as any one who knows what has been happening in the Mediterranean can tell. . . .

Now, if that speech was wrong I cannot plead any impulse. I cannot plead that it was something I said in the heat of the moment. I had considered it, and I did it for a deliberate purpose. I have seen resolutions for unity and for co-ordination. Where are they? You might as well have thrown them straight away into the waste-paper basket. Lord Kitchener tried it on January 28, 1915. I have seen other schemes by M. Briand and [Mr. Asquith], yet, somehow or other, they all came to nought, because naturally you got the disinclination of independent bodies to merge their individualities in a sort of common organization. It is inevitable and I was afraid that this would end in the same sort of way.¹

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 895-898, 899, 901.

III. PROCEEDINGS OF INTERALLIED CONFERENCE

The date first set for the meeting of the Interallied Conference was November 16. But on November 14 the Painlevé ministry in France was overthrown and the reconstitution of the government with Georges Clemenceau as premier and minister of war did not occur until the 19th. England produced a brake to smooth progress when, simultaneously with these events, a drive against Premier Lloyd George began in Parliament for his having supposedly curtailed the power of the general staff by assenting to the Rapallo agreement. His answer on November 19, quoted in part above, silenced his critics. Meantime the head of the American mission then in London gave out for publication the fact that the President had cabled that the United States Government considered unity of plan and control between the Allies and America essential. The effect of this can be appreciated by realizing that as respected supplies America was at the time the Providence of the Allies, as Lloyd George remarked later without any objection from the general staff. With Clemenceau at the head of things in France and the British general staff once more off its feet and down to business, the way was clear for the meeting of the conference.

The Interallied Conference convened on November 29, 1917, at the Quai d'Orsay. That it was an important gathering can readily be seen from the mere list of the principal delegates:

France.—Georges Clemenceau, premier and minister of war; Stephen Pichon, minister of foreign affairs; Louis L. Klotz, minister of finance; Georges Leygues, minister of marine; Etienne Clementel, minister of commerce; Louis Loucheur, minister of munitions; Victor Boret, minister of provisions; M. Lebrun, minister of blockade and invaded region; André Tardieu, high commissioner to the United States; Jean Jules Cambon, general secretary to the Foreign Office; P. de Margerie, director of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Great Britain.—David Lloyd George, premier; Lord Milner, member of the War Cabinet without portfolio; Arthur James Balfour, secretary of state for foreign affairs; Lord Bertie, ambassador to France; Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, first lord of the Admiralty; General Sir William Robertson, chief of the imperial staff at army headquarters; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, chief of the naval staff; Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary to the Committee on Imperial Defense; Lord Reading, special adviser on financial matters.

United States.—William Graves Sharp, ambassador to France; Edward Mandell House, chairman of special mission; Admiral William S. Benson, chief of naval operations; General Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff; Oscar Terry Crosby, assistant secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; Thomas Nelson Perkins of the Priority Board.

Italy.—Vittorio E. Orlando, premier and minister of the interior; Baron Sonnino, foreign minister; Francesco S. Nitti, minister of the Treasury; Count Bonin-Longare, ambassador to France; Signor Bianchi, minister of transports; General Alfredo dall' Olio, minister of munitions; General Cadorna.

Japan.—Viscount Chinda, ambassador to Great Britain; Mr. Matsui.

Belgium.—Baron Charles de Broqueville, foreign minister; Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, minister to France; General Rucquoy, chief of the general staff.

Serbia.—Nikola P. Pachich, premier and minister of foreign affairs; Milenko R. Vesnich, minister to France.

Rumania.—V. Antonescu, minister to France; General Iliescu, chief of the general staff.

Greece.—Elephtherios Constantine Venizelos, premier and minister of war; Athos Romanos, minister to France; Alexander Diomedes, former minister of finance; M. Agyropoulos, governor of Macedonia; Colonel Frantzis; M. Rottassis, naval attaché.

Portugal.—Affonso Costa, premier and minister of finance; Augusto Soares, minister of foreign affairs.

Montenegro.—Eugene Popovich, premier and minister of foreign affairs.

Brazil.—Antonio Olynthe de Magalhaes, minister at Paris.

Cuba.—General Carlos García y Velez, minister at London.

Russia.—Mathieu Sevastopulo, counselor of the embassy at Paris; M. Maklakov, ambassador to France (by special invitation and unofficially, as he had not yet presented his letters).

Siam.—M. Charoon, minister at Paris.

China.—Hu Wei Teh, minister in France; General Tang Tsai Lieh, vice secretary of the general staff of China.

Liberia.—Baron dé San Miguel.

FORMAL ADDRESSES AT THE MEETINGS

In opening the conference Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, said:

Gentlemen, I have the honor of bidding you welcome on behalf of the French Republic. In this the greatest war it is the feeling of the supreme solidarity of the peoples which finds us united in the desire to win upon the field of battle the right to a peace which will really be a peace of humanity. In this way we all here are a magnificent center of hopes, duties and wills, all united for all the sacrifices demanded by the alliance, which no intrigue and no defection can in any way shake. The high passions which animate us we must translate into acts. Our order of the day is to work. Let us work.

The session adjourned immediately after organization was completed and continued the working out of the program in committees composed of the appropriate delegates and the technical experts accompanying them. The final meetings of the Interallied Conference were held on December 3, the committees continuing their activities according to the character and advancement of their labors. At the final session only two speeches were made,

both indicative of the extremely businesslike manner of the whole conference. They were as follows:

EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE, chairman of the American mission: M. Clemenceau, in welcoming the delegates to this conference, declared that we had met to work. His words were prophetic. There have been co-ordination and unity of purpose which promise great results for the future. It is my deep conviction that by this unity and concentrated effort we shall be able to arrive at the goal which we have set out to reach.

In behalf of my colleagues I want to avail myself of this occasion to thank the officials of the French Government, and through them the French people, for the warm welcome and great consideration they have shown us. In coming to France we felt that we were coming to the house of our friends. Ever since our Government was founded there has been a bond of interest and sympathy between us—a sympathy which this war had fanned into passionate admiration. The history of France is the history of courage and sacrifice. Therefore the great deeds which have illuminated the last three years have come as no surprise to us of America. We knew that when called upon France would rise to splendid achievement and would add luster to her name. America salutes France and her heroic sons, and feels honored to fight by the side of so gallant a comrade.

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, premier of France, president of the Interallied Conference: As it is my duty to declare this conference closed, allow me to add a few words to those you have just heard. I came here fully intending to remain silent, so as to leave you under the spell of the impressive words which have just been uttered by my eminent friend, Mr. House, who so worthily represents American eloquence. As I listened to him I could not help thinking that, if there be a lesson to be learned from that historical friendship which to-day again unites in the memory of a glorious past the French and American nations, there is no less instruction in the total abolition of ancient feuds.

In the past we were the friends of America and the enemies of Great Britain. French and British fought bravely and loyally against each other, both on land and sea. The two peoples are to-day united in community of action and friendship. It is no longer a question of great and little nations. 'All peoples fighting for the same ideal of justice and liberty are great, and they will succeed in attaining that ideal by dint of sacrifices soon to be magnificently recompensed.

If I am to believe the newspapers, a guttural voice has made itself heard from the other side of the trenches mocking at this conference. This is no jesting matter. Our enemies, who recognize nothing but brute force, cannot understand us. We are all fighting at the dictates of the conscience of humanity, and wish simply the realization of right, justice and liberty. And we are met together to see that the right we have always sought shall become a reality.

Even if on the other side of the Rhine there is no desire to understand, the world expects our victory and will get it. All the peoples here represented are assisting each other for the success of the greatest of causes. Let us labor to win by our strength the right to peace.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The Department of State published a review of the report filed with it by Mr. House as head of the special American war mission on January 2, 1918. The report, said the Department of State, showed that the mission "succeeded in its purpose of reaching a definite working plan for the prosecution of the war through co-operation of the Governments represented at the conferences held in Paris in the various fields of activity and through marshaling the resources of the nations at war with the Central Powers and co-ordinating their uses under a common authority, thus avoiding the waste and uncertainties that arise from independent action."

The summary of the report is here quoted as the authentic statement of the work done by the Interallied Conference and the second session of the Supreme War Council, November 29-December 3, 1917:

The results of the conferences, as shown in the report, are most gratifying to this Government, first because they indicate that the conferees were inspired by the desire to be mutually helpful, and second because the agreements which were reached, when in full operation, will greatly increase the effectiveness of the efforts now being put forth by the United States and the Allies in the conflict against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

A summary of the results accomplished at their conferences and the recommendations made by the American mission will indicate the value

of the work done and the practical methods which were considered by the conferences and which are recommended in the report. The summary is as follows:

I. DIPLOMATIC

(1) Full and frank discussion between Colonel House as special representative of the Government of the United States and the heads of the British, French and Italian Governments with regard to the war policy of the United States and her associates in the war.

(2) Participation by the members of the mission in a meeting of the British War Cabinet, at which conference a general and useful discussion was had concerning the needs of the Allies and the extent of the assistance to be expected from the United States.

(3) Participation by the United States in an Interallied War Conference, held in Paris on November 29. At this conference all preliminary speeches were dispensed with and within half an hour after the conference had been called to order by M. Clemenceau it had split into committees for work.

(4) Participation by the United States in a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Versailles, December 1. Representatives of England, France, Italy and the United States there met as a first step toward securing unity of control of the armies on the western front. This meeting, the first of its kind, assures for the future unity of support on the part of the United States and the Allies.

(5) First steps taken in the establishment of a more perfect *liaison* between the commanding generals of the United States and the Allies.

II. NAVAL

(1) The formation of an Interallied Naval Council to co-ordinate the operation of the naval forces of the United States and her associates in the war, so that these forces may in the future be operated as one in the prosecution of the war on the sea and in conjunction with the land forces.

(2) An agreement between the British Admiralty and the Navy Department putting into effect certain plans relating to the prosecution of the naval war against the submarines.

(3) The formation of a definite plan for the more active utilization of American naval forces in conjunction with those of nations engaged in the war against the Central Powers.

(4) Agreement with the British Admiralty making it possible for American naval officers to keep fully informed of the operations and policy of the British Admiralty, so that perfect co-operation between the Navy Department and that body is assured.

(5) Reorganization of American naval forces at French ports.

(6) The securing of a full and detailed picture of the naval problem in European waters.

III. MILITARY

(1) After conferences extending over approximately 30 days with the chiefs of staff, members of the general staffs and commanders-in-chief of the allied armies on the western front, as well as with the highest civil officials of the respective Governments, the extent of the military effort to be aimed at by the United States was clearly determined.

(2) With this determination in mind negotiations were carried on looking to the pooling of resources for the mutual advantage of all of the countries engaged in the war against Germany. The contribution of the United States to this pooling arrangement was agreed upon. The contributions, likewise, of the countries associated with the United States were determined. This pooling arrangement guaranteed that full equipment of every kind would be available to all American troops sent to Europe during the year 1918.

(3) Unqualified support to the resolution adopted by the Interallied Conferences looking to the creation of an Allied Advisory Board charged with the duty of advising the shipping authorities of each nation concerning the allocation of tonnage so as to permit the American military effort to be realized.

(4) Full survey made of the problem of debarkation in Europe of American military forces and transportation of such forces and supplies to the bases of military operations.

(5) Arrangements made for fullest co-operation between the United States, Great Britain and France in the production of military instruments and supplies of all kinds.

(6) Plans made for the proper organization under naval and military control of ports of debarkation of troops and discharge of cargoes, looking to the most economical utilization of tonnage.

(7) Participation in military deliberations of the Supreme War Council as a step toward efficient and centralized unity of control of military operations.

IV. FINANCE

(1) Full detailed conferences with the financial representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and Russia, for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of the financial effort necessary on the part of the United States in order properly to co-operate with these Governments in making financial arrangements for the prosecution of the war against the Central Powers.

(2) Conferences with the representatives of the above mentioned countries for the purpose of perfecting the organization of an interallied council, which is a priority board whose duty it should be to consider the relative importance and urgency of the financial demands to be made by the concerted effort of the countries waging war against the Central Powers.

(Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Crosby, the financial member of the mission, remained in Europe to act as president of the interallied council.)

(3) Arrangements begun for the proper financing of purchases by the countries at war with Germany of supplies from neutral countries.

(4) Participation in the financial discussions of the Interallied Conference.

V. SHIPPING

(1) Full and detailed reports were secured showing total loss of tonnage due to war risks and marine risks from August 1, 1914, to September 30, 1917.

(2) The estimated output of new tonnage by the Allies during the year 1918 was ascertained.

(3) The proper employment of existing tonnage so that the maximum utilization of such tonnage could be effected, was provided for in a resolution adopted by the Interallied Conference:

"The Allies, considering that the means of maritime transport at their disposal as well as the provisions which they dispose of should be utilized in common for the pursuit of the war, have decided to create an interallied organization for the purpose of co-ordinating their action to this effect and of establishing a common program constantly kept up to date, enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view of liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops."

(4) The whole question of the employment of neutral tonnage in line with the proposals made by neutral countries with respect to this tonnage was exhaustively discussed and plans looking to the favorable result of tonnage negotiations with neutral countries were substantially agreed upon.

(5) A survey was completed of the ports of debarkation of American troops and supplies, and plans were made looking to the more expeditious discharge of troops and cargoes so as to permit the return of vessels to their home ports with the least possible delay.

VI. WAR TRADE

(1) Full and detailed conferences were held with the British, French and Italian representatives upon blockade matters, and a complete understanding was obtained of the principles under which these countries were proceeding.

(2) A mass of information was obtained with reference to rationing requirements of Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland.

(3) An agreement between the War Trade Board and the Swiss Society of Surveillance was agreed to and executed by the Swiss delegates and Mr. McCormick, the chairman of the War Trade Board.

(4) Arrangements were made for the participation of the United States in the deliberations of the Permanent International Commission on Contingents, sitting in Paris and on the Interallied Commission of Bern, Switzerland.

(5) Tentative plans subject to the approval of the War Trade Board were made for the appointment of representatives and staffs of the War Trade Board in London and Paris.

VII. WAR INDUSTRIES

(1) A detailed study was made of the organization of the British Ministry of Munitions and the supply departments of the British Admiralty and the British War Office, and a complete analysis of the facts and figures in possession of these departments of the British Government was made. The report embodying the results of these investigations contains a full statement of the methods in vogue in England for supplying the army and navy with munitions and other materials, and also statistics relating to the mutual co-operation necessary to be effected for

the proper supplying of the armed forces of the countries waging war on the Central Powers.

(2) A survey was made of the system in practice in Great Britain relating to the letting of Government contracts and the organization of industries throughout Great Britain.

(3) Attendance at the Interallied Conference in Paris and in particular at the meetings of the representatives of the several allied nations having to do with munitions questions.

(4) Full conferences with representatives of the United States Ordnance Department in France and representatives of British and French munitions departments stationed there, resulting in the embodying of conclusions in memoranda submitted to the War Department.

III. Food

(1) A comprehensive and accurate estimate was obtained of the food in the possession of the allied nations and of the amounts that must be supplied by North America during the year ending October 1, 1918. Cabled information had not been of a satisfactory nature and personal contact with the statistical boards and food administrations of the countries concerned was necessary in order that the necessary data could be made available.

(2) The curve of shipments of foodstuffs required from North America for the United Kingdom, France and Italy was fixed for the year ending October 1, 1918. It is believed that the program worked out in the conference with the several interallied executives dealing with supplies of foodstuffs will grant greater facilities for the distribution of foodstuffs at a lower cost in terms of tonnage and transportation.

(3) In order to permit the United States to visualize the problem of food control in North America, plans were worked out whereby the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy agreed to put into effect a legalized and compulsory control of foodstuffs in these countries.

(4) The creation by the Interallied Conference in Paris of an International Scientific Committee on Alimentation, to consist of two representatives each of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.¹ This committee to be in continuous session in Europe for the purpose of studying the alimentation of the Allies. This committee to stand in

¹ A delegate representing Belgium was subsequently added.

an advisory capacity to the food administrations of the aforementioned countries.

(5) Dr. Taylor, the representative of the Food Administration on the mission, represented the United States Department of Agriculture in a conference held in Paris to consider the problems of food production in the allied countries during the year 1918. At this conference, an Interallied Agricultural Committee was established to consist of one delegate each from the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, to sit continuously in Europe and to act in an advisory capacity to the Governments named.

RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO UNITED STATES

(1) That the United States exert all their influence to secure entire unity of effort, military, naval and economic, between themselves and the countries associated with them in the war.

(2) Inasmuch as the successful termination of the war by the United States and the Allies can be greatly hastened by the extension of the United States shipping program, that the Government and people of the United States bend every effort toward accomplishing this result by a systematic co-ordination of resources of men and materials.

(3) That the fighting forces of the United States be dispatched to Europe with the least possible delay incident to training and equipment.

IV. STATEMENTS OF POLICY

The Rapallo meeting in November, 1917, was the first session of the Supreme War Council, resulting in the constituent agreement and the organization of the Board of Military Representatives. Its second session consisted of the meetings at Paris, November 29-December 3, 1917, when the Interallied Naval Council, an allied shipping board, the Interallied Munitions Council, the Interally Council on War Purchases and Finance, the Permanent International Commission on Contingents, the International Scientific Commission on Alimentation and the International Agricultural Committee were either provided for or made subordinate to the council. The third session was held at Paris, January 30-Febru-

ary 2, 1918, and the fourth session at London, March 14-16, resulting in a statement on the Brest-Litovsk "peace."

The fifth session was held May 1-2 at Versailles and elsewhere in France. Naval and military advisers of the Governments, Generalissimo Foch and the commanders-in-chief of the American, British and French armies were present. The meetings were almost wholly concerned with military matters, the officials staying at the British Officers' Club at Abbéville, during the meeting. No official statement is available respecting that meeting.

The sixth session was held at Versailles June 3-4. In addition to the customary statement a second was issued respecting the aspirations of the Polish, Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slavic peoples. The session was attended by the British foreign secretary and Sir William Weir, chief of the British imperial general staff, besides the regular members. The presence of these two officials would suggest that the international political situation and the relation of the forces of the British self-governing dominions were discussed.

The seventh session was held July 2-5, and was followed by a formal statement.

A meeting was held in France, during the week of October 7-12 which was attended by the premiers, foreign ministers, naval and military advisers and others.

A meeting of the Supreme War Council began on October 30 at Versailles. It rapidly developed into an Interallied Conférence, for it was the body which, with naval and military representatives as advisers, fixed the terms of the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and German armistices. "The conferences were attended by ministers representing France, Italy and Great Britain; by Colonel House representing the President of the United States; and by the naval and military advisers of the allied Governments; by representatives of Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Greece and Portugal; and also representatives of the Czecho-Slovaks. The first matter dealt with was the final elimination of Turkey from the war. . . . After the fullest consultation with both naval and military advisers the Supreme War Council agreed upon armistice conditions [for Austria-Hungary]. . . . The Supreme War Council proceeded to

consider the answer which they are making to the President of the United States covering his correspondence with the German Government . . . and the reply they should give to the German request for an armistice. . . . After the fullest deliberation with their naval and military advisers a complete agreement as to conditions was reached among the Allies.”¹

The enemies of Germany have come to look to Versailles for regular statements of their general policy in the conduct of the war. Apparently by agreement the summary of the American report given above did duty for a more formal statement on the first meeting. Since then the statements have been formally issued either from Versailles or London. They have been important guide posts for public opinion and before examining the activities of the committees it will be well if the reader has these to peruse as a whole. The formal statements issued, since the two sessions of the Supreme War Council in connection with the Interallied Conference of November–December, 1917, have been as follows:

THIRD SESSION, JANUARY 30–FEBRUARY 2, 1918

Seven meetings of the third session of the Supreme War Council were held at Versailles, January 30 and 31, February 1 and 2:

In addition to the members of the Supreme War Council itself, namely, Monsieurs Clemenceau and Pichon for France, Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner for Great Britain, Professor Orlando and Baron Sonnino for Italy, and the military representatives of the Supreme War Council, Generals Weygand, Wilson, Cadorna and Bliss, there were also present for the greater part of the purely military discussions the French and British chiefs of general staff, Generals Foch and Robertson, the Italian minister of war, General Alfieri, and the commanders-in-chief on the western front, Petain, Haig and Pershing.

Mr. A. H. Frazier, first secretary of the United States embassy at Paris, was present during the political discussions.

The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterances² of the German chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian

¹ Premier Lloyd George, House of Commons, November 5, 1918.

² See texts of the speeches of January 24, 1918, by Chancellor Hertling for Germany and Count Czernin for Austria-Hungary, *A League of Nations*, Vol. I, No. 3, pages 139–158.

minister of foreign affairs, but was unable to find in them any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by all the allied governments.

This conviction was only deepened by the impression made by the contrast between the professed idealistic aims with which the Central Powers entered upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and their now openly disclosed plans of conquest and spoliation.

Under the circumstances the Supreme War Council decided that the only immediate task¹ before them lay in the prosecution of the war with the utmost vigor and the closest and most effective co-operation of the military effort of the Allies.

This effort must be prosecuted until such time as the pressure of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy Governments and peoples a change of temper which would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on terms which would not involve abandonment, in the face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism, of all the principles of freedom, justice and respect for the law of nations which the Allies are resolved to vindicate.

The decisions taken by the Supreme War Council in pursuance of this conclusion embrace not only a general military policy to be carried out by the Allies in all the principal theaters of the war, but, more particularly, a closer and more effective co-ordination under the council of all the efforts of the powers engaged in the struggle against the Central empires.

The functions of the council itself were enlarged, and the principles of unity of policy and action initiated at Rapallo in November last received still further concrete and practical development. On all these questions a complete agreement was arrived at after the fullest discussion, with regard to both the policy to be pursued and to the measures for its execution.

Complete agreement is thus established both among the Governments and the military chiefs in all necessary directions in order that resolutions on which all agree may receive their full effect.²

¹ In the House of Commons debate on the King's address February 13, 1918, Mr. Holt moved as an amendment to the address:

"But regrets that, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the prosecution of military effort is to be the only immediate task of your Majesty's Government."

The House divided, and there voted for the amendment, 28; against, 159; majority against, 131.

² This and the next two succeeding paragraphs are rendered as follows in the version given out by the British Government:

Hence there exists for all a calm feeling of strength, unfailing by reason of firm confidence in unanimous agreement, not only on arrangements and methods but principally on aims.

A coalition in broad daylight of hearts and wills which pursues no designs other than the defense of civilized peoples against the most brutal attempt at world domination opposes to the violence of the enemy the quiet confidence of the greatest energies unceasingly renewed.

The splendid soldiers of our free democracies have won their place in history by their immeasurable valor, and their magnificent heroism and the no less noble endurance with which our civilian populations are bearing their daily burden of trial and suffering testify to the strength of those principles of freedom which will crown the military success of the Allies with the glory of a great moral triumph.

STATEMENT ON THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE, MARCH 18, 1918

The prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Entente, assembled in London, feel it to be their bounden duty to take note of the political crimes, which under the name of a German peace, have been committed against the Russian people. Russia was unarmed. Forgetting that for four years Germany had been fighting against the independence of nations and the rights of mankind, the Russian Government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected to obtain by persuasion that "democratic peace" which it had failed to obtain by war.

The results were that the intermediate armistice had not expired before the German command, though pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, transferred them *en masse* to the western front and so weak did Russia find herself that she dared to raise no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany's plighted word. What followed was of like character, when "the German peace" was translated into action. It was found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defense, and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—a proceeding which did not differ from "annexation" because the word itself was carefully avoided.

"The Allies are united in heart and will, not by any hidden designs, but by their open resolve to defend civilization against an unscrupulous and brutal attempt at domination. This unanimity is confirmed by a unanimity no less complete both as regards the military policy to be pursued and as regards measures needed for its execution which will enable them to meet the violence of the enemy's onset with firm and quiet confidence, with the utmost energy and with the knowledge that neither their strength nor their steadfastness can be shaken."

The rendering given in the text is a literal translation from the French version as published in Paris.

Meanwhile those very Russians who had made military operations impossible found diplomacy impotent. Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that, while they refused to read the treaty presented to them, they had no choice but to sign it, so they signed it, not knowing whether in its true significance it meant peace or war nor measuring the degree to which Russian national life was reduced by it to a shadow.

For us of the Entente Governments the judgment which the free peoples of the world will pass on these transactions would never be in doubt. Why waste time over German pledges when we see that at no period in her history of conquest—not when she overran Silesia nor when she partitioned Poland—has she exhibited herself so cynically as a destroyer of national independence, the implacable enemy of the rights of man and the dignity of civilized nations?

Poland, whose heroic spirit has survived the most cruel of national tragedies, is threatened with a fourth partition and to aggravate her wrongs, devices by which the last trace of her independence is to be crushed are based on fraudulent promises of freedom.

What is true of Russia and Poland is no less true of Rumania, overwhelmed like them in a flood of merciless passion for domination.

Peace is loudly advertised, but under the thin disguise of verbal professions lurk the brutal realities of war and the untempered rule of a lawless force. Peace treaties such as these we do not and cannot acknowledge. Our own ends are very different. We are fighting, and mean to continue fighting, in order to finish once for all with this policy of plunder and to establish in its place the peaceful reign of organized justice.

As incidents of this long war unroll themselves before our eyes, more and more clearly do we perceive that the battles for freedom are everywhere interdependent; that no separate enumeration of them is needed and that in every case the single, but all-sufficient, appeal is to justice and right.

Are justice and right going to win? In so far as the issue depends on battles yet to come, the nations whose fate is in the balance may surely put their trust in the armies, which, even under conditions much more difficult than the present, have shown themselves more than equal to the great cause intrusted to their valor.

SIXTH SESSION, JUNE 4, 1918

The Supreme War Council has held its sixth session under circumstances of great gravity for the alliance of free peoples. The German Government, relieved of all pressure on its eastern front by the collapse

of the Russian armies and people, has concentrated all its efforts in the west; it is now seeking to gain a decision in Europe by a series of desperate and costly assaults upon the allied armies before the United States can bring its full strength effectively to bear. The advantage it possesses in its strategic position and superior railway facilities has enabled the enemy command to gain some initial successes; it will undoubtedly renew the attacks, and the allied nations may be still exposed to critical days.

After a review of the whole position, the Supreme War Council is convinced that the Allies, bearing the trials of the forthcoming campaign with the same fortitude which they have ever exhibited in the defense of right, will baffle the enemy's purpose, and in due course will bring him to defeat. Everything possible is being done to sustain and support the armies in the field. Arrangements for unity of command have greatly improved the position of the allied armies, and are working smoothly and with success.

The Supreme War Council has complete confidence in General Foch; it regards with pride and admiration the valor of the allied troops. Thanks to the prompt and cordial co-operation of the President of the United States, arrangements which were set on foot more than two months ago for the transportation and brigading of American troops will make it impossible for the enemy to gain a victory by wearing out the allied reserve before he has exhausted his own.

The Supreme War Council is confident of the ultimate result. The allied peoples are resolute not to sacrifice a single one of the free nations of the world to the despotism of Berlin. Their armies are displaying the same steadfast courage which has enabled them on many previous occasions to defeat the German onset. They have only to endure with faith and patience to the end to make the victory of freedom secure. The free peoples and their magnificent soldiers will save civilization.

STATEMENT RESPECTING THE POLISH, CZECHO-SLOVAK AND YUGO-SLAVIC PEOPLES

At a meeting held at Versailles on June 3 the prime ministers of the three allied countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, agreed to the following declarations:

(1) The creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.¹

¹ An Associated Press dispatch of August 19, 1918, stated:

"Brazil has been invited by the Allies to outline her position on the restoration

(2) The allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the secretary of state of the United States Government and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations toward freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav peoples.

SEVENTH SESSION, JULY 2-5, 1918

The Supreme War Council has held its seventh session. It offered its earnest congratulations to the Italian army and people on their memorable defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army. In their judgment, this victory, gained at a critical period of the war, has been an invaluable contribution toward the eventual success of the allied cause.

A feature of the session was the presence during the third meeting of Sir Robert Borden, prime minister of Canada; Mr. W. M. Hughes, prime minister of Australia; Mr. W. F. Massey, prime minister of New Zealand; Mr. W. F. Lloyd, prime minister of Newfoundland, and several other ministers of the overseas Dominions of the British Empire, who were presented by Mr. Lloyd George.

On behalf of the Supreme War Council, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando tendered to these representatives the thanks of the allied nations for the very great services rendered on the battlefield during the war by the troops of the great British colonies.

The Supreme War Council considered the present situation of the war in all its aspects in conjunction with General Foch and its other military advisers, and came to important decisions in regard thereto.

Among those present during the session were M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, M. Pichon, Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Baron Sonnino, General Foch, Sir Henry Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Pershing, and the permanent military representatives at Versailles.

of independence to Poland as one of the conditions of peace. Nilo Pecanha, minister of foreign affairs, has stated that he would not consider any compromise on the part of the Allies on the question of Poland's freedom. Brazil has no choice of roads which may be followed in this matter, he says, having already chosen the right path."

SESSION OF OCTOBER 30–NOVEMBER 10, 1918

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO PEACE TERMS

The allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2 relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.¹

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO FEEDING CIVILIAN POPULATION

The Supreme War Council in session at Versailles desire to co-operate with Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria in the making available as far as possible food and other supplies necessary for the life of the civilian population of those countries.²

ARMISTICE WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 31,
1918, 12 M.³

One—The opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupations of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

Two—The positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes and other ob-

¹ Official U. S. Bulletin, November 6, 1918, page 2. In the newspaper accounts this statement was identified as the 22nd resolution of the Supreme War Council.

² Official U. S. Bulletin, November 6, 1918, page 1.

³ The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: By Great Britain, November 5, 1914; by Italy, August

structions in Turkish waters are to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them, as may be required.

Three—All available information concerning mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated.

Four—All allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners are to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

Five—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except such troops as are required for surveillance on the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. The number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.

Six—The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or in waters occupied by Turkey. These ships will be interned in such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

Seven—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

Eight—Free use by allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Similar conditions are to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for the purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

Nine—The use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

Ten—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

Eleven—Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontier already has been ordered, and will be carried out. A part of Transcaucasia already has been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops. The remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

Twelve—Wireless, telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies. Turkish Government messages to be excepted.

21, 1915; against Rumania, August 29, 1916; holy war against Allies, November 11, 1914.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: By Belgium, October 30, 1914; by France, October 30, 1914; by Greece, July 2, 1917; by United States, April 20, 1917.

The text printed is that given out by the British Government. It differs from the text published in America particularly in that Art. 15 was not included in the cabled version. There were consequent differences in order and numbering.

Thirteen—Prohibition against the destruction of any naval, military or commercial material.

Fourteen—Facilities are to be given for the purchase of coal, oil fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above materials is to be exported.

Fifteen—Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Transcaucasian railways now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

Sixteen—The surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to the nearest allied commander, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause Six.

Seventeen—The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey agrees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

Eighteen—The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenica, including Misurata, to the nearest allied garrison.

Nineteen—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions. Those in remote districts as soon after that time as may be possible.

Twenty—Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of equipment, arms and ammunition, including the transport of that portion of the Turkish army which is demobilized under Clause Five.

Twenty-one—An allied representative to be attached to the Turkish ministry of supplies in order to safeguard allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all aid necessary for this purpose.

Twenty-two—Turkish prisoners are to be kept at the disposal of the allied powers. The release of the Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age is to be considered.

Twenty-three—An obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

Twenty-four—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

Twenty-five—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, Thursday, October 31, 1918.

ARMISTICE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 4, 1918,
3 P.M.¹

MILITARY CLAUSES

One—The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea and air.

Two—Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in Clause Three, below, there shall only be maintained as an Austro-Hungarian military force a maximum of 20 divisions reduced to pre-war effectiveness.

Half the divisional, corps and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

Three—Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war.

Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commanders-in-chief of the allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Zoaller. The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis, and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou), and the watershed of the Cols di Pod-

¹ Official U. S. Bulletin, November 4, 1918. The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: Against Belgium, August 28, 1914; against Japan, August 27, 1914; against Montenegro, August 9, 1914; against Russia, August 6, 1914; against Serbia, July 28, 1914; by China, August 14, 1917; by Cuba, December 16, 1917; by France, August 12, 1914; by Great Britain, August 13, 1914; by Italy, May 24, 1915; by Nicaragua, May 6, 1918; by Panamá, December 10, 1917; by Rumania, August 27, 1916; by Siam, July 22, 1917; by United States, December 7, 1917.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: Against Portugal, March 15, 1916; by Greece, July 2, 1917.

berdo, Podlaniscam, and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg, excludes the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries. From Schneeberg it goes down toward the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tridania, and to the south territory limited by a line from the coast of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastward, so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water courses flowing toward Sebenico, such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Paga and Puntadura, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant'Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza. All territory thus evacuated shall be occupied by the forces of the Allies and of the United States of America.

Maintenance in place of all the military and railway material of the enemy found on the territory to be evacuated. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of all this material (supplies of coal and others included) according to the detailed instructions given by the commanders in chief of the associated powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the associated powers.

Four—The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and water ways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation. The armies of the associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the armies of the associated powers wherever they may be.

Five—Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within the date.

Six—The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be intrusted to the local authorities under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

Seven—The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all allied prisoners of war and internal subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes, on conditions to be laid down by the commanders-in-chief of the forces of the allied powers on the various fronts.

Eight—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

NAVAL CONDITIONS

One—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marine of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Two—Surrender to the Allies and the United States of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.

Three—Surrender to the Allies and the United States with their complete armament and equipment of three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, one mine layer, six Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America.

Four—Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the allied and associated powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allies and associated powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

Five—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Six—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Seven—Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

Eight—Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

Nine—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allies and associated powers to be returned.

Ten—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

Eleven—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and associated powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, declare approval of the above indicated conditions. November 3, 1918.

The representatives of the supreme command of the Austro-Hungarian army:

Victor Weber Edler von Wibenau
Karl Schneller
Y. von Liechtenstein
J. V. Nyekleji
Zivierkowski
Victor Freiherr von Seiller
Kamillo Ruggera

The representatives of the supreme command of the Italian army:

Pietro Badoglio
Scipione Scipioni
Tullio Marchetti
Pietro Gazzera
Pietro Maravigna
Alberto Pariani
Francesco Accinni

ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 11, 1918, 11 A.M.¹

Convention between Marshal Foch, commander-in-chief of the allied armies, acting in the name of the allied and associated powers, with Admiral Wemyss, first sea lord, on the one hand; and

Herr Erzberger, secretary of state, president of the German delegation, Count von Oberndorff, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Major-General von Winterfeldt,

Captain Vanselow (German navy),
duly empowered and acting with the concurrence of the German chancellor, on the other hand,

An armistice has been concluded under the following conditions:

A.—MILITARY CLAUSES ON WESTERN FRONT

One—Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two—Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as also Alsace-Lorraine, so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note ² (Appendix I) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

Three—Repatriation beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

¹ As revised by the military authorities. The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: By Brazil, October 26, 1917; by China, August 14, 1917; by Cuba, April 7, 1917; by and against France, August 3, 1914; against Belgium, August 4, 1914; by Great Britain, August 4, 1914; by Greek Provisional Government, November 23, 1916; by Greece (Government of Alexander), July 2, 1917; by Guatemala, April 21, 1918; by Haiti, July 12, 1918; by Honduras, July 19, 1918; by Italy, August 28, 1916; by Japan, August 23, 1914; by Liberia, August 4, 1917; by Nicaragua, May 6, 1918; by Panamá, April 7, 1917; by Portugal (intervention as English ally), November 23, 1914; against Portugal, March 9, 1916; by Serbia, August 6, 1914; by Siam, July 22, 1917; by United States, April 6, 1917.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: Bolivia, April 14, 1917; Ecuador, December 7, 1917; Perú, October 5, 1917; Uruguay, October 7, 1917.

² Appendix I specifies the details and times of evacuation of stated sectors and of the delivery of war material (*Holland News*, II, 2393-2394).

Four—Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 *minenwerfer*, 1,700 fighting and bombing aéroplanes—primarily all the D. 7's and all the night bombing-machines. The above to be delivered *in situ* to the allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure number one) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

Five—Evacuation by the German armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories by allied and United States troops will be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometers deep, from the Dutch frontier to the Swiss frontier. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note (annexure number one) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Six—In all territories evacuated by the enemy all evacuation of inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in military measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions and equipment which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

Seven—Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain so employed; 5,000 complete locomotives, 150,000 wagons

in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in annexure number two¹ and total of which shall not exceed 31 days. There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (camione automobiles) in good condition within 36 days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system. Further, working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals and repair shops shall be left *in situ*, and kept in an efficient state by Germany, as far as the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine are concerned. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note annexure number two regulates the details of these measures.

Eight—The German command must reveal, within 48 hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delay-action engines on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

Nine—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten—The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial and convicted. The allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls all previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification.² However, the repatriation of German prisoners

¹ Appendix II relates to communications. Instructions for meetings of representatives of both sides, in accordance with its Art. 1, to arrange for the extended operations of the Interallied Commission of Railways in the Field and the Interallied Commission of Navigation in the Field, and for the taking over of Belgian railroad, waterway, telephone and telegraph systems were published in the *London Times*, November 14, 1918, page 6.

² An Agreement between the British and German Governments concerning combatant Prisoners of War and Civilians (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office). Miscellaneous No. 20 (1918), Cd. 9147.

of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Eleven—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the necessary material required.

B.—DISPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

Twelve—All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in the territory which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to these frontiers of Germany, as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, account being taken of the internal situation of these territories.

Thirteen—Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents now on the territory of Russian frontiers as existing on August 1, 1914, to be recalled.

Fourteen—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measure with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

Fifteen—Denunciation of the treaties of Bukharest and Brest-Litovsk, and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

C.—EAST AFRICA

Seventeen—Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

D.—GENERAL CLAUSES

Eighteen—Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed of all interned civilians including hostages and persons under trial and convicted, who may be subjects of other allied or associated states other than those enumerated in Art. Three.

Financial Clauses

Nineteen—With the exception of any future concessions and claims by the Allies and United States of America: Repair of damage done.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be held in trust by the Allies until the signature of peace.

E.—NAVAL CONDITIONS

Twenty—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, without raising questions of neutrality.

Twenty-one—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two—The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States of all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and equipment and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.

Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designed for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of 14 days after the signing of the armistice.

Twenty-three—German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States, shall be immediately dismantled and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, in default of them, in allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain under the surveillance of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The following warships are designated

by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), 50 destroyers of the most modern types. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely dismantled and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military equipment of all vessels of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

Twenty-four—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and to destroy obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Kattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up and destroy all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated by Germany, who shall be permitted to raise no question of neutrality.

Twenty-six—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Twenty-seven—All aërial forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight—In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and intact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

Twenty-nine—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and

other material of all kinds seized in those ports are to be handed over and German materials as specified in Art. Twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty—All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored to ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, delivery or restoration.

Thirty-two—The German Government shall formally notify all the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for special concessions, such as the export of ship-building materials, or not, are immediately canceled.

Thirty-three—No transfer of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag is to take place after signature of the armistice.

F.—DURATION OF ARMISTICE

Thirty-four—The duration of the armistice is to be 36 days with option to extend. During this period, if its clauses are not carried into execution, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning 48 hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of Arts. Three and Eighteen shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is recognized. This commission¹ will act under the supreme authority of the high command, military and naval, of the allied armies.

The present armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, at 5 o'clock, A.M., French time. F. Foch, R. E. Wemyss, Erzberger, A. Oberndorff, Winterfeldt, Vanselow.

¹The commission met first at Spa.

APPENDIX.

I. ANNOUNCEMENT OF AMERICAN MISSION TO EUROPE, NOVEMBER 8, 1917¹

The Government of the United States will participate in the approaching conference of the powers waging war against the German Empire and has sent as its representative Edward M. House, who is accompanied by Admiral William S. Benson, chief of naval operations; General Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff, United States Army; Oscar T. Crosby, assistant secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; Bainbridge Colby, United States Shipping Board; Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor, representing the Food Controller; Thomas Nelson Perkins, representing the Priority Board; and Gordon Auchincloss, as secretary.

The conference is essentially a "war conference," with the object of perfecting a more complete co-ordination of the activities of the various nations engaged in the conflict and a more comprehensive understanding of their respective needs in order that the joint efforts of the co-belligerents may attain the highest war efficiency. While a definite program has not been adopted, it may be assumed that the subjects to be discussed will embrace not only those pertaining to military and naval operations, but also the financial, commercial, economic, and other phases of the present situation which are of vital importance to the successful prosecution of the war.

There will undoubtedly be an effort to avoid any conflict of interests among the participants; and there is every reason to anticipate that the result will be a fuller co-operation, and consequently a much higher efficiency, and a more vigorous prosecution of the war.

The United States in the employment of its man power and material resources desires to use them to the greatest advantage against Germany. It has been no easy problem to determine how they can be used most effectively since the independent presentation of requirements by the allied Governments have been more or less conflicting on account of

¹Official Bulletin, November 8, 1917.

each Government's appreciation of its own wants, which are naturally given greater importance than the wants of other Governments. By a general survey of the whole situation and a free discussion of the needs of all the approaching conference will undoubtedly be able to give to the demands of the several Governments their true perspective and proper place in the general plan for the conduct of the war.

Though the resources of this country are vast and though there is every purpose to devote them all, if need be, to winning the war, they are not without limit. But even if they were greater, they should be used to the highest advantage in attaining the supreme object for which we are fighting. This can only be done by a full and frank discussion of the plans and needs of the various belligerents. It is the earnest wish of this Government to employ its military and naval forces and its resources and energies where they will give the greatest returns in advancing the common cause. The exchange of views which will take place at the conference and the conclusions which will be reached will be of the highest value in preventing waste of energy and in bringing into harmony the activities of the nations which have been unavoidably acting in a measure independently.

In looking forward to the assembling of the conference it can not be too strongly emphasized that it is a war conference and nothing else, devoted to devising ways and means to intensify the efforts of the belligerents against Germany by complete co-operation under a general plan, and thus bring the conflict to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

II. STATEMENT OF PAUL PAINLEVÉ, PREMIER, IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 13, 1917

The grave events which have taken place in the last few weeks impose on the Government the duty of submitting this declaration to both Chambers.

On the one hand, the extremists in Petrograd have temporarily made themselves masters of the city, and although the latest news gives ground for thinking that the provisional Government has been able to re-establish its authority, the effects of such a shock will continue to be felt for some time.

On the other hand, the relative freedom which the Russian armies are leaving to the German armies on the eastern front is allowing the latter to detach a certain number of divisions against Italy. The Italian northeastern front has been broken in in circumstances which remain

obscure. The second Italian army, which some weeks earlier gained a brilliant victory on the Bainsizza plateau, has suffered considerable losses in a grievous retreat, and Venetia has been opened to invasion. This grave and unexpected situation called for immediate measures.

At the very earliest moment and without awaiting any appeal, French troops hurried up and took their place upon the Italian front with a precision and rapidity which filled all those who had the opportunity of witnessing it with admiration. To-day it is the British contingents that are spreading out beyond the Alps. The measures taken cannot be better summed up than in the statement that from the very first moment when the gravity of the situation became manifest not a moment was lost.

It was a fresh opportunity for the stout-heartedness and clear judgment of the nations to display themselves. Neither at the front nor at the rear was a word of recrimination raised because France, herself still invaded, was sending thousands of her children beyond the Alps. Everyone understood that in acting thus she was not only fulfilling loyally and spiritedly her duties as an Ally, but that, by giving her soldiers to fight in those parts of Italy where every name recalls some glorious victory, she was defending the outposts of her own frontiers.

Such events emphasize better than any theoretical reasoning the magnitude of the duties faced by the nations whose armies have charge of the vast western front, stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic. They can fulfil their immense task only by close union in their plans, by a thorough inter-connection between their armies, by the pooling and harmonious adjustment of all their resources. The Government program which Parliament approved two months ago declared, in speaking of the country's Allies:

"Combatants of yesterday or to-day, drawn together by the same sacred cause, they must act as if they constituted a single nation, a single army, a single front. Since the defeat of any one of them would be the defeat of all, and since victory would be the victory of all, they should put their men, their armies, and their money into a common stock."¹

That program we have from the outset done our utmost to realize. To it we have devoted all our efforts; for on its realization victory depends. These last few weeks have only made our duty more urgent.

And now I come to the results we have obtained. In order to realize unity of military action, Great Britain, France and Italy have agreed on the establishment of an interallied committee, which will be known as the Supreme War Council [*Conseil supérieure de guerre*]. We have no

¹ *Journal officiel. Chambre des députés.* September 18, 1917, 2323.

doubt that the United States, whose troops are called to fight upon the same front, will give this council its adhesion. As regards the other fronts, further negotiations will be conducted with Russia and Japan.

PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL

The purpose of the council is not to direct military operations in detail but to shape the general policy of the war and the general plans of the Allies by adapting them to the resources and means available in such manner as to insure those means yielding the best results. It is to comprise two representatives of each Government and to meet normally in France at least once a month. It will rely upon the permanent inter-allied general staff, which will be both its central intelligence organ and its technical adviser. The decisions of such a council can have no tinge of particularism. They will embrace the field of battle as a whole. They will be subject to ratification by the respective Governments, and already we hear the objection: "What we want is a single command, and not a consultative committee."

No plan escapes criticism, and I am far from saying that ours constitutes the last step in the line of the progress that has to be made, but in such matters the wisest course is to realize immediately what is possible without making the attainment of the best an excuse for waiting for months without achieving anything.

If unity of command is one day possible, and is really efficacious, its exercise will require just such an interallied general staff as has now been created. Perhaps even the working of the Supreme War Council will lead to the institution of that unity of command without its being so called, which is better than having the word without having the thing.

In fact, the creation of this Supreme War Council is regarded by the British and Italian Governments as an immense step forward, which others may follow. The language of their whole press-shows that the Italians have derived from this new creation a big source of comfort and enthusiasm, while the judgment of the British may be summed up in Mr. Lloyd George's dictum: "The war has been prolonged by sectionalism; it will be shortened by solidarity."

Another problem in the military domain which urgently calls for the attention of Parliament is that of the extension of the British front.

A preliminary agreement has just been reached between the two commanders-in-chief, with the authority of the two Governments, and

will be carried out at a very early date which it would be inadvisable to specify.

Besides this, the victory on the Aisne, one of the most brilliant of this war, by its rectification of our front and its improvement of our positions places some divisions at our disposal.

But every one in this house understands that at such a time and in the face of the military developments now taking place there can be no question of removing fresh classes from the front.

Germany is attempting a desperate effort with all her available forces to obtain before the end of the year a showy victory, which she might hope would be decisive. This supreme effort of the enemy must be met by a supreme effort on the part of France and her Allies without abandoning a scrap of our military strength.

COMMON FOOD SUPPLIES

But it is not only in the military domain; it is in every domain, and in particular in the economic domain, that the Government has endeavored to realize a systematic co-ordination and complete solidarity with our Allies. The negotiations which we have just been conducting with the British Government aimed at assuring a full and regular co-operation between the two Governments for the provisioning of both countries, as well as of Italy and of our European Allies. Great Britain and France have arrived at a complete agreement, which will be put into execution at once. In virtue of this agreement, the allied countries will in future constitute but a single country from the point of view of food supplies and imports indispensable to their existence.

Great Britain has never hesitated before the division of resources, which she regards as one of the essential duties of the alliance, but hitherto the measures taken have been provisional measures for immediate aid. The agreement arrived at for the future replaces such immediate aid, given to meet an imminent danger, by the common execution of a concerted program, thanks to which, provided we discipline ourselves and are ready to impose upon ourselves the same sacrifices and restrictions as our Ally is going to impose upon herself, all fear of a crisis suddenly yawning before us will be averted in advance. The country must make up its mind that these restrictions are indispensable if the necessary tonnage is to be freed for the transport of American troops in great numbers.

The collaboration of the Government of the United States is indispensable to the development of this policy of co-operation, which is imposed

by events. Everybody knows the daily efforts of the federal Government, under the direction of President Wilson, to bring to the Allies and especially to France not only the military but the economic aid of the great American nation. We are certain that the next interallied conference, to which America has specially delegated Colonel House as its eminent representative, will contribute to the final realization of unity of action in the economic and financial fields.¹ . . .

III. DIPLOMATIC UNITY OF ACTION

At a conference held in Paris March 27-28, 1916, the representatives of the allied Governments affirmed "the entire community of views and solidarity of the Allies," by which they meant, besides military and diplomatic unity, "diplomatic unity of action, which is guaranteed by their unshakable determination to pursue the struggle to the victory of their common cause."

An editorial in the *London Times*, September 20, 1918, suggested the creation of a diplomatic council—"a sort of political Versailles"—to give unity of political command under the Supreme War Council. This suggestion drew forth discussion. The writer signing himself "Pertinax" in the *Echo de Paris* said:

"A Government can pool its armies, ships, economic resources and so on. It cannot altogether alienate its freedom of judgment, cannot withdraw from the daily changing influence of public opinion. Do what one may, there are certain decisions which will never be taken at Versailles. To ignore this would be to defeat the end in view. The innovation should be confined to:

"1. More frequent meetings between allied ministers.

"2. The participation by American plenipotentiaries in these meetings, a measure which Mr. Wilson has hitherto declined to take.

"3. The creation of offices for the centralization of all information received by the various Governments concerning current events, thus assuring that, if the decisions are not everywhere

¹ Translated from *Journal officiel, Chambre des députés*. Séance du 13 Novembre 1917, 2940-2942; *ibid.*, *Sénat*, 978-979.

identical, at any rate the problems shall be formulated everywhere in identical terms.

"4. The creation of 'small executives' for the application in a strictly defined field—for instance, in the field of Russian affairs—of decisions taken in common."

The *Temps* was of the opinion that the best means would be that which has succeeded so well in securing military unity—namely, an interallied organ of information, studies and preparation. *Le Pays* thought that if an organ of diplomatic unity were already in existence, the Allies might have sent a collective reply to the Austrian proposal.

The Italian *Corriere della Sera* of Milan remarked that the privileged position of the United States, which is not bound by special agreement with the other powers of the Entente, permitted Mr. Wilson to dictate a reply to Austria before the Entente leaders had time to meet. The paper added that unfortunately before creating a diplomatic Versailles the Entente Governments were obliged to determine the big lines of a common Entente policy, and have not yet been able to seek a solution of problems which ought to have been solved at the beginning of the war."

This discussion had not resulted in any definite action up to mid-October. Political decisions of the Supreme War Council must take into consideration the terms of the following engagements:

I. DECLARATION BY WHICH GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN AND RUSSIA ENGAGE NOT TO CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE PRESENT WAR¹

The Italian Government having decided to accede to the Declaration between the British, French and Russian Governments, signed at London on the 5th September, 1914, which Declaration was acceded to by the Japanese Government on the 19th October, 1915,² the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:

¹Treaty Series No. 14 (1915).

²Treaty Series No. 9 (1915).

The British, French, Italian, Japanese and Russian¹ Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war.

The five Governments agree that, when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quintuplicate, this 30th day of November, 1915.

(L.S.) E. GREY.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

(L.S.) IMPERIALI.

(L.S.) K. INOUYÉ.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORF.

2. DECLARATION OF THE ALLIED GUARANTEEING POWERS TO BELGIUM, HAVRE, FEBRUARY 14, 1916²

a. MINISTERS OF FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The allied powers signatory to the treaties guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium have decided to renew to-day by solemn act the agreements made regarding your country, which has been heroically faithful to its international obligations. Consequently we, the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia, duly authorized by our Governments, have the honor to make the following declaration:

"The allied and guaranteeing powers declare that when the moment comes the Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in peace negotiations, they will not put an end to hostilities without Belgium having re-established its political and economic independence."³

¹Russia was still an allied state for the purposes of the war, said the British secretary of state for foreign affairs in reply to a question in Parliament on January 21, 1918. He added that the position taken up by Russia at the present time with reference to the pact of London did not affect the validity of the treaties so far as he knew. (*London Times*, January 22, 1918, page 10.)

²New York *Times*, February 17, 1916.

³The Italian minister, although Italy was not among the powers which guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium, stated that his Government had no objections to the foregoing declaration. A similar announcement was made on behalf of the Japanese Government.

b. BARON BEYENS, BELGIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE MINISTERS
OF THE ALLIES

The Government of the King is profoundly grateful to the Governments of the three powers guaranteeing the independence of Belgium of which you are representatives for their generous initiative in making known to-day this declaration. I thank you heartily in its behalf. Your words will have a vibrating echo in the hearts of Belgians, whether they are fighting at the front, suffering in their occupied country, or awaiting in exile—and all with the same courage—the hour of deliverance. The new assurance which you have just given will confirm their unshakeable conviction that Belgium will be restored from its ruins and re-established in its complete political and economic independence.

I am certain that I express their sentiments in telling you that you must have complete confidence in us, as we have confidence in our loyal guarantors, for we are all resolved to continue the struggle energetically with them until the triumph of the right, for defense of which we sacrificed ourselves after the unjustifiable violation of our beloved country.

3. STATEMENT OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL RESPECTING THE POLISH,
CZECHO-SLOVAK AND YUGO-SLAVIC PEOPLES

This statement is printed above, pages 386–387.

4. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND THE MURMAN COUNCIL ¹

The General Assembly of the Murman Regional Council has sanctioned without opposition the following agreement, which is temporary in character and made necessary by special circumstances, between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, and the Presidium of the Murman Regional Council:

Item 1. The present agreement, which has to be sanctioned by the Governments of the Allies, is concluded between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, on the one side, and the representatives of the Murman Regional Council, on the other side, with the object of securing co-ordinated action on the part of those who have signed this agreement, for the defense of the Murman region against the powers of the German coalition. For the purpose of obtaining this aim both the signing parties take upon themselves the obligation to support each other mutually.

¹ London *Times*, July 24, 1918, page 6.

Item 2. The Murman region is composed of the former Alexandrovsk district of the province of Archangel.

Item 3. All detachments of Russian armed forces of the Murman region, alike those which already exist and those which will be formed, will be under the direction of the Russian military command appointed by the Murman Regional Council. (Remark.—It is recognized as very desirable that an independent Russian army should be created, but with the object of obtaining more speedily the principal aim of this agreement the admission of Russian volunteers into the allied forces is permitted. In the case of such admissions it is to be taken as recognized that of these volunteers no independent Russian detachments shall be formed, but that, as far as circumstances permit, the detachments should be composed only of an equal number of foreigners and Russians.)

Item 4. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France will give to the Russian command necessary help in equipment, supplies and transports and for the instruction of the Russian armed forces which are formed.

Item 5. The whole authority in the internal administration of the region belongs without qualification to the Murman Regional Council.

Item 6. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France and their agents will not interfere in the home affairs of the region. In all matters in which it may be found necessary to have the support of the local population, the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France and their agents will address themselves to the respective Russian authorities and not directly to the population, excepting in the belt along the front in which the orders of the military command, justified by the conditions of field service, must be obeyed unconditionally by all. The Murman region will be determined by the Murman Regional Council, which will take into consideration the state of war in which the region is involved and the necessity for most energetic precaution against espionage. Salaries and the standard of labor productivity will be established by the Murman Regional Council.

Item 7. In view of the impossibility of importing the necessary food from Russia the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise, as far as it shall be possible, to secure food to the Murman Regional Council for the whole population of the region, including all immigrant workmen with their families, the

rations to equal in food value the rations which the privates of the allied armed forces in Murman are receiving.

Item 8. The distribution of food among the population is to be carried out by trustworthy Russian troops.

Item 9. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise to secure, as far as may be possible, the importation of manufactured goods and other articles of the first necessity.

Item 10. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise as far as it may be possible to secure to the Murman Regional Council all necessary materials and implements for technical equipment and supplies so that it may carry out its program of construction which has been elaborated by mutual agreement. In this agreement, first, the requirements of war-time are taken into consideration; secondly, the development of international trade intercourse; and, thirdly, the local fisheries.

Item 11. All expenses which may be incurred by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France as the result of this agreement are to be set down to the account of the respective Powers.

Item 12. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France recognize that their Governments must give the necessary financial assistance to the Murman Regional Council.

Item 13. The present agreement comes into force from the moment of its ratification¹ by the Murman Regional Council and will remain in force as long as normal relations between the Russian central authority on the one side and the Murman Regional Council and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France on the other side, are not re-established.

Item 14. Before signing this agreement the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, in the name of their Governments, again affirm the absence of any purpose of conquest in respect to the Murman region as a whole or in regard to any of its parts. The Presidium of the Murman Regional Council, before the Russian people and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, declares that the only object of this agreement is to guard the integrity of the Murman Region for a Great United Russia.

¹The agreement was sanctioned by the Murman Regional Council on July 7.

The original of this agreement has been signed by the Presidium of the Murman Regional Council and by the representatives of the above-named Powers.

5. DECISIONS RESPECTING JOINT ACTION IN SIBERIA

a. DECLARATION OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, AUGUST 2, 1918

The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy re-establishment of order in Russia and of the healthy, untrammelled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the central European empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenseless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country, and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian Far Eastern possessions.

They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume the position of command. The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race, and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern.

In the presence of the danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events, and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok.

The Government of the United States, equally sensible to the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for the early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok.

In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and

of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects here indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from the Russian territories, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.

b. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AUGUST 4, 1918¹

In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distresses.

Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and

¹ Official Bulletin, August 4, 1918.

Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks; and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary

or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

6. INTERNATIONAL COUNCILS IN RUSSIA

In order to co-ordinate the efforts of the Allies and the United States in Russia, an American official dispatch from France on August 22, 1918, announced the decision to create two international councils, one at Archangel, including the Entente ambassadors under the presidency of American Ambassador Francis, and the other at Vladivostok, to be composed of five high officials.

On the Vladivostok council Great Britain is represented by Sir Charles Norton Edgumbe Eliot; France by Eugène Regnault, former ambassador to Japan; and Japan by Mr. Matsudaira. An American representative had not been named, but Mr. Caldwell, the American consul, was serving.

Ambassador Francis presides over the work of the Archangel commission as dean of the diplomatic corps there.

These councils, it is understood, act as diplomatic representatives in dealing with the independent Russian Government in Siberia and on the Murman coast and pave the way for the great economic and industrial commissions organizing to aid in the rehabilitation of Russia. The councils relieve the military leaders operating from Vladivostok and in the Archangel territory of all nonmilitary work. Their first task was to aid in the re-establishment of civil government in regions entirely disorganized as a result of Bolshevism.

JAPAN, AMERICA AND THE GREAT WAR.

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I. WHY JAPAN ENTERED THE GREAT WAR

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war upon Germany. She was thus the fourth of the Allies to enter the Great War, and the first power outside of Europe.¹ Four days later Austria-Hungary declared war on her. Japan later was one of the five powers to adhere to the pact of London, joining with Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy in a declaration not to make a separate peace. Thus Japan, from the early days of the war, was one of the Allies in the strictest sense of the term.

The reason for Japan's action is not hard to find. Primarily it was based upon a fine sense of honor and the readiness in the fullest sense to meet the obligations of a treaty. In this respect the contrast between the conduct of Germany and of Japan is sharply defined from the beginning. But as human actions are rarely the result of single factors, so there were other underlying motives, in which the conduct of Germany in the Far East and the development of Japan's Asiatic policy were involved.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was first formulated in 1902.² It was the direct result of the Far Eastern policy of Russia, which threatened the interests of both powers in North China and Korea. During the Boxer uprising in 1900 and the subsequent negotiations, British and Japanese military and diplomatic representatives worked in harmony, and thus a good understanding paved the way for a formal alliance. This was a surprising step for Great Britain to take. It was the first alliance entered into

¹ For texts of the ultimatum and rescript declaring war see Appendix I, p. 443.

² The text of the alliance and the history of its origin are given in *The Background of the War*, 202-204, 242-246 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 4).

by her since the Crimean War, and it brought to an end the days of her proud isolation. It proved to be but the first step in her new foreign policy, and soon was followed by the French entente in 1904 and the Russian entente in 1907. And all three of them served to unite the four great powers in an understanding which reacted immediately to the German threat in 1914. But in many quarters, the alliance was denounced as an unprecedented union of a western and an eastern state, a Christian and a Pagan one, and Germany has never lost an opportunity to dwell upon the treason of Great Britain to the cause of "civilization." The first treaty called for joint action only when two powers combined to threaten the interests of Britain or Japan in the East, and this gave Japan the assurance that should Russia attack her, Great Britain, controlling the seas, would "hold the ring" and see that no other European power intervened, as had been the case after the Chino-Japanese War in 1895. And this is exactly what happened. Although the Kaiser sympathized with Russia during the Japanese War and deliberately broke international law in order to help coal the Russian fleet,¹ yet he dared not openly join her so long as Britain was ready to meet her obligations under the Japanese alliance.

It might be added that there was some question among Japanese statesmen as to whether an English or a Russian alliance would be most helpful. Prince Ito believed it would be better to ally with Russia, to work with her and endeavor to avoid friction. But the Japanese cabinet believed, and wisely, that Japan had far more in common with Great Britain than with the then government of Russia, which had already shown its cynical disregard for its plighted word.

During the Russo-Japanese War, 1905, the terms of the alliance were altered, and now both parties would join forces if the interests of either were attacked, and as the scope of the alliance extended to India it now became possible for Britain to reduce greatly her eastern fleet and commence the concentration in the North Sea which served so well in 1914. The last renewal of

¹ Herman Bernstein, *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 57-59, 60-73, 78-81, 90-102 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1918).

the alliance was in 1911 and the terms were again altered in order to permit the operation of arbitration treaties, and especially those which the United States had proposed to the powers.

Since 1902 the alliance with Great Britain has been the corner stone of Japanese foreign policy. In spite of criticism on the part of certain British and Japanese journalists and of narrow-minded politicians in both countries, the statesmen of the two empires have realized the value of this compact, which, as the Japanese liked to say, assured the peace of the Far East. And the existence of this agreement was often overlooked during the period of friction between Japan and the United States before the Great War. Japan, allied with Great Britain, could hardly think of forcing any issue with the country with which Britain had most in common. Instead of seeking to make trouble, Japan, as we shall see, sought to improve her good relations with the two great English-speaking powers.

The vital clause of the alliance provided that, should the territorial rights or special interests of either power in Eastern Asia or India be threatened, the two allies would unite in their defense. If the Japanese had been inclined to a strict interpretation of their obligations it would have been easy to assert that the presence of German raiders in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the existence of a German base on the coast of China did not seriously affect the territorial rights of Britain, and that only when India or the other eastern possessions of Great Britain were attacked would Japan have to intervene. But if this idea ever occurred to the Japanese statesmen it certainly did not delay their action. And in addition to the formal obligations of the alliance it was felt that Japan's own interests prompted her to enter the world war.

GERMANY IN THE FAR EAST

For the past 20 years Germany had been the stormy petrel of Far Eastern politics. It was Germany that arranged for the triple demonstration of Germany, Russia and France at the close of the Chino-Japanese War, which robbed Japan of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula. It was Germany that commenced

the vicious circle of territorial demands on China, when, with the worst excuse in the world, she extorted the lease of the fine port of Kiaochow, just across the Yellow Sea from Japan. It was the Kaiser who gave to the world the bogey of the "Yellow Peril." It was Germany who behaved so badly during the Boxer uprising and the peace negotiations. It was believed that it was the Kaiser who encouraged the Tsar in his fatal Manchurian policy, which cost Japan so much in blood and treasure. And at Tsingtao (the city on the Bay of Kiaochow) Germany had built up a strong naval base which might be used for strengthening her hold upon China, or even against Japan herself. Japan, therefore, had no love for Germany. With Germany she had been able to come to no understanding, although she had an alliance with Great Britain and ententes with France and Russia. The elimination of Germany from China would fit in with Japan's new policy of checking foreign aggression there. But without the Anglo-Japanese alliance it is very doubtful if Japan would have promptly entered the European War. In my mind there is no doubt that Japan would soon have been drawn into it when Germany began her raids upon neutral shipping. But the idea that at any time Japan would have joined with Germany against the Allies is so absurd that it existed only in German minds or in the minds of German sympathizers. The last power in the world, of all the belligerents, that Japan would have fought was Great Britain. And as we have seen, she had understandings with both France and Russia. The talk of a German-Japanese alliance was made in Berlin and was primarily intended to affect such anti-Japanese sentiment as existed in the United States.

ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY

As soon as the news of Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany on August 4, 1914, reached Japan, she notified her Ally that she was ready to live up to the terms and duties of the alliance. Britain promptly made a formal request for Japanese aid. A few days elapsed while the Japanese studied the problem and perfected their plans. Finally, it was decided that she would

help police the eastern seas, would drive Germany out of her naval base at Tsingtao, and would capture her islands in the South Seas. On the 15th, a formal notice was served upon Germany that she must surrender the entire leased territory of Kiaochow to Japan, for eventual restoration to China, and she was given until the 23rd to reply. On that date, when the only answer Germany made was to strengthen the defenses and concentrate her reservists at Tsingtao, Japan formally declared war. This was promptly followed by the sailing forth of Japanese ships to run down German commerce destroyers and by a naval bombardment of Tsingtao.

II. JAPAN'S PART IN THE WAR¹

The operations at Tsingtao were insignificant from a military point of view. The port was well fortified, but the garrison consisted of only some 4,500 men. Japan sent over an expeditionary force of 20,000, and Great Britain co-operated with 925 British and 300 Sikh troops. In order to get at the German territory it was necessary to land on Chinese soil. This was a violation of neutrality, and was promptly decried by the Germans as on a par with the invasion of Belgium. Naturally, there was no comparison. Germany was by treaty bound not only to respect but to defend the neutrality of Belgium. But China was too weak to prevent the Germans, on her territory, from violating neutrality, and it was incumbent on the Allies to do what China herself could not do. There would have been no attack on Tsingtao if the Germans had not used it as a base of naval operations. It should also be remembered that the Russo-Japanese War was fought almost entirely on Chinese soil. In both cases it was the price she had to pay for permitting militant powers to hold and fortify leaseholds in her territory.

The investment of Tsingtao proceeded slowly, for the Japanese were unwilling to sacrifice many lives in gaining an assured victory. Finally, on November 7, after the Japanese had taken

¹ For a summary of Japan's attitude in the war by the foreign minister, see Appendix II, p. 445.

the dominant forts, the German commander surrendered. The prisoners were soon removed to Japan, where their lot was so different from that of prisoners of war in Germany that any comparison would be odious. And throughout the whole period the Japanese showed no bitterness toward the German residents in Japan. It was only when their courtesy was abused that they began to intern recalcitrant Germans.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

On the high seas the Japanese navy had been ceaselessly active. Their squadrons scoured the Pacific from Canada to Cape Horn. Other vessels served as convoys for the Australian troop-ships on their way to Egypt and the Dardanelles, and many an Australian who had dreamed of the Japanese invasion of Australia saw for the first time the sun-flag of Japan on the ships which protected him and his comrades from the German cruisers. During this time a Japanese cruiser ran aground off the Mexican coast, and the German propaganda in this country incited a great hue and cry that Japan had established a naval base to the south of California. This report was investigated by an American naval officer and the real situation reported.

It was a Japanese squadron also which swept down the South American coast searching for Von Spee's fleet, which had destroyed a smaller British force off Chile. Happily, for the satisfaction of the British navy, the Japanese drove the Germans into the Atlantic, where at the Falkland Islands the British fell upon them and destroyed them every one.

By understanding with Great Britain, the Japanese captured the German islands north of the equator, while British colonial forces occupied German New Guinea and Samoa. The Japanese took and garrisoned the Marshall and Caroline Islands in October, 1914.

With the destruction of all the German raiders and their bases, the naval operations were practically at an end. But it was the Japanese and British vessels which kept the Pacific free from the horrors of submarine warfare such as the Atlantic was soon to know.

Later services were those rendered at Singapore when an Indian regiment, incited by German propagandists, mutinied. And after Japanese merchant vessels were submarined in the Mediterranean Japan sent a torpedo-boat flotilla to those waters, where they rendered efficient service until the end of the war. In effect this was a participation in the war in Europe.

MILITARY SUPPLIES FURNISHED RUSSIA

But a greater, although far less spectacular, service was rendered in supplying Russia with military materials of all description as long as she remained in the war. With only one port of entry on the west, at Archangel, Russia had to depend more and more upon the goods made in Japan and shipped over the Trans-Siberian railway. Not only did the Japanese government arsenals and factories work at full blast, but the authorities encouraged private concerns to make every effort to supply the Russian needs. As a result Russia received invaluable help, and the Japanese hold some hundred millions of doubtful securities. But if this help had been denied, the collapse of Russia would have come long before it did. It would be an interesting, but hardly profitable, study to estimate what would have been the effect if Japan had been bound by a German alliance. Russia would have had to mobilize a large army in the Far East, the British colonials would hardly have dared leave their own lands, and the commerce of the Pacific would have passed out of the control of the Allies.

III. WHY JAPAN SENT NO TROOPS TO EUROPE

These positive contributions of Japan to the Allies' cause have frequently been overlooked, and during the first three years of the war the question was often asked: Why has Japan not sent a force to Europe? In considering this question we should first of all remember that Japan was primarily charged with the maintenance of peace in the Far East and its adjacent seas. To

send a force to Europe, to France or to Russia, Japan should receive a formal request from the Allies. There is no evidence that such was made.

Instead, early in 1915, a number of articles appeared in French newspapers and reviews advocating Japanese participation. To a less extent the question was discussed in Great Britain. Among the French publicists who urged this were M. Pichon, formerly minister of foreign affairs, and M. Clémenceau, former premier and later in office at the close of the war. These proposals, which it must be remembered were informal and unofficial, generally called for the landing of a Japanese force of about half a million men in the Balkan Peninsula to co-operate with Serbia. Another proposal suggested that the Japanese move across the Trans-Siberian railway and join the Russian armies.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

These discussions naturally were echoed in Japan. At once a considerable divergence of opinion was expressed both there and abroad. First of all, it was held that Japan should not take part in the European battles unless her aid was absolutely essential to victory. The war began primarily as a European conflict. A sound psychology demanded, in the early period, that the armies of European states, aided by their colonies, should triumph over the Central Powers. To bring in a large force of Japanese would give the Germans a sentimental argument for use in neutral countries, and especially in America. This was realized by responsible Entente statesmen. And as to the eastern front, the Japanese, with a fine sense of propriety, appreciated that it was too soon after the Russian War for them to assume that without their aid the Russians would be defeated. Some resentment was manifested in Japan at the idea that Japanese soldiers were desired in order to spare the European troops. For it must not be forgotten that from every calculation the man-power of the Allies far surpassed that of the Central Powers. As long as Russia remained in the field the eastern front could be supported best by supplies rather than men, and Japan made every effort to meet this need.

It was not until after the collapse of Russia that the question of man-power became a serious one with the Allies. But before that day the United States had entered the field, and she could place men in Europe much faster and more easily than could Japan. The general view in Japan, except among a few outspoken advocates of the Allies' cause, was that she should thoroughly perform her duties in the Far East, and should adopt a policy of "watchful waiting" in regard to sending a force to Europe, although prepared to participate if her man-power were formally desired.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

The sending of a force to Europe, therefore, never passed out of the stage of discussion. But in that stage certain very practical difficulties were presented. First of all was the question of transport. When we remember how every resource of ocean transportation was called upon to convey the American armies across the relatively narrow Atlantic, we can understand the almost insoluble difficulties presented in moving a force from Japan to Europe. From Yokohama to Marseilles, via the Suez Canal, is over 9,000 marine miles; from Yokohama to Bordeaux, via Panama, is over 12,000; from New York to Bordeaux is only 3,187. Given an equal number of transports, of equal size and speed, it would take three or four times as much tonnage to land a Japanese army in Europe as it would an American one of the same size. But the transportation facilities in the Far East could not be compared with those on the Atlantic. In 1914, the merchant marine of Japan numbered 168 steamers of over 3,000 tons, with a total of 922,020 tons. She possessed only eight ships of over 10,000 tons. This tonnage was worked to the fullest capacity to carry on the trade abandoned by British and other Allies' ships because of the military needs of the Entente. It requires little insight to understand that, as long as the man-power of the Allies remained superior to that of Germany, the very best use that Japan could make of her tonnage was in supplying the Allies with food and materials. The effect of withdrawing all the large Japanese vessels for transport services would

have been lamentable. But if she withdrew one-third of her available tonnage, say 300,000 tons, this would only suffice to transport and maintain 50,000 Japanese in Europe, if the moderate allowance of six tons per man were made. While British and requisitioned German tonnage has carried the bulk of the American troops to Europe, little help could have been found in those quarters for Japan. From every point of view, therefore, the transportation of an effective Japanese force to Europe seemed out of the question. But if it became absolutely necessary, then the tonnage could have been diverted, the Far Eastern trade allowed to lapse, the civilians of Europe and of Japan placed on a starvation allowance, so that Japan might throw her reserves of men into the European field. Fortunately, the war was brought to a close before such a need developed.

And a similar situation existed on the eastern front. The only means of transportation between Japan and European Russia was the Trans-Siberian railway, over 5,000 miles long. This was worked to fullest capacity to convey the supplies to the Russian front from Vladivostok. As long as Russia had hundreds of thousands of soldiers without equipment, was it not sound policy to use the railroad for transporting supplies rather than for transporting unneeded man-power which would in turn need more supplies? With the establishment of Bolsheviki control in Russia, their abandonment of the Allies, and their treachery to both the Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovak troops, the Japanese were profoundly grateful that no desire for glory had caused a Japanese force to be left at the mercy of the Germans and Bolsheviki five thousand miles from their base.

Of all the practical difficulties, that connected with transportation was the most insoluble. But two others were presented. First, was that of the expense involved. No one of the five Allies was so unprepared to finance a costly war as was Japan. She was still groaning under the burden of taxation due to the Russian War, which only ended in 1905. In 1914, the national debt of Japan amounted to over \$1,250,000,000. About 25% of the annual expenditure of the state went to paying interest. The people had borne, with increasing unrest, a burden of taxation

which Americans in time of peace would have deemed unthinkable. A study of the fiscal system shows how the Government had been compelled to tap almost every conceivable source of revenue.¹ Such unpopular taxes as the salt monopoly, the textile, business and transit taxes called for readjustment. One economist estimated that 44% of the people's income went for taxes. And when the low standard of living is borne in mind, the fact that in 1914 the highest skilled laborer received only about 50 cents a day, while the farm laborer received \$27.00 a year, we can understand that for the poorest of the Allies to have conducted one of the most expensive operations would have been more than any one could ask, unless the need was absolutely imperative. To be sure, the Japanese soldiers would be paid little, and their food would be cheap, but all the implements of warfare would cost her as much as any other state, while transport would cost more. Farm laborers earning \$27.00 a year can hardly bear the burden of a modern war as well as Americans whose earnings in a similar capacity would run from six to nine hundred dollars, with food and lodging provided.

The second problem was the equipment of the Japanese army. As far as man-power went the Japanese possessed a very effective force. But the Great War was largely a war of machinery. Japan was hopelessly deficient in airplanes, motor transport, artillery and machine guns. In her last war, with Russia, man-power counted for much, but in the Great War man-power had to be re-enforced by unheard-of quantities of guns, airships and motors. At the outbreak of the war Japan did not possess a single automobile factory. To equip an expeditionary force she would have had to fall back upon the overworked factories of Europe and America. That fact in itself indicates one of the great problems which the Japanese staff would have had to face.

¹ For details of Japanese finances see the plates prefixed to the Seventeenth Financial and Economic Annual of Japan. 1917. The Department of Finance (Tokyo, Government Printing Office, 1917).

IV. THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITION

In March of this year an entirely new question was presented by the action of the Bolshevik representatives in signing the wretched treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Russia thus withdrew from the war, breaking the pact of London signed by the Tsar's Government. The eastern front had collapsed—not only was Germany free to mass most of her divisions on the west for her strenuous offensives which so promptly commenced, but there was the immediate danger of her overrunning Russia and exploiting such stores of food and supplies as might be found. Japan at once consulted her Allies as to what should be done under these new conditions. Three plans were unofficially considered. First, the immediate landing of a Japanese force to take possession of the vast amount of military supplies piled up at Vladivostok; secondly, the sending of an expeditionary force to seize the Trans-Siberian railway and thus prevent a German advance to the east, if such were attempted. This also called for the recapture and disarmament of the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners in Siberia, who had been released and armed by the Bolsheviks. And, thirdly, the endeavor to restore the eastern front;—but this plan was recognized as impossible from the start. It was difficult to know what was best to be done because of the abnormal conditions in Russia. But one thing was certain, and that was that Japan would not act without the advice and approval of her Allies, especially Great Britain and the United States. In Japan the discussion was complicated because of a bitter political controversy then raging, and any decision of the Terauchi ministry was bound to provoke criticism, largely of a political nature.

The first step was taken on April 5, when a small force of sailors was landed at Vladivostok to protect life and property there, after a Japanese had been killed and two wounded by Russians. This was followed by the landing of British and later American sailors. In this way the great port of Vladivostok and the supplies there came under the control of the Allies. For the next few months there was indecision. President Wilson then

considered the problem and used his strong influence in favor of moderate measures. A new turn was given to the discussion when the Czecho-Slovak troops began to appear at Vladivostok, after having fought their way across Siberia, leaving most of their numbers embattled behind them.

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PLAN

By August 3 the American proposal had been formulated and adopted by Japan. It called for the dispatch of a joint expeditionary force to Siberia to rescue the Czecho-Slovak troops from the German and Austro-Hungarian armed prisoners. Furthermore, this military assistance would "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." In addition the United States proposed to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there. Statements were issued in Tokyo and in Washington defining the scope of the joint expedition.¹ The Japanese document contained this pledge: "They reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION

Steps were at once taken to carry out these plans. The Japanese contingent was commanded by General Otani, who became the commander-in-chief of the joint force. Two American regiments were hurried up from the Philippines and Major-General Graves led the first troops across from the United States. After some

¹ For the texts of the statements, see The Supreme War Council, 413-416 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 7).

fighting along the Amur River, the Allies and the Czecho-Slovaks were able to disperse the combined Bolsheviki-German-Austrian forces. Almost all the former prisoners were disarmed and placed under restraint, the Czecho-Slovak troops were rescued, and the Trans-Siberian railroad opened for its whole length. At present an All-Russian Council is in session in Omsk which has been recognized by the Allies. What the future holds for Russia no one can say, whether order will soon be restored or whether a long period of military occupation may be necessary. But so far as Japan is concerned, we can say that she has co-operated cordially and loyally with her Allies and with the United States in Siberia, and any future decisions will be reached as in the past, through friendly discussion and, if necessary, mutual concession.

If any one had prophesied, five or six years ago, that soldiers of the United States and of Japan would soon be fighting side by side against a European foe, he would have been laughed into silence. For at that time our relations with Germany and Austria were of the best, whereas on several occasions a rumor of war with Japan had been current in many quarters in the United States. What, then, have been the relations between the United States and Japan in the past, and what foundation has there been for alarmist reports which have dismayed many of the people of the two countries?

V. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

For a full 50 years the relations between the United States and Japan were more friendly than those which we had with almost any other power. They were more than "correct," in the diplomatic sense; they were based upon genuine good will on our part and a keen sense of appreciation and gratitude on the part of Japan. The United States in 1854, through kindly but firm pressure, had brought about the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse, after her ports had been closed for over 200 years to all but a limited Chinese and Dutch commerce. In the first years of Japan's new foreign relations the United States consistently tried to help the Japanese solve their many unfamiliar problems,

and repeatedly tried to moderate the less conciliatory views of European diplomats. So Japan turned to the United States for advice and assistance in many of her new ventures, and not a few of the leaders of New Japan were either educated in America or by Americans in Japan. And for more than 40 years the trusted adviser of the Japanese foreign office was always an American. Every well-informed student of international relations would testify that the official intercourse between Japan and the United States has been a model which might well have been followed by other powers.

CONTROVERSIAL INCIDENTS, 1906-1913

It was in 1905 that the first suspicion of friction appeared. And in the next nine years a series of incidents occasioned some ill-feeling, but it must be remembered that the friction was always between popular groups: the official relations were always cordial.

The occasions for controversy were found in both the United States and in the Far East. In the United States it arose from the agitation for the exclusion of the Japanese immigrants.¹ This movement began in California about 1905. It had small basis in fact, for there were relatively few Japanese in this country, but if their number continued to increase as rapidly as it had since 1900 a real social and economic problem would soon be presented. Instead of meeting this problem through diplomatic channels, the agitators, remembering the Chinese exclusion movement of an earlier generation, commenced direct action. This took the form of the so-called "school-boy incident" in San Francisco. Using the excuse that school facilities were lacking after the great fire in 1906, the school board ordered all Oriental students to attend a designated school. The Japanese, recognizing the motive which prompted this action, justly resented it. And it was the more ungracious because at the time of the earthquake and fire the Japanese Red Cross had contributed to the relief of San Francisco more money than all other foreign countries combined. They had eagerly seized this opportunity of showing their appreciation of all that the United States had done for Japan in the

¹For American documents relating to this question, see Appendix III, p. 448.

past. The action of a local school board soon became a national and an international question. With the legal aspects we are not concerned here. The matter was settled, between the Federal Government and San Francisco, by a compromise. The Japanese students were admitted to all the schools as of old, and President Roosevelt promised to take up the question of immigration with Japan.

When the matter was presented in proper form, the Japanese at once met our requests. Practically all thoughtful Japanese realized the dangers involved in a mass immigration of people from a land with low standards of living to one where they were high. The understanding took the form of the "gentlemen's agreement," under which Japan promised not to give passports to laborers desiring to emigrate to the United States, and our Government in turn agreed not to subject the Japanese to the humiliation of an exclusion act. Since this agreement went into effect in 1907, it has met every need. No one has found ground for questioning the scrupulous good faith of the Japanese foreign office in the issue of passports. In fact the admission of Japanese, under the passport system, has worked out with fewer abuses than the admission of Chinese under the exclusion laws which we administer ourselves.¹

Unfortunately this good understanding did not quiet the agitation on the Pacific Coast. In the California Legislature in 1909, 1911 and 1913 a number of measures were proposed which would have caused discrimination against the Japanese residents of the state. These were reported to the Japanese press, and even though not passed they kept alive the resentment. Japanese who accepted our views regarding immigration did not hesitate to assert that such Japanese as were admitted to our country should enjoy rights and privileges equal to those of any alien. A crisis was reached when, in 1913, a bill was proposed at Sacramento

¹ The immigration from Japan by years since 1908 has been as follows:

1908	15,803	1914	8,929
1909	3,111	1915	8,613
1910	2,720	1916	8,680
1911	4,520	1917	8,991
1912	6,136	1918	10,213
1913	8,281		

which would deny to Japanese the right to acquire land or to lease it for more than three years. The purpose of this bill was to prevent the accumulation of agricultural land by the industrious and thrifty Japanese farmers. But the danger was largely imaginary because, due to the "gentlemen's agreement," very few Japanese could enter the country, and in 1913 less than 13,000 acres were actually owned by them. In spite of the efforts of the national administration, the bill was passed in a modified form, which made it apply only to "aliens ineligible to citizenship." This class included, specifically, the Chinese, and, by interpretation, all aliens who were not "free white persons" or persons of African nativity or descent. The act, moreover, especially asserted that it respected all treaty obligations. Thus the responsibility was thrown back upon the Federal Government, whose naturalization laws apparently debarred Japanese from citizenship. At the time Professor H. A. Millis, a well-known economist who had made the most careful study of the Japanese in the western states, did not hesitate to assert that the law was "unjust, impolitic and unnecessary legislation." Against this land law the Japanese Government protested, and our administration defended the legality of the act. But as an effort was made on both sides to avoid trouble the issue was never joined, and the exchange of notes never completed. But the so-called "alien land law" did more to disturb friendly relations than the immigration controversy seven years before. Happily, there has been no renewal of the anti-Japanese agitation in California. In 1915 Japan made a notable exhibit at the Panama-Pacific Exposition, which was properly appreciated, and since that time a better understanding has been established between the labor organizations of California and Japan.

FRICION IN THE FAR EAST

The other occasion for friction was found in the Far East. The United States had befriended Japan in her days of weakness, and she adopted the same policy toward China when her "break-up" and division among the powers was openly discussed. In 1899, John Hay, the American secretary of state, sent out his "open

door" note, which was indorsed by Japan as well as the other powers. The next year, during the Boxer uprising, a second note won the support of all the powers to a pledge of the "integrity of China." Since that time the "open door" and the "integrity of China" have been fundamental principles of both American and Japanese policy in the Far East.

But after the Russo-Japanese War Japan succeeded to Russia's interests in Manchuria. American merchants had enjoyed a fair trade in that region. The propinquity of Japan, her cheap processes of manufacturing and her subsidized shipping all meant that she would soon prove a dangerous competitor for American and European traders in North China. Charges were soon made by Americans that, in addition to these advantages, the Japanese were closing the "open door" in the interests of their merchants. That Japan was trying in every way to improve her trade in that region is unquestionable. But that she deliberately and officially broke her "open door" pledge has never been proven, and after the first few years of adjustment were over, this charge was no longer heard. But there were some Americans who asserted that the United States should go to war with Japan in order to protect American trade in China. This was a proposition too absurd to be taken seriously by our people.

On the other hand a certain amount of criticism of American merchants and corporations was voiced in Japan. Up to that time railroad and mining concessions in China had generally been used by European powers for political ends. The Japanese could not understand that the United States had no intention of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of China. An American railroad or mine or dock-yard would be a business, not a political, enterprise. But it has taken time to drive this home to a certain type of Japanese writer, who constantly thought of American enterprises in terms of Russian or German procedure.

With such grounds for recrimination in the Far East and in our western states, it was not difficult for thoughtless writers to keep alive an alarming discussion. And as our people were so little informed regarding the facts and also regarding the purpose and power of Japan, it was easy for some to think seriously of the day

when a powerful Japanese squadron might, unannounced, appear off our coast and land an expeditionary force large enough to overrun the region as far as the Rocky Mountains. It is hard to realize this to-day, but many of our people feared, if they did not believe, it a few years ago.

GERMAN PROPAGANDA

We now know that in large part this propaganda was directed by German agencies. Before the war Berlin was the source of many of the alarming rumors of Japanese-American strife. During the war the group of newspapers in this country which had been most bitterly anti-Japanese was the most pro-German.¹ As soon as Japan entered the war the Germans tried in every way to use it as an argument against further American sympathy with the Allies. And just before we declared war upon Germany, our efficient secret service secured possession of the famous Zimmermann note, in which the German foreign secretary proposed a joint Mexican-Japanese attack upon the United States, and promised Mexico her old provinces in our southwest as a reward.² This, we must remember, was proposed while we were still on friendly terms with Germany. Japan denounced the attempt in the strongest terms. And a formal reply from both the United States and Japan may be found in the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes on November 2, 1917.³

These notes were exchanged between Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii, the special Japanese ambassador. Their purpose was "to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated." The provisions were much like those in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908,⁴ when trouble makers were criticising Japan's conduct in Manchuria. But in addition to renewing the pledge by both parties to respect the integrity of China and the policy of the open door, the United States, on the

¹ This group was also the extreme advocate of American intervention in Mexico and furthered its plans by frequent references to the alleged menace of Japan there.

² For text of the note and official discussions of it, see Appendix IV, p. 450.

³ For text of the notes and official American statement regarding them, see Appendix V, p. 456.

⁴ For essential text of the exchange, see The Monroe Doctrine after the War, 298 (*A League of Nations*, I, No. 5).

ground that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries," recognized that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Thus, in 1917, the alarmists who sought to create trouble between Japan and the United States because of the former's policy in China, were silenced. Japan once more gave a formal pledge to respect the integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry there. Until she has positively broken these assurances the self-appointed mentors might well keep their peace.

NO BASIS OF MISUNDERSTANDING

There has been, and is, no reasonable ground for misunderstanding between the United States and Japan. In every possible way Japan has shown that she seeks to maintain friendly relations, the "traditional friendship," with the United States. The exchange of notes and the cordial acceptance of the American plans for Siberian intervention are the latest expression of this feeling. In China the two countries may well co-operate, through their representatives and their merchants. Competition between business men may cause hard feeling, but no one should consider it a proper occasion for war. And our Government has formally recognized that Japan has special interests in China, just as the United States has for almost a hundred years asserted it has special interests in the lands to the south of us.

And at this time when America has played so important a part in redressing the wrongs of the Old World, she might well right a few in the New. The naturalization laws which debar Oriental residents from citizenship are as unjust as any of the racial discriminations of the Dual Empire. Because of our Chinese exclusion laws, the "gentlemen's agreement," and our last immigration law, only a few Orientals of a superior class can enter the country. Those that we admit should be placed on terms of absolute equality with all other aliens, and they should be permitted and encouraged to accept the responsibilities of citizenship. President Roosevelt proposed this to Congress in 1906. It might

well be passed in the year of the Great Peace. And with this national law, all discriminatory laws on the statute books of our states would become inoperative. In these ways the most irritating causes of misunderstanding would be removed, while the fundamental immigration policy would remain unimpaired.

VI. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. AUTOCRACY OR DEMOCRACY

But even should the present occasions for friction be removed, there is always the danger that other misunderstandings may arise as long as the people of Japan and of the United States are so little familiar with the history, culture and ideals of each other. In the absence of the needed information, we are apt to apply to the Japanese the ideas which we have gained of peoples with whom we are more familiar. Our people knew, for example, that Japan was an empire, possessed of a relatively large standing army and navy. In these respects it seemed to have more in common with Germany than with the United States. How could Japan take a loyal part in a war which finally was designed "to make the world safe for democracy"? This point was well covered by our ambassador to Japan, Mr. Morris, in his first public statement after his arrival at Tokyo. He pointed out that the Allies were not fighting to establish democratic governments throughout the world, but rather in order that peoples might be free to establish their own governments. So, as we believe that the monarchy will be preserved in Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and among our Balkan Allies, we also believe that it will remain unimpaired in Japan. A better understanding of the Japanese governmental system would be of service to Americans.

EMERGED FROM FEUDALISM IN 1871

First we must bear in mind that as recently as 1871 Japan was a feudal state, not unlike those of Europe in the Middle Age. The country was divided into about 300 fiefs, over which feudal lords ruled. The central power was divided between the emperor, or mikado, who was the source of all authority, and an hereditary general, or shogun, who administered the government in the name

of the emperor. This dual government, which had existed practically from the end of the twelfth century, came to a close in 1868, when the emperor resumed entire control of the state. Three years later, after the feudal lords had surrendered their power and wealth to the emperor, the feudal system was abolished, and a centralized government was rendered possible.

Those were momentous years in the history of Japan. She had emerged from seclusion in 1854 and had entered upon relations with the countries of the world. Soon after, she made the great governmental changes already described. In the next 30 years she reorganized every branch of her government, administration, judicial system, education, and economic life. This reorganization was based upon European experience and was designed speedily to transform Japan from a self-contained Oriental state into a nation organized after the best models found throughout the world.

So with the aid of foreign advisers employed in Japan, and Japanese students and commissioners who investigated conditions abroad, the transformation was rapidly effected. The resulting forms showed the influence of ideas from literally all over the world. American, British, French and German influences were the more important. In diplomacy, education, banking, postal organization, in business and to some extent in political theory, American views prevailed. In the formation of judicial codes and the organization of the courts, French and German experience was largely followed. Britain offered a model for the navy, and British advisers served in many other capacities. The army, first organized on French lines, soon followed the German methods, which were considered the most efficient in the world. The Japan of 1914 was the product of Japanese development and tradition, modified by many European and American contributions.

THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Feudalism had scarcely fallen before Japanese publicists were advocating the introduction of constitutional and parliamentary government. Their efforts, commencing about 1872, resulted in

the grant of a constitution in 1889, and the assembling of a Parliament, or Diet, in 1890. Many of the popular advocates of this system were influenced by American, French, and especially British, political theories. Especially British, because no one advocated the establishment of a republic in Japan. But Prince Ito, who was intrusted by the emperor with the duty of drafting the constitution, kept in mind the real conditions in Japan, her recent change from a feudal state, and the political inexperience of the people; and he found in Prussia a constitution which was more suitable for the Japanese people in their present state than that of any other nation. The constitution, therefore, shows considerable signs of Prussian influence. But the important thing to bear in mind concerning this constitution is that it is a very concise document, framed in very general terms which are subject to interpretation. In Japan this interpretation is made, not by the courts but by the emperor, or, in other words, the government. It became possible for Japan to develop from a very conservative constitutional monarchy to a very liberal one, without any verbal change in the constitution itself. This point has been well made by Professor Latourette. "Although conservative, [the constitution] is so elastic that its real working may change with the political education of the people, and still retain its form." Such a change took place in the autumn of 1918, when a new ministry, representing the dominant party in the House of Representatives, took office. It seems doubtful if in the future a cabinet will be formed which does not have the support of the lower House; in this respect Japanese practice would exactly conform to that of Great Britain, France, and other states where ministerial responsibility is found.

EMPEROR REIGNS, BUT DOES NOT RULE

Under the constitution, the emperor retains all those powers which he did not specifically grant to the people and their representatives. Taken literally, this would mean almost autocratic power. But in Japan it may be accurately said that the emperor "reigns but does not rule." The Emperor Meiji, who reigned

from 1867 until 1912, was never known to act without the advice of his responsible ministers. He was keenly interested in affairs of state and participated in all the important discussions of the cabinet and privy council. His rôle was usually that of arbitrator when differences of opinion arose among his advisers. In every crisis of which we have knowledge, his influence was thrown in favor of the advocates of peace, notably during the Korean difficulty in 1873. And in the later years of his reign his views were properly received with the greatest respect because he was familiar with every step in the progress of Japan from a weak feudal state to a strong, united nation.

Because of its ancient lineage and its complete identification with the people's interests, the ruling dynasty of Japan holds the loyal affection of the nation to a degree surpassed by no other royal house. Whereas the Hohenzollerns repeatedly imposed their will upon the Prussian and German peoples, the emperors of New Japan have never been known to override the views of their advisers. And when the Emperor Meiji spoke to his people his words contrasted strongly with those of the late Kaiser. You will find in his rescripts no reference to the "mailed fist," to "standing in shining armor," or exhortations to his soldiers to "act like Huns." The famous imperial rescripts are those on education, which is memorized by every Japanese school-boy, on moral instruction, on thrift and diligence, on charity. This deep interest in the moral development of his people has given the late emperor a lofty place as a "peace-lord," in spite of the heroic achievements of his armies in the Chinese and Russian wars.

So to-day Japan enjoys a constitutional government, under an emperor who reigns but does not rule. The people still lack political experience, for parliamentary government is only 27 years old. But, through an excellent system of elementary education, and with the experience which time alone can bring, there is no reason to doubt that Japan will develop a government quite as democratic as that in any constitutional state, with the emperor, loyally revered by his people, serving practically as an hereditary president.

NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

But with this development of popular control there comes the greater need for sound knowledge of international relations. And this is just as essential in our own democracy, where the people, in the last analysis, control our foreign affairs. In this connection Elihu Root has said: "Democracies have their dangers, and they have their dangers in foreign affairs, and these dangers arise from the fact that the great mass of people haven't the time or the opportunity, or, in most cases, the capacity to study and understand the intricate and complicated relations which exist necessarily between nations. And being so situated that they cannot study the relations, cannot become familiar with the vast mass of facts which they involve, cannot become familiar with the characters and purposes of other nations, they are peculiarly open to misrepresentation and misunderstanding. The great danger to international relations with the democracies is misunderstanding—a misunderstanding of one's own duties, and of the rights and duties of other peoples."

And in the same address, at a banquet in honor of Viscount Ishii, Mr. Root continued: "For many years I was very familiar with our own department of foreign affairs, and for some years I was especially concerned in its operation. During that time there were many difficult, perplexing and doubtful questions to be discussed and settled between the United States and Japan. During that time the thoughtless or malicious section of the press was doing its worst. During that time the demagogue, seeking cheap reputation by stirring up the passions of the people to whom it appealed, was doing his worst. There were many incidents out of which quarrels and conflict might have arisen, and I hope you will all remember what I say: that during all that period there never was a moment when the Government of Japan was not frank, sincere, friendly and most solicitous not to enlarge but to minimize and do away with all causes of controversy. No one who has any familiarity at all with life can be mistaken in a negotiation as to whether the one with whom he is negotiating is try-

ing to be frank or trying to bring on a quarrel. This is a fundamental thing that you cannot be mistaken about. And there never was a more consistent and noble advocate of peace, of international friendship and of real, good understanding in the diplomacy of this world than was exhibited by the representatives of Japan, both here and in Japan, during all these years in their relations with the United States. I wish for no better, no more frank and friendly intercourse between my country and any other country than the intercourse by which Japan in those years illustrated the best qualities of the new diplomacy between nations as distinguished from the old diplomacy as between rulers."

NOVEMBER 20, 1918.

APPENDIX.

Assembled here are the principal documents referred to by Professor Treat in his clear and concise account of Japan's recent international relations. Japan has the rare distinction of never having broken her word in international affairs, and the editors have prepared this appendix both to furnish documentary proof of Professor Treat's accurate estimate of events and to provide the reader an opportunity to gain from it a realistic conception of Japan's position in the family of nations.

I. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITH GERMANY.

I. THE JAPANESE ULTIMATUM, AUGUST 15, 1914.¹

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

First.—To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which can not be so withdrawn;

Second.—To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the

¹This ultimatum was stated at the time of its issuance to be a paraphrase of the note handed to Japan on April 25, 1895, by Russia, supported by Germany and France. For comparison the essential text of that note is here given:

"The Imperial Russian Government, having examined the terms of peace demanded of China by Japan, consider the contemplated possession of the Liao-tung peninsula by Japan will not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but will also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, the Imperial Government, in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan, hereby counsel the Government of the Emperor of Japan to renounce the definitive possession of the Liao-tung peninsula."

The Japanese rescript of May 13 following stated that she "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three powers." (*Revue générale de droit international public*, II, 458-459.)

entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

2. IMPERIAL JAPANESE RESCRIPT DECLARING WAR AGAINST GERMANY
FROM NOON OF AUGUST 23, 1914.

We, by the grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochow, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of eastern Asia are threatening our commerce and that of our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the agreement of alliance, and we on our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.

It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced.¹

II. JAPAN'S ATTITUDE IN THE WAR.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT ICHIRO MOTONO, JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, JANUARY 22, 1918.

(Extract.)

The great war which has bathed Europe in blood for the last three years continues its grievous course, and it would seem difficult to predict the end. The valiant sea and land forces of all our friendly allied powers have fought throughout these long years amid sufferings of every kind with supercourage and unalterable confidence which call for the admiration and esteem of the entire world. Japan, faithful to her international engagements, has made every effort to aid the Entente Allies to secure the objects of the war and has co-operated by every possible means with her military and navy.

I am happy to be able to state that Japan's co-operation is highly appreciated by the peoples and the Governments of the Entente Allies. Our alliance with Great Britain always has been the fundamental basis of our foreign policy. It was, above all things, the reason why Japan participated in this war. Since then Japan has spared no effort to assist her Ally. It is an undeniable fact that the relations existing between our two countries have become more firmly cemented and more intimate.

We are unable to foresee now what may be the situation in the world after the war, but it is certain that while the common interests of Japan and Great Britain in Asia exist the Governments and peoples of the two nations will understand more and more the necessity of a loyal maintenance of the alliance, and I am firmly convinced that this should be the guiding principle of our nation.

With regard to our policies toward China, I declared on a previous occasion the Japanese Government had no intention of interfering or taking sides in internal political dissensions in China. The Japanese Government will maintain good relations with a stable Government in

¹ Japan's hostile relations to Austria-Hungary were not clearly defined. August 24, 1914, an Austro-Hungarian warship was "instructed to participate in the action at Tsingtao," and at the same time the Vienna Government severed diplomatic and consular relations. (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. LXIX; Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1917, p. 51-52).

China without regard to party or faction. Such a stable Government will have always our assistance and recognition so long as the attitude and policies of that Government are compatible with the interests of our country. Since this statement was made the Government scrupulously has followed the course outlined. We now are able greatly to felicitate ourselves upon the appreciable improvement in the relations resulting therefrom.

One thing I desire particularly to speak of, namely, the decision taken by our neighbor to declare war against Germany in August, 1917. The increased German power was the greatest menace to the security of the Far East. All the powers having large interests bordering on the Pacific recognized the danger. It was for this reason that Japan forced Germany from Tsing-tao. China recognized that her interests marched with ours, and I wish now with you, gentlemen, to extend the heartiest congratulations to China for her wisdom in deciding to place herself resolutely in the camp of the Entente Allies.

The Chinese Government expressed a desire to increase the customs tax, to suspend indemnity payments, and also to modify certain conditions. Japan, therefore, in accord with all the interested powers, and wishing to show sympathy with China in recognizing the just demands, acceded to these requests.

The question of the customs increase required careful regulation, and a conference of delegates of the powers interested has now gathered at Shanghai for a discussion of the details. The Government will convey to you the results of this conference as soon as possible.

The Government last year sent a special mission to America for the purpose of conveying our sincere felicitations and at the same time to consult with the American officials regarding the co-operation of the two countries in the European war. The members of that mission exchanged frank views with the American authorities and the result was the establishment of a full mutual accord with regard to military co-operation.

Profiting by this opportunity the Chinese question was made the subject of a full and frank discussion. Being convinced of the sincerity of our determination to maintain and safeguard the independence of China and the integrity of Chinese territory, the American Government gave recognition to the special Japanese position in regard to China. Official notes were exchanged between the two Governments. Japan and America may well feel gratification at this outcome of the negotiations, because it demonstrates that the relations which already were cordial have been cemented more closely.

For some time there existed a certain doubt in America with regard to Japan's intentions toward China, while at the same time it is a fact, clearly proved, that by intrigues and underhand methods our enemies conspired to create antagonism between the two nations. It is an inestimable result obtained by our mission that it has been able to convince the people of the United States of the true sentiments of Japan and thus dissipate all misunderstandings. I desire to express the profound gratitude of the nation and Government of Japan for the reception and treatment, so spontaneous and warm, extended by the American Government to our mission.

With regard to Russia, events have followed quickly. The Government which is at present in power already has concluded an armistice with our enemies and appears to be at the point of signing a separate peace. Information reaching us regarding the negotiations are more or less contradictory. We are unable to secure definite information, but it will be necessary to exercise extreme prudence in considering measures which we may be called upon to take. We are unable to say whether the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk will reach a definite conclusion, but, in view of the friendly relations hitherto existing between Japan and Russia, the Japanese Government earnestly hopes the Russian nation will be able to establish a strong and stable government without prejudice to the interests of their Allies or the honor and prestige of Russia.

In this connection the enemy powers have frequently attempted by indirect means to draw the Entente Powers into *pourparlers*, but it is necessary to regard with much circumspection alleged proffers of peace from our enemies. We know from declarations of our friends and Allies what they consider the basis of future peace. These differ appreciably from those well known to be the objects of our enemy.

We must conclude, then, that so long as the views are thus widely apart, there is little hope of peace in the near future. Nevertheless, I desire to show you the position of the Imperial Government regarding peace. You know that by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance the two countries have engaged reciprocally not to conclude a separate peace. At the outset Japan adhered to the Declaration of London of September 5, 1914, which obliges the signatory powers and those which may hereafter adhere to make peace only in common, and to consult mutually upon conditions proposed by the enemies. Not only has Japan not received up to this day any proposition from any allied power whatsoever concerning peace conditions, but we do not believe the time has yet come definitely to take up negotiations.

Japan is continuing to exert every effort to co-operate. It is entirely superfluous to declare that Japan will continue with loyalty to support her Allies with every means of assistance materially possible. This would merely be honorably carrying out the duties and the obligations of loyalty toward our Allies.

Gentlemen, the responsibility for maintenance of the security of the Far East lies entirely with Japan. It is proper that we should not hesitate at a moment's notice to take necessary steps in the event that our security should be menaced. I will add that in order to assure lasting peace in the future we are firmly convinced that Japan must not recoil from any sacrifice she may be called upon to make.

III. IMMIGRATION AND THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT."

Section I of the act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States, approved February 20, 1907, contained the following:

Provided further, That whenever the President shall be satisfied that passports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any country other than the United States or to any insular possession of the United States or to the Canal Zone are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders to come to the continental territory of the United States to the detriment of labor conditions therein, the President may refuse to permit such citizens of the country issuing such passports to enter the continental territory of the United States from such other country or from such insular possessions or from the Canal Zone.

In accordance with this provision and, it is understood, after negotiations with the Japanese Government, the President on March 14, 1907, issued an executive order which cited the above proviso and continued:

And Whereas, upon sufficient evidence produced before me by the Department of Commerce and Labor, I am satisfied that passports issued by the Government of Japan to citizens of that country or Korea and who are laborers, skilled or unskilled, to go to Mexico, to Canada and to Hawaii, are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders thereof to come to the continental territory of the United States to the detriment of labor conditions therein;

I hereby order that such citizens of Japan or Korea, to wit: Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled and unskilled, who have received passports to go to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, and come therefrom, be refused permission to enter the continental territory of the United States.

It is further ordered that the secretary of commerce and labor be, and he hereby is, directed to take, through the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, such measures and to make and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry this order into effect.

The treaty of commerce and navigation signed between Japan and the United States at Washington, February 21, 1911, was proclaimed by the United States April 5, 1911, with the following included in the proclamation:

And whereas, the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States to the ratification of the said treaty was given with the understanding "that the treaty shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States,' approved February 20, 1907":

And whereas, the said understanding has been accepted by the Government of Japan;

And whereas, the said treaty, as amended by the Senate of the United States, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the City of Tokyo, on the fourth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eleven;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, William Howard Taft, President of the United States of America, have caused the said treaty, as amended, and the said understanding to be made public. . . .

The Japanese ambassador made the following declaration on February 21, 1911, which is considered as an integral part of the treaty:

In proceeding this day to the signature of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and the United States the undersigned, Japanese ambassador in Washington, duly authorized by his Government, has the honor to declare that the Imperial Japanese Government are fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of the emigration of laborers to the United States.

IV. GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AMERICAN-JAPANESE ENMITY.

I. INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE IMPERIAL GERMAN SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE GERMAN MINISTER TO MEXICO.¹

BERLIN, January 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMANN.

2. GERMAN STATEMENT ON THE NOTE, MARCH 3, 1917.²

Foreign Secretary Zimmermann was asked by a staff member of the Overseas News Agency about the English report that "a German plot had been revealed to get Mexico to declare war against the United States

¹ In response to a resolution adopted by the United States Senate on March 1, 1917, the President transmitted a letter from the secretary of state in which Mr. Lansing stated "that the Government is in possession of evidence which establishes the fact that the note referred to is authentic, and that it is in possession of the Government of the United States, and that the evidence was procured by this Government during the present week."

The Munich *Nachrichten*, according to an Amsterdam dispatch of October 17, 1918, stated that Professor Moritz J. Bonn, director of the Commercial High School, had disclosed that Legation Counselor Chemitz was the originator of the dispatch.

"Von Chemitz imagined himself an authority on Latin American affairs, and suggested the scheme to Dr. Albert Zimmermann, then German secretary for foreign affairs. Zimmermann discussed it with other foreign office-officials, but they thought it unfeasible.

"Zimmermann kept the matter in mind. Presently von Chemitz came and told him that in the next few days an especially reliable messenger would start for Mexico, to whom the message could safely be intrusted, and that it was a matter of now or never.

"Zimmermann allowed himself to be over-persuaded, and so the fatal step was taken."

² Overseas News Agency (official German news bureau) wireless dispatch, March 3, 1917.

and to secure Japan's aid against the United States." Secretary Zimmermann answered:

"You understand that it is impossible for me to discuss the facts of this 'revealed plot' just at this moment and under these circumstances. I therefore may be allowed to limit my answer to what is said in the English reports, which certainly are not inspired by sympathy with Germany. The English report expressly states that Germany expected and wished to remain on terms of friendship with the United States, but that we had prepared measures of defense in case the United States declared war against Germany. I fail to see how such a 'plot' is inspired by unfriendliness on our part. It would mean nothing but that we would use means universally admitted in war, in case the United States declared war.

"The most important part of the alleged plot is its conditional form. The whole 'plot' falls flat to the ground in case the United States does not declare war against us. And if we really, as the report alleges, considered the possibility of hostile acts of the United States against us, then we really had reasons to do so.

"An Argentine newspaper a short while ago really 'revealed a plot' when it told that the United States last year suggested to other American republics common action against Germany and her allies. This 'plot' apparently was not conditional in the least. The news as published by *La Prensa*¹ (Buenos Aires) agrees well with the interpretation given, for instance, by an American newspaper man, Edward Price Bell, in Berlin and London, who said that the United States was waiting only for the

¹ The facts distorted by the German official at this point in his interview were connected with open efforts made soon after the outbreak of the war to protect the rights of neutral commerce in the Western Hemisphere. After the sinking of the American sailing ship *Frye*, when German raiders and a German war fleet were particularly active on both sides of South America, some of the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the Latin American countries conceived the idea of joint action to prevent the theater of war from extending into American waters.

The Governing Board of the Pan American Union appointed a special commission on December 8, 1914, to consider certain propositions advanced by individual members to protect the commerce of the Americas. The essential feature of the proposal became the declaration of a zone about 200 miles wide along the American coast from Cape Horn to Canada, within which no belligerent warships or submarines should be permitted to interfere with merchant ships. This subject was discussed in various phases for many months in a desultory way at occasional meetings, but as no substantial encouragement was received from the Department of State no attempt was made to make any report.

Later, on the announcement of the German purpose to prosecute ruthless submarine warfare, some of the Argentine papers made known the fact that Ambassador Naon had proposed joint action by some of the American nations to prevent war between the United States and Germany. It was soon declared, however, by the Ambassador himself that he had acted solely off his individual responsibility.

At the Argentine Embassy in Washington nothing was known of Zimmermann's charge. No one there had any knowledge of the so-called news article said by the German foreign minister to have been published recently in *La Prensa*. Copies of the paper received were said to contain nothing on the subject.

proper moment in order openly to assist the Entente. The same American stated that Americans from the beginning of the war really participated in it by putting the immense resources of the United States at the Entente's disposal, and that Americans had not declared war only because they felt sure that assistance by friendly neutrality would be during that time much more efficient for the Entente than direct participation in the war. Whether this American newspaper man reported the facts exactly we were at a loss to judge in satisfactory fashion, since we were more or less completely cut off from communication with the United States.

"But there were other facts which seemed to confirm this and similar assurances. Everybody knows these facts, and I need not repeat them. The Entente propaganda services have sufficiently heralded all these Entente demonstrations in the United States. And if you link those demonstrations with the actual attitude of the United States, then it is obvious that it was not frivolous on our part to consider what defensive measures we should take in case we were attacked by the United States."

3. IMPERIAL GERMAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE REICHSTAG, MARCH 4, 1917.¹

(*Extract.*)

We were looking out for all of us, in the event of there being the prospect of war with America. It was a natural and justified precaution. I am not sorry that, through its publication in America, it also became known in Japan. For the dispatch of these instructions a secure way was chosen which at present is at Germany's disposal. How the Americans came into possession of the text, which went to America in special secret code, we do not know. That these instructions should have fallen into American hands is a misfortune, but that does not alter the fact that the step was necessary for our patriotic interests. Least of all are they in America justified in being excited about our action. It would be erroneous to suppose that the step made a particularly deep impression abroad. It is regarded as what it is—justifiable defensive action in the event of war.

4. JAPANESE REFUTATIONS.

a. STATEMENT OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1917.

With regard to the alleged German attempt to induce Japan and Mexico to make war upon the United States, made public in the press

¹ Quoted from Reuter dispatch from Amsterdam, March 5, 1917.

this morning, the Japanese embassy, while lacking information as to whether such invitation ever reached Tokyo, desires to state most emphatically that any invitation of this sort would under no circumstances be entertained by the Japanese Government, which is in entire accord and close relations with the other powers, on account of formal agreements and our common cause, and, moreover, our good friendship with the United States, which is every day growing in sincerity and cordiality. Japan is not only in honor bound to her Allies in the Entente, but could not entertain the idea of entering into any such alliance at the expense of the United States.

b. STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE.

A statement issued by the Japanese foreign office March 3, 1917, referred to frequent attempts of Germany "to sow seeds of distrust between Japan and Great Britain and to cause the estrangement of Japan and the United States," and added:

"The Government is confident that the peoples and Governments of the Entente will continue to have confidence in Japan's loyalty and its determination to extend all possible aid and share the difficulties and hardships until the struggle against Germany and German cruelties ends."

The statement, which supplemented a declaration of the Japanese Government through Foreign Minister Viscount Motono that Japan had received no proposition from Mexico or Germany to join in a possible war against the United States, was made to the Associated Press on behalf of the Government by Kijuro Shidehara, vice foreign minister.

"We were greatly surprised to hear of the German proposal," he said. "We cannot imagine what Germany is thinking about to conceive that she could possibly involve us in war with the United States merely by asking Mexico. This is too ridiculous for words. Needless to say Japan remains faithful to her Allies."

In reply to a question regarding Japan's attitude toward the anti-Japanese measures which were brought forward in Idaho and Oregon, Mr. Shidehara said he had especially requested newspapers to refrain from inflammatory comment, advising that the matter be left for treatment through diplomatic channels. It was noticeable that the agitation did not approach that of the time the matter was brought up in California in 1913, and it is doubtful whether the masses of the people were even cognizant of the Oregon and Idaho bills.

"Of course, we registered objections to the bills on the ground that they were discriminatory," Mr. Shidehara continued. "Japan is convinced Secretary Lansing has done everything possible to prevent the passage of the measures, but regrets the apparent revival of anti-alien measures in one state. We realize the embarrassment of the central Government, owing to the system of state rights, but it is our duty to protect the dignity, honor and interest of Japanese subjects."

Mr. Shidehara, continuing, declared that Japan hoped to discover a fundamental solution of the problems affecting Japanese residents in the United States, but had not yet found it.—*Associated Press Dispatch.*

c. STATEMENT OF COUNT SEIKI TERAUCHI, PREMIER OF JAPAN,
MARCH 5, 1917.

The revelation of Germany's latest plot, looking to a combination between Japan and Mexico against the United States, is interesting in many ways. We are surprised not so much by the persistent efforts of the Germans to cause an estrangement between Japan and the United States as by their complete failure of appreciating the aims and ideals of other nations.

Nothing is more repugnant to our sense of honor and to the lasting welfare of this country than to betray our Allies and friends in time of trial and to become a party to a combination directed against the United States, to whom we are bound not only by the sentiments of true friendship, but also by the material interests of vast and far-reaching importance.

The proposal which is now reported to have been planned by the German Foreign Office has not been communicated to the Japanese Government up to this moment, either directly or indirectly, officially or unofficially, but should it ever come to hand I can conceive no other form of reply than that of indignant and categorical refusal.

d. ADDRESS OF VISCOUNT ISHII, HEAD OF THE JAPANESE MISSION TO THE
UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHINGTON,
SEPTEMBER 21, 1917.

(*Extract.*)

I am quite confident that some day, and I sincerely trust the day is not far distant, the eyes of all men who honestly endeavor to present the truth will be opened and that the truth about Japan and about America will be revealed to all the world. When that day comes you and all men will know how cleverly the work of deception has been carried on

and how long we have listened to lies about the ambitions and ideals of the East and West.

For more than ten years propaganda has been carried on in this country, in Japan, and in fact throughout the world for the one and sole purpose of keeping the nations of the Far East and Far West as far apart as possible, to create distrust, suspicion and unkindly feelings, all in order that Germany might secure advantage in the confusion. The world was flooded with tales of Japan's military aspirations and Japan's duplicity. Have these been borne out by history? Even now the German publicity agent whispers first in your ear and then in mine. To the accompaniment of appeals to the human heart, he tells to me stories of your duplicity and to you of mine.

These agents have been supplied with unlimited resources. No wonder we have been deceived. A short time ago a bad blunder gave us a clew. The Zimmermann note to Mexico, involving Japan, was a blunder. It made such a noise that we were disturbed in our slumbers and so were you. This gave a check for a time, but since then the agents have been hard at work; they were at work yesterday and they are at work to-day. Every prejudice, every sympathy, every available argument has been appealed to and used to show to your people and to ours what a low, cunning enemy we have each in the other, and how much dependent we are upon the future friendship, support and good will of—Germany.

Let me tell you a piece of secret history. When it became known to us that the American and British Governments were alike desirous of entering into a general treaty of arbitration, but that they found the making of such a treaty was precluded by the terms of the British alliance with Japan, as they then stood, it was not with the consent of Japan, but it was because of Japan's spontaneous offer that the stipulations of the alliance were revised so that no obstacle might be put in the way of the proposed treaty. As you know, Art. IV of the new Anglo-Japanese treaty, now in effect, excludes the United States from its operation. This is a true account of the genesis of that clause. It was Japan's own idea—her own contribution to the cause of universal peace.

Now, if Japan had the remotest intention of appealing to arms against America, how could she thus voluntarily have renounced the all-important co-operation of Great Britain? It would have been wildly quixotic.

There is, one may surely be safe in saying, only one way to interpret this attitude of Japan. It is a most signal proof—if indeed any proof is needed—that to the Japanese Government and nation anything like armed conflict with America is simply unthinkable.

V. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN DURING THE WAR.

I. EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING CHINA, NOVEMBER 2, 1917.¹

a. SECRETARY LANSING TO VISCOUNT ISHII.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1917.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

¹ Official Bulletin, November 6, 1917; Treaty Series No. 630.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

His Excellency VISCOUNT KIKUJIRO ISHII, *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on Special Mission.*

b. REPLY OF SPECIAL AMBASSADOR.

THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN,
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1917.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

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The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I take this opportunity to convey to you, sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) K. ISHII,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan on Special Mission.

HON. ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.

c. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY LANSING.

The announcement of the exchange of notes was accompanied by the following statement from the Secretary of State:

Viscount Ishii and the other Japanese commissioners who are now on their way back to their country have performed a service to the United States as well as to Japan which is of the highest value.

There had unquestionably been growing up between the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, promised to develop a serious situation. Rumors and reports of improper intentions were increasing and were more and more believed. Legitimate commercial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive were presumed to have political significance, with the result that opposition to those enterprises was aroused in the other country.

SEES GERMAN INTRIGUE

The attitude of constraint and doubt thus created was fostered and encouraged by the campaign of falsehood, which for a long time had been adroitly and secretly carried on by Germans, whose Government, as a part of its foreign policy, desired especially to so alienate this country and Japan that it would be at the chosen time no difficult task to cause a rupture of their good relations. Unfortunately there were people in both countries, many of whom were entirely honest in their beliefs, who accepted every false rumor as true, and aided the German propaganda by declaring that their own Government should prepare for the conflict,

which they asserted was inevitable, that the interest of the two nations in the Far East were hostile, and that every activity of the other country in the Pacific had a sinister purpose.

SUSPICION WAS INCREASING

Fortunately this distrust was not so general in either the United States or Japan as to affect the friendly relations of the two Governments, but there is no doubt that the feeling of suspicion was increasing and the untrue reports were receiving more and more credence in spite of the earnest efforts which were made on both sides of the Pacific to counteract a movement which would jeopardize the ancient friendship of the two nations.

The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relation to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. In a few days the propaganda of years has been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skillfully set for them.

CANDOR SHOWN BY ISHII

Throughout the conferences which have taken place Viscount Ishii has shown a sincerity and candor which dispelled every doubt as to his purpose and brought the two Governments into an attitude of confidence toward each other which made it possible to discuss every question with frankness and cordiality. Approaching the subjects in such a spirit and with the mutual desire to remove every possible cause of controversy the negotiations were marked by a sincerity and good will which from the first insured their success.

The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two Governments in relation to China. This understanding is formally set forth in the notes exchanged and now made public. The statements in the notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the "open-door" policy, but introduce a principle of noninterference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally

applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation also of Pan Americanism as interpreted by this Government.

FURTHER PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHED

The removal of doubts and suspicions and the mutual declaration of the new doctrine as to the Far East would be enough to make the visit of the Japanese commission to the United States historic and memorable, but it accomplished a further purpose, which is of special interest to the world at this time, in expressing Japan's earnest desire to co-operate with this country in waging war against the German Government. The discussions, which covered the military, naval and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, showed the same spirit of sincerity and candor which characterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange of notes.

At the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of those conversations, but it may be said that this Government has been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their Government desired to do their part in the suppression of Prussian militarism and were eager to co-operate in every practical way to that end. It might be added, however, that complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of naval co-operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her allies have been reached between the representative of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who is attached to the special mission of Japan, and the representative of the United States Navy.

ISHII WON GOOD WILL OF ALL

It is only just to say that the success, which has attended the intercourse of the Japanese commission with American officials and with private persons as well, is due in large measure to the personality of Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in negotiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness won the confidence and good will of all. It is doubtful if a representative of a different temper could in so short a time have done as much as Viscount Ishii to place on a better and firmer basis the relations between the United States and Japan. Through him the American people have gained a new and higher conception of the reality of Japan's friendship for the United States which will be mutually beneficial in the future.

Viscount Ishii will be remembered in this country as a statesman of high attainments, as a diplomat with a true vision of international affairs, and as a genuine and outspoken friend of America.

d. DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.¹

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have recently, in order to silence mischievous reports, effected an exchange of notes at Washington concerning their desires and intentions with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have been communicated to the Chinese Government by the Japanese minister at Peking, and the Chinese Government, in order to avoid misunderstanding, hastens to make the following declaration so as to make known the views of the Government.

The principle adopted by the Chinese Government toward the friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality, and consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so even with the special relations between countries created by the fact of territorial contiguity, it is only in so far as they have already been provided for in her existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principle hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations.

CHINESE LEGATION,
November 12, 1917.

2. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN SECRETARIES FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MAY 6-7, 1918.²

a. BARON SHIMPEI GOTO TO SECRETARY LANSING.

Charged with the direction of foreign affairs in this ministry, owing to the regrettable illness and retirement of Viscount Motono, I need hardly assure you of as firm a determination as ever of this Government to promote and cement in every possible way the relations of mutual regard and confidence between our two nations, holding implicit faith in the final victory of our common cause, to which we are unalterably committed. I am indeed proud of the privilege that is afforded me of associating myself with you in the great task before us.

¹ Official Bulletin, November 14, 1917.

² Official Bulletin, May 7, 1918.

b. SECRETARY LANSING TO BARON GOTO.

I have received with gratification your telegram of yesterday, which expresses so frankly the spirit of good will for this country and of devotion to the common cause to which we are pledged.

It is needless to assure your Excellency that your words of confidence and esteem are fully reciprocated by this Government. Candor and friendship in all our relations are our supreme wish and purpose; and we feel confident that, guided by this spirit, the United States and Japan will enjoy an even better understanding—if that is possible—than the understanding which to-day characterizes their intercourse.

I appreciate your words concerning our personal association, and I am highly honored in this relationship, looking forward as I do with confidence to a continuance of the cordial spirit of helpfulness which has been so manifest in these days of conflict when the bonds of mutual interest draw our countries so closely together.

Please accept my expressions of sincere esteem and of earnest desire to co-operate with you in vigorously and successfully resisting our common enemy who menaces the national safety of Japan as well as that of the United States.

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT

(Article published posthumously, in the Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919.)

It is, of course, a serious misfortune that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is happening on the other side. For the moment the point as to which we are foggy is the League of Nations. We all of us earnestly desire such a League, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice. There is not a young man in this country who has fought, or an old man who has seen those dear to him fight, who does not wish to minimize the chance of future war. But there is not a man of sense who does not know that in any such movement, if too much is attempted, the result is either failure or worse than failure.

The trouble with Mr. Wilson's utterances, so far as they are reported, and the utterances of acquiescence in them by European statesmen, is that they are still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric, precisely like the 14 points. Some of the 14 points will probably have to be construed as having a mischievous sentence, a smaller number might be construed as being harmless, and one or two even as beneficial, but nobody knows what Mr. Wilson really means by them, and so all talk of adopting them as the basis for a peace or league is nonsense, and, if the talker is intelligent, it is insincere nonsense to boot.

So Mr. Wilson's recent utterances give us absolutely no clew as to whether he really intends that at this moment we shall admit Russia, Germany, with which, incidentally, we are still waging war, Turkey, China and Mexico into the League on a full equality with ourselves. Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of

the League and the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of us to say we very heartily agree in principle with his theory, and can, without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details.

Would it not be well to begin with the League which we actually have in existence—the League of the Allies who have fought through this great war? Let us at the peace table see that real justice is done as among these Allies, and that while the sternest reparation is demanded from our foe for such horrors as those committed in Belgium, northern France, Armenia, and the sinking of the *Lusitania*, nothing should be done in the spirit of mere vengeance.

Then let us agree to extend the privileges of the League as rapidly as their conduct warrants it to other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a guiding part in the League and the weak nations who should be entitled to the guiding voice in the councils. Let each nation reserve to itself and for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth, questions which are nonjusticiable. Let nothing be done that will interfere with our preparing for our own defense by introducing a system of universal obligatory military training, modeled on the Swiss plan.

Finally, make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of an international Meddlesome Matty. The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause, and where the issue is absolutely plain. Therefore, we do not wish to undertake the responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die in obscure fights in the Balkans or in Central Europe, or in a war we do not approve of.

Moreover, the American people do not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds. But let the United States treat Mexico as our Balkan peninsula and refuse to allow European or Asiatic powers to interfere on this continent in any way that implies permanent or semi-permanent possession. Every one of our Allies will with

delight grant this request if President Wilson chooses to make it, and it will be a great misfortune if it is not made.

I believe that such an effort, made moderately and sanely but sincerely and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be productive of real and lasting international good.

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